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HISTORY OF GREECE

ABBOTT

A
HISTORY OF GREECE

BY
EVELYN ABBOTT, M.A., LL.D.

LATE FELLOW AND TUTOR OF BALLIOL COLLEGE

PART II.

From the Ionian Revolt to the Thirty Years' Peace

500-445 B.C.

THIRD IMPRESSION



LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.

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INTRODUCTORY

SKETCH OF CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY. UNION AND DISUNION.

I. The beginning of the fifth century B.C. marks an epoch in the history of Greece. With the burning of Sardis in 499 B.C. the country entered on a struggle, which was not brought to a close till a hundred and seventy years later on the field of Arbela (331 B.C.). In the life of a nation, as in the life of a man, we sometimes find a dominating chord, and henceforth antipathy to Persia determined the career of the Greeks, as hatred of Rome determined the career of Hannibal. The events which make up so much of the history of Greece—the Age of Pericles and the Peloponnesian War—are merely episodes in the long drama in which this antipathy was displayed; and even these episodes arose out of the Persian invasion which preceded them. For, on the one hand, the combination of forces by which Hellas resisted Xerxes was the source of the dualism which ended in the Peloponnesian war; and on the other, it was the imperial position of Athens—a position virtually won at Salamis—which rendered the age of Pericles possible. The Sicilian expedition of 415 B.C. marks, it is true, a different policy, but all hope of a Western Empire was crushed in the harbour of Syracuse. At the close of the Peloponnesian war Persia is once more the active enemy of Athens; Cyrus renewed the contest, in which Xerxes had failed; and so low was Hellas brought, so demoralised was she in sentiment, so forgetful of old antipathies, that Greeks were not ashamed to settle their disputes with the help of a prince whose ambition aimed at the destruction of the first of

Hostility to Persia determines the history of Greece after 500 B.C.

Renewal of the conflict at the close of the Peloponnesian War.

Hellenic cities. The death of Cyrus at Cunaxa was a most fortunate event for the Grecian world. Had he succeeded in acquiring the throne of Persia, the history of the first quarter of the fourth century would perhaps have been a repetition of the history of the first quarter of the fifth century, with success and failure interchanged. The feebleness of Artaxerxes II., and the quarrels of his satraps, allowed Agesilaus to invade Asia, but the day of vengeance was not yet come. Though nominally all-powerful, Sparta was even less at the

Sparta and
Persia:
Peace of
Antalcidas.

head of a united Hellas in 400 B.C. than she had been in 480 B.C. The Corinthian war broke out, and Agesilaus, who had wished to pose as a second Agamemnon, was recalled to waste his abilities in petty Hellenic struggles. As her position became more and more untenable, Sparta abandoned her principles, and, instead of invading Persia, she invoked the authority of the Great King to establish order in Hellas. The Peace of Antalcidas (387 B.C.) marks the extreme limit of Hellenic degradation—a degradation which spread from practical politics to speculation and sentiment. The contrast of Greek and Barbarian, which had been a cardinal point of

Xenophon's
Cyropaedeia.

Hellenic belief, the conviction of the superiority of Hellenic life and Hellenic customs, now seemed to be fading away; and the founder of the Persian Empire was presented to the Greeks by Xenophon—himself a soldier in the army of Cyrus—as an ideal monarch ruling in an ideal constitution. But the past was not forgotten. Though direct attacks on Persia were out of the question, rebellious satraps fought with the aid of Greek mercenaries, while the Greek rhetoricians strove to resuscitate the old

Renewal of the
hostile feeling:
Alexander.

antipathy, in which alone they saw a hope of national union. Isocrates called on Philip to lead the forces of Hellas against Persia, and though Philip was struck down before he could enter on the task, it was carried out beyond the dreams of ambition by Alexander.

2. In the centuries which preceded this long conflict,

Hellas had gone through many stages of development; through periods of action and reaction, of combination and disintegration, of approach on the one hand to a national unity, and on the other to an almost parochial isolation. A brief review of this development is necessary if we would understand the state of Greek politics at the beginning of the fifth century, when the nation was brought face to face with its great opponent; only thus can we explain the divided counsels and want of national feeling which went near to destroying the liberty of Greece.

Political development of Greece.

In his sketch of the early history of Greece, Thucydides carries us back to a time when the country was not "regularly settled," and the inhabitants were driven from their homes with little resistance, whenever they were overpowered by numbers. No costly form of agriculture had yet arisen to bind the cultivator to the soil which he tilled or planted; there were no walls to protect his labours or his produce from attack. More especially "the richest districts were constantly changing their inhabitants," such as Thessaly, Boeotia, and the most fertile parts of the Peloponnesus. In this period of disorder there was no lasting bond of union but that of the family and the tribe, though a number of tribes may have combined to invade the territory of others. Yet even in this primitive time the conquest of the Peloponnesus and the colonisation of the Asiatic coast seem to have brought about a consolidation of the Dorians and Ionians respectively, so that a separation was made, not only between these two tribes, but between them and the rest of the Greeks.

Migrations and changes of population.

Tribal union: Dorians and Ionians.

3. Another indication of increasing unity—and also of increasing peacefulness—is to be found in the territorial distribution of the country. When we look at a map of continental Hellas, we see the whole extent portioned out into separate and well-defined districts. Here is Attica, there is Laconia; here Thessaly, there Aetolia. It would be very interesting to know how

Territorial Distribution of Greece.

these names arose; when and why they were given to the territories which they denote. In some cases it appears that

Names of Countries; how derived.	the name of the country is quite distinct from the name of any of the tribes which inhabited it.
--	---

There were, for instance, no Arcadians existing as separate tribes in Arcadia, nor do we hear of them existing elsewhere; in this district local union seems to have overruled tribal separation, and the country gave its name, which was derived from natural characteristics, to the inhabitants—whatever the particular name of these might be. On the other hand, Thessaly was so called from the Thesprotian tribe which entered it over Mount Pindus: Boeotia, from the Boeotians who conquered the land from the north. In the Megarid, Sicyonia, and Corinthia, the towns have given their names to the country immediately beneath the walls, while in Attica the town and the country are known by different names. Whatever the circumstances under which this distribution was made, it marks a step in the direction of unity. Greece is no longer the battlefield of wandering tribes; it is parcelled out to different owners, and though border quarrels go on, so

Effect of Terri-
torial settle-
ment on Tribal
union.

much cohesion prevails that one territory is distinguished from another. The inhabitants of each, though separated by minor differences, are conscious of a common tie which holds them

together and divides them from their neighbours. Yet even this degree of unity was not acquired without some corresponding disintegration. So long as a tribe was migratory, it was under the command of the chief, and “moved altogether if it moved at all.” When it settled down, perhaps in a territory too large for its numbers, this union began to disappear. There was no longer any common enterprise to keep the whole tribe together, and the king, who was all-powerful in the battle-field, was by no means so pre-eminent in more peaceful times. Local distinctions made themselves felt; difficulties also arose between the immigrants and the old inhabitants of the country, who might or might not coalesce into one body with them,

4. Of the nature of the early Greek tribe, whether migratory or settled in some definite territory, we have almost no information. If we may draw conclusions from the little that is known about the tribes in the west and north of Greece in the time of

Nature of the
early Greek
Tribe.

Thucydides, we can assert that the government of the tribe was generally—though not always—in the hands of kings, who were, no doubt, supported by some kind of council, formed of heads of families or subordinate chiefs. There were differences of wealth and condition among the members of the tribe; the more powerful men did not disdain to receive presents from those who required their aid. The chiefs, in some instances, claimed a different descent from their followers, and perhaps not without reason, for we need not suppose that the tribes were strictly homogeneous or exclusive.¹

They were not
homogeneous,

In some cases the monarchy may have lapsed, annual chiefs being chosen from “the royal family” to lead the forces of the nation; in others, perhaps, chiefs were only chosen when required, the management of the tribe being left in time of peace to the elders. In every territory the sacred place where the tribal deity was worshipped with peculiar ceremonies became the centre and meeting-place of the tribe for sacrifices, or games, or the coronation of kings, or the discussion of the affairs of the community. Such a centre was not necessarily a town or city; it might be a hill, or temple; and often it remained the sacred place of the nation when the seat of government had been transferred elsewhere.²

but gathered
round a central
shrine.

¹ The kings of the Molossians in Epirus claimed to be Aeacids; the kings of Macedon to be Temenids from Argos.

² Such sacred places were Mount Lycaeus in Arcadia, the temple of Athena Itonia in Boeotia, Passaron in Aetolia (Plut. *Pyrr.* 5), and the Samion in Triphylia, of which Strabo says (p. 343), *συντελοῦσι δ' εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν πάντες Τριφυλῖαι*. The best account of the nature of a tribe is that given by Sir A. Lyall in his *Asiatic Studies*, chap. vii. He there shows us how tribes form and re-form on the wolds of central India. The leading emigrant, exile, or outcast, forms the starting-

5. The mutual hostilities of the early Greeks were perhaps increased rather than diminished with the growth of agriculture in tribes originally pastoral. New causes of strife were now added to the old quarrels about flocks and herds. Private possession of land came into existence; the borders of neighbouring hamlets had to be fixed. But in time the disease produced its own remedy, for a strife which threatened to be internecine could not last. Either one hamlet acquired a superior degree of power, and absorbed its neighbours, or several hamlets combined for mutual safety into a larger whole. Hence arose the *συστήματα δήμων*, out of which, in the course of time, were developed what the Greeks called *πόλεις*. In other words, a number of neighbouring villages, each with a domain of cultivated land, associated in groups, which in turn were transformed into an organised state.

A Greek *πόλις* was not a city in the sense in which we use the word of the mediæval cities of Italy. It was not necessarily provided with walls, and there was no opposition between the city and the country. In the narrower sense, the word signifies the citadel, in which, when necessary, the members of the community sought refuge from an invader. When a town grew up round the citadel, the name *πόλις* was transferred to the town, and the citadel was distinguished as the High-town or Acropolis. But the word had also a wider sense, in which it signified not only the town, but the township; not only the township, but the townsmen. The *πόλις* is now the state, the civic community, whether dwelling round the ancient citadel, or in villages united with it. In this

point for a fresh cycle of affinity: a vigorous leader becomes a famous ancestor. So in Greece, in a period of constant warfare, "impure" clans would be ever forming round a successful chief, the tie of blood being disregarded under the pressure of circumstances; but when the clan had achieved success the new lords of the dominion would at once proceed to set up as patricians. Nothing can be gained from a study of the Greek word *ἔθνος*, a word which merely implies a group, whether of *γένη* or of individuals.

sense Athens as a πόλις included the whole of Attica—and indeed the name of the city is sometimes used for the country. But if wide in one sense, the term is strict in another; a πόλις admitted no rival; there could be no second town within the township. Every inhabitant of Attica was a citizen of Athens, wherever his dwelling might be; his tribe and his “deme” or village only existed as parts of a larger whole.

6. It is obvious from this account of the uses of the word πόλις, that the Greek states varied greatly in size. In some cases, three or four adjacent hamlets united together; in others, eight or nine; in Attica, a whole country was formed into one state. This variety was perhaps due, in some instances, to tribal feeling, those hamlets coalescing which were, or supposed themselves to be, of one stock; in others, to geographical position, as in Arcadia, where the hamlets of the plain of Mantinea formed one state, and those of Tegea formed another. Distance and ease of communication were also important factors in the formation of hamlets into a city; for it was a feeling innate and indomitable in every Greek, that a state must not be too large to allow of the personal exercise of his rights by every citizen.

Varieties in
Greek States :
(1) Differences
of size.

The states also differed in their composition. There were states which were wholly composed of citizens to the extent that every inhabitant of the country, who was not a slave or an alien, enjoyed at least the passive rights of citizenship; and again, in other districts (Sparta, Argos, Thessaly) there was a distinction between the conquerors and the inhabitants whom they had conquered. The Dorians of Sparta were the only full citizens in the whole of the territory which Sparta called her own; the rest of the inhabitants, of whom a large proportion was not Dorian, were either Perioeci, who dwelt in towns and enjoyed some subordinate degree of local self-government, or Helots, *i.e.* serfs attached to the soil.¹

(2) Differences
in composition.

¹ The supposition that a large proportion of the subject population of the Peloponnesus was not Dorian rests on the evidence of the

Similar distinctions prevailed in Thessaly and Argos. It was indeed the inevitable result of the migrations and conquests of early Greece, that there should be two classes of communities, one founded on amalgamation and coalescence, the other on conquest and subordination, and not less inevitable that in the states founded on conquest the subject population should be a source of alarm and uneasiness to their rulers. But whether founded on conquest or amalgamation, the city-state was the utmost limit reached by the civic and political aspirations of the Greeks. Neither statesman nor philosopher, with very few exceptions, rose to any higher or wider conception of unity.

The πόλις the utmost limit of Greek political union.

With the formation of the city-state, Greece became crystallised into a number of separate communities, each sharply distinguished from the other,—communities which

Isolation caused by the rise of the city-state.

might enter into leagues, or form alliances, but were incapable of any further amalgamation. Every citizen was an alien when he passed beyond the limits of his own state, though the limits lay within a few paces of his door. He could neither acquire land nor marry a wife in any state but his own. Neither similarity of race nor identity of political constitution was allowed to remove this barrier. Though Dorians, the Megarians were prepared to fight to the death against amalgamation with Corinth; though democrats, they resisted the aggression of Athens.¹

historians of the fourth century. Herodotus, in his enumeration of the nations dwelling in the Peloponnesus (viii. 73), says nothing certain of the original inhabitants of Laconia and Messenia, but apparently he regarded them as Pelasgians or Achaeans: in the time of Thucydides Doric appears to have been universally spoken throughout the Spartan dominions. The Dorian immigrants may have utterly swept out the original population, but, on the other hand, language is a doubtful test, for Herodotus himself allows that the Cynurians were Ionians who had become Dorised by the Argives; and it seems certain that a nation not Doric remained at Amyclae for some centuries after the Doric migration.

¹ See W. Vischer, *Ueber die Bildung von Staaten und Bündeln*, Kleine Schriften, i. 311 ff.

The city-state was not, of course, found everywhere in Greece. In many parts of the country the old tribal relations continued to exist, the inhabitants dwelling in "unwalled villages," and perhaps moving up and down the river valleys, as their cattle required different ground for pasture in summer and winter. There was sufficient cohesion among them to produce united action when necessary, but they were without any kind of "polity." Such were the Aetolians and the inhabitants of the western part of Arcadia. But these tribes hardly entered into history while Greece was "living Greece"; and, so far as we can see, they did not enter into it, because they never attained to the city-state. That was the necessary condition of political and civilised life in Greece, and through it, Hellas won her place among the nations of history.

Tribes still continued to exist in Greece.

7. In the Homeric poems all the states of Greece are cities (*πόλεις*), and all the cities are governed by monarchs. We may assert, without fear of contradiction, that such a state of affairs never prevailed in Greece, but it is nevertheless true that monarchies were far more common in early than in later times.

Monarchy in Greece: (1) in the Homeric poems;

In the Homeric poems we can distinguish at least three forms of monarchical government. There is the monarchy of Agamemnon, who is at once king of Mycenae and overking of the whole expedition; there is the monarchy of Menelaus, who, though he is subordinate to Agamemnon, is absolute master in his own dominions; and there is the third form of monarchy, such as that in Ithaca, in which the king holds his office and his royal domain from the people, and therefore cannot himself have absolute authority. There are also kings who are little more than patriarchs, such as Nestor; and kings whose day of active rule is over, as Laertes. But whether any of the forms of royalty described by Homer is a sketch from the life, or merely a picture composed to suit the necessities of the Trojan story, is a question which it is impossible to decide. I, at any rate, hesitate to believe, on the evidence of the Homeric poems, that the Peloponnese was at an early time practically governed by one family, or that any

Grecian potentate was ever able to summon forces from the wide extent of territory described in the Homeric catalogue.

Very different is the picture presented by Aristotle. In his day monarchy has almost entirely disappeared from the Grecian cities, and in seeking for examples of
(2) in Aristotle.

that form of government, he is carried to the remote past or beyond the limits of Hellas; he also includes in his enumeration forms of monarchy which are limited in function and duration, or which are purely ideal. "There are four kinds of royalty," he says; "first, the monarchy of the heroic ages; this was exercised over voluntary subjects, but limited to certain functions; the king was a general and a judge, and had the control of religion. The second is that of the barbarians, which is an hereditary despotic government in accordance with law. A third is the power of the so-called Aesymnete or Dictator; this is the elective tyranny. The fourth is the Lacedaemonian, which is, in fact, a generalship, hereditary and perpetual. There is also a fifth form of kingly rule, in which one has the disposal of all, just as each tribe or each state has the disposal of the public property; this form corresponds to the control of a household. For as household management is the kingly rule of a house, so kingly rule is the household management of a city or of a nation, or of many nations."¹

8. The reason of this remarkable change will become clear when we examine the origin and nature of royalty in Greece.

Aristotle traces it to two sources: great benefits conferred on a nation by a single person, which incline them to accept him as their king; and pre-eminent personal merits; and his statements can be verified from the history of Greece. More than once a chief who has rendered great services to his tribe or nation is accepted by them as their king, even though an alien;—such, for instance, was the legendary origin of the rule of the Melanthidae at Athens; and in the case of Solon and Pittacus we have instances of men of eminent merit elected by their

Origin of
Monarchy:
Aristotle's
account.

¹ Arist. *Pol.* iii. 14=1285 b, Jowett.

fellows to rule over them for a definite period,—a form of government which finds a place among the varieties of kingship. On the other hand, it is remarkable that Aristotle omits to repeat here, what he has said in another passage, and Plato had said before him,¹ that the obedience paid by the members of a family to the head contributed largely to the formation of monarchies both in the cities of the earliest period, and in the tribes of a later age. This obedience and the need of a competent leader in war are in fact the sources from which monarchy has chiefly sprung.

The powers and privileges of a king naturally differed in different forms of the office. A king who was a military chief, selected to lead the armies of his tribe, would have little or no authority beyond the battlefield; and if he fell at the head of his men, his place would be filled by a sort of competition, in so far as the most successful warrior, whether a son of the slain chief or not, would be selected to lead the tribe. Patriarchal monarchies rested on a firmer basis. They derived their origin from the authority of the father over his children; of the chief over his tribe. They were hereditary, and continued to be so as long as certain gifts, sacerdotal or judicial, were considered necessary in a king, and peculiar to a family, and a certain degree of "divinity" hedged them. More powerful still were the monarchies in which the functions of the patriarch were combined with those of the warrior, the king being at once priest, judge, and general-in-chief of the nation.

Varieties in
the power of
a king.

Yet so far as we can trace the history of monarchy in Greece, the military power of the king, though it was not the most lasting, was by much the most important and prominent. The king was never a priest in the stricter sense of the word; in his royal capacity he offered sacrifice for the people—not as the priest offered it to the deity, of which he was the chosen minister, but as a father sacrificed

The priestly
and judicial
functions of
the king
subordinate to
his military
functions.

¹ Arist. *Pol.* 1, 2.=1252 b 15 ff.; Plato, *Laws*, 680 A.

for his family, or a general for his army. We hear a good deal in the older poets about the justice or injustice of kings, and Sarpedon is said to protect Lycia "by his justice and his strength";¹ but there seems to be no certain instance in Homer of a king acting alone as a judge; he was always supported by the council of elders, and indeed, in the picture of a case at law wrought upon the shield of Achilles, there is no mention of the king.² Nor is there an instance in Greek history of a king who was a great lawgiver. But as a military

The king as
a military
officer: his
power due to
the needs of
the time.

officer a Greek king approached the position of the despot or absolute monarch. In the *Iliad*, Agamemnon asserts his right to put to death those who are slow in obeying his orders,³ and the Spartans were compelled, under pain of the public curse, to follow their kings wherever they led them.⁴

This pre-eminence of the military power was in fact inevitable in the earlier periods of Greek history. In a time of constant disturbance brave men specially skilled in warfare were not likely to lack employment. Successful captains, such as Thucydides supposes the sons of Hellen to have been, became war-kings, and they found a ready entrance into any state which needed their help or was unable to resist their advances. They led their adherents to victory, and the more disturbed the period, the greater their authority.

¹ *Il.* xvi. 542.

² Professor Robertson Smith, in his *Religion of the Semites*, p. 63, informs us that "the old Semitic king was supreme judge, and his decrees were laws; but neither his sentences nor his decrees could take effect unless they were supported by forces over which he had very imperfect control."

³ *Il.* ii. 391. Yet he is unable to control Thersites in the assembly: cf. *Arist. Pol.* iii. 14=1285 a.

⁴ *Herod.* vi. 56. The Macedonian nobles seem to have sworn fealty to their monarchs on their accession, and this was certainly the case among the Molossians. Abel, *Makedonien*, p. 124; *Plut. Pyrrh.* 5. Εἰώθεισαν οἱ βασιλεῖς ἐν Πασσαρῶνι, χωρίῳ τῆς Μολοττίδος, Ἀρείῳ Διὶ θύσαντες ὀρκωμοτεῖν τοῖς Ἠπειρώταις, καὶ ὀρκίζειν, αὐτοὶ μὲν ἄρξειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, ἐκείνους δὲ τὴν βασιλείαν διαφυλάξειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. Whether these laws restricted the king in his military capacity is not known.

If we attempt to decide whether Greece was more united when governed by monarchs than in later times, we may observe that in many instances the kings ruled over tribes, and that tribes not only extended over larger areas, but coalesced more readily than cities—even in the Peloponnesian war the whole of Aetolia was divided among three

Was Greece more united when governed by monarchs than at a later period?

great tribes, each counting as a whole, and all three ready to unite at the approach of danger: that a country in which one form of government prevails to the exclusion of any other, is at least free from the antipathies which arise from the collision of various forms of government: that a state is more united when it acknowledges one chief, and is ready to follow his lead. On these grounds we may regard the period of monarchy as a time when many elements of combination existed in Greece, which afterwards ceased to exist. This was the view of the Greeks themselves. The myth of the Trojan war, in which many princes consented to follow one leader, exercised a deep influence on Grecian thought, as the great example of a Hegemonia, which Athens and Sparta afterwards strove to imitate; and even the Dorian invaders of the Peloponnesus were sometimes represented as members of a confederation. On the other hand, we are compelled to confess that these elements of combination were of little force; and if, on the one hand, the spirit of isolation was less felt in earlier than in later times, on the other, the majority of those gatherings which afterwards aroused and fostered the sense of a brotherhood among Hellenes had not come into existence; and those that did exist were of little importance.

9. A change came when the country was more settled. Three causes may be selected as most efficient in diminishing the authority of the monarchs in Greece. The first is the establishment of peace, a cause which we find in operation all over the world.

Causes of the decline of Monarchy.

"The kings of the Indians in America," said Locke in 1689, "though they command absolutely in war, yet at home and

in time of peace they exercise very little dominion, and have but a very moderate sovereignty." "These same old Saxons," Bede informs us, "have not a king, but a great number of satraps set over their nation, who in case of imminent war cast lots equally, and on whomsoever the lot falls, him they all follow as leader during the war; him they obey for the time; but when the war is over all the satraps again resume their equal power."¹ In peace the occupation of the war-king is gone, and far other virtues are needed than those of the battle-field; in peace, also, the wealth gained by raids is equalised by the products of husbandry. A second cause was the separation of the tribes, or families, which had joined in some common enterprise. Each family wished to return to its old independence, and the king, who could claim authority as a leader, had no authority at all when the purpose for which he was chosen was accomplished. This is perhaps the reason why monarchy died out so early in Boeotia, and hardly existed at all, as a form of constitution, in Thessaly. Thirdly, the union of hamlets to form a city in the manner already described was a severe blow to the monarchy existing in any one of them. It is true that if one village succeeded in reducing the neighbours to subjection, or in absorbing them, the chief of that village no doubt continued to reign in the new state, just as the kings of Athens became kings of Attica, after the consolidation of the whole country. But when villages united on equal terms the monarchy could only exist, if at all, to a limited extent. The chiefs of each village claimed a part in the administration of the new state; a council was formed including members from each, and political as well as judicial or military in its functions.²

For these reasons the power of the nobles increased while that of the king declined, until at length aristocracy took the

¹ Cf. Arist. *Pol.* iii. 14=1285 b; Stubbs, *Const. Hist.* ch. iii. § 22.

² See on this subject Lyall, *Asiatic Studies*, p. 204, who states forcibly the difficulties which attend hereditary monarchies in early forms of civilisation.

form of monarchy. The change was made in many ways. The kings, if hereditary, were allowed to be so no longer, or the functions of the office were divided, the civil and military duties being separated from the religious, as appears to have been the case at Athens in early times, and afterwards at Cyrene. Or the monarchy was limited in point of time, or fenced about with a variety of limitations. The change seems to have taken place without any violent outburst of hostility between king and nobility. We do not hear of any wars which raged between them, and, in fact, such wars were almost impossible, the nobles and their retainers being the only forces which the king could put into the field in a period when the common people were without arms. On the other hand, it frequently happened that there were divisions in the royal family. If a king died, leaving an infant child in the care of his brother, the brother had little hesitation in taking for himself the throne, which he held in trust for his nephew. A quarrel of this kind is said to have brought about the abolition of the monarchy at Corinth.

Aristocracy
takes the place
of Monarchy.

No baronial
wars in Greece.

The royal
families con-
tributed to
the change.

Or if the throne was vacant, and two candidates appeared to claim it, the nobles were sometimes called in to decide the dispute—a course which inevitably brought the monarchy into a dependent position. This was the case at Miletus. Or a younger brother in the royal family attempted to carry out a policy to which the king was opposed, and called on the people to support him, as in the first war of the Messenians against Sparta. Or the king was deposed, owing to flagrant misconduct and incapacity, as in Arcadia. But whatever the immediate cause, the change was inevitable, and by the end of the eighth century there were no kings in Greece but the Spartan, unless we make an exception in favour of Argos.

10. Monarchy then was succeeded by the rule of the great families. Those who had taken a leading part in the conquest of new territory, or who had been from ancient times distinguished by their birth or wealth, or their knowledge

of religious rites, became on the fall of the monarchy the rulers of the state. Or the old royal race agreed to divide political power among themselves while keeping it in their own hands. In either case a strict line was drawn between the privileged and unprivileged classes. All without the circle were excluded from participation in office, and at the most exercised a passive franchise. Such governments were of course founded on birth,¹ and their existence depended upon preserving the purity of the ruling families. An order, which Restrictions imposed on the members. formed a class apart from the rest of the citizens, soon found it necessary to protect themselves by strict regulations. The members were not free to marry as they chose, but only in the circle of their order; they could not deal with their property as though it were their own, for hereditary wealth was necessary to support the claims of birth. Every precaution was taken to preserve equality within the circle, and to distinguish the circle from those outside it.²

II. Those who occupied such an exclusive position were naturally known by exclusive names. The aristocrats called themselves the "Eupatrids," the "Fair and Good," the "Notables," the "Accomplished," the "Worthy." Those outside their order were the

¹ Cf. Lyall, *l.c.* p. 213. "Land tenure is not the basis of this noblesse, but their pure blood is the origin of their land tenure."

² The account which Aristotle gives of aristocracy is not very satisfactory from a historical point of view. He uses the word in a philosophical rather than a historical sense, as the government of the morally best. Perhaps such a constitution as is called aristocracy in the text was not worth discussion in his day; certain it is that he ascribes little importance to birth, which he defines as ancient wealth and virtue. He would hardly distinguish an aristocracy of birth from an oligarchy. Yet there is a point in the development of political life in which virtue and birth are regarded as inseparable. His failure to recognise the government of families as a distinct form of government, except in the extreme shape of *δυναστεία*, is perhaps due to the imperfect knowledge which he has of the clan or tribe, for aristocracy in this sense is just the form of government by which the clan passes into the state. Arist. *Pol.* iv. 7=1293 b; iv. 8=1294 a; iii. 7=1279 a.

"Low," the "Rabble," the "Base." The high were distinguished from the low by manner and bearing, and it was the aim of the education of the day to substantiate and develop these distinctions. In the elegies of Theognis we have a number of rules for the formation of the noble character. To despise the acquisition of wealth, to stand by a comrade, to reject all association with the "low," to be devoted to martial exercises, to give public service without thought of reward, to uphold the worship of the gods: these were the imperative duties of the "Fair and Good." Such a conception of duty was doubtless narrow, but it was not without elevation. It compares favourably with the Italian idea of courtesy, which had so great an influence on European manners at the close of the middle ages. We can trace its mark even in our own times, for among the precepts formulated by Theognis there are some which the world will not allow to be forgotten. "From the worthy you will learn what is worthy, but in base company you will lose what judgment you have," is a doctrine which we can only accept when we forget the peculiar meaning of the words "worthy" and "base." But other rules need no modification of the kind. "The righteous maintain that there is nothing better in the wide world than mother and father." "Those who neglect their parents—their portion is small in the land." "I will teach you, Cyrrhus, a lesson, which as a child I learned from the good: Never, for the honour, or excellence, or wealth, that may come of it, do aught that is base, shameful, or unjust." "Never taunt a poor man with his poverty: God gives wealth as he will; a man may be very rich and very base, but virtue is the portion of the few." Of course there is another side to the picture; the side which we see in Hesiod's *Works and Days*. The "Fair and Good" were not free from the vices of an exclusive society; rapacity and extortion, perversion of justice, and the taking of bribes, were not unknown among them.

Principles and education of the aristocrats.

Aphorisms of Theognis.

With the growth of population the claims of the aristocracy became heavier. The more numerous the members of

the privileged class, the greater their demands upon the poor ; the greater the numbers of the unprivileged, the less their power to meet the demands thus made. Hence arose the state of society which we find at Athens in the time of Solon, when the land is in the hands of a few, and the mass of the people are in a state of helpless servitude. Or the accidents of fortune threw some of the privileged into obscurity, while the increasing facilities for acquiring wealth led to the formation of a class of *nouveaux riches*. For these reasons the barrier which had been so long regarded as almost divine became an oppressive or an irritating "survival." At its best, aristocracy must have been a selfish and prejudiced form of government, though its evils were no doubt concealed by the mists of immemorial antiquity, and by the genuine interest which some of the aristocrats may have shown in the welfare of their cities. In any case it was a form of government which could not survive in a progressive state of society : it was also a form of government out of which no national union could arise. If the aristocrats in each city kept themselves jealously apart from the rest of the people, they were not less jealous in their relations to other cities ; their family rites and their family traditions prevented any fusion of state with state.¹

12. There is no clear mark in Greek history which enables us to fix the point at which aristocracy ended and oligarchy began. The high-born aristocrats were a minority of rich men : the oligarchs were often men of ancient race ; and of some states it would be difficult to say whether they were oligarchical or aristocratical. The government of Corinth, during the rule of the Bacchiadae, was from one point of view an aristocracy, inasmuch as the Bacchiadae were certainly the first family in the city, but from another

¹ On this subject Dr. Arnold's essay in the first volume of his *Thucydides* is exceedingly interesting.

point of view it was an oligarchy, for the Bacchiadae were only one among the great families of Corinth, and their position as rulers was due, in a great measure, to their superior wealth. Moreover, the change from aristocracy to oligarchy did not bring with it any striking change in the form of the constitution, such as the removal of the king. Whatever the difference might be in the qualification for office or the mode of election, aristocracies and oligarchies were equally governed by councils and yearly officers. Yet in every society a distinction has been drawn between those who derive their wealth through a series of ancestors, and those who have recently acquired it; and, speaking generally, it was the introduction of the qualification of wealth, and government in the interests of a select few, regardless of equality of birth, which marked the rise of oligarchy in the Greek sense of the word. The rise roughly coincides with the great development of colonisation and trade which took place after the middle of the eighth century. From the time that her colonies were planted in the West and North, Greece must have become a much richer country, and with the growth of wealth, the order of the wealthy naturally came into prominence.¹

The members of the order of wealth might be persons of ancient race, or they might be "new men," with little or no knowledge of hereditary custom or law, and quite untrained in aristocratic bearing and culture. But whether new or old, the richest men possessed the means of acquiring the best equipment in battle; they could avail themselves of every innovation in the art of war. Among these none was more effective than the use of cavalry. In the Homeric poems the principal warriors fight with the aid of chariots, mounted horsemen never appearing in the field. But in the cities of

Oligarchies
rested on the
principle of
wealth,

¹ "There was once no resource for the small except to serve the great. Now industry has opened a thousand ways which were not known a hundred years ago."—Voltaire, *Louis XIV.* c. 30, quoted by Lecky, *Hist. Engl.* v. 312.

Asia Minor, in Thessaly, Boeotia, and Euboea, we find cavalry employed as a most efficient instrument of warfare, and it is in these countries that the most powerful oligarchies existed. It is indeed obvious that with the development of this mode of fighting, the position of those whose wealth enabled them to keep a horse became assured. At Cyme, under the constitution of Pheidon, every one who would enjoy the franchise must keep a horse.¹ At Colophon the efficiency of the cavalry was so great that a proverb came into use: "The Colophonian must decide it": and the Colophonians were governed by a rich oligarchy,² when they had dispossessed the posterity of Andraemon, the founder of the city, of their hereditary rights. The oligarchs of Euboea were known as the "Horse-breeders"; and even at Athens the class of citizens who came second in order of wealth were called "Horsemen." "In old times," says Aristotle, "the cities whose strength lay in their cavalry were oligarchies, and they used cavalry in wars with their neighbours." And again, "When a country is adapted for cavalry a strong oligarchy is likely to be established."³ There is, in fact, no reason to doubt that the oligarchies of Greece maintained their position because they could send into the field a large body of horse.⁴

13. As the aristocracies attempted to keep the government within a circle of families, so the oligarchs framed their regulations with a view to retaining the power and wealth of the community in the hands of the rich. There were oligarchies in which the qualification for office was a high census; others which added to this the co-optation of new members into the governing

Various forms
of oligarchy.

¹ Heracl. Pont. *Frag.* xi. 6.

² Arist. *Pol.* iv. 4. = 1290 b.

³ Arist. *Pol.* iv. 3 = 1289 b; vi. 7 = 1321 a.

⁴ In the mercenary armies of Italy cavalry largely preponderated. Machiavelli (*Prince*, c. xii. end) says that in an army of 20,000 men, not 2000 foot-soldiers were to be found.

body, the members being taken, not from the whole number of citizens, but from a section ; others again, in which office was hereditary ; others in which office was not only hereditary, but those who held office claimed to be above the law,—a kind of absolute oligarchy which the Greeks called *δυναστεία*, and which stood to the more moderate forms as tyranny stood to monarchy.¹ But the significance of oligarchy in the constitutional history of Greek cities does not consist in the greater or less degree of selfishness by which it may have been distinguished from the earlier aristocracies. Nor need we consider whether an oligarchy of birth or an oligarchy of wealth is the more oppressive. The two facts connected with the rise of oligarchies, which made the change one of the most important in Greek history, are these : (1) The oligarchical constitutions broke with the past ; they were without the support of immemorial antiquity. As they were formed by a party in their own interests, without regard to existing rights, a door was now opened for all kinds of innovations in politics, and those who had the power could henceforth claim the right to govern the state. (2) The rule of the oligarchies often excited the most bitter opposition ; the power of the few implied the discontent of the many. Not that discontent came into existence with oligarchy ; for there had been “gift-eating princes” and “crooked judgments” from the first. But aristocracies had been supported by reverence for the past and the customary ; they arose in a period when the poorer population was still spread about the country and employed in agriculture. Oligarchies, on the other hand, as we have said, involved a breach more or less complete with the past, and they arose when the people were gathered into towns. Even in their mildest forms they were oppressive to the mass of the citizens, and if at first they were all-powerful, with the progress of time the opposition made itself more deeply and

Oligarchies
broke with the
past

and intensified
discontent
among the
poorer classes.

¹ Arist. *Pol.* iv. 5 = 1292 b.

more effectually felt. The spirit of rebellion was always present, and nothing but an opportunity was needed to produce an outbreak.

14. In this case also an innovation in military tactics helped to bring the rising power into prominence. Greece was, as a whole, a country ill suited for the employment of cavalry. It was only in the plains that horses could be used with effect, and even in the plains the broken and stony ground quickly injured their feet, which were not yet protected by iron. It was soon discovered that a body of heavy-armed infantry, if strictly disciplined, was not only more manageable than a troop of horse, but that on well-chosen ground it could hold its own against them. This discovery led the way to a political revolution. Compared with the horseman, the heavy-armed soldier was a man of humble position in the state; he belonged to that order which the oligarchs wished to exclude from any share in the government. And so long as the cavalry carried all before them, the oligarchs had been secure; but with the new tactics the despised "multitude" came to be an all-important power. Aristotle tells us that "when cities increased and the heavy-armed grew in strength, more had a share in the government," and in our own history we read that the "peculiar shape which English warfare assumed, the triumph of the yeoman and archer over noble and knight, gave new force to the political advance of the commons."¹

The situation was more serious still when a tyrant came forward to lead the rabble against his own order, and by breaking down the superiority of his class, established, for a brief space, his own dominion, and for ever afterwards a wavering balance of power between the few and the many, with the result that, as one or other triumphed, the city was oligarchical or democratical.

¹ Arist. *Pol.* iv. 13=1297 b; Green, *Hist. Engl.* i, 402; cf. *ibid.* 420.

The division of cities between these two parties is one of the most important features in Greek history. On the one hand it created enmities between cities which had previously been on good terms; on the other it laid the foundation for alliances between similar parties in different cities. In the fifth century these effects are seen in innumerable examples; in the sixth they are only beginning to appear. Yet even then the division introduced a new source of disunion into Greek politics, and, as the evil genius of Greece would have it, the opposition of oligarchs and democrats came to coincide, to a great extent, with the opposition of Dorian and Ionian, of Sparta with her allies and Athens with her empire.

Division of
Greece
between
oligarchy and
democracy.

15. From this sketch of the development of Greek states, it is clear that the progress of politics was not towards greater harmony; but in order to complete the picture of disunion we must speak of the feuds which raged between many of the Greek states and families. At the beginning of the fifth century, Athens and Aegina, Thessaly and Phocis, had been enemies for a long time; and their enmities had recently broken out in open hostility.¹ The desertion of Plataea from Thebes to Athens had also created an implacable hatred between these neighbouring cities, which never died out, and was most disastrous to Hellenic unity. In the Peloponnesus, Sparta and Argos had been at war for generations; the calamities of either were the gains of the other. And even within the same walls there were family or party quarrels. In the middle of the sixth century Athens was torn asunder by the factions of the Plain, the Shore, and the Mountain; at the close of it, Clisthenes and Isagoras were fighting for pre-eminence. More than once before the great invasion the aid of Persia had been invoked to preserve in power a despot or a party. There were some

Greece
distracted by
quarrels be-
tween cities

and feuds be-
tween families.

¹ *Infra*, chaps. ii. iv.

Greeks in Europe, as well as in Asia, who were willing that their cities should be enslaved to the Great King, if only they might be the governors or satraps of them. Better to reign as subjects than not to reign at all.

16. Such was the condition of political disunion into which Hellas had been brought in spite of the growing feeling of a

Influences
which tended
to counteract
the disunion
of Greece.

common Hellenism, partly by the peculiar institution of the city-state, partly by the differing forms of government, partly by the feuds of neighbours and factions. When we ask what sources of union existed to keep in check the growing evil, we seem at first sight to have numerous institutions well calculated to hold the people together and promote a sense of common nationality:—we have games, Amphictyonies, a great central shrine, common gods, a common language, common customs,—but on examination we find that these centripetal forces had little effect on the politics of Greek cities. They promoted a sense of Hellenism, but they never combined the cities into any sort of federal union: they created neither a “league-city” nor a “city-league.”

When a tribe settled in a definite territory, the worship of the tribal deity became established at a common temple.

Origin and influence of the great national games.

Hence arose festivals, forming a centre round which the inhabitants of the country would from time to time be collected, and which would even attract the neighbours from over the border. It was from local gatherings of this kind that the great festivals of Greece arose, than which nothing contributed more to instil into the Greeks a sense of the unity of the Hellenic race. We know that the Olympian games went on increasing in importance from the end of the eighth century B.C. until by the middle of the sixth they were undoubtedly the greatest gathering in Greece. From all parts of Hellas, continental and colonial, they brought together a gay and varied crowd, where the rough herdsmen of Arcadia and Aetolia could admire the utmost splendour of Grecian art. The quarrels of neighbouring countries and cities were sus-

pended by mutual consent at the time of the festival; even the most bitter hostility was not allowed to prevent a friendly meeting on the banks of the Alpheus. The vast multitudes of spectators were united by common interests, and pledged to a common act of worship; and, what was more important still, a test was provided for determining genuine Hellenic descent. During the sixth century three other festivals were renewed on a scale which made them national instead of local: the Pythia, the Nemea, and the Isthmia. At these also the Hellenes met, and the consciousness of union became stronger as the meetings were more frequent. A sense of nationality grew up beside the sense of tribal or territorial or civic connection, with the result that the name of Hellenes was extended to all within a certain circle, and denied to all beyond it. For however great the differences within the circle, there was a prevailing similarity which distinguished the Hellenes from every other race.

Growth of
a common
feeling of
Hellenism.

17. In what, we may ask, did this similarity consist? The test by which a competitor was judged at Olympia was no doubt a genealogical one, but the fiction of a common descent was supported by a common language and the worship of common gods. It is true that each of these characteristics, if we consider it separately, would afford but a weak criterion of Hellenism. The Greeks worshipped many different deities, some of which were hardly Greek deities at all. Even at the great festivals it was not the "Hellenic Zeus," the god of the Hellenes, who was worshipped, but the *numen loci*, Zeus of Olympia, Pythian Apollo, Nemean Zeus, Isthmian Poseidon; and the crowd were not Hellenes because they worshipped these gods, but they were allowed to worship them because they were Hellenes. A great variety of dialects were spoken in Greece, some of which were almost unintelligible to the ordinary Greek; as much so, we may assume, as the tongue of Macedon or Thrace. The community of

In what did
the feeling of
Hellenism
consist?

Community
of language,
religion, and
descent—to
what extent
real.

descent had long passed into a fiction at the time when the Greeks were most conscious of their distinction from the "Barbarians." Nevertheless language, religion, and blood had a real influence in forming the stamp of Hellenism. In the legendary past, which to the Greeks was history, tribes were connected with one another by all kinds of genealogical fictions; deities were transplanted from one place to another, or brought into mutual relations; the Hellenic language drove out any barbaric dialect which survived in Greece. Yet these were not the only links which bound the Greeks together. When they met at Olympia or Nemea the Hellenes were conscious that they possessed peculiar customs and institutions characteristic of the Greeks. They enjoyed personal freedom in their tribes and their cities; they practised monogamy; they respected the sanctity of temples; they abhorred mutilation of the body; they had risen above the grosser forms of superstition; they understood the nature of civic life. And in these customs we, looking back, may find the most characteristic marks which distinguish Greek and Barbarian.¹

18. Within a narrower circle the union of the Greeks was promoted by a number of religious associations or Amphictyonies. The origin of these associations is ancient and obscure; their authority, never powerful, diminished as the greater cities of Greece acquired a position from which they would set them at defiance. An Amphictyony was a lasting association of neighbouring cities or tribes which met at stated times to celebrate a common festival. In some cases the communities which formed the association were members of the same stock. The Argive Amphictyony, for example, if it

¹ Cf. Herod. viii. 144, where τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἔδν θραιμὸν τε καὶ ὁμόγλωσσον, καὶ θεῶν ἰδρύματά τε κοινὰ καὶ θυσίαι ἡθεῖα τε ὁμότροπα, are mentioned as the links which hold Greece together and apart from the barbarian; ii. 64; ix. 79; vii. 103. It is remarkable that these games came into prominence at the time when the Greeks were becoming more familiar, through their colonies, with foreign nations.

ever existed, must have been almost exclusively an association of Dorians, and the ancient Delian festival which was re-organised as an Amphictyony by Athens in 426 B.C. was a gathering of Ionians. On the other hand, the Amphictyony which met at Calauria to worship Poseidon, though it was probably formed under Ionian influence, included cities which cannot be proved to be Ionian. And in the Amphictyony which met at Thermopylae, the most important of all the associations of the kind, the members were certainly not united by common descent: Dorians and Ionians, Thessalians and the nations which they had conquered, met as equals in the assembly. Amphictyonies then were unions, which on the one hand transcended the limits of the tribe or city, while on the other they were more close and more highly organised than the national games and festivals.

19. The association at Thermopylae had its origin in a gathering of tribes which met at Anthela, a hamlet in the famous pass, to worship Demeter, but at a very early time the temple of Delphi and the worship of Apollo were connected with it. The

The Delphian
Amphictyony.

members were those tribes which, at any rate after the invasion of Thessaly by the Thesprotians, dwelt in the immediate neighbourhood of the pass. All the members were equal, and each had originally one vote, but with the growth of the Ionians and the Dorians, and the division of Locris into two sections, it became necessary to make a change in the voting. The original vote was doubled (or split), with the result that the tribes which remained solid had henceforth two votes, but in those which were divided, one vote was assigned to each of

The double
vote.

the sections. Thus the vote of the Dorians was divided between the Dorians of the Peloponnesus and the Dorians of the "metropolis," each of whom gave one vote. The vote of the Ionians was divided between the Ionians of Athens and Euboea; the vote of the Locrians between the Locrians of the Euripus and the Locrians of the Corinthian gulf. On the other hand, the Phocians, who remained undivided, gave two

votes.¹ The meetings took place twice a year, in the spring and in the autumn, and at each meeting the deputies from the various states visited both centres, Anthela and Delphi. The deputies were themselves of two classes, the Hieromnemones and the Pylagori. The first were chosen by lot, twenty-four in number; one for each of the twenty-four votes, which they alone were competent to give. The Pylagori, on the other hand, whose number was not fixed, were orators elected for the especial purpose of supporting the interests of their states by their eloquence or skill in debate. The Hieromnemones formed the assembly in the stricter sense, but they could call the Pylagori before them, and occasionally they summoned a universal assembly of all the members of the tribes present at the time. But neither the Pylagori nor the assembly could reverse the decision of the Hieromnemones.²

20. A number of adjacent tribes, even if unconnected by descent, could not meet together twice a year to share in a common sacrifice without feeling that they were united by a peculiar tie. In the Amphictyonic league this feeling was shown in the oath by which the members were mutually pledged not to destroy any Amphictyonic city or to cut it off from running water in time of war—a compact to which we can find parallels in the arrangements which existed between neighbouring states in other parts of Greece.³ But this feeling, which was perhaps never active, seems to have died out at a

The officers of the Amphictyony.
The Amphictyony produced no political unity.

¹ Bürgel, *Die pylaëisch-delphische Amphiktyonie*, p. 49. It is not, I think, quite clear that the votes were "doubled": each tribe may have had two from the first, though it is difficult to give a reason for this. The passage in Strabo, p. 420, is not decisive: καὶ ψήφον ἐκάστη δοῦναι, τῇ μὲν καθ' αὐτήν, τῇ δὲ μεθ' ἑτέρας ἢ μετὰ πλείονων. Aeschines says, *F. L.* § 116, δύο γὰρ ψήφους ἕκαστον φέρεי ἔθνος.

² See Bürgel, *l.c.* p. 113 f., 125; Gilbert, *Handbuch*, ii. pp. 413, 414. Yet Herodotus, vii. 213, distinctly affirms that it was the Pylagori who put a price on the head of Ephialtes.

³ Strabo, p. 448; Plutarch, *Quaest. Graec.* 17; Thirlwall, *Hist. Greece*, i. 276.

very early time, so far as any practical result was concerned. The association was as powerless as any other to prevent strife and bloodshed among the members, some of whom, such as the Phocians and Thessalians, were deadly enemies. Yet the oath was not wholly without effect; it marked a departure from the savage warfare depicted in the Homeric poems, and it supplied the Greeks with an ideal, which was present to their minds, even when they failed to act up to it. The political philosophers of the fourth century, when regulating the practice of war among the Greeks, proceeded on the lines laid down in the Amphictyonic oath. The Hellenes were to quarrel "as those who intended some day to be reconciled"; they were to "use friendly correction," and not to devastate Hellas, or burn houses, or think that the "whole population of a city, men, women, and children, were equally their enemies, and therefore to be destroyed."¹

though it
tended to
regulate war-
fare, at least
in theory.

21. The Amphictyonic Council was not a national assembly; it neither conducted the policy of Greece, nor had it power to settle disputes between great cities. The deputies, who met to consider the defence of Greece in 481 B.C., did not assemble at Anthela, but at the Isthmus; and even in the last days of Grecian freedom, Corinth was selected as the centre where the deputies should meet to discuss the proposals of Philip. Nor was the association national in the sense that it included the whole of Greece. There were countries which never had any share in it, such as Elis, Arcadia, and Acarnania. Even southern Achaea never received a vote. Moreover, the majority of the tribes which formed the Amphictyony, whatever may have been their claim to the name of Hellenes in a special sense, were far too unimportant to form a Hellenic Council. They could not carry into execution the decrees of the Hieromnemonēs without the assistance of the greater powers, and the greater powers were always jealous and

The Amphic-
tyonic Council
never became
a national
assembly.

¹ Plato, *Rep.* 471, Jowett.

divided. Under such circumstances it was impossible for them to exercise any real influence. They could put a price on the head of Ephialtes, as a traitor to Greece, and set up a monument over those who fell at Thermopylae; and the Council was not ashamed to do these things, though nine or ten of the members had gone over to the Persian side in the invasion! They did not hesitate to declare that the inhabitants of Scyros must be expelled from the island as pirates, when they knew that the Athenians were anxious to be intrusted with the execution of the decree; and in the fourth century, relying perhaps on the power of Epaminondas, they imposed a fine on the Spartans for their unjust seizure of the citadel of Thebes, though they were unable to enforce the payment of it. Lastly, by their sentences upon Phocis and Amphissa, sentences passed in the interest of Thebes and Philip, they contributed very largely to the loss of national independence. These instances are sufficient to show that their interference in national affairs, when it was not ridiculous and servile, was feeble or mischievous. Their decrees could be recognised on one of two conditions only: they must either be concerned with matters which did not touch the political interests of the Greeks at all, or they must be the result of an intrigue by which one of the powerful states sought to use the Amphictyony for its own purposes.¹

22. The temple of Apollo at Delphi was in a certain sense a centre of Greek life and national feeling. Every one resorted to it for advice and guidance. But however great the influence of the oracle might be in determining the colonisation of the Greeks, or in forming the morality of domestic and commercial life, or in regulating the ceremonies of religion, it was feeble and uncertain in its operation on the

Delphi not a
real centre
of national
feeling.

¹ For everything connected with the Amphictyony see Bürgel, *Die pylaerisch-delpische Amphiktyonie*, München, 1877; Gilbert, *Handbuch*, ii. p. 404; Hermann, *Lehrbuch d. Gr. Staats*, §§ 13, 14. See also Freeman, *History of Federal Government*, pp. 123-143.

national politics. And the reason of this weakness is not far to seek; on the one hand, the Greeks, however willing to meet at festivals, or even to acknowledge the existence of a national shrine, resented any interference with their political life; on the other, Delphi was not impartial, and had no definite policy. The intimate connection of the oracle with Sparta from a very early time tended to throw suspicion on its awards; and there was a not unreasonable fear that utterances which claimed to be divine could be influenced by bribes. For these reasons, though it was often proposed to refer political disputes to Delphi for decision, the offer was rarely accepted. Worse still for the influence of the oracle was the want of consistency in the answers given to those who sought its aid. Sometimes it counselled submission to tyrants, as in the case of the Cnidians; yet it also insisted on the expulsion of the Pisistratidae from Athens, and on the return of the Alcmaeonids. In the so-called Sacred War of 448 B.C., the Spartans, who put the oracle in the hands of the Delphians, received the highest honours which the temple could bestow; but no sooner were they gone than the Athenians appeared and gave back the shrine to the Phocians, from whom they in their turn received the right of precedence in consulting the god. The constant opposition of the Phocians and Delphians, each of whom claimed the temple, made it, in fact, impossible for the oracle to be consistent; and the more so when the Phocians had the support of Athens, and the Delphians the support of Sparta.¹

The oracle
suspected of
partiality,

and some-
times in-
consistent.

23. Once more, the links connecting the cities of Greece

¹ The oracle is said to have been bribed by the Alcmaeonids (Herod. v. 63, cf. 90), by Cleomenes (*ib.* vi. 66), and by the brother of Plistoanax (Thuc. v. 16). It supports the usurpation of Gyges; it promises assistance to the Peloponnesians against Athens; its mischievous advice precipitates the quarrel between Corcyra and Corinth (Thuc. i. 25). It dissuades the Athenians from resisting Persia; bids the Argives remain inactive, and the Cretans also (Herod. vi. 140, 148, 169).

with their colonies formed to a certain extent a bond of union between the old country and the new. The feeling which united a mother and daughter city was indeed honorary and religious rather than legal and political, but such cities were not supposed to attack each other without very grave reasons, or to take opposite sides in a quarrel. When the Corcyraeans appeared at Athens in 433 B.C. asking to be received into alliance, they had to explain why they were at war with Corinth, their mother-city, and the Corinthians, on their part, sought to prove the unrighteous character of the Corcyraeans, by pointing to the fact that they alone of the numerous colonies of Corinth treated the parent city with disrespect. The connection between a colony and her metropolis was in some respects closer than that between two allied states; Lesbos needed less apology for revolting from Athens than Corcyra for going to war with Corinth. Yet the link between them was little more than a religious sentiment, which might easily be destroyed or weakened by rivalry in trade, or by different forms of constitution. The quarrel between Corcyra and Corinth was one of the oldest and the most disastrous in Greek history.

24. Of far more value from a political point of view than these religious sources of union were the small federations, of which we find a few traces in the west and north of Greece—regions where the city-state never attained to full development. Unfortunately we have little knowledge of the nature of these federations till a comparatively late period in Greek history.¹ In the Peloponnesian war, and even earlier, we find the Acarnanians acting as one people, with the exception of the city of Oeniadae, but we do not hear of any organised arrangement of the community. It is in the "Corinthian war" (394 B.C.) that we first find

The link which united mother-city and colony was religious rather than political,

and at the best an ineffective sentiment.

Federations in Greece.

Acarnania.

¹ Cf. Freeman, *History of Federal Government*, chap. iv.

mention of "the community of the Acarnanians" (τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀκαρνάνων), which met at Stratus and concluded alliances with foreign powers.¹ Of the early condition of Aetolia we have only a few notices in Thucydides, from

Aetolia.

which we gather that the three great tribes, the Apodoti, Ophiones, and Eurytanes, though they acted together in a moment of great danger, were not closely united in any confederation. Each tribe sends a separate envoy to Sparta, and the Messenians contemplate an attack upon each separately. The Agræi also have a separate king.² The necessity of defending their country against the Thesalians may have caused the Phocians at an early time to combine into a confederacy with a

Phocis.

common meeting-place and officers chosen in common to control the military affairs of the nation. This was certainly the case in the fourth century, and as the coinage of Phocis, which is federal, is carried back into the sixth, the federation in some form or another was no doubt in existence even then.

In Boeotia the traces are clearer. From ancient times the Boeotians celebrated a common festival at the temple of Athena Itonia; and out of this union arose a federation of cities, of which Thebes, at a later date, claimed to be the head.³ This union was so far efficient that Boeotia (with the exception of Plataea and Thespieae) pursued a common policy, in which the great families of Thebes took the lead. Yet even in Boeotia the confederacy became little more than a decent pretext, under which Thebes attempted to carry out her cherished project of bringing the country under her control; and the most fatal quarrel of Central

Boeotia.

¹ Xen. *Hellen.* iv. 6. 4. For the κοινὸν δικαστήριον at Olpae (Thuc. iii. 105), see Oberhummer, *Akarnanien*, p. 93 note; he shows that it cannot have been a central meeting-place of the Acarnanians; it was rather a common court for Acarnanians and Amphilocheians, for which its situation on the borders of both was suitable.

² Thuc. iii. 100, 94, 111.

³ The coinage of Boeotia is of course federal; but it may have arisen in a religious rather than a political association.

Greece—the quarrel of Thebes and Athens—arose out of the refusal of Plataea to range herself in the confederacy under the leadership of Thebes. In the Peloponnesus the twelve cities of Achaea, if they were not exactly formed into a confederacy, were at least united round a common

Achaea.

centre, but the union was of no importance from

our point of view, inasmuch as Achaea never took any active part in Greek politics till the third century B.C. In Arcadia

the union was slighter still, for there is little

Arcadia.

reason to suppose that the national gathering

which celebrated the festival of Zeus on Mount Lycaeus had any political significance.¹

25. It is only in the Spartan confederacy that we find a working combination among independent Greek cities. Of

the antiquity of this confederacy, or of the

The Spartan
confederacy.

germs out of which it arose, a good deal has been said, but, so far as we can judge, it does

not go back beyond the middle of the sixth century B.C.²

At that time the great Dorian city, which herself possessed about two-fifths of the entire Peloponnesus, became the leading state in Hellas, under whose guidance a number of

neighbouring cities were content to range them-

Not very

ancient nor
very powerful.

selves. Such were Tegea, Mantinea, Sicyon, Aegina, Corinth. Even Athens, though not

an ally, looked on Sparta as the foremost city and established head of Greece. But however valuable in combining the resources of the Peloponnesus, the Spartan confederacy failed to

¹ Mr. Head, *Hist. Num.* p. 372, states plainly that a federal coinage implies other federal institutions, of which history has left us no records; and as the archaic money of Arcadia, ranging from the middle of the sixth to the latter part of the fifth century B.C., is federal, Mr. H. concludes that in spite of their continual dissensions, the Arcadians 'maintained from first to last something more than a mere tradition of political unity.' But is it yet proved that federal money, at any rate in earlier times, does not point to religious rather than political union?

² See Busolt, *Forschungen zur Griechischen Geschichte*, especially p. 37.

achieve the union of Greece ; and it failed for two reasons. In the first place, its aims were too selfish. In the eyes of the confederate cities the Peloponnesus was Greece, and all beyond the Peloponnesus was regarded with neglect or indifference. In the second place, owing to the insufficient powers conferred on the central city, the confederacy was ill organised. The cities which composed it did not abate one jot of their civic independence. There was "no regular assembly" to transact business ; the cities were slow to meet, and when they did meet they gave little time to any subjects of common interest. They were all isolated units, ready to make war with one another, and resisting the control which could alone have made their combination effective. Such control was in fact intolerable to any Greek city ; and in this sentiment of independence, exaggerated and universal as it was, lay the fatal obstacle to Greek political union.

Its defects.

Ineradicable
spirit of dis-
union in
Greece.

Such was the country, so feeble and disunited, which was suddenly called upon to meet the forces of the mighty empire of Persia, an empire reaching from the Indus to the Aegean, from the Caucasus to Nubia, and organised with a skill and perfection which were without a parallel among the empires of the East.¹

¹ Friendships between particular cities, such as Miletus and Sybaris (Herod. vi. 21), Cnidus and Tarentum (*ib.* iii. 138), Eretria and Miletus (*ib.* v. 99), Samos and Chalcis (*ib.*), Samos, Thera, and Cyrene (*ib.* iv. 152) need not be noticed here.

CHAPTER I.

THE IONIAN REVOLT AND THE BATTLE OF MARATHON.

I. We are informed by Herodotus that the attention of Darius was first directed to Greece by Democedes, a physician of Croton. Owing to the violent temper of his father, with whom he found himself continually at strife, Democedes had left his Italian home for Aegina, where he practised as a surgeon with such skill that, although he was without the usual instruments, he became in a year the most successful man in his profession. In the next year he was appointed public physician of Aegina at a salary of a talent (£276, if Aeginetan).¹ In the next year the Athenians—*i.e.* the Pisistratidae—secured his services for a hundred minae (£333); in the next he was induced by Polycrates to leave Athens for Samos by an offer of two talents. On the death of Polycrates, he passed with the retinue of the tyrant into the possession of Oroetes, the satrap of Sardis. It was a time when important changes were taking place in Persia. For seven months after the death of Cambyses (522 B.C.) the throne had been occupied by the pretender who took the name of Smerdis, the younger son of Cyrus; and when he was put to death by Darius and the six conspirators, nearly the whole Persian Empire broke into rebellion. So far from rendering

Democedes
of Croton.
525 B.C. ?
Ol. 64. 4.

Passes with
the retinue of
Polycrates into
the possession
of Oroetes.

¹ The value of the Attic talent is given at £200, that of the Aeginetan at £276, in accordance with the calculations of Prof. W. W. Goodwin. See his paper on "The Value of the Attic Talent," in the *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, 1885.

any assistance to Darius at this critical moment, Oroetes seized the opportunity to put to death, not only Mitrobates, the satrap of Dascyleum, who had reproached him with his failure to acquire Samos for the king, but also his son Cranaspes; he even caused a courier sent to him by Darius to be assassinated. Darius was alarmed; he was not yet sufficiently established on the throne to crush Oroetes by force, and yet it was impossible to allow his power to increase, for he had already acquired the whole of the Ionian, Lydian, and Phrygian satrapies, and had surrounded himself with a bodyguard of 1000 Persians. Calling together some of the leading Persians, Darius asked which of them would bring Oroetes into his presence alive, or put him to death. Thirty at once volunteered on the service, and the lot fell upon Bagaeus. As Herodotus tells the tale, Bagaeus provided himself with a number of rolls containing various orders, and bearing the royal seal. With these he repaired to Sardis, where he sought an interview with Oroetes. He found him surrounded by his guards. One by one Bagaeus gave his rolls to the royal scribe, who, according to the universal rule of the satrapies, was in attendance on Oroetes. While the scribe read, Bagaeus watched the demeanour of the guards. Seeing them reverent to the royal missives—as they supposed them to be—he gave the scribe a roll in which the king forbade them to remain the guards of Oroetes. They at once gave in their lances. Then Bagaeus handed his last roll to the scribe, in which were written the words: "The king commands you to slay Oroetes." The guards immediately drew their scimitars and cut him down. After his death his property and slaves, including Democedes, were conveyed to Susa.

A happy accident soon brought the physician to the king's notice. Leaping from his horse when hunting, Darius had the misfortune to dislocate his ankle. He sought assistance from the best Egyptian surgeons in his court, but in vain; they merely added to his sufferings by their unskilful and

Oroetes and
Darius.

Democedes
at Susa.
516 B.C.?
Ol. 66. r.

violent treatment; for seven days and nights he was in such pain that sleep was impossible. His condition had already become serious, when a Persian, who had heard of Democedes at Sardis, informed the king of his great reputation. Democedes was at once sought out, and brought into

He cures
Darius.

the royal presence in the chains and rags of his dungeon. At first he denied all knowledge of surgery, for he had no wish to spend his life at Susa as a court-physician; and when compelled by the threat of torture to confess that he had practised, he declared that he had never received a proper training: what he knew, he knew imperfectly, having acquired his knowledge as attendant on a physician. Darius did not hesitate to place himself in his hands. The Greek treatment succeeded; the king was at once relieved of his pain by soothing remedies, and in a short time he was restored to active life. Democedes was now loaded with presents, both by Darius and his wives; he was also happy enough to save from impalement the Egyptians who had failed to cure the king. His house was magnificent; he enjoyed the honour of being 'a table-companion of the king'; but none the less he was a prisoner at Susa, unable to return to Greece, and share in the free life which was so inexpressibly dear to every Greek.

A second cure enabled him to achieve his release. Atossa, the daughter of Cyrus, whom Darius had made his queen on acquiring the throne, found herself suffering from a tumour, which, though at first she concealed it, compelled her in time to consult Democedes. He undertook to cure her on the condition that she would in return render him any service which he might claim, pledging himself to ask nothing that she could not grant with honour.

He cures
Atossa.

Scheme of
Democedes for
returning to
Greece.

She consented, and found herself under a promise to aid Democedes in returning to Greece. Democedes was well aware that Darius would not listen to any direct proposal on the subject, even from Atossa. Success could only be gained by stratagem. At Democedes' suggestion, Atossa took an

opportunity to persuade Darius into undertaking some new conquest. As Herodotus tells the story, the conversation took place in the royal bedchamber. Atossa reminded the king that his power was great, and his wealth enormous; he was still in the prime of life; by undertaking some great expedition, he would exhibit to the Persians the prowess of their monarch, and at the same time occupy the thoughts of his people and prevent them from forming plots against himself. Darius replied that he was already planning an expedition against Scythia, which he hoped in a short time to bring to a successful conclusion. "Let the Scythians go for the present," replied Atossa, "for they are always at your mercy. Listen to me, and send your forces into Greece. I have heard of Laconian, Argive, Attic, and Corinthian ladies; I wish to have them among my waiting-women. Besides, you have at hand a man fitted beyond all others to give information about Greece, and to guide your forces—the surgeon who cured your foot." Darius consented, but resolved to send Democedes to examine Greece before entering

Democedes
sent to exam-
ine the shores
of Greece.

on an expedition. Fifteen Persians were at once selected to form a commission with Democedes for exploring the coasts of Greece. It was also a part of their charge to prevent the escape of Democedes, who was himself entreated to return. Darius offered him abundant presents for his father and brothers, bidding him take the whole of his furniture, which should be replaced with new on his return, but Democedes, fearing that Darius was merely testing him, refused these lavish offers, and only accepted presents sufficient to fill the merchantman, which, together with two triremes, was ordered to be in readiness at Sidon. In these ships the fifteen Persians and Democedes set sail to the west. They coasted the shores of Hellas, of which all the cities and harbours were carefully noted, until at length they arrived at Tarentum. Here, at the instigation of Democedes, the ships were disabled by the removal of the rudders, and the Persians were thrown into prison as spies by Aristophilides,

the king of the city, while Democedes escaped to Croton. On their release the Persians followed him thither, and, finding him in the market-place, they attempted to carry him away by force. Some of the Crotoniates were sufficiently alarmed at the Persian power to look coolly on; others resisted and beat the Persians with their staves. The envoys threatened them with the prompt and full vengeance of Darius, but in vain; they were driven off, leaving behind them not only Democedes, but the merchantman and the presents! As they withdrew, Democedes bade them inform the Great King that he was about to marry the daughter of Milo, the Crotonian athlete, whose name was well known to Darius. On their way home the Persians were wrecked off the coast of Iapygia, and sold as slaves by their captors. From this unhappy plight they were rescued by Gillus, an exile from Tarentum, who restored them to Darius. "These were the first Persians," says Herodotus, "who ever came from Asia into Greece, and they were sent to spy out the land for the reason that I have said."¹

2. What amount of truth there may be in this story we cannot determine. The incidents are not improbable, and Herodotus, during his stay in Italy, was in a position to ascertain the facts; yet we cannot help wondering that Darius takes no further steps on the return of the Persians. We should have thought that he would at least have endeavoured to recover Democedes and avenge upon the Crotoniates the insult which they had paid to his officers. Far from this, he abandons the project of an invasion of Greece, forgetting

¹ Herod. iii. 125-138. Two anecdotes in the story of Herodotus may be repeated:—(1) Each of the wives of Darius "dipped with a saucer" into her store of gold staters, and gave Democedes full measure and running over. His servant, Seiton, who picked up the coins which fell, amassed a handsome sum! (2) Darius presented Democedes—whom he had summoned to his presence in chains—with two pairs of golden fetters. "Do you wish me, then, to be twice a prisoner for setting you free?" asked Democedes. The date is fixed by the Scythian expedition, *i.e.* it falls before 515 B.C.

entirely his conversation with Atossa. However this may be, the Persian attacks on southern Europe began with the return of Darius from Scythia. When he crossed the Hellespont, he left Megabazus behind at the head of an army of 80,000 men, with instructions to complete the conquest of Thrace. The campaign opened with the siege of Perinthus; and in spite of the brave resistance of the inhabitants, the city fell before the superior numbers of the enemy. Megabazus then proceeded through the rest of Thrace, carrying out the commands of the king, by the subjugation of every city and every nation.¹

The Persians
in Thrace.
515 B.C.?
Ol. 66. 2.

While in Thrace, Megabazus received orders to transport a number of Paeonian tribes from the banks of the Strymon to Asia. In the story told by Herodotus, Pigres and Mantyas, two Paeonians, who had conceived a desire to rule over their own tribe, came to Sardis, where Darius was at the time on his return from Scythia, taking with them their sister, a woman of great beauty. Watching their opportunity when Darius was in the suburb of the city, they dressed their sister in splendid attire, and sent her past the king to the river. She went carrying a water-jar on her head, leading a horse by a bridle attached to her arm, and spinning flax with her fingers. The attention of Darius was attracted by a sight so unusual; he gave orders for the woman to be watched. When he was informed that she watered the horse, filled the jar and replaced it on her head, and returned spinning as before, he commanded her to be brought into his presence. Her brothers, who came with her, in answer to the questions of the king, stated that they were Paeonians, and that the woman was their sister. Their country was situated on the Strymon, not far from the Hellespont. They were Teuerian colonists from the Troad by race, and had come to put themselves in his hands. "Were

The
Paeonians.

The Paeo-
nian woman
at Sardis.

¹ Herod. iv. 143; v. 1, 2.

all their women equally industrious?" inquired the king; and on receiving the assurance that they were, Darius wrote a despatch to Megabazus bidding him transplant the Paeonians with their wives and children from Europe to Asia.

Transporta-
tion of the
Paeonians
to Asia.

The Paeonians, who as a nation were distinct from the Macedonians on the one hand, and from the Thracians on the other—whence their story that they were Teuceri—inhabited in early times the valleys of the Axios and the Strymon, but by the constant incursions of their neighbours, they had lost much of their original territory, and they were now to be found only in the mountains at the sources of those rivers, and in some districts on the lower Strymon. It was against the inhabitants of the lower districts that Megabazus directed his attack. Two routes were available for one marching from Thrace: he might proceed by the coast on the south of Mount Pangaeus to the mouth of the Strymon; or he might strike at once, north of the mountains, into the region of Lake Prasias. The Paeonians, who anticipated an attack by the lower or coast route, left their cities and assembled near the shore; but Megabazus, securing the services of some Thracian guides, marched by the upper route. The towns, which were defenceless, at once fell into his hands; and when the Paeonians heard of their capture, they could only disperse and surrender. A small number of tribes, inhabitants of the plain, the Siriopaeones, Paeoplae, and others as far as Lake Prasias, were removed and conveyed to Asia by Megabazus; but the Dobêres on Mount Pangaeus, the Agrianes on the upper Strymon, and the tribe which dwelt on the lake, were able to preserve their independence and their home.¹

While engaged with the Paeonians, Megabazus sent seven of the chief Persians in his army to Amyntas, the king of

¹ Herod. v. 1, 12-16. I assume that Lake Prasias is the same as Lake Cercinitis. What became of Pigres and Mantyas is not recorded. On the Paeonians see Pauly, 'Real-Encycl.,' *sub voce*.

Macedon, requesting earth and water as a sign of submission. Amyntas gave what was demanded, and invited the envoys to a banquet. The Persians, not content with enjoying his hospitality, requested that the wives and concubines of the Macedonians should be introduced into the banquet-hall: this, they said, was the custom of the Persians at their own entertainments, a custom with which it was now the duty of Amyntas to comply. Even this request was granted; the women were introduced and took their seats opposite the guests. Still more insolent demands were then proposed, upon which Alexander, the son of Amyntas, persuaded his father, now an old man, to leave the entertainment in his hands. Pretending to acquiesce in the request of the Persians, he ordered the women to retire, for the purpose of bathing, and sent back in their places a number of armed youths disguised in their dress. These he bade seat themselves beside the guests, whom in their half-intoxicated condition they cut down without difficulty. The servants and equipages also of the Persians were so completely destroyed that no trace of them was left. Search was subsequently made for the envoys, but Alexander was able to prevent the truth from coming to light by bribing Bubares, the son of Megabazus, who conducted the inquiry, with large sums of money, and the hand of his sister Gygaea.¹

The Persians
in Macedonia.

Massacre of
the envoys and
their suite.

3. On reaching Sardis, Darius called to mind the eminent services rendered by Histiaeus and Coes in the Scythian expedition. He summoned them to his presence and bade them choose their own rewards. Coes, who was a man of humble rank, elected to be tyrant of Mytilene, but Histiaeus, who was already sovereign of Miletus, asked for the possession of Myrcinus, a tract of

Coes becomes
tyrant of
Mytilene.

¹ Herod. v. 17-22. Herod., c. 17, puts the subjugation of the Paeonians *before* the embassy to Macedonia, though in c. 23 he speaks of Megabazus as conveying the Paeonians to Sardis in person; vii. 22.

land in the Edonian territory, on the Thracian coast, which Megabazus had recently conquered. The Edonians lay between Lake Cercinitis (Prasias) and Mount Pangaeus; their land was not only rich in timber and minerals, but it commanded the passage of the Strymon; it was a prize which, at a later time, the Athenians endeavoured to secure by the foundation of Amphipolis.¹ Darius having probably no idea of the value, or even of the position, of Myrcinus, readily acceded to the request of Histiaeus, who immediately began to fortify the place. But Megabazus, who was well aware of the excellence of the site, when he arrived at Sardis with the Paeonians, warned the king of the danger of allowing a clever and unscrupulous Greek to establish himself in a position where he was not only in communication with warlike barbarians, but commanded the route to Thessaly. Darius saw the danger, and on the pretence that he had a great enterprise in view, which he wished to lay before him, he summoned Histiaeus to Sardis. When Histiaeus arrived, he was received with expressions of the warmest personal regard; he must abandon Miletus and his newly-founded city in Thrace, and go with Darius to Susa, that he might share his table and assist him with his advice. Whether Histiaeus suspected the real motives of the king's graciousness is uncertain, but it was now too late to go back. He was carried away to Susa, where he remained many years (515-497 B.C. ?) in what was little better than a splendid captivity.² Such a change in his position was, of course, highly distasteful to him, and the more so, as he quickly perceived that the enterprise of which Darius had spoken was a delusion. From being the tyrant of the greatest city on the Asiatic coast, and the master of the most valuable and important site in Thrace, he was reduced to daily dependence on the Persian monarch, and the inaction of an Oriental courtier.

Histiaeus
acquires
Myrcinus.

Histiaeus is
recalled from
Myrcinus and
carried away
to Susa.

¹ Herod. v. 11. See Stein's note.

² Herod. v. 23-25.

On leaving Sardis, Darius placed the command of the troops, now vacant by the return of Megabazus, of whom we hear no more, in the hands of Otanes, the son of Sisamnes, a royal judge, who had been elevated to that dangerous eminence by Cambyses.¹ Otanes proceeded to reduce to subjection the cities which had revolted during the absence of Darius in Scythia: Byzantium and Chalcedon on the Bosphorus; Antandrus and Lamponium in the Troad. Even the islands of Lemnos and Imbros, which at this time were still inhabited by the old Pelasgic population, were added to the Persian dominions, with the aid of ships supplied by the Lesbians. The obedience of the Lemnians, who fought bravely for their freedom, was secured by establishing a "tyrant" in the island, Lycaretus, the brother of Maeandrius of Samos, being selected for the office. The recent acquisitions in Thrace, which extended along the entire coast, were held in control by a fortress erected near Doriscus, at the mouth of the Hebrus, and garrisoned by Persian troops. A second fortress was added—perhaps some years later—at Eion, near the mouth of the Strymon. The kings of Macedonia, though not conquered, were vassals of Persia. In Asia Minor, Artaphernes, the half-brother of Darius, was established as satrap at Sardis, with command over Lydia and Ionia; the more northern districts were governed from Dascyleum. The whole of the Asiatic coast, with the adjacent islands, was in the absolute control of the king, held down by tyrants in his interest, and governed by satraps with large forces at their command. For a brief time there was "a respite from evils," but the Greeks were ill content

Persian conquests in the Bosphorus and Hellespont.

Organisation of the conquered territory.

The satraps of Asia Minor.

¹ This Otanes is of course to be distinguished from the famous conspirator, whose daughter discovered that the Magian had no ears. His father, Sisamnes, had also been a royal judge, but Cambyses, finding him guilty of bribery, had executed him, and used his skin as straps for the judge's chair. When he put Otanes in his father's place, he bade him remember on what seat he sat!

with their lot, and within twelve or fourteen years they were again in revolt.¹

4. The island of Naxos was at this time the most flourishing of the Cyclades. Colonised by the Ionians at the time of their great migration, it subsequently became famous for its wine, and for the worship of Bacchus and Ariadne.² In 735 B.C. it shared with Chalcis in founding the colony of Naxos in Sicily, but for the next two centuries we hear little or nothing of it, unless the war with Miletus, mentioned by Plutarch, falls in this period.³ During this interval, owing no doubt to its central position and superior power, it acquired a certain authority, not only over the adjacent islands of Andros and Paros, but over the whole of the Cyclades, while the inaccessible nature of the rock-bound coast rendered it particularly easy of defence.⁴

When Pisistratus was in exile at Eretria (*circa* 545-535 (?)

¹ See Herod. v. 25, 30, 20 f. For Doriscus, *ib.* vii. 105. The extent of the Persian conquests in Europe before 492 B.C. is stated in Herod. vi. 44, where we are told that Mardonius and his army τοῦτο μὲν τῇσι νηυσὶ Θασίους κατεστρέψαντο, τοῦτο δὲ τῷ περὶ Μακεδόνας πρὸς τοῖσι ὑπάρχουσι δούλους προσεκτήσαντο. τὰ γὰρ ἐντὸς Μακεδόνων ἔθνη πάντα σφι ἦν ἤδη ὑποχέτρια γεγονότα. Tribute was received from the conquered territory—Herod. iii. 96: προϊόντος μέντοι τοῦ χρόνου καὶ ἀπὸ νήσων προσήιε ἄλλος φόρος καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ μέχρι Θετταλίας οἰκημένων. It does not seem possible to determine (1) the relation of the "general of the forces on the seashore" (see Herod. v. 25, 30, Stein's notes) to the satraps of Sardis and Dascyleum; (2) the manner in which the three satrapies, mentioned in Herod. iii. 90, became merged into two; (3) whether there was or was not an European satrapy. Cf. Herod. ix. 116, ἐνυράνευε δὲ τοῦτου τοῦ νομοῦ (in Chersonesus) Ξέρξῃ ὑπαρχος Ἀρταύκτης. See Krumboltz, *De Asiae minoris satrapis Persicis*, Lipsiae, 1883; Posselt, *Quae Asiae minoris orae, etc., fuerit condicio*, Regimonti, 1879.

² Naxos is perhaps the Dia of *Od.* xi. 325. There was a fabulous fountain of wine in the island; Steph. Byz. *sub voce*. Head, *Hist. Num.* 416, speaks of the "massive archaic silver money" of Naxos.

³ Plut. *De Mul. Virt.* (*Moral.* 254 B), in connection with Polycrite and Diognetus. The Erythraeans aided the Milesians. See Dugit, *De insula Naxo*, Paris, 1867.

⁴ Herod. v. 31. Or the sovereignty may be due to Lygdamis,

B.C.) he was joined by Lygdamis of Naxos, who showed the greatest enthusiasm in his cause, and supplied him with men and money for accomplishing his return to Athens.¹ At that time Lygdamis had recently failed in an attempt to establish himself as a popular leader or tyrant in his own city. For in Naxos, as everywhere, the Many and the Few were at variance, and a recent outrage had brought the enmity to a head. Though the mass of the richer citizens lived in the city, others preferred a country life in the scattered hamlets of the island. Among these was the wealthy and hospitable Telestagoras, whose popularity was a source of annoyance to the higher orders. Quarrels frequently arose, and at length some young nobles of the city resolved to be revenged upon the man who was more than a rival in the affections of the people. They repaired to the house of Telestagoras at Lystadae, some little distance from the town, where they were kindly received and entertained. But they were not to be turned from their purpose; utterly regardless of the ties of hospitality, they not only beat Telestagoras, but violated his two daughters. The populace took up the cause of their favourite. A period of civil strife followed, in which Lygdamis, though by birth an oligarch, placed himself at the head of the popular party. For the moment he appears to have been unsuccessful, but afterwards, with the help of Pisistratus, he became tyrant of the island. How long he retained the coveted prize we do not know. His name appears in the list of tyrants deposed by Sparta, and though the authority is not good, we have no positive reason for contradicting the statement. On his deposition the government of the island no doubt reverted into the hands of the oligarchy.²

Factions in
Naxos.
540-535 B.C.
Ol. 60. 1-61. 2.

Story of
Telestagoras.

Lygdamis be-
comes tyrant
circ. 535 B.C.
Ol. 61. 2.

¹ Herod. i. 61; Arist. *Athen. Pol.* c. 15.

² Curtius, *G. G.* i. 615 (6th ed.); Arist. *Pol.* v. 6=1305 a, ult.; Herod. i. 64; Arist. *Frag.* 558 R.; *Ath. Pol.* l. c. For the deposition see Plut. *De mal. Her.* 21.

Somewhat more than a generation had elapsed since these events took place. What circumstances led to the new revolution we do not know, but once more the democratical party succeeded in getting the upper hand, and they now expelled a number of the rich, or "substantial" as Herodotus calls them, from the island.

501 B.C.

Ol. 69. 4.

Naxian exiles
at Miletus.

The exiles fled to Miletus, where Aristagoras was governor, in the room of his cousin and father-in-law, Histiaeus. As they had been on friendly terms with Histiaeus, they naturally looked to Aristagoras for assistance in securing their restoration. Aristagoras, reflecting that he would become ruler of Naxos, if the exiles were restored by his help, professed himself ready to assist the friends of Histiaeus; but he had not the power, he said, to restore exiles in the teeth of such resistance as Naxos could offer. The island not only possessed a large fleet, but could bring 8000 hoplites into the field. It would be necessary to apply to Artaphernes, the satrap of Sardis, who could, without difficulty, furnish a sufficient force. The Naxians, on hearing this, urged Aristagoras to go at once to Artaphernes, promising on their own part to bear the cost of the expedition. They had no doubt that when they appeared with the Persian forces before Naxos, the island would at once submit, for up to this time a Persian fleet had not been seen in the Cyclades.¹

Aristagoras at once repaired to Sardis to lay the matter before Artaphernes. He described Naxos as an island of no great size, but productive and wealthy, crowded with slaves, and lying close to Ionia. "If you despatch a force against Naxos, you will acquire the island for the king, and also all those islands which are dependent on it:

Aristagoras
applies to
Artaphernes
for help in re-
ducing Naxos.

Paros, Andros, and the rest of the Cyclades; the enterprise,

¹ Herod. v. 28-30. The number 8000 is contested by Beloch, *Bevölkerung*, p. 181. "Eight thousand hoplites postulate a population of 20,000 citizens, a number only reached by the most important Greek cities, such as Athens or Argos, and quite inconceivable in a

so far from involving you in expense, will bring you great riches. From Naxos you can then attack the prosperous island of Euboea, an island as large as Cyprus, which will fall an easy prey." Artaphernes was delighted at the prospect opened before him; his attention had already been directed to Greece by appeals for help from Athens, and Sardis was now the home of the Pisistratidae, who sought by every means in their power to secure their own return to Athens. The satrap had, in fact, himself commanded the Athenians to take Hippias back, on pain of incurring the king's displeasure; and he might reasonably hope to govern Greece by tyrants in the interest of Darius. He promised Aristagoras double the number of ships for which he had asked, and arranged that they should be ready by the following spring. Nothing remained but to gain the king's consent, which was done in the course of the winter (501-500 B.C.).¹

Artaphernes
eagerly agrees.

5. In the spring, therefore, a fleet of 200 triremes, with a large army of Persians and allies, was collected and placed under the command of Megabates, a cousin of Darius, who led the forces to Miletus, where they were joined by the Ionian soldiers and the Naxian exiles. To divert suspicion a rumour was spread that the expedition was intended for the Hellespont, but when sailing off Chios it put in at Caucasa, whence a north wind would carry it to Naxos. The conquest of the island seemed imminent; but unhappily the mutual position of Aristagoras and Megabates had not been defined, and an incident now occurred in which the double command led to the most disastrous results. The discipline of the fleet was in the care of Megabates, who on visiting the ships found a Myndian vessel without a watch. Exasperated by such neglect, he called for

Expedition
against Naxos.
500 B.C.
Ol. 70. 1.

Quarrel of
Megabates and
Aristagoras.

rocky island, without any large city, an island too, which, including the neighbouring small islands, is not more than 500 square kilometres in extent." He thinks the amount includes the whole force furnished by the Cyclades.

¹ Herod. v. 31.

his bodyguard, and caused the captain of the vessel, Scylax by name, to be put in chains on his ship with his head projecting through one of the oar-holes in the side. The news was at once carried to Aristagoras, who was a personal friend of Scylax. Aristagoras came to Megabates and begged that his friend might be released, but in vain. He then released him with his own hands. Megabates was at no pains to conceal his displeasure. Aristagoras retorted with equal plainness: "Why must you needs meddle in these matters? Were you not sent here to take your orders from me, and sail where you were bid? Better mind your own business!" As soon as night came on, Megabates revenged himself by sending a boat to Naxos with news of the real object of the expedition.

Failure of the expedition.

Hitherto the Naxians had been without any suspicion, but on receiving this intelligence, they at once gathered their moveables into the city, and prepared for resistance. When the Persians advanced from Chios, they found Naxos ready to receive them. A surprise was now impossible; it was necessary to blockade the city. For four months the siege went on; the funds which the Persians had brought and all that Aristagoras could supply were exhausted. It was hopeless to prosecute the undertaking further, and after building a few fortresses for the fugitive Naxians the fleet returned to Miletus. The enterprise had ended in total failure.¹

6. Aristagoras was now in a desperate position. He had not only exhausted his own resources, but the splendid hopes

Aristagoras determines to revolt and is encouraged by a message from Histiaeus.

which he had held out to Artaphernes had ended in loss and discredit to the Persians. Expecting to be deprived of his command at Miletus, he determined to anticipate the sentence by causing the city to revolt from the king. He was encouraged in the project by a message which he received from Histiaeus at Susa, urging him to take the same step; if Miletus were in revolt, Histiaeus had hopes that

¹ Herod. v. 32-35.

he would be allowed to return to the sea-coast and his old dominions; otherwise he must remain at Susa during the king's pleasure.¹

Thus encouraged, Aristagoras assembled the leading men in Miletus, and laid before them both his own plan and the message of Histiaeus. Hecataeus, the "logographer," was alone in opposing the scheme, but his opposition was of weight, for he was the most distinguished historian of his day, a man who spoke with something more than the caprice of the moment to guide him. He endeavoured to persuade the Ionians not to enter into a conflict with Persia by dwelling on the immense forces which Darius could bring against them. When he failed to convince them on this point, he advised that they should seize the treasures consecrated by Croesus to Apollo at Branchidae, treasures which would certainly fall into the hands of the enemy, if allowed to remain in the temple. With these he had hopes that the Ionians would gain the superiority at sea. This advice was also rejected. But, however deaf to admonition, Aristagoras and his friends resolved to revolt, and as a first step Iatrageras, one of their number, was sent to Myus, where the force, which had returned from Naxos, was now encamped, with orders to arrest the generals in command of it. Iatrageras succeeded in his object. Two Carians, Oliatus of Mylæsa and Histiaeus of Termera, Coes, the tyrant of Mytilene, and Aristagoras of Cyme, with many others, were seized. They were no sooner in his power than Aristagoras openly revolted from the king. Beginning with Miletus, where he formally renounced the throne, he established new forms of government throughout Ionia. The tyrants whom

Advice of
Hecataeus.

Arrest of the
Persian
generals.

Aristagoras
revolts from
Darius.

¹ Herod. v. 35. The historian tells us that Histiaeus sent his message by branding it on a slave's head, which had been shaven close. When the hair had grown, the slave was sent. Aristagoras shaved him again, and saw the letters. How the message was concealed while the hair was growing, we are not informed. Polyænus (2nd cent. A.D.) can even quote the words of the message; i. 24.

he had arrested among the commanders at Myus were given up to their respective cities to be dealt with as seemed good; the rest were expelled. Their places were taken by officers whom Herodotus calls "generals," a vague term, which in this case seems to mean officers chosen by the oligarchical party to which Aristagoras belonged, but holding office for a definite time, and responsible for their conduct.¹

7. After establishing these new forms of government, Aristagoras departed to Lacedaemon, as the foremost city in

Greece, in order to gain her support in his enterprise. Cleomenes was still on the throne, a prince who had given great proofs of

capacity and valour, though headstrong to the verge of insanity. To him Aristagoras went with a bronze tablet, on which was engraved a map of the world. He represented that the slavery of the Ionians was a disgrace to Hellas, and especially to those who were the champions of Hellas; that it would be an easy matter to rescue them from the oppression of such poor soldiers as the Persians, a turbaned and trousered horde, who had no better weapons than bows and arrows and short javelins. The gains which victory would secure were enormous: gold, silver, bronze, brodered robes, beasts of burden, and slaves in lavish abundance. He then proceeded to point out the position of the various nations on his map, tracing them in their order from Lydia to Susa, where lay the palace and treasures of the Great King—a prize which would make the conquerors the rivals of Zeus himself. "Surely you will defer your conflicts for a poor and scanty territory with Messenians and Arcadians and Argives, who have neither gold nor silver that a man should risk his life for

¹ Herod. v. 35-38. For the "generals," see Stein on c. 38. The state of parties in the Asiatic cities is not clear, but we may guess that Aristagoras and Histiaeus, when they decided to break away from Persia, made common cause with the oligarchical party, to whom the presence of tyrants was offensive. When Mardonius came to the coast in 492 B.C., he attempted to secure the people for Persia by establishing democracies, but his arrangement does not seem to have been lasting; *infra*, § 27.

it, when you can easily become lords of all Asia?" Cleomenes put off his answer till the third day, and when the day came, he merely asked how great was the distance from the sea-coast to Susa. Aristagoras was thrown off his guard, for when "it was a mistake to tell the truth, if at least he meant to bring the Spartans into Asia," he replied that it was a journey of three months.

Cleomenes
refuses to
invade Asia.

Cleomenes did not wait to hear more; he at once ordered Aristagoras to leave Sparta before sunset, and returned home. Aristagoras made a last attempt. He followed the king, and claiming an audience as a suppliant, begged Cleomenes to send away his little daughter, Gorgo, who was in the room, a child of eight or nine years of age, and give him a hearing. Cleomenes bade him say his say without heeding the child; whereupon Aristagoras began to tempt the king with bribes, raising the sum higher and higher till he reached fifty talents (£10,000). At this moment Gorgo exclaimed: "Father, you must go away at once, or the stranger will be your ruin." Cleomenes immediately went out of the room, and Aristagoras, perceiving that further efforts would be useless, left the city.¹

The scene
with Gorgo.

8. From Sparta he went to Athens, where he met with a more favourable reception. The city was still smarting under the insulting message of Artaphernes, that the Athenians must receive Hippias back, on pain of incurring the king's displeasure; still excited with its newly recovered freedom and unexpected success in war. The application of Aristagoras thus came at an opportune moment, "and he found it easier to mislead 30,000 men than one." On hearing his report of the riches which were in store for them in Asia, and the ineffective character of the Persian mode of warfare—a report which Aristagoras accompanied with profuse promises and appeals to the ties of kindred linking Miletus with Athens—the Assembly voted

Aristagoras
at Athens.

¹ Herod. v. 49-51. Gorgo afterwards became the wife of Leonidas. Cf. Herod. vii. *ult.*

to send twenty ships to the assistance of the Ionians.

Twenty ships
sent to
Miletus. "These ships," Herodotus remarks, "were the beginning of misfortunes for the Greeks and Barbarians."¹

9. Elated by his success, Aristagoras at once hastened to Miletus. Here he found means, even before the arrival of

Aristagoras
and the
Paeonians. the Athenian contingent, to carry out a plan, which, though it neither aided the Greeks nor injured Darius, was calculated to cause the king

no slight degree of annoyance. As we have said (p. 42), Megabazus transported a number of Paeonians from the Strymon into Asia, where they had been settled in a village of Phrygia, apart from the native inhabitants. To these immigrants, who had now been domiciled about fifteen years in Asia,

He induces
them to return
to Europe. Aristagoras sent a message, bidding them seize the opportunity of the revolt of Ionia to return to their homes by the Strymon. If they

could find their way to the sea-coast, the Ionians would arrange for their transport over the Aegean. A few of the Paeonians had not courage for the enterprise, but the large majority eagerly embraced the offer; they reached the sea-coast with their wives and children, and were carried at once to Chios, in time to escape the pursuit of a large body of Persian horse. An order bidding them return to Asia was disregarded; they were conveyed from Chios to Lesbos, and from Lesbos to Doriscus, whence they returned to their old homes.²

10. With the spring of 499 B.C. the twenty Athenian

¹ Herod. v. 97. This expression gives great offence to Plutarch, *De mal. Herod.* 24, ἀρχεκάκους τολμήσας προσειπεῖν, ὅτι τοσαύτας πόλεις καὶ τηλικαύτας Ἑλληνίδας ἐλευθεροῦν ἐπεχείρησαν ἀπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων. Düncker (*G. A.*, vii. 39) and, with some modifications, Busolt (*Lakedaim.* p. 331) blame the Spartans because they did not take a more vigorous line in regard to the Ionians, but in my opinion their caution was more than justified. The Ionian revolt was a rash and ill-considered measure, opposed by the best judgment among the Ionians, and Sparta was not consulted till the fatal step was taken.

² Herod. v. 98.

vessels set out for Asia. On their way they were joined by five Eretrian ships, under the command of Eualcides. This addition to the force was not due to any arrangement between Athens and Eretria; it was an act of gratitude, so Herodotus declares, on the part of the Eretrians for the assistance which Miletus had rendered them in their ancient war with Chalcis. When the allied forces were assembled, Aristagoras resolved to make an attack on Sardis. As personal courage was not among his gifts, he did not venture to march at the head of the army which he had collected; the command was assigned to his brother Charopinus, with whom was joined Hermophantus, a citizen of Miletus. The force was despatched in boats to Ephesus, whence, under the direction of Ephesian guides, it marched along the Cayster, and over Mount Tmolus to Sardis.¹

The Ionians
and Athenians
march on
Sardis.
499 B.C.
Ol. 70. 2.

Sardis lay at the northern foot of the mountain, above the river Hermus. The city was apparently without walls or defences of any kind, and the houses, which were either entirely built of reeds, or roofed with reeds, were extremely inflammable. But the acropolis, which rose above the town, a projecting spur of Mount Tmolus, was inaccessible on every side but that on which it joined the mountain. On either hand flowed a stream, that to the west being the Pactolus, which also washed the base of a temple of Cybele, and passed through the market-place of the city. In the reign of Ardys the acropolis had saved Sardis from the Cimmerians; and Croesus had only lost it to Cyrus from too great a confidence in the strength of the position. To this stronghold Artaphernes now retired with a considerable body of men, leaving the lower town at the mercy of the invader. Before the Ionians had time to pillage the city, a

Sardis: the
city and the
acropolis.

Burning
of Sardis.

¹ Herod. v. 99. The boats were left ἐν Κορησὶ τῆς Ἐφεσίου: cf. Xen. *Hell.* i. 2. 7, where Thrasyllus lands his hoplites at Corësus. It is obvious that the force did not proceed by the great road which joined Ephesus and Sardis.

soldier set fire to a house; the conflagration spread, and the outskirts of the city were quickly in flames. The Lydian inhabitants and those of the Persian garrison who had remained in the town, were driven by the fire into the market-place and to the banks of the Pactolus. Thus forcibly united, they became aware of their numbers, and began to think of

The Persians
unite,

resistance. By this time also reinforcements were at hand; for, on hearing of the invasion, the generals stationed west of the Halys, Daurises, Hymaees, and Otanes, had assembled their forces, and they were now advancing upon Sardis. The Ionians were terror-stricken at the prospect of a resistance, which they had not expected. They withdrew at once to Mount Tmolus, and when night came on, retreated to the coast, hotly pursued by the Persians.

and defeat the
Ionians.

A battle was fought at Ephesus, in which the Ionians suffered a ruinous defeat, a large proportion of their forces being left on the field, and among them Eualcides, the Eretrian general. The Athenians, finding the result so contrary to their expectations, at once returned home, nor could the messages of Aristagoras induce them to send any further assistance. The rest of the survivors dispersed through the cities of Ionia.¹

II. Such was the disastrous beginning of the Ionian revolt. The attempt on Sardis had proved an utter failure; the Athenians, in whom Aristagoras mainly trusted, had left the rebels to their fate; the Eretrian general was slain. But the

¹ Herod. v. 100-103, 116. Plutarch, *De mal. Her.* 24, condemns this account of the conduct of Athens and Eretria. He asserts that the Eretrians conquered the Cyprians in the Pamphylian sea, "at the time when the royal forces were sailing up." They then went to Ephesus, and, leaving their ships, attacked Sardis and besieged Artaphernes in the acropolis, 'wishing to raise the siege of Miletus,' in which they succeeded. They were then dispersed by superior numbers. For this he quotes the Eretrian history of Lysanias of Mallos, of whom nothing is known. In regard to the Athenians, Plutarch quotes verbatim the account of Charon of Lampsacus, an older contemporary of Herodotus; this account agrees with Herodotus so far as the capture of Sardis, but adds that the Athenians, after the capture, returned to Miletus.

Ionians had gone too far to draw back. The only course open to them was to spread the disaffection, and collect as large a force as possible. With this object their fleet sailed northwards to the Hellespont, where they compelled Byzantium and all the other cities of the district to join them; then, returning to the south, they won over the greater part of Caria; Caunus also, on hearing of the burning of Sardis, came in. The island of Cyprus, with the exception of Amathus, was induced by Onesilus of Salamis to revolt from the king, and so eager was Onesilus in the cause that he not only expelled his own brother Gorgus, the king of Salamis, who refused to join him, from his throne and city, but also laid siege to the recalcitrant Amathusians (498 B.C.)¹

Spread of the
revolt to Caria
and Cyprus.
498 B.C.
Ol. 70. 3.

12. After the defeat of the Ionian army at Ephesus, the three generals of the Persians went on with the work of crushing the rebellion. They divided the cities of the coast among them. Daurises attacked the towns of the Hellespont; Dardanus, Abydus, Percôte, Lampsacus, and Paesus were taken on successive days; but when he was on his way from Paesus to Parium, he received intelligence that the Carians had joined the rebels. He at once turned his forces in that direction. The Carians, who were warned of his approach, gathered together at their place of assembly, the "White Pillars" on the Marsyas—not the more famous river of that name, but a stream which rose in the neighbourhood of Idrias—and debated the plan of battle. Pixôdarus of Cindye, the son of Mausôlus, an ancestor of the Mausôlus of Halicarnassus, whose name has been rendered famous by his tomb, advised them to cross the Meander, and give battle on the northern side of the river; retreat would then be cut off, and their native valour would be roused to still greater efforts by desperation. This advice was not taken. The Carians resolved to remain on the south

The revolt
crushed in the
Hellespont.

Conflicts
in Caria.

¹ Herod. v. 103, 104.

of the river, and, if possible, to drive the Persians into it. A long and obstinate battle was fought, in which the Carians were severely defeated, with a loss of 10,000 men. The survivors gathered together at the temple of Zeus Stratius at Labranda, and were there discussing whether they should submit to the Persians or abandon Asia entirely, when they were joined by the Milesians and their allies. Thus reinforced, they determined to try the fortune of war once more. Again they were defeated, and with even greater loss, which chiefly fell on the Milesians. But this was the end of their

Defeat of the
Persians by
the Carians.

disasters. On discovering that the Persians were about to attack their cities, the Carians lay in wait for them by night on the way to Pédasus, under the command of Heraclides of Myläsa. The Persian army fell into the trap and was destroyed; the generals Daurises, Amorges, and Sisamaces were among the slain.¹

Hymæes, the second of the Persian generals, undertook to subdue the revolt in the Propontis. When he had taken the

Repression of
the revolt in
Æolis.

city of Cios, he learnt that Daurises had left the Hellespont for Caria, upon which he immediately turned his steps thither. He reduced all the Æolians in the Ilian territory, and the Gergithians—the sole remnant of the old Teucric stock—but further successes were cut short by his death. The war was then carried on by Artaphernes of Sardis, and Otanes, the third general, who directed their attention to Ionia and southern Æolis, where they captured Clazomenæ and Cyme.²

13. Meanwhile the Persians had made preparations for the recovery of Cyprus. A large army was assembled in Cilicia, and placed under the command of Artybius. From Cilicia it crossed to the north of the island, whence it marched on foot to Salamis, the Phœnician fleet being at the same time brought round the north-eastern promontory of Cyprus,

¹ Herod. v. 118-121. The "White Pillars" seems to be the place indicated by Strabo, p. 660.

² Herod. v. 122, 123.

(the "Keys"). When Onesilus, who was still engaged in the siege of Amathus, heard of these preparations, he hastily summoned the Ionians to his aid, and on their arrival, the princes of the Cyprian cities and the captains of the Ionian fleet were called together for consultation. The Cyprians were willing to fight by land or sea, with the Persians or the Phoenicians, as the Ionians might choose. If the Ionians decided to fight at sea, no change was necessary; if they wished to fight on land, let them place their ships in the hands of the Cyprians; but whether they fought on land or sea, they must do their best to save Cyprus and Ionia from enslavement. The Ionians chose to fight at sea, according to their instructions; and in return bade the Cyprians remember what they had suffered as the slaves of Persia.¹

The revolt
in Cyprus.
497 B.C.
Ol. 70. 4.

Preparations
for a battle.

When the Persians advanced into the plain of Salamis, the Cyprian princes drew out their forces to meet them. The best of the troops of Salamis and Soli were ranged against the Persians; and Onesilus prepared to meet Artybius, who rode a horse trained to rear upon the shield of his opponent and bear down his defence. The same day found both the fleets and the armies engaged; on sea the Ionians were victorious over the Phoenicians, but on land treachery divided the Cyprian forces and gave the day to the Persians. Onesilus indeed succeeded in slaying both Artybius and his horse, with the aid of a Carian servant, who cut off with a scythe the legs of the horse, as he reared against his master's shield, but in the midst of the battle, Stesenor, the king of Curium, took over his forces to the enemy's side; he was quickly followed by the war-chariots of the Salaminians, and after this change the cause of the Cyprians was hopeless. Onesilus fell, and with him Aristocyprus, the king of Soli, the son of that Philocyprus who had been the friend of Solon. With this defeat

Defeat of
the Greeks
in Cyprus.

¹ Herod. v. 108, 109.

the revolt was at an end. Salamis was restored to Gorgus; the rest of the rebellious cities were besieged, and reduced to submission, Soli being the last to submit, after a siege of four months. The Ionians in the fleet, on hearing of the failure of the enterprise, returned home. The island had enjoyed freedom for a year (498-497 B.C.).¹

14. Aristagoras, the author of the revolt, was still at Miletus. He knew that the reduction of Cyprus would be followed by the appearance of the Persian fleet off Ionia, and as he had little regard for anything but his own safety, his thoughts were bent on finding a secure retreat. He called his party together, and suggested that they should retire either to Sardinia or to Myrcinus in Thrace. Hecataeus, the logographer, who was again present at the conference, advised that Aristagoras should build a stronghold in the island of Leros. This would serve as a safe retreat, if he were driven out of Miletus, and at the same time, he would be at hand to take measures for his return, when an opportunity offered. Aristagoras preferred to retire to a greater distance; he went to Myrcinus, leaving Miletus in the hands of a leading citizen named Pythagoras. Soon after his arrival in Thrace, his army was destroyed and himself slain by the inhabitants of an Edonian town, who took advantage of a truce to fall upon him (497 B.C.).²

15. When Darius heard that Sardis had been burnt by the Ionians and Athenians, and that Aristagoras of Miletus was the chief mover in the revolution, he paid little attention to the Ionians, whom he knew to be at his mercy, but inquired who the Athenians might be. On hearing that they were a distant nation, he called for his bow and shot an arrow into the air, imploring Zeus, the lord of all, to grant him vengeance on the Athen-

¹ Herod. v. 109-115.

² Herod. v. 124-126; Thuc. iv. 102.

ians ; and lest he should forget his new enemy, a servant was commanded to remind his master of the Athenians thrice at the daily banquet. Then he ordered Histiaeus to be brought into his presence, and reproached him with the conduct of his son-in-law, whom he had left in charge of Miletus. Darius and Histiaeus. "Take care," he added significantly, "that you do not bring yourself into trouble ; such a change as this can hardly have occurred without a hint from you." The words were nearer the truth than Darius was aware, but Histiaeus was profuse in his protestations of innocence. How could he be guilty of conduct which would cause annoyance to the king ? What object could he have in view ? Had he not everything that a man could desire ? If such a thing had been done, it was entirely the work of Aristagoras, but he doubted the truth of the report. And if it were true, the revolt was due to Darius' own conduct, in keeping him from his city. "Had I been in Ionia, not a city would have risen ; let me go there at once, that I may restore order and deliver my viceroy into your hands. When all is once more as you would have it at Miletus, I swear by the royal gods, that I will not put off the tunic, in which I go to Ionia, till I have made you lord of Sardinia, the largest of all islands." Histiaeus returns to the sea-coast. Darius was persuaded, and allowed Histiaeus to go down to the sea-coast, on condition that he returned to Susa when his mission was accomplished (497 B.C.).¹

16. Histiaeus reached Sardis about the time of the death of Aristagoras. He met with a reception which was not reassuring. Artaphernes, the satrap, asked him what in his opinion was the cause of the revolt, and when he declared that he could give no reason, and was greatly astonished at what had taken place, Artaphernes replied : "The truth is, Histiaeus, that you made the shoe, and Aristagoras put it on." In the very next night, Histiaeus left Sardis for the coast, whence he crossed to

¹ Herod. v. 105-107.

Chios, and, far from bringing Sardinia into subjection to the Great King, he attempted to assume the command of the war against him. But so great were the suspicions which he had excited by his devious courses, that, on arriving at Chios, he was thrown into prison for a time as a partisan of Darius. To the Ionians, who inquired why he had urged Aristagoras to revolt, and brought such a calamity on the Greeks, he excused his conduct by an audacious falsehood, asserting that Darius had formed a scheme for transferring the Ionians to Phoenicia, and the Phoenicians to Ionia; an assertion utterly without foundation, but calculated to excite great alarm among the Ionians, especially as the Phoenicians were now expected on the Anatolian coast.

From Chios Histiaeus despatched Hermippus of Atarneus to Sardis, with letters to a number of Persians, to whom he had already made treasonable proposals. Hermippus, however, carried the letters to Artaphernes, who, after reading them, bade him deliver them as he had been commanded by Histiaeus, and to bring the answers to him. Having thus obtained evidence of their treachery under their own hands, he put to death a considerable number of Persians, and Sardis was for the time thrown into great confusion.

Disappointed in this attempt, Histiaeus requested the Chians to convey him to Miletus. But the Milesians, who were only too glad to be rid of Aristagoras, and had no mind to change their newly acquired freedom for the old tyranny, refused to receive him; and when he attempted to enter the city by night, he was repelled by force and wounded. As the Chians, to whom he returned, refused to supply him with ships, he proceeded to Mytilene. The Lesbians manned eight triremes at his request, and sailed with him to Byzantium. There he established himself, seizing on their way through the strait all the ships of those cities which refused to acknowledge his authority. Such a course of action can only have been undertaken

in order to revenge himself on the Milesians, whose trade was chiefly with the Euxine. No advantage to the Ionian cause, no injury to Persia, could follow from it.¹

17. At Byzantium Histiaeus remained for about three years (497-494 B.C.). When the news of the fall of Miletus was brought to him, he placed the control of the Hellespont in the hands of Bisaltes of Abydos, and with his Lesbian ships proceeded to attack

497-494 B.C.
Ol. 70. 4.—71. 3.

Chios, which was of course still suffering from the disaster at Lade (*infra* § 20). The guard of the Chians attempted to prevent his landing in the island, but they were defeated with great slaughter in an engagement at the "Hollows"; after which Histiaeus established himself at Polichna, and reduced the rest of the island. From Chios he went to Thasos. He had already begun

Histiaeus
conquers
Chios;

to besiege the city, when he heard that the Phoenicians were sailing up from Miletus to northern Ionia. On this he returned to Lesbos, but his supplies running short, he crossed over to the mainland, with the intention of carrying off the harvest from Atarneus and the plain of the Caicus. Unhappily for him, Harpagus, a Persian general, was in the neighbourhood, who no sooner heard of the landing of Histiaeus than he attacked him, and destroyed the greater part of his forces. Histiaeus himself was taken captive, carried to Sardis, and immediately put to death by Artaphernes. His body was crucified, but his head was embalmed, and conveyed to Darius at Susa.²

lands in
Atarneus;

his death.
493 B.C.?
Ol. 71. 4.

Histiaeus had saved his life in the battle at Atarneus by

¹ Herod. vi. 1-5; cf. 26, συλλαμβάνοντι τὰς Ἰώνων ὀλκάδας ἐκπλεούσας ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου. We may notice that the Lesbians aid Histiaeus in his attacks on Chios and Thasos, as well as in this nefarious business.

² Herod. vi. 26-30. It is difficult to account for the movements of Histiaeus; did he wish to bring over Chios and Thasos to Persia? If he did, why was he afraid of the approach of the Phoenician fleet? if not, what was his object in attacking cities which he could not possibly hold against the superior force of Darius?

discovering his name, in the hope that the king would pardon him. And in the opinion of Herodotus, he would have been pardoned, if he had been taken from the battle-field into the royal presence. For when Darius heard of his death, he was displeased that he had not been brought before him alive,

Character of
Histiaeus;

and caused the head to be honourably buried, as the head of one "who had done great service to himself and the Persians." It is indeed true

that Darius owed his life to the advice given by Histiaeus to his fellow-princes at the Danube, on the return from Scythia;

his services
to Darius.

had the bridge been broken, the king and his army would certainly have perished. But this advice was given, not from any fidelity to

Darius, but entirely with a view to his own interest, as tyrant of Miletus. No other thought ever weighed with Histiaeus, a man who may be justly said to present us with the worst type of tyrant and traitor.

18. After the capture of Clazomenae and Cyme (p. 58), Miletus became the centre of the war. The generals of the land

Miletus be-
comes the
centre of
the war.
496 B.C.
Ol. 71. 1.

forces of the Persians, disregarding the smaller towns, concentrated their armies round the city; the Phoenicians sailed up from Cyprus, eager to retrieve their defeat, and reinforced by contingents from that island—now reduced

to submission—from Cilicia and Egypt. Meanwhile the Ionians sent their deputies to the Panionium to discuss the measures which should be taken against this formidable array. It was decided that no attempt should be made to meet the Persian army on land; the country must be sacrificed, and

The Greeks
prepare for a
naval battle.

the walls of Miletus left to the defence of her own citizens. The decisive battle must be fought at sea, where the Ionians were still

unconquered. Every available ship was pressed into the service, and, when manned, the contingents met at Lade, a small island covering the entrance into the harbour of Miletus. The total number of the fleet amounted to 353 vessels, of which the Milesians, who held the eastern

wing, supplied 80; next were ranged the Prieniens, with 12; the Myesiens, with 3; the Teiens, with 17; the Chians, with 100, on each of which 40 chosen citizens served as marines. Then followed the Erythraeans, with 8 ships; the Phocaeans with 3; and the Lesbians with 70. On the west were the Samians, who furnished 60 ships.¹

Their order
and number.

The fleet of the Persians amounted to 600 vessels, but this superiority in numbers failed to inspire them with confidence, and as the tyrants, whom Aristagoras had expelled from Ionia, had taken refuge with the Persians, and were now present in the army, an attempt was made through them to detach from the Grecian force the contingents supplied by their several cities. They were directed to inform their countrymen that those who joined the Persians now should in no way suffer for the part which they had taken in the revolt, but all who continued obstinate would experience the most cruel punishment, if defeated. Their country would be given up to others; themselves sold into slavery; their sons would be mutilated for service at the Persian court; their daughters carried away to Bactrian harems. The tyrants conveyed this message to their cities, but without effect; each city thought that the offer of pardon was made to it alone.²

The Persian
fleet.

19. For some time after their arrival at Miletus the fleets lay opposite to each other, neither side venturing to begin the engagement. Among the Greeks many meetings were held, and Dionysius of Phocaea seized the opportunity to persuade his countrymen to put themselves in his hands for training and exercise. Each morning he drew the ships out in

Dionysius of
Phocaea at-
tempts to train
the Grecian
fleet.

¹ Herod. vi. 6-8, 15. The numbers are interesting, because they furnish some clue to the relative strength of the cities; the Phocaeans must have suffered severely in the war with Cyrus to be able to furnish no more than three vessels. Ephesus, Colophon, and Lebedus furnished no contingents at all. For Clazomenae, see *supra*, § 12.

² Herod. vi. 7-10.

line, exercised the sailors in manœuvres, armed the marines, and kept the vessels at anchor for the rest of the day. When the training had gone on for a week, the Ionians, who were unaccustomed to such vigorous measures, refused to submit any longer. "Are we out of our minds," they said, "through the vengeance of some offended deity, that we have put ourselves

The Ionians
impatient of
hardship.

in the hands of a swaggering Phocæan, who brings no more than three ships of his own to the fleet? Who can put up with such intolerable vexations? Some of us are already on the sick-list, others expect to be: better endure the slavery which is to come than such as this." They resolved to practise no more, and passed the rest of their time in tents on the island. When the Samians saw this want of spirit, they were more

Treachery of
the Samians.

inclined to listen to the proposals made to them through Aeaces, the son of Syloson, the tyrant of their island, whom Aristagoras had deposed. They reflected that the king's power was irresistible; that if the present fleet were defeated, another, five times as large, could be brought against them; it was better to save their temples and their property by a timely submission; they resolved to desert in the action.¹

20. Such were the melancholy circumstances under which the Ionian fleet went into battle. Success in the war was in

Battle of Lade.
496 B.C.

any case improbable, for the victory of the fleet would not have relieved the city from the presence of the Persian army, but it was now quite impossible. Herodotus cannot bring himself to state precisely how the infamous bargain was carried out: the Ionians, he says, blame each other for the treachery of that day. It was,

Treachery and
defeat of the
Ionians.

however, asserted that the Samians, when the fleets came into action, hoisted their sails and left for Samos. The Lesbians with their seventy ships followed the example of the recreant Samians, being ranged next them in the line; "and so also did the majority

¹ Herod. vi. 11-13.

of the Ionians." The Chians, however, remained firm, displaying great courage and skill, but though they sunk many of the enemy's ships they lost many of their own, and were at length forced to retire to Chios. Those of the vessels which were in too disabled a condition to make the voyage they ran aground on Mycale, where the crews went ashore. In the night the sailors reached the territory of Ephesus, unhappily at a moment when the Ephesian women were celebrating the Thesmophoria, a festival from which men were rigidly excluded. The Ephesians, seeing their country invaded, as they thought, by armed men at such a time, supposed that an attack was being made on their women; they rushed out one and all to the rescue, and the Chians were cut down. Of the Samians, also, eleven ships refused to share in the guilt of their comrades, the trierarchs remaining at their posts, without regard to the orders given to them by their generals, for which conduct they subsequently received public honours from the Samian community.¹

Misfortune of
the Chians.

The battle of Lade was practically the end of the Ionian revolt. A more miserable picture of selfishness and treachery than that which this rising brings before us it is difficult to conceive. Histiaeus and Aristagoras, to whose cruel ambition the revolt was due, were among the first to abandon the Ionians to their fate; the Athenians, who promised assistance, left at the first repulse. The Ionians and Cyprians were not only divided in their views, but allowed this division to lead them into treachery and desertion. The best counsels were systematically neglected; whatever involved immediate danger or hardship was neglected as impracticable. Such were the men who ruled under the protection of Persia;

Wretched
condition of
Asiatic Greece.

¹ Herod. vi. 14-16. The pillar on which the names of the patriotic Samians were recorded stood in the market-place of the city in the days of Herodotus. It was doubtless set up when the oligarchy recovered the government of the island.

such the condition into which fifty years of submission had brought the Greeks of Asia.

21. After their victory the Persians blockaded Miletus by land and sea. Every artifice which engineering science could

Siege and
capture of
Miletus.

suggest was employed against the city; the walls were undermined, and engines of all sorts brought up against them. Winter and summer the siege went on, but it was not till 494 B.C., two years after the battle of Lade, and five after the outbreak of the revolt, that Miletus fell. The greater part of the male population was slain in the storming of the city; the women and children

Punishment
of Miletus.
494 B.C.
Ol. 71. 3.

were treated as slaves; the temple of Apollo at Branchidae was pillaged and burnt. The captives were taken to Darius at Susa, who established them at Ampe, near the mouth of the Tigris; the territory round the city, and the plain of the Maeander, were retained by the Persians in their own hands; the more hilly and barren districts were assigned to the Carians of Pedasa, who appear to have submitted to the Persians immediately after the fall of the city.¹

The fall of Miletus seems to have reminded the Athenians of the part which they had taken in the disastrous and ill-planned revolt. "The Athenians," says Herodotus, "manifested their exceeding grief at

Vexation of
the Athenians.

the fall of Miletus in many ways, and more especially in this, that they fined their poet Phrynichus, who made the 'Capture of Miletus' the subject of a tragedy, in the sum of a thousand drachmae, and made it a law that this drama should never again be put upon the stage."²

22. After the fall of Miletus the Phoenician fleet was ordered to restore Aeaces to Samos, and as the reward of the treachery of the Samians at Lade, their island was left uninjured. From the narrative of Herodotus it appears that

¹ Herod. vi. 18-20. The allotment of the hill-country to the Carians is remarkable after the severe defeat of the Persians at Pedasa, three years previously, but see Herod. *l.c.* c. 25.

² Herod. vi. 21.

the traitors belonged to the democratic party, who preferred, as they often did, the rule of a tyrant to the rule of an oligarchy. The wealthier inhabitants of the island were by no means pleased with the turn of events, and after the defeat, which they perceived would be followed by the restoration of Aeaces, they resolved to seek a new home in Sicily, far removed from Medes and tyrants. This resolution, so honourable in the conception, was unhappily executed with the grossest perfidy, but with the result that the Samians, "without any trouble, got rid of the Medes, and established themselves in an excellent home, at Zancle in Sicily."¹

The Samian
patriots

sail to Zancle.

23. The Persian fleet passed the winter of 494-493 B.C. at Miletus. In the ensuing spring it proceeded to lay waste the islands off the coast, Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos. The towns on the mainland were also captured; and in all the severe punishment which was threatened at Lade was strictly carried out: the cities and their temples were burnt; the comeliest boys were mutilated; the fairest virgins were carried away to the king. Herodotus goes so far as to assert that the islands were "netted,"—i.e. soldiers joined hands so as to form a continuous line, and then marched from end to end of the territory. This is highly improbable, owing to the numerous precipices and ravines in the islands; but we need not doubt that the inhabitants were hunted down with complete and merciless ferocity.²

End of the
Ionian revolt.
493 B.C.
Ol. 71. 4.

From Ionia the fleet passed to the European side of the Hellespont, where Byzantium and Selymbria, Perinthus and the Thracian coast, the Chersonese and its numerous cities, still remained in revolt. The Byzantians, and with them the Chalcedonians of the opposite shore, did not even wait for the approach of the fleet, but at once retired to

The Persians
in the Bos-
porus, Pro-
pontis, and
Chersonese.

¹ Herod. vi. 21, 24, 25. See *infra*, chap. xii. § 10.

² Herod. vi. 31, 32. The Lesbians do not seem to have gained anything by their treachery.

Mesembria in the Euxine, leaving their cities to be burnt by the Phoenicians, who also destroyed Proconnesus and Artace. Cyzius, however, saved herself by a timely submission to Oebares, the satrap of Dascyleum. The fleet now returned, spreading fire and desolation on its way among all the cities of the coast to the Chersonese, where Cardia alone escaped destruction.¹

24. The Chersonese had been occupied by Miltiades, the son of Cypselus, and a number of Athenian colonists, soon

Occupation of
the Chersonese
by Miltiades,
the son of
Cypselus.

after Pisistratus obtained the tyranny at Athens for the first time (560 B.C.). On his arrival Miltiades had protected his territory from attacks on the north, by building a wall from Cardia to Pactye, a distance of $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles. When

he had thus secured himself, he began to attack the Lampsacenes, his neighbours, on the other side of the Hellespont. The Lampsacenes lay in wait for him and took him alive. But Croesus, who was on friendly terms with the tyrant, and at that time all-powerful on the Asiatic coast, threatened them that if they did not let Miltiades go, he would extirpate their city like a pine-tree—"the only tree which when cut down never grows again." Upon this Miltiades was restored to his kingdom, where he died without issue. After his death he was worshipped with sacrifices as the "founder" of the Chersonese; gymnastic and equestrian games were held in his honour, from which it is interesting to find that the Lampsacenes were rigidly excluded. He was succeeded by Stesagoras, the son of his half-brother, Cimon; but soon after his accession, Stesagoras lost his life, being struck down in the council-chamber at Cardia by a pretended deserter from Lampsacus,

Miltiades, the
son of Cimon.

with which city he also had gone to war. In his place, Miltiades, the second son of Cimon, was now sent out by the Pisistratidae, who, after the assassination of his father, had retained him in the city and treated him with consideration, in order to divert

¹ Herod. vi. 33.

suspicion from themselves. On arriving at the Chersonese, Miltiades professed to honour his brother's memory by secluding himself in his palace, but when the heads of the cities in the Chersonese came with one consent to Cardia to condole with him, he put them in prison, and having thus established his power, he secured it by maintaining a body of five hundred mercenaries, and by marrying Hegesipyle, the daughter of Olorus, the king of the Thracians.¹

25. Unless we reject the story that Miltiades, the son of Cimon, advised the Ionians to break the bridge over the Danube, we must allow that he was tyrant of the Chersonese at the time of the expedition of Darius to Scythia. But what his fortunes were in the years which followed it is difficult to say. His conduct must have been known to Darius, who could hardly have allowed him to remain in the Chersonese, and, indeed, Cornelius Nepos informs us that he left his kingdom and retired to Athens. The last statement is incredible, but he may have retired to Thrace under the protection of Olorus. From a chapter in Herodotus, who, it must be confessed, is by no means clear on this occasion, we gather that he returned to the Chersonese about 496 B.C., perhaps before the battle of Lade, when the prospects of the revolt were not yet hopeless; but he had no sooner done so than he was expelled by an immigrant horde of Scythians, who may have heard of the Ionic revolt and seized the opportunity to invade the dominions of Darius. In a short time he again returned. He seems to have induced the cities of the Chersonese to revolt, or they did so in his absence, and he availed himself of the confusion to get possession of Lemnos and Imbros, from which he expelled the Pelasgian inhabitants. This was of course equivalent to making war upon Persia, and Darius had now a second cause for resentment against Miltiades. When the Phoenician

Fortunes of
Miltiades
after the
Scythian
expedition.

¹ Herod. vi. 34-40. The threat to extirpate Lampsacus "like a pine" may have had some reference to the old name of Lampsacus—Pityussa, Pine-town.

fleet approached Tenedos in 493 B.C., it was no longer possible for him to remain in the Chersonese; he packed his possessions on five triremes, and left Cardia for Athens. As he was sailing through the Black Gulf, the Phoenician fleet came upon him; he escaped with four ships to Imbros, but the fifth was captured. On board was Metiochus, the eldest of his sons by his first wife, who was at once carried to the king. Darius treated the captive with the greatest kindness, giving him a house and estate, and a Persian wife, by whom he had children, who became national-Persians. Meanwhile Miltiades arrived safely at Athens.¹

Miltiades
leaves the
Chersonese
for Athens.
493 B.C.
Ol. 71. 4.

On his return to Athens, Miltiades found that he was by no means at the end of his troubles. Though the factions of the sixth century were now at an end, the Alcmaeonidae were by no means pleased to see the chief of a rival family back in the city.

Miltiades
at Athens.

Miltiades had shown himself daring and unscrupulous in his management of the Chersonese; his wealth was great; his family had been conquerors at Olympia; he was perhaps descended from, or connected with, Cypselus, the tyrant of Corinth, and for many years of his life he had occupied the position of an irresponsible despot. Would such a man consent to be an equal among equals in his old city? In the interval which had elapsed since he had taken the place of his elder brother, Stesagoras, in the Chersonese, Athens had gone through a great revolution. When he left the city, the tyrants were still on the throne; when he returned, the reforms of Cleisthenes had been firmly established for more than ten years. To a man of such experiences, accustomed to the unlimited exercise of personal power, "freedom of speech" was not likely to commend itself. The Alcmaeonidae resolved to crush him at once. The granddaughter of Megacles, a second Agariste, had married Xanthippus, of the

¹ Herod. vi. 40; Corn. Nep. *Milt.* 3. 6. For the capture of Lemnos by Miltiades see Herod. vi. 140. Imbros was probably taken about the same time.

ancient race of the Buzygae, who seems to have become, as it were, the representative of the great and ambitious family into which he had married. Supported by his friends, Xanthippus brought an action against Miltiades, immediately after his return to Athens, charging him with tyrannical government in the Chersonese. The charge was ridiculous. The Athenians had nothing whatever to do with the government of the Chersonese. The first Miltiades had gone out at the invitation of a native tribe to protect them against the incursions of their neighbours on the north, and the "tyranny" thus acquired had remained in the hands of the family ever since. Under such circumstances, Miltiades was, of course, acquitted; the plot of his enemies entirely broke down.¹

He is put on his trial, but acquitted.

26. In the remainder of the year 493 B.C. no further military operations were undertaken by the Persians against the Ionians. But in their domestic affairs a change was introduced at the instance of Artaphernes, which almost amounted to a revolution. Though the tyrants had been restored to their ruined cities, they were no longer allowed to occupy the independent position which they had hitherto enjoyed. Envoys from the cities were commanded to appear before Artaphernes at Sardis, and compelled to enter into compacts with each other, that their quarrels might be settled henceforth by arbitration and not by the sword. Their lands were also carefully measured, and upon each was imposed a tribute, computed according to the extent of the territory. The rates fixed by Artaphernes, which did not greatly differ from those previously in existence, continued unchanged down to the time of Herodotus.²

Artaphernes reorganises Ionia.

¹ Herod. vi. 104. Herodotus does not specify Xanthippus here—he merely says, "the enemies of Miltiades," but as Xanthippus led the attack in 489 B.C., he probably led it now.

² Herod. vi. 42, φόρους ἔταξε ἐκάστοισι, οἱ κατὰ χώραν διατελέουσι ἔχοντες ἐκ τούτου τοῦ χρόνου αἰεὶ ἔτι καὶ ἐς ἐμὲ ὡς ἐτάχθησαν ἐξ Ἀρταφέρνηος. Herodotus does not say that the rate of tribute was

27. In the following spring (492 B.C.) a complete change was made in the military arrangements of the Persians. The subjugation of Asia Minor and the European shore of the Hellespont being now complete, Darius resolved

Darius
resolves to
invade Greece.
492 B.C.
Ol. 72. 1.

to strike a blow at the more distant authors of his troubles, by sending an expedition against Eretria and Athens. All the generals of the preceding year were superseded, and Mardonius, the son of Gobryas, who had recently married the king's daughter and was in the vigour of early youth, was sent down to the sea-coast in command of a large army and fleet. The place appointed for the rendezvous was Cilicia. Here Mardonius went on board, and while he sailed to the Hellespont, the army was conducted by land to the same point.

On his voyage past the cities of Ionia, Mardonius revolutionised the Persian system of government prevailing in them.

Mardonius
removes the
tyrants in
Ionia.

Hitherto the Great King had endeavoured to maintain his authority by establishing tyrants, whose interests were identical with his own, and who held their places with the help of Persian troops. Experience had shown that this system—which was due to Cyrus—was a failure. The tyrants were not only untrustworthy as vassals of Persia, but incapable of controlling their own cities. While they quarrelled with each other and with the oligarchs, they lost their hold on the people. In the previous year Artaphernes

Democracy
in Ionia.

had taken measures to put an end to their turbulence and factions; Mardonius resolved to go much further. He removed them altogether, and put the government in the hands of the popular party. It was of the first importance to conciliate Ionia before setting out on a more

paid by the Asiatic cities down to his own time. But his words undoubtedly imply that Persia never ceded her claim to the tribute; and to this extent they imply that he knew nothing of the so-called Cimonian peace. For a somewhat different account of this event, in which Hecataeus figures as the envoy of the Ionians, see Diod. x. 25.

distant sphere of conquest ; and at the same time the oligarchs, who resented the influence of Persia in their cities, would best be kept in order by the "people," who felt the oppression of their own citizens far more than that of the Great King.¹

After making this change, Mardonius passed on to the Hellespont, whence he crossed over to Europe with his forces and proceeded on his way to the south. He had no difficulty in subjugating the island of Thasos ; and after completing the conquest of Macedon, which Megabazus had begun more than twenty years previously, he arrived at Acanthus on a full tide of success. But the delay in Ionia, and the long march of the army from Cilicia to the Troad, had occupied the best part of the summer ; by the time that he reached Acanthus, the stormy season had set in, during which Mount Athos is the terror of the Greek mariner. Ignorant of the dangers which awaited them, Mardonius sent his ships round the steep and rugged promontory. A terrible north-east wind, from which there was no escape, struck the vessels and hurled them on the inhospitable coast. Many of the sailors were drowned ; many perished with cold and exposure ; many were dashed to pieces on the rocks ; many were devoured by the monsters which swarmed in the sea. No fewer than 300 ships and 20,000 men perished on this disastrous voyage. At the same time the Thracian Brygi made a night attack on the army as it lay in Macedonia, which was attended with considerable slaughter, Mardonius himself being among the wounded. This disaster was quickly retrieved ; but though Mardonius did not leave the place till he had reduced the Brygi to submission, the fleet was hope-

Mardonius
sails to Europe.

His fleet is
wrecked off
Mount Athos.

but he reduces
the Brygi and
the Mace-
donians.

¹ Herod. vi. 43. For Mardonius, see Curtius, *Gr. Gesch.* i. 630 (ed. 6). He may have been influenced by the action of the democratic party at Samos in the battle of Lade. Twelve years later Xerxes made Theomestor tyrant of Samos, and Strattis was the tyrant of Chios ; in fact, the system established by Mardonius was not permanent.

lessly ruined, and it was far too late in the year to think of new operations. He returned to Asia; the first attempt to conquer Greece had ended in utter failure.¹

28. The spring of the next year (491 B.C.) found the Thasians once more in trouble. The island was rich in metals; even

The Persians
at Thasos.

491 B.C.

Ol. 72. 2.

in prehistoric times the Phoenicians had "overturned a mountain" there, in the search for gold, and the supply was not yet exhausted. The

Thasians had also acquired mines on the mainland, at Skaptê Hylê ("the excavated forest") and elsewhere, which were still more productive than those of their own island. From these sources they derived a revenue, which, according to Herodotus, amounted on an average to 200 talents (£40,000) a year. Warned by the attack of Histiaeus, they had devoted part of these revenues to building ships of war, and strengthening the wall of the city; and by their ready submission to Mardonius in the preceding year, they had preserved both their possessions and their defences intact. Such prosperity provoked the envy of their neighbours, who had, perhaps, good reasons for supposing that they would use their power to extend their possessions on the mainland. A message was sent to Darius intimating that the Thasians were about to throw off their allegiance. Whether the accusation was true or not, Darius did not wait to inquire; he at once sent orders to the Thasians that their walls were to be destroyed and their ships of war sent to Abdera—which lay on the Thracian coast opposite Thasos, and was, therefore, within the observation of the "neighbours." As before, the Thasians submitted without any attempt at resistance.²

29. Disastrous though the result had been of the expedition sent against Athens under Mardonius, Darius was not the man to forget an injury or acknowledge a failure. He recommenced his preparations against Greece on a wider and more systematic scale. On the one hand, he gave orders to

New pre-
parations for
invading
Greece.

¹ Herod. vi. 44, 45.

² Herod. vi. 46, 47.

all the maritime cities in his dominions to prepare ships of war and transport-vessels for horses ; on the other, he sent envoys into Greece to demand from the various nations the gift of earth and water, by which they would acknowledge that their country was the king's, and held by them at his pleasure. We may reasonably suppose that such a step was taken by the advice of Hippias and his family ; they knew the divided state of Hellas, and the enmities which prevailed among the cities ; they could point out the great advantage which would be gained by a more precise estimate of the resistance, for which it was necessary to prepare, and by securing friendly harbours to which the Persian fleet could direct its course without fear of opposition.

Darius demands earth and water from the Greeks.

30. The arrival of these envoys in Greece was followed by a series of events which determined the course of the history of the country. Many of the nations on the mainland, and all the islanders, whom they visited, acceded to their request. Among these were the Aeginetans. Fifteen or sixteen years previously the Aeginetans had made a sudden and unprovoked attack on the Athenians, and the injury had neither been atoned for nor forgiven. If not actually at war, the two cities were on the worst of terms. No sooner did the Athenians hear what their enemies had done, than they went to Sparta and denounced them as traitors to Hellas. So excellent an opportunity was not to be lost. They had failed in their own attempts on Aegina, but Sparta was at once the head of the confederacy, of which Aegina was a member, and the foremost state in Hellas, the guardian of Hellenic freedom. So, at least, the Athenians declared, in spite of the recent quarrel. The Spartans at once took the matter up. Cleomenes, who was still on the throne, crossed over to Aegina, with the intention of arresting those citizens who had taken the lead in submission to Persia. But the opposition was too strong. Crius, a leading citizen, bade him touch any

The Aeginetans accede to his request.

Cleomenes at Aegina.

Crius.

Aeginetan at his peril. He had come alone, bribed to his work by Athenian gold; had he been the representative of the Spartan people, the second king would have been with him. Cleomenes was compelled to retire from the island, but his words at leaving were remembered. He asked Crius (Ram) his name, and when he heard it, replied: "Then get your horns tipped, for you will need the protection."¹

31. The line of opposition taken by Crius had been suggested to him by Demaratus, the reigning Eurypontid monarch at Sparta. Demaratus had already thwarted Cleomenes in his expedition against Athens, and he now took

Cleomenes
plots against
Demaratus.

the opportunity of his absence from Sparta to damage him in the eyes of the people. Cleomenes determined to get rid of him. The

representative of the younger branch of the Eurypontid line at this time was Leotychidas, the son of Menares. To him Cleomenes went with a proposal that he would make him king of Sparta, if, when he became king, Leotychidas would join in an expedition to Aegina. As he already had a quarrel with Demaratus—for when he was about to make Percalus, the daughter of Chilon, his wife, Demaratus had carried off the lady by force and taken her for himself—Leotychidas at once closed with the proposal. He came forward with a declaration that Demaratus was not the son of Ariston; he appealed to Ariston's own words when the birth of the child was announced to him, and cited the ephors, who had heard them, as witnesses in his behalf. On the

Demaratus
is deposed.

suggestion of Cleomenes, who had taken steps to influence the priestess, the matter was referred to the oracle at Delphi; and when the decision was given against Demaratus, he was deposed, and Leotychidas became king in his place, as the next-of-kin. Demaratus afterwards left Sparta, and withdrew to Elis on his way, as he said, to consult the oracle of Delphi. The Lacedæmonians, who suspected his intentions, started in pursuit,

¹ Herod. vi. 48-50.

They overtook him in Zacynthus, and demanded his surrender. The Zacynthians refused it, but Demaratus, perceiving that Greece was no longer safe, proceeded to the Persian court. Here he received a hearty welcome from Darius, who gave him a city and lands, upon which his descendants were living in the fourth century.¹

The two kings at once sailed to Aegina, and as no opposition could now be offered to the legality of their mission, they selected ten of the leading citizens, including Crius himself, as hostages for the good behaviour of the island, and placed them for safe keeping with the Athenians, who for the moment had Aegina in their power.²

Cleomenes
again visits
Aegina, with
Leotychidas.

32. The envoys whom Darius had sent to Athens and Sparta did not return to him. Those who arrived at Athens were executed like the vilest criminals, being thrown into the pit or Barathrum; those who went to Sparta met with a more humorous, but not less cruel, reception. They were plunged into a well "to obtain earth and water for themselves!" These two cities were pledged to internecine war with Persia, but from the rest the report was for the most part favourable. Darius knew that he could cross the Aegean without risk, and that no fleet in Hellas could prevent him from landing where he chose.

The Persian
Ambassadors
at Athens and
Sparta.

With the return of spring (490 B.C.) he completed his preparations for the new invasion. Mardonius was removed from his post, the command of the expedition being intrusted to Datis, a Mede, and Artaphernes, the son of the satrap of Sardis. As before, the place of rendezvous was Cilicia, but the route which had proved so disastrous in 492 B.C. was abandoned; the ships were to sail to Ionia, and thence from Samos across the Icarian sea, leaving Athos far

The new ex-
pedition under
Datis and
Artaphernes.
490 B.C.
Ol. 72. 3.

¹ Herod. vi. 61, 65, 70; Xen. *Hell.* iii. 1. 6.

² Herod. vi. 73.

to the north. We may also assume that the expedition set out in time to avoid the storms of the early autumn on its return. Lastly, a number of horses were added to the army, perhaps at the suggestion of Hippias, who might remember the very efficient help which the horse of Thessaly had rendered him against the attack of Anchimolius. The commanders were bidden to bring the inhabitants of Eretria and Athens as slaves into the presence of the Great King.¹

33. On their way across the sea the fleet put in at Naxos, which was still independent of Persia. The island had taken

The Persians
at Naxos;

no part in the Ionic revolt, but it was, nevertheless, treated as Chios and Lesbos had been treated before it; perhaps in revenge for the failure of the previous expedition (p. 50). Those inhabitants who did not escape to the mountains were enslaved, the city and the temples were burnt, and for the next ten years the island formed part of the Persian dominions. From Naxos the fleet proceeded to the neighbouring islands.

But when he reached Delos, Datis chose to treat at Delos.

it as holy ground. At the news of his approach the inhabitants had retired to Tenos, but Datis, who would not allow his ships to anchor nearer than Rhenaea, bade them return; he had orders from the king to do no hurt to the land in which Apollo and Artemis had been born; a clemency which he confirmed by offering 300 talents of incense on the sacred altar. He then passed on his way to Eretria with the Ionians and Aeolians, who formed part of his fleet. From every island which he passed he took a new contingent, and, in order to secure their fidelity, he carried away a number of boys as hostages. "After his departure from Delos," says Herodotus, "the island was shaken, as the Delians say, which was the first and last earthquake down to my time." In the incident the historian saw a sign of the miseries which were

¹ Herod. vi. 94, 95. For the envoys, *ib.* vii. 133. I see no reason to doubt the truth of the story. It is neither more nor less certain than a great part of the details of the Persian war. Paus. iii. 12. 7.

about to come upon Hellas. For in the reigns of Darius, Xerxes, and Artaxerxes—three successive generations—more evils befell Hellas than had been known in the twenty previous generations.¹

34. From Delos the Persian fleet advanced in a north-westerly course to Euboea and made the land at Carystus, a town under Mount Ocha, at the head of a bay on the southern coast of the island. Here a surprise awaited them. The small Dryopian town, unshaken by the terror of the Persian name, refused to give hostages, or to join in an expedition against her neighbours; and the Carystians did not change this resolution till the city was besieged and the vineyards of the Carystian plain laid waste. Meanwhile the Eretrians, conscious of the part which they had taken in the burning of Sardis, were in great alarm. Their first thought was to send for aid to Athens, a city selected like their own for Persian vengeance. The Athenians at once responded to the appeal, and gave orders that the 4000 colonists, who some seventeen years previously had been sent out to occupy the rich lands of the Chalcidian oligarchs, should march to the defence of Eretria. But counsels were divided in the ill-fated city; one section proposing to retire to the summits of the Euboean mountains, the other expecting to secure a handsome reward by betraying the town to the Persians. Under such circumstances there was little hope of any serious resistance, and Aeschines, a leading citizen of Eretria, urged the Athenians to retire before they perished in the ruins of his own city; advice which they were quite ready to follow. The fleet of the Persians now arrived on the coast. At three separate points, Tamynae, Choereae, and Aegilia, they disembarked troops of cavalry, expecting to

The Persians
at Carystus.



They attack
Eretria,

¹ Herod. vi. 96-98. Plutarch, *De mal. Her.* 36, informs us on the authority of the Naxian annalists that Datis was repulsed from the island after he had burnt some part of it! The twenty generations cover the time between Darius and the Trojan war.

meet the enemy in the field. But the Eretrians had no intention of risking an engagement; when it was decided not to abandon the city, they resolved to give their whole attention to maintaining their walls. The Persians were compelled to attack the town, and for six days the assault went on with which, after some resistance, is betrayed to them. great slaughter on either side; on the seventh the counsels of the traitors prevailed, and the city was given up by Euphorbus and Philagrus, "men of note" in Eretria. The Persians were no sooner in the town than they pillaged and burnt the temples and enslaved the inhabitants, as Darius had commanded.¹

35. Hitherto the expedition had been attended with complete success; the wishes of Darius had been carried out in every particular. What resistance had been offered had either been easily overcome, as at Carystus, or paralysed by divided and treacherous counsels, as at Eretria. And though the last and greatest part of the task still remained, Datis might look forward with confidence to the result. He had Hippias with him—whose name would be a rallying-point for the disaffected citizens at Athens—whose experience could guide him in directing his attack to the most vulnerable parts of Attica. And Hippias himself would have a very imperfect conception of the progress which Athens had made in the twenty years since his expulsion. He remembered that he had been driven out by the aid of the Lacedaemonians, who had been once foiled in the attempt, and finally owed their success to the happy accident which had placed his children in the power of his enemies. He knew that Athens had twice appealed to Persia to extricate her from the almost overwhelming difficulties of her situation. The deceit by which the Alcmaeonidae had secured their return to Athens had been discovered; the Spartans had seen reason to repent of the


¹ Herod. vi. 99-101; Plato, *Menez.* p. 240. The Carystians were Dryopians, Thuc. vii. 57.



1. Murus Phocensium 2. Cyttri

London: Stanford & Co. Geogr. Inst.

London & Bombay, Longmans & Co.



policy which induced them to remove the tyrants from Athens; the Aeginetans, whose navy commanded the Attic coast, were favourable to the Great King. Such thoughts may have passed through the mind of Hippias, as he directed the Persian fleet from Eretria to Marathon, following the course, which, nearly fifty years before, he had traversed with his father on the venture which had ended in the final establishment of a tyranny at Athens. He did not know—or did not realise—that Athens was now an united city; that the reforms of Clisthenes had put an end for ever to the old local divisions which had made a tyranny possible; that the Athenians had tasted the sweets of liberty, and shown their appreciation of them by defeating their enemies on every hand; that Cleomenes, who represented the reaction at Sparta, was mad or dead, or at least absent from his city.

Growth of
unity and
patriotism
in Athens.

After a few days' delay at Eretria, the fleet passed over to Marathon. On the way the captive Eretrians were deposited in the small island of Aegleia, near Styra, off the S.W. coast of Euboea, and a number of ships must have been left behind to guard them. The rest were ranged on the shore of the bay, which the promontory of Cynosura shields from the north and east; the soldiers, after disembarking, were encamped on the adjacent plain.¹

The Persians
land at Mara-
thon.

36. The famous plain is about six miles in length, and averages two in breadth. Narrow passes lead into it from the north, south, and west, but otherwise it is shut in by a wall of mountains, so as to form a distinct and isolated district. The hills which surround the northern half are the eastern off-shoots of the range of Parnes; those in the south are the north-eastern spurs of Pentelicus. Between the two, dividing the plain into halves, a stream rushes to the sea, carrying down the waters of the high

The Plain of
Marathon.

¹ Herod. vi. 102, 107.

ground near Aphidna; and further to the south, a second brook descends from Pentelicus. Before reaching the plain, the larger stream passes through a deep and narrow valley; this was the site of Oenoe, though the modern village has usurped the name of Marathon; on the smaller stream, where the valley is wider, but still protected by hills on either side (Argaliki on the south, Kotroni on the north), near the site of the hamlet of Vrana, lay the deme of Marathon.

Two roads connect the plain with Athens; one runs up the stream past Vrana, and over the northern end of Pentelicus into the plain of the Cephissus; this, in point of distance, is the shorter route, but it is rendered difficult by the steep and rugged ground which must be crossed between Vrana and Cephissia.

The second road leaves the plain at the southern end, and after crossing the saddle between Hymettus and Pentelicus, descends to the valley of the Ilissus. The length of this route is about twenty-six miles, and it alone is convenient for carriages.¹

The northern end of the plain is occupied to a great extent by a marsh, impassable in winter, but probably dry enough when the Persians landed (in August?) to allow soldiers to encamp upon it. We may suppose, therefore, that on disembarking from their ships, the Persian army was encamped in the northern half of the plain, beyond the brook. Here they awaited the approach of the Athenians.

37. Meanwhile intelligence of their coming had been brought to Athens. The generals of the year had recently been elected; and chief among them was Miltiades, who, as we have seen, had returned to the city three years previously. Of the internal state of Athens at this time we know but little. Clisthenes, the great reformer, has disappeared from view: whether ostracised or dead is uncertain; at any

Roads connecting Marathon and Athens.

The news of the invasion reaches Athens.

¹ It was by this road that Pisistratus advanced from Marathon to Athens on his final return.

rate we never hear of him.¹ His place, as head of the Alcmaeonidae, and leader of the people, had been taken by Xanthippus, between whom and Miltiades, now State of the city. the champion of the "notables," a sharp contention prevailed. Aristides, who was also one of the generals for the year, was known as a firm friend of the reformed constitution, and his views were shared by Alcibiades, who had renounced an old connection with Sparta, owing, doubtless, to the Spartan efforts in the cause of Hippias. Themistocles, if we reject the account in which he is archon in 493 B.C., was a young man, whose triumphs were yet to come, but he was old enough to take part in military service. Besides the rival leaders of the "demos" and the "notables," there was also a section who would not unwillingly have seen Athens once more under the rule of a tyrant.²

When the news arrived of the approach of the Persians, a trained runner, Phidippides by name, was at once despatched to Sparta; for Sparta was not only the leading Phidippides sent to Sparta. state of Greece, but her treatment of the heralds of Darius had implicated her in the quarrel with Persia. Phidippides, leaving Athens on the seventh, reached Sparta on the ninth day of the moon, and was back again on the eleventh, with the answer that the Spartans could not leave home till the full moon; five or six days His message from Sparta, would therefore elapse before their contingent could arrive at Athens. But though the answer from Sparta was discouraging, Phidippides had other news to tell, which might compensate in some degree for the dis- and from the god Pan. appointment. When crossing Mount Parthenius, above Tegea, the god Pan had called him by his name, and asked why the Athenians paid so little heed to a deity who

¹ He is said to have been ostracised, Aelian, *V. H.* xiii. 24, but in *Ath. Pol.* c. 22 we read that Hipparchus, the son of Charmus, was the first Athenian ostracised; and that this took place two years after the battle of Marathon. See also *Plut. Nic.* 11.

² It was in the year 501 (?) that ten generals were first elected at Athens: they were chosen one from each tribe, the Polemarch being commander-in-chief; *Arist. Ath. Pol.* c. 22.

was their friend, who had often aided them, and would aid them again.¹

The account which Herodotus gives of the battle of Marathon reads like a chapter out of a romance, written to exalt Miltiades and place the victory of the Athenians in the most brilliant light. Of the events which immediately followed the return of Phidippides he says nothing; he carries us at once to the field of Marathon, where the Athenians are en-

The Athenians
at Marathon.

camped in the precincts of Heracles, together with the Plataeans, who have gone out with their whole force; but neither of the Athenians, nor of the contingent which joined them, are the numbers given.² And though the ten generals had agreed to march to the plain where the enemy lay encamped, they were by no means decided about giving battle. Half of them, we are told, were averse to a conflict, the other half—in which was included Miltiades, whom all regarded as their leader—were in favour

Division of
opinion.

of it. What were the views of those who wished to avoid an engagement is not stated; but the “worse opinion” seemed likely to gain the day, when Miltiades repaired to Callimachus, the Archon-Polemarch, who could give a casting vote.³ To him he appealed in these impressive words:—“It is for you, Callimachus, to decide

Miltiades
appeals to
Callimachus.

whether you will enslave Athens, or leave behind you a name more glorious than that of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. We are now in such danger as Athenians have never been in before. If we submit, we know what Hippias has in store for us; if we are

¹ Herod. vi. 105, 106. The Athenians, when their fortunes prospered, founded a shrine for Pan under the Acropolis, and propitiated him with yearly sacrifices and a torch-race. Justin, ii. 9. 9, says that the Lacedaemonians asked for four days' delay; *quadridui teneri religione*.

² Herod. vi. 108.

³ Herodotus speaks of Callimachus as *ὁ κνᾶμω λαχών*. In the *Ath. Pol.* c. 22, it is said that the archons were not elected by lot in 490 B.C. In 487 B.C. the system of electing by lot out of a number of selected candidates, which Solon had established, was re-introduced with modifications.

victorious, our city may become the first in Hellas. We generals are divided in our judgment; half would fight, half would not. If we do not fight, I fear that civil strife will break out among us; and the Athenians will be misled into joining the Medes; if we fight before the evil shows itself, we may hope, with the gods' help, to gain the day. The issue rests with you. If you vote with me, you remain the citizen of a free city, and your city will be the first in Greece; if you join the others, every blessing of our lives will change into the corresponding evil."¹

Callimachus was induced by this appeal to give his vote for Miltiades, and on this decision the rest of the generals not only gave way, but as his day of office came round, each of those who were for battle ceded the command to Miltiades, who was thus general-in-chief of the forces. Miltiades, however, delayed the engagement till his own day of command should arrive.²

Callimachus
decides for
battle.

The Persians, as we have seen, had probably occupied the northern and central part of the plain, their ships being drawn up on the shore, doubtless within the shelter of the promontory of Cynosura. They now came forward to the west and south towards the mouth of the valley of Marathon, with their left and rear on the shore. The Athenians, who had been safe in the valley, their flank protected from any attack through the narrow ravine which connects the valleys of Marathon and Oenoe by a fortification, advanced further down to the plain. But they were careful not to go beyond the limits of the hills which protected them on right and left, and the wooded ground at the foot of the slopes. Their position was excellent. The Persians could not bring their numbers to bear with effect in the valley, nor could they march by the coast road to Athens, without exposing their unshielded side to attack. The Athenians, on the other hand,

¹ Herod. vi. 109. Harmodius and Aristogeiton were natives of Aphidna, a deme of the Aentiad tribe, to which Callimachus belonged. Plut. *Quaest. Conv.* i. 10. 3.

² Herod. vi. 110.

were on the higher ground, from which they could charge with greater ease and force.

38. When it came to his turn, Miltiades drew up the Athenians in the following order :—The right wing was led by Callimachus, the Polemarch, in accordance with the law in force at the time at Athens : the rest of the Athenians followed, arranged by their

Order of the
Athenians at
Marathon.

tribes ; on the extreme left were the Plataeans. In order to put forward a line equal to the Persian front, the Greek centre was weakened, consisting of a very few ranks, while the two wings were made as massive as the numbers would allow. When the omens were found to be favourable, the word was given. The Athenians dashed forward at a run down the mile of sloping ground which divided them from the enemy ;

THE BATTLE.

490 B.C.

Ol. 72. 3.

the Persians prepared to receive them. When they saw so small an army—unprotected by cavalry or bowmen—rushing on at full speed to the charge, their hopes were raised to the highest ; they looked on them as madmen hastening to their death. “For the Athenians,” says Herodotus, with pardonable exaggeration, “were the first of the Greeks to charge the enemy at the double : they were also the first to support the sight of the Modes and Median dress.”¹ The whole Grecian force was at once engaged. For a long time neither side gave way. At length the Persian centre (where were the Persians and Sacae—the picked troops of the army) broke the slender ranks of the Greeks and pursued them towards the interior of the plain ; but at the same time the heavier masses on the wings were victorious. Instead of pursuing his advantage, Miltiades ordered the wings to change front and attack the Persian centre. Here also they gained the day ; they forced the enemy to retreat, and followed closely in his steps till they drove him to his ships. So hot was the pursuit that the foremost Athenians seized the vessels and called for fire to destroy them. In this desperate conflict Callimachus was

¹ Herod. vi. 111, 112.

slain, and many other Athenians of note; among them Stesilaus and Cynegeirus, the brother of Aeschylus, the poet, whose hand was struck off as he clung to the prow of a Persian galley. They were only able to capture seven of the vessels; the rest escaped. The number of Persians who fell in the engagement was 6400; the number of the Athenians was 192.¹

And now a new alarm spread through the Greek army; they saw the Persian fleet—apparently at a preconcerted signal of a shield raised aloft on Mount Pentelicus—sailing towards Sunium and making for Athens. Without delay or rest the army at once marched back to the city, and ere night it was encamped in the Heracleum at Cynosarges, on the banks of the Ilissus. Their haste had not been in vain; the dreaded fleet soon appeared off the bay of Phalerum, but finding that it was too late to surprise the city, it abandoned any further attack and returned to Asia.²

The shield on
Pentelicus.

39. From Nepos, who is thought to have followed Ephorus, we receive a different version of the events which immediately preceded the battle of Marathon; a version which, though it may not be more authentic, is certainly in some points more intelligible than that of Herodotus. He informs us that the division of opinion arose among the generals before they left Athens, and that the question in dispute was, whether they should go out to meet the enemy in the field, or remain behind the walls of the city, not whether they should engage with forces which lay at a mile's distance from their front. He also states that the Plataeans joined the Athenians while still at Athens, and that the battle took place on the very next day after the Athenians arrived at Marathon. He fixes the number of Persian ships at 500; their infantry at 200,000, of which, however, only half were engaged in the battle;

Account of
the battle
in Nepos,

¹ Herod. vi. 113-117; cf. Justin, ii. 9. 9-21.

² Herod. vi. 115, 116.

their cavalry at 10,000—though it is obvious that the number of ships is quite inadequate for the conveyance of so large an army. The Athenian forces amounted to 10,000, of whom 1000 were Plataeans; and they were drawn up for battle in a manner calculated to protect them from the Persian horse.

But at this point the account becomes too general to be of any further service. How the engagement was fought—whether the Persian horse were or were not upon the field—whether the whole of the defeated army embarked in the course of the battle, we are not told. Nothing is said of the signal shield, or of the hasty return of the army to Athens.¹

From Plutarch we are able to add a few details to the story of Herodotus. The tendency of his narrative is to exalt the glory of Aristides—a tendency which we shall have to notice again in his account of the battle of Plataea. Aristides is one of the ten generals; it was owing to his action that the division of opinion among the generals, of which Plutarch speaks in the vaguest manner, was composed, and he set the example of giving up his own day of command to Miltiades. In the battle he fought with his tribe (the Antiochid) in the centre of the line, and next to him was Themistocles, with the Leontid tribe. When the Athenians saw the Persians directing their fleet to Athens, nine of the ten tribes hurried homewards, but Aristides was left with the Antiochid to collect and guard the captives and the spoil, which was immense.²

¹ Nepos, *Milt.* 4, 5. Miltiades alone is said to have been in favour of immediate battle, and he was enabled to have his way by the arrival of the contingent from Plataea. Of the position of the Athenians Nepos says: "Dein postero die sub montis radicibus acie regione instructa non apertissima prœlium commiserunt (namque arbores multis locis erant rarsae), hoc consilio, ut et montium altitudine tegerentur et arborum tractu equitatus hostium impediretur ne multitudine clauderentur." The greater clearness of Ephorus does not, of course, prove that his account is more historical than that of Herodotus. The statements in Suidas, *sub v. χαρπὶς ἱππέως*, are not worth serious consideration.

² Plut. *Aristid.* 5. The fact, if it is a fact, that the Leontid and Antiochid tribes fought side by side, shows that the tribes were

40. When the conflict of Marathon came to be depicted on the Painted Porch at Athens, the prosaic events of a battle-field were not sufficient to satisfy the genius of the artist. The picture was composed of three sections: in the foreground both the hostile lines were seen engaged in equal combat; in the middle, the barbarians were already in flight, and trampling each other into the marsh; in the background were the Phœnician ships, and the Greeks slaughtering the enemy, as they embarked. The hero Marathon was present, and Athena and Heracles. Theseus was seen ascending out of the earth, and Echetus, a hero of rustic dress and appearance, struck down the fugitive Persians with a ploughshare. Long afterwards, in the time of Pausanias, it was believed that the belated traveller, whom chance brought by night to the hallowed scene of Athenian glory, could hear the neighing of horses and discern the forms of ghostly combatants—a belief which lingers still among the inhabitants of the neighbouring hamlets.¹

Picture of the
Battle on the
"Painted
Porch."

Legends.

It was the custom of the Athenians to carry home the remains of those who had fallen in battle, and place them in the fair suburb of the Ceramicus. But the excellent bravery of the heroes of Marathon demanded a peculiar mark of honour; they, and they alone, were buried on the scene of their immortal victory. A mound was raised over the corpses of the Athenians, on which were erected ten pillars, one for each tribe, inscribed with the names of the dead. Another tumulus covered the Plataeans and the slaves who had taken part in the conflict. And though Miltiades had not the happiness to fall on the field, a separate tomb was afterwards erected

Honours paid
to the slain at
Marathon.

placed in some sequence different from the fixed and permanent order of arrangement, in which the Leontid was the fourth, the Antiochid the tenth; see Stein on Herod. vi. 111.

¹ Paus. i. 15. 3; i. 32. 4. The impious curiosity of those who visited the field with a design of seeing the phantom battle was never satisfied.

there in his honour. The scene of the conflict was marked by a trophy of white marble—a lasting memorial was not out of place in recording a victory won over barbarians.¹

41. The triumphant day of Marathon was regarded as the crowning achievement of the Athenian army. The glory was

Significance
of the battle.

all their own—or shared only by the faithful Plataeans. The Lacedaemonians, who marched out in such haste, when the full moon per-

mitted them, that they reached Attica on the third day after leaving Sparta—the distance is 150 miles—were a day too late. They proceeded to the field of battle, looked with wonder on the corpses of the terrible Medes, commended the Athenians for their bravery, and returned home. In such a parade there was little that could be satisfactory to Spartan pride; little to support her position as the champion of Hellenic freedom. It is not surprising, therefore, that writers, who were jealous of Spartan honour, should endeavour to diminish the glory of Marathon. Theopompus, the historian

Attempts to
disparage it.

of the fourth century, spoke of the battle as an unimportant engagement, which Athenian pride had magnified into a decisive conflict;

and in the eyes of the author of the "Malignity of Herodotus," it was no more than a "slight tussle." We are indeed compelled to admit that the recorded numbers of the Persian army—even on the lowest estimate—are far in excess of any number which can have been carried across the sea in five or six hundred vessels; and in two respects the details of the

Difficulties in
the accounts
of it.

battle are incomplete and unintelligible: (1)

Though Marathon was selected by Hippias as an excellent field for the operations of horse; though Nepos speaks of 10,000 Persian horse at Marathon, and of the precautions which the Athenians took against

¹ Thuc. ii. 34, ἐκείνων δὲ διαπρεπὴ τὴν ἀρετὴν κρίναντες αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸν τάφον ἐποίησαν. Paus. i. 32. 3, ἐμαχέσαντο γὰρ καὶ δούλοι τότε πρῶτον. Older authorities say nothing of this. Paus. i. 32. 4, 5. Lasting trophies were not erected for victories won in battle over Greeks.

them; though Pausanias saw the "mangers of Antaphernes," and mentions the neighing of horses in the nightly conflicts, not a word is said by any author of the part taken by the horse in the battle. (2) The embarkation of a large number of men and horses is a tedious matter, which, even under the most favourable circumstances, would consume several hours, yet, if we are to believe Herodotus and Plutarch, the battle was fought and won, the Persians were driven to their ships and embarked, in time for the Athenians to reach Athens, a distance of more than twenty miles, on the same day! It is possible to modify these difficulties by assuming facts, which our authorities have omitted, or altering those which they have recorded; but it is better to leave the accounts as we find them. This much, at least, is certain. The victory of Marathon was not only the first defeat of the Persians on Hellenic ground, but it saved Athens; and by saving Athens it saved Greece. For this reason it deserves a place among the great and decisive battles of the world.¹

42. For a time the great conqueror of Marathon was the foremost man in Athens; the enemies who had attacked him on his return from the Chersonesus were Miltiades after silenced; no one could claim equal authority Marathon. with him as a general. That his views were not those of all the Athenians is clear from the danger of internal faction and Medism, which he expressed so plainly to Callimachus, and from the signal shield shown to the Persians on the day

¹ Herod. vi. 120; Plato, *Menex.* 240; *Laws*, 698, 707. Nepos says nothing of the journey of the Spartans, but merely states that Datis resolved to give battle before the Spartans arrived: *Mil.* 5. 4. Theopomp. *Frag.* 167 M, τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχην οὐχ ἅμα πάντες ὑμνοῦσι γεγενημένην. Plut. *De mal.* Herod. 27. 3, οὐδ' ἄγων τις ἔοικεν οὐδ' ἔργον γεγονέναι τοσούτου, ἀλλὰ πρόσκρουσμα βραχὺ τοῖς βαρβάροις ἀποβᾶσιν. Compare the view which Curtius takes of the battle. For the mangers, Paus. i. 32. 7. The third difficulty, the long delay of the Persians at Marathon, which, in the account of Herodotus, extended from the 6th to the 17th of the month, is much diminished in the account of Nepos. Yet even in his story, the Persians remained idle on the field, while Phidippides travelled to Sparta and back (four days), and the Athenians marched out from Athens (one or two days).

of Marathon. Whether leagued with the Persians or not, the hostile party, which may have included some members of the Alcmaeonidae, was by no means friendly to the chief of the Philaidae; it looked with an envious eye on his pre-eminent position. It was not long before he afforded his enemies an opportunity for giving effect to their hatred. As Herodotus tells the story, he requested the Athenians to furnish him with seventy ships, and a sum of money; what the object was which he had in view he did not even state, but merely promised to enrich the city by the conquest of a country where gold was plentiful. The request was granted, and Miltiades proceeded to attack Paros, ostensibly on the ground that the island had supplied ships to the Persians, but really to be revenged on Lysagoras, a Parian, who had maligned him to Hydarnes, the Persian. He shut up the Parians into the city and demanded 100 talents as the price of removing his army. The Parians refused to give the money; they prepared for a siege, and resisted with such vigour that Miltiades was unable to reduce the town. At length, in despair, he entered into secret communication with a female captive named Timo, who was a sacristan in the service of the Chthonian deities. At her suggestion, he visited by night the temple of Demeter, which lay on an eminence outside the wall of the city. and failure. He had leapt into the enclosure, which he found secured, and was close to the doors of the shrine, when he was seized with sudden fear, and in leaping back over the wall he injured his thigh. Thus wounded, he returned to Athens, without fulfilling any of the promises by which he obtained the ships. He had besieged the island twenty-six days, only to show that Paros was able to resist successfully the conqueror of Marathon.

On his return, his old enemy, Xanthippus, put him on his trial "for deceiving the Athenian people," fixing the penalty at death. Miltiades was reduced to such a condition by his wound, which had begun to mortify, that he was unable to defend himself, but his friends spoke in his behalf, while he

lay helpless on his couch in court. They reminded the Athenians of his victory at Marathon, of the capture of Lemnos, of the vengeance which he had taken on the Pelasgians for the ancient wrongs which they had done to the Athenians. The people were so far moved that they commuted the sentence of death for a fine of 50 talents. Miltiades soon afterwards died in prison; the fine was paid by his son, Cimon.

His condemnation and death.
489 B.C.?
Ol. 72. 4.

43. In this story Herodotus derives his statements from two sources. What he says of the expedition to Paros, the motives which impelled Miltiades to it, the demand for money, the investment of the city and the vigorous defence of the Parians, was the "account current among all the Greeks"; what follows about Timo and the temple of Demeter, the nightly visit and the wound received in leaping over the wall, was derived from the Parians. The Athenian account, which we should regard as the most important of all, in forming a judgment on the change in the feelings of the Athenians towards their great hero, Herodotus does not mention. The Parian story supplied him with that trait which, in his eyes, sufficiently accounted for the disastrous end of Miltiades. When the Parians consulted Delphi on the conduct of Timo, intending to punish her, the oracle replied that she was in no way to blame; she was merely the guide who led Miltiades to his destined fate. And we know from Pausanias, who in these matters is like-minded with Herodotus, that Miltiades was thought to have come to his evil end, because it was on his proposal that the envoys of Darius had been thrown into the pit. Here, therefore, was found that correspondence of offence and punishment which it was the delight of the Greek historian to trace in the sequence of events.¹

The account of Herodotus.

44. When we turn to Ephorus (Nepos), we find ourselves in a clearer atmosphere. There is no hint that Miltiades took away

¹ Herod. vi. 132-136; Paus. iii. 12. 7.

the ships without stating the object for which he took them. The attack on Paros was one of a series of attacks made by the Athenians under the command of Miltiades, upon the islands which had rendered assistance to the Persians. In most cases the attacks were successful, but Paros was too powerful to be reduced by the Athenian fleet; and after a vigorous siege the expedition came to a sudden end. A chance conflagration in the neighbouring island of Myconus raised the alarm that the Persian fleet was coming up, upon which Miltiades returned to Athens, severely wounded in the assault. His failure was complete. His enemies were able to turn the tide of feeling against him, and secure his condemnation to a heavy fine.¹

The stain of this ingratitude rests in the first instance on the ambitious and unscrupulous Alcmaeonidae, but the Athenian people cannot be held guiltless. It is obvious that Miltiades, if he wished to detach the wealthy island of Paros from Persia, would desire that his intentions should be kept as secret as possible. He well knew that a project openly discussed in the Athenian assembly would be known at Paros long before he could reach the island. The secrecy of the expedition, therefore, if it was secret, was quite justifiable. The object was not less so. While it remained a subject of Persia, the island of Paros was a source of danger in the Aegean; if the Athenians conquered it, they would have a base of operations in the Cyclades, from which they could intercept such an expedition as that which brought Datis to Marathon. But Miltiades failed, and failure at the moment was intolerable. In the animation of their recent victory the Athenians forgot how inadequate were the means at their disposal for the

Miltiades
unjustly con-
demned.

¹ Ephorus, *Frag.* 107 M; Nepos, *Milt.* 7. They represent the city as on the point of surrender when the conflagration occurred. This story is rendered suspicious to some degree by the fact that it is quoted as an explanation of the word *ἀναρπιδίαι*. And though it is free from some of the difficulties which beset the account of Herodotus, Ephorus may have seen these difficulties, and dressed up his account with the object of removing them.

capture of walled cities; they thought that there could be no limits to their success. The enemies of Miltiades took advantage of this feeling to bring about his ruin. His condemnation was one in a long series of similar punishments, for the Athenians never learnt to be just to those who served them, or to distinguish between treachery and errors of judgment. It was the natural result of such conduct that those who entered their service were compelled to sacrifice their devotion to their country to the precautions necessary for their own safety.¹

¹ Cf. Macaulay, *Essays*, vol. ii. p. 183 (Cab. ed.). "Treachery, cowardice, ignorance amounting to what lawyers have called *crassa ignorantia*, are fit objects of severe penal inflictions. But Byng was not found guilty of treachery, of cowardice, or of gross ignorance of his profession. He died for doing what the most loyal subject, the most intrepid warrior, the most experienced seaman, might have done. He died for an error in judgment, an error such as the greatest commanders, Frederic, Napoleon, Wellington, have often committed, and have often acknowledged. Such errors are not proper objects of punishment, for this reason, that the punishing of such errors tends not to prevent them, but to produce them."

CHAPTER II.

THE AEGINETAN WAR AND THE RISE OF THEMISTOCLES.

I. While Athens was achieving immortal glory on the plain of Marathon, Sparta was the scene of a catastrophe by which she gained neither reputation nor advantage. We have said (p. 78) that Cleomenes, in order to rid himself of the opposition of his fellow-king, conspired with Leotychidas, who represented the younger branch of the Eurypontid line, to remove Demaratus from the throne. The conspiracy proved a complete success, and for the time Cleomenes carried all before him. But the success was transient; the secret was soon betrayed; and so enraged were the Spartans at the discovery, that Cleomenes thought it prudent to leave the city. He withdrew to Thessaly, perhaps at that time the only place in Greece where the Spartans could not reach him. At this distance he was secure, but he was also powerless; and after a short interval he returned to the Peloponnesus, where he sought refuge in Arcadia. The tribes of this region, in spite of the protection afforded by the almost inaccessible fastnesses of the hills, had reason to be suspicious of Sparta, inasmuch as those parts of the country which immediately bordered on Spartan territory had been reduced to a greater or less degree of subjection. By working on their fears Cleomenes attempted to combine and organise their scattered forces, perhaps in the belief that a power might thus be created which would be able to inflict serious damage on Sparta. If the Arcadians could acquire

Troubles at
Sparta.
490 B.C. ?
Ol. 72. 3.

Cleomenes
retires to
Thessaly.

Cleomenes
in Arcadia.

the command of the roads which connected Sparta with the north, they would be able to destroy her communications with her allies at Corinth, Sicyon, and Phlius; and under a vigorous commander an united Arcadia might even venture to attack Sparta herself. With some such object in view, Cleomenes engaged the Arcadians by solemn oaths to follow wherever he should lead them, and, to make the covenant more binding, he proposed to swear their chiefs by the sacred water of the Styx at Nonacris.¹ When the Spartans heard of these plans they were greatly alarmed; if they had reason to hate Cleomenes, they had still greater reason to fear him; they also knew from their experience of Tegea the brave nature of the Arcadian soldiers. Envoys were at once despatched to bring the fugitive back to Sparta. On the assurance that he would be He returns to Sparta. allowed to enjoy his royal position, Cleomenes returned; but only to perish by a miserable death. Always violent, he now became insane; his frenzy took the form of a furious hatred of his countrymen—a hatred so uncontrollable that whenever he met a Spartan he dashed his staff in his face. It became necessary for his friends to interfere; and Cleomenes was placed in confinement, with his feet secured in wooden stocks. The indignity was more than his spirit could bear. Though carefully watched, he took advantage of a moment when he was alone with the Helot, who was his keeper, to obtain possession of a knife. His death. With this he at once began to cut his "body into strips," from the calves of the legs upwards; and, before he could be prevented, he reached a vital part.²

¹ Herod. vi. 74.

² Herod. vi. 74, 75. The date of the death of Cleomenes is uncertain. The first unsuccessful visit to Aegina may be put in 491 B.C. After this comes the deposition of Demaratus, the second visit to Aegina, the discovery of the plot, the flight to Thessaly, the operations in Arcadia, the madness and death. Those who think a year or eighteen months too little to cover these events put the death of Cleomenes later (in 488 or 487 B.C.). There is no decisive evidence, but I do not think 490 impossible, and it is remarkable that Cleomenes

Such was the melancholy end of a king, who, in spite of grave faults, was one of Sparta's greatest rulers. Whether he came by his death fairly has been doubted, and not without reason. The Spartan government was in fear of him—and when the Spartan government was in fear, it was cruel, secret, and unscrupulous. His death attracted great attention in Greece, many reasons being given for so tragic an event. The Spartans attributed the madness of their king to a habit of drinking unmixed wine, a habit contracted by associating with some Scythians, who had visited Sparta to arrange for a joint invasion of Persia. But we hear nothing elsewhere of such a visit, and the story may have arisen from the use of the word *episkythisai* at Sparta, to signify "fill to the brim." Others saw in the affliction the more direct interposition of an avenging deity, for Cleomenes had shocked the feelings of the Greeks by acts of impiety at Delphi, Argos, and Eleusis.

There is no reason to doubt that Cleomenes committed the acts laid to his charge, but he does not become an important figure in history because he was mad or sacrilegious. The significance of his reign lies in this: that he made the nearest approach to a military despotism ever known at Sparta. So far as we can judge, he was the last of the kings who asserted the full prerogatives of the throne; the first who put himself at the head of a Peloponnesian army. Had he succeeded in his attempt to lead the Spartan allies with all the unrestrained pri-

is not mentioned in connection with Marathon. If the words of Herodotus (vii. 3) are precise, Demaratus, who left Sparta before the flight of Cleomenes, reached Susa at the time when Darius was about to set out for Egypt, i.e. about 486 B.C. But we do not know how long it was after leaving Sparta that Demaratus reached Susa. Aristophanes, *Lysist.* 278, speaks of Cleomenes as *πινών, ῥυπών, ἀπαράλιτος, ἐξ ἐτών ἀλυντος*. Such a state would now be considered evidence of insanity, but it probably arose from a desire to be a Spartan of the Spartans: cf. *Plut. Inst. Lac.* 5, *αὐχμηροὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ λούτρων καὶ ἀλειμμάτων κατὰ τὸ πλείστον ἀπεχόμενοι*.

vileges of a Spartan king, or had he been permitted to carry his Arcadian plans into effect, the Peloponnesus might have been combined under the rule of a single monarch, an event which would certainly have thrown the history of Greece into a different channel.—As he left no son, Cleomenes was succeeded on the throne by his younger brother Leonidas.

2. The intelligence of the death of Cleomenes was welcome news to the Aeginetans. They at once repaired to Sparta to impeach Leotychidas, who had taken a part in placing the Aeginetan hostages with the Athenians. The Spartans listened to their complaint, and decided in their favour; Leotychidas was to be given up to them as a compensation for their lost citizens. The Aeginetans were about to carry him away with them, when a Spartan friend pointed out the danger of such an act; the Spartans, he suggested, might one day change their minds, and make the ill-treatment of a Spartan king a ground for utterly destroying Aegina. The Aeginetans on hearing this, abandoned their intention of carrying away Leotychidas, but demanded that he should accompany them in person to Athens, and ask for the citizens whom he had placed with the Athenians. To Athens they went. But the Athenians had no wish to part with hostages who secured for them the good behaviour of Aegina; they fell back on the plea which Crius of Aegina had previously urged against Cleomenes, affirming that as two kings had placed the hostages with them, they could not restore them to one only. In vain did Leotychidas repeat the impressive story of the Spartan Glaucus, who was cut off root and branch for inquiring of the Delphian oracle whether he might safely refuse to restore a sum of money deposited with him; the Athenians persisted in their refusal, and Sparta made no attempt to recover the hostages by force.¹

The Aeginetans at Sparta.
489 B.C.f.?
Ol. 72. 4.

They propose to carry off Leotychidas.

He goes with the Aeginetans to Athens.

¹ Herod. vi. 85 ff.

Thus the Aeginetans, in spite of their success at Sparta, found themselves left to their own resources. They determined to retaliate in kind. They were still superior to the Athenians in naval power, and could make descents on the Attic coast whenever they pleased. Every fifth year it was the custom of the Athenians to celebrate a festival in honour of Poseidon at Sunium, on the lonely peak which forms the extreme point of Attica, and a mission ship was despatched on the occasion to convey to the promontory those citizens—chiefly members of the first families at Athens—who took a public part in the festival. When this became known to the Aeginetans, they seized the opportunity to carry off the ship and all on board. This brilliant achievement restored the balance between the cities: neither Athens nor Aegina could now take a decided step without risking the lives of her foremost citizens.

Nothing daunted, the Athenians resolved on revenge, and ere long an opportunity occurred of striking a home blow.

At this time Aegina was in the hands of an oligarchy, who governed in their own interests, and here as elsewhere a hostile “demos” was gathered round the “Few.” This “demos” was always ready to rise against those who monopolised the wealth and power of the island.

Nothing was wanting but a leader, to bring about a revolution, and such a leader was now forthcoming. A member of the oligarchy, Nicodromus by name, had been banished by his own order, and though afterwards allowed to return, he was burning to revenge the insult. If only he could succeed in this object, he was equally ready to join the Athenians who hated his country, or the

masses who hated his order. It was agreed that on a fixed day Nicodromus should raise the people, while the Athenians attacked Aegina by sea. The day arrived and Nicodromus carried out his part of the agreement by seizing the “Old city,” but the Athenians failed to appear. At this time they could

muster no more than fifty ships, a fleet quite inadequate to engage the Aeginetans, who could put seventy vessels on the sea; and, in order to equalise the numbers, they sent to Corinth to borrow twenty vessels.

Delay in preparing a fleet.

Time passed in the negotiations. Corinth was friendly, but her laws did not permit the lending of ships; and the difficulty had to be met by a nominal sale. In the end, the fleet arrived at Aegina a day too late. Meanwhile that city had been the scene of a terrible conflict. Nicodromus, on finding that the Athenians did not arrive, escaped from the island

with a few friends, but the unfortunate populace, which had been induced to revolt, met with ruthless punishment. When the rebellion was

Defeat of the democracy at Aegina.

crushed, seven hundred captives were led out for execution.

To add to the horror, one of the victims escaped to the temple of Demeter Thesmophoros, where he clung to the handles of the door with such tenacity that his grasp could not be loosed. Regardless of

Impious cruelty of the Aeginetans.

the sanctity of the place, the Aeginetans severed his arms at the wrist, leaving the hands attached to the door, while the man was hurried off to his death. This act of cruel impiety was thought to be the cause of the calamities which subsequently befell Aegina. No "art could wash the guilt away," and, in spite of their utmost efforts, the act was still unexpiated when the Aeginetans were driven from the island by Athens in 431 B.C.

When the Athenian ships arrived, the Aeginetans met them with their seventy vessels. The Aeginetans were defeated, but to what extent is not recorded;

we only know that they sent an urgent appeal to Argos for help. The envoys might plead

The Argives aid the Aeginetans,

that the Argives were Dorians like themselves; that both cities had a common interest in crushing the growing trade of Athens; but whatever their arguments, the request was refused. The Argives could not forget that Aegina had furnished ships to Cleomenes in the recent disastrous invasion of their country; she had even refused to pay the fine

imposed upon her for such a breach of the international relations of the two cities. The ill-feeling did not however prevent one thousand Argives from going as volunteers to the help of Aegina under the command of Eurybates. On their arrival the Aeginetans again attacked the Athenians, but with no better success. Most of the Argives were slain; even Eurybates, who had remarkable skill in single combat, after killing three Athenians was himself slain by Sophanes of Decelea. Then the tide of fortune turned; the Aeginetans attacked the Athenian ships, when in disorder, and succeeded in capturing four vessels with their crews. Here our knowledge of the war ends. Nicodromus and his associates were planted by the Athenians at Sunium, a convenient point from which to plunder the Aeginetan territory; but nothing decisive was done on either side. The old enmity remained with the old inability to give effect to it.¹

3. The condemnation of Miltiades in 489 B.C. marks the ascendancy of his rivals at Athens. As Aristides was archon for the year and Xanthippus brought forward the accusation, we may suppose that these two men were now at the head of affairs, and for some years to come they were the leaders of the popular party at Athens.² Aristides was a member of an ancient family, which, if not wealthy, was sufficiently rich to be

¹ Herod. vi. 88-93. I believe that these events took place after 490—perhaps between 490 and 486 B.C. Much is made of the fact that the Athenians have only fifty ships in this war, whereas Miltiades took seventy to Paros in 490-489, and for this reason the affair of Nicodromus is sometimes put in the year 490 B.C. But Herodotus merely says that the Athenians had not seventy ships fit for action at the time: οὐ γὰρ ἔτυχον εἶδσαι γέες σφί ἀξιόμαχοι τῇσι Αἰγινήτων συμβάλλειν. The expression in Thucydides, ὑπὲρ τὰ Μηδικά (i. 41, referring to the ships lent to Athens by Corinth), is indecisive. Cf. *ib.* c. 14. The Aeginetan war was in fact more or less continuous from its first outbreak till 481 B.C. (Herod. v. 89). Jerome puts the Aeginetan supremacy at sea in the years between Ol. 67. 4 (509 B.C.) and the invasion of Xerxes.

² *Athen. Pol.* c. 28, τοῦ μὲν δήμου προεστῆκει Ξάνθιππος τῶν δὲ γνωρίμων Μιλτιάδης. Cf. *ib.* c. 23.

ranked in the first class of the Solonian census; he had been the friend of Clisthenes, and had aided in the great reformation of 508 B.C. Xanthippus, as we know, Aristides and Xanthippus. was connected by marriage with the Alcmaeonidae; his wife was Agariste, the daughter of Hippocrates, and niece of Clisthenes. A common regard for the great family, and a sympathy with the policy which it had pursued for the last thirty years, formed a bond between the two leaders. Meanwhile, the spirit of the "people" was elevated by the recent victory of Marathon; they were not only conscious of the power which Clisthenes had put into their hands; they determined to use it. Hitherto the friends of the tyrants, who had not taken an active part in political strife, had been allowed to remain unmolested in the city; it was now resolved to expel them. Ostracism was proposed for the first time in the year 488 B.C. The sentence fell on Hipparchus, the son of Charmus, whom indeed Clisthenes had had in view when introducing the institution nearly twenty years before. In the next year Megacles, the son of Hippocrates, and nephew of Clisthenes, was ostracised, as a friend of the tyrants; and if it is strange to find a kinsman of the reformer in the ranks of those who were suspected of a sympathy with tyranny, the expulsion of an Alcmaeonid, on this ground, gives some support to the statement that it was one of this family who raised aloft the signal shield to the Persians at Marathon. In this same year also (487 B.C.) a change was made in the election of the archons. Hitherto they had been elected by choice,—at least since the introduction of the reforms of Clisthenes, but now a number of candidates—whether fifty or ten is doubtful—were chosen by each of the tribes, and from these the archons were elected by lot.¹

Development
of democratic
spirit at
Athens.

Ostracism of
Hipparchus
and Megacles.
488, 487 B.C.
Ol. 73. 1, 2.

Change in
the election
of archons.

¹ *Athen. Pol.* c. 22. This was practically a return to the arrangements of Solon.

4. The men who had triumphed by the failure of Miltiades were destined themselves to fail. The war with Aegina lingered on; the city which had repulsed the forces of Darius was as helpless now against the Aeginetans as it had been in 489 B.C. against the Parians. Nor had any active measures been taken to bring these disasters to an end; the leaders of the city did not see what changes were necessary before success was possible, or appreciate the impulse which the victory of Marathon had given to the people. It did not occur to them that the men who had been indignant at the failure before Paros were also indignant at the failure before Aegina. But a younger contemporary was fully alive to the situation. Themistocles, the son of Neocles, had small advantages of birth or wealth. His father belonged to a family which was respectable, but not eminent; his mother is variously said to have been a Thracian, a Carian, or an Acarnanian. Such mixed marriages appear to have been recognised at this time in Athenian law, but the issue, though legitimate, and seized of the rights of Athenian citizenship, was commonly ranged in the same class with the issue of concubinage. Both were "bastards" (*vóθoι*), and in consequence of this feeling, Themistocles, from his early youth, found himself under certain social restrictions. He could not train or exercise in the gymnasia frequented by the sons of those who were born of pure Athenian blood, but only in the Cynosarges beyond the walls of the city near the banks of the Ilissus. Such distinctions had a meaning outside the gymnasia: a meaning which was increased by the character of the man. The gossip of a later generation contrasted the manners of Themistocles with those of Cimon. The two rivals, we are told, were present at an entertainment where Cimon delighted the company with his skill in music and song, upon which some ill-mannered guest observed to Themistocles that nothing of the kind was to be heard from him. "No,"

Effect of the
Aeginetan
war on Athen-
ian feeling.
489 B.C. ?
Ol. 73. 3 ?

Rise of
Themistocles,

and character.

Themistocles
contrasted
with Cimon.

he replied, "I know nothing of music and song; but I know how to make a small city into a great one." The retort was not less characteristic than true. Self-confident, silent, and thoughtful, absorbed in politics and withdrawn from society, egotistical to a degree which made many personal enemies, but impressed the masses with a sense of power, Themistocles won his way to the front, because he gave expression to the tendency of the time. He saw what had been done at Marathon, and what had been left undone; he seized the spirit of enthusiasm aroused by the victory, and led his city on a new career of development.

Causes of
the rise of
Themistocles.

The date of his birth is uncertain; it probably took place about 520 B.C. Later writers have invented or repeated apocryphal stories of his boyhood and youth.

Stories of his
youth.

When at school he spent the hours of play in composing speeches for or against his companions; that part of his education which was intended to improve his manners and character, he neglected or acquired with effort; but exercises of a purely mental nature seemed unnecessary and superfluous to his strong intellect. Whether he would turn out well or ill, his master would not predict; but remarkable he certainly would be. His youth was perhaps wild and irregular; we may believe that such a strong nature was not easily tamed; but the stories that his father cast him off, and that his mother was driven to suicide by his infamies, are no doubt fictions of the stamp which pleased the fancy of Greek biographers. There is more probability, or at least there is more meaning, in the statement that his father warned him against a political life by pointing to some old ships which, worn out in public service, were now cast aside

His ambition.

and neglected. The warning, if given, was given in vain. The trophy of Miltiades allowed the young Themistocles no rest. Expecting, perhaps hoping, that the conflict with Persia would be renewed, he trained himself and his city for the struggle in the desire to secure a prize even

more splendid than that which had fallen to the great Philaid.¹

5. So far as we know, Themistocles took no part in the proceedings against Miltiades. His views were not such as Miltiades would have approved, and this may have led to the assertion that he had to overcome the opposition of Miltiades in carrying them out, which has come down to us on the authority of Stesimbrotus, a contemporary of Pericles. But Herodotus, who is our best authority, indicates, though he does not state, that some years elapsed from the death of Miltiades before Themistocles became a prominent man at Athens. It was Xanthippus and Aristides, but more especially Aristides, who saw with alarm that a younger rival was forming a party, which represented a new and still more democratic policy.

¹ The statements about the date of Themistocles vary. In Dionysius (*Antiq.* vi. 34) Themistocles is mentioned as archon in 493 B.C., and as archons were selected from men over thirty years of age, this would give 523, at the latest, for his birth. This date is to some degree supported by the statement of Stesimbrotus (*Plut. Them.* 4), who affirms that Themistocles was opposed by Miltiades in his designs—an opposition which would not be possible before 493 or after 489. Eusebius also (*Arm. Vers.*) puts the fortification of the Peiræus in 496 B.C.=Ol. 71. 1. And this fortification was begun, says Thucydides, in the archonship of Themistocles. On the other hand, it is incredible that fortifications begun in 493 (or 496) should have been left unfinished till 478 B.C., and the Themistocles mentioned by Dionysius may not have been our Themistocles. It is much more probable that he was archon in 482 B.C., as Krüger suggested. In his life of Themistocles (c. 31) Plutarch says that he was sixty-five years old at the time of his death, which took place after the outbreak of the revolt in Egypt, but, apparently, before the revolt was crushed, i.e. between 459 and 453 B.C. (yet cf. *id. Cim.* 18, which implies that Themistocles was alive in 449 B.C.). This would give 524-518 B.C. for his birth, and as Plutarch speaks of him as νέος (? under thirty) at the time of the battle of Marathon, the second date is perhaps the nearer the truth. Herod. vii. 143, speaks of Themistocles in 482 as ἀνὴρ ἐς πρότους νεώρι παρών. This seems to imply that he had come forward after the death of Miltiades, but νεώρι cannot be pressed, for the Argives in 481 use the word with reference to their defeat by Cleomenes. For the ἐραπεία of Themistocles, see *Plut. Aristid.* 2.

In the history of Athens, associations, or clubs, were a common, if not a very legitimate, means of nursing a policy. We hear of them even in the time of Clisthenes, who was compelled to call in the aid of the people against the power of the "clubs" which favoured Isagoras.¹ Of this means Themistocles availed himself. While Aristides trusted to his high position in the state, Themistocles gathered round him those citizens who were of his own way of thinking, and discussed the measures which he had at heart. Athens must be enabled to meet Aegina on the sea; she must have a fleet larger and not less excellent than her rival; her citizens must not only be trained as hoplites to serve in the field, but as sailors and seamen; her docks and harbours must be made of equal importance with the city, and rendered safe from attack.

6. Such proposals implied an important change in the habits of the Athenians. For fifty years or more, if we pass over the wars which arose on the expulsion of the Pisistratidae, Attica had enjoyed a season of repose. This period had been one of great prosperity for the farmers and peasants, for though it suits the democratic writers of a later time to speak of the oppression of Hippias, we have no evidence that his severity extended to those whom he had no reason to fear. Prosperity so unbroken could not fail to create a close bond between the husbandman and the farm which he tilled; the tendency of the time must have been strongly in favour of agriculture and an agricultural life. And whenever it had been necessary to resort to arms, the heavy infantry of Attica had been uniformly successful. It was they who acquired the rich domain of Chalcis, who drove the Boeotians back from the frontier, who met and defeated the Persians at Marathon. So far as their experience went,

Associations
or clubs.

Policy of
Themistocles.

His plans im-
plied a change
in Athenian
life and
warfare.

Agriculture in
Attica.

The heavy-
armed soldier.

¹ Arist. *Athen. Pol.* c. 20. So Clisthenes προσηταιρίζεται τὸν δῆμον, Herod. v. 66.

the Athenians had every reason to put confidence in their army. Yet Themistocles succeeded in arousing a different spirit; he turned the attention of his countrymen from the land to the sea, and convinced them that a powerful fleet was absolutely necessary to their welfare. He could of course point to the failure of the Aeginetan war, and to the raids which the Aeginetans were constantly making on the sea-board of Attica; the capture of the mission ship was not likely to be forgotten. It is also probable that a development

Growth of
trade in
Athens.

of trade had been going on at Athens in the later half of the sixth century, of which no details have been preserved. At any rate the

Athenians were aware of the advantage to be derived from commerce, so that it was possible, even for this purpose, to persuade them of the necessity of a better and more defensible harbour than the open roadstead of Phalerum. They looked with envy on the wealth and prosperity of the hated Aeginetans, who had depôts in Umbria, the Black Sea, and Egypt; whose bronzes and pottery were known to every trader in the Mediterranean.¹

7. These feelings Themistocles knew how to utilise for his own views, which went far beyond the present quarrel with Aegina, or the interests of Athenian trade. But though he

Opposition to
the plans of
Themistocles.
486-485 B.C.
Ol. 73. 3, 4.

gained the people to his side, he could not carry out his aims without a severe struggle.

Whether it was owing to him that Xanthippus was ostracised in 486 B.C. we do not know; but we are informed that Xanthippus was the first of those outside the circle of the friends of the tyrants who was thus exiled; and the statement implies some change of policy, some new impulse in the people. Aristides, however, still remained, and apparently he offered such vigorous opposition to the plans of Themistocles that nothing could be done till he also was removed from the scene. The constant quarrels

¹ Plat. *Them.* 4, says of the Aeginetan war, ἤκμαζε γὰρ οὗτος ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι μάλιστα κατεῖχον οἱ Αἰγινῆται πλήθει νεῶν τὴν θάλασσαν.

between the parties endangered the peace of the city; even Aristides confessed that the Athenians would never prosper unless both himself and Themistocles were thrown, like malefactors, into the "Pit." In 484-483 B.C. matters came to a crisis; ostracism was again proposed; the people supported their new leader, and Aristides was driven into exile.¹

Ostracism of
Aristides.

8. A fleet could not be provided, and a harbour could not be fortified, without a large outlay of public money. Hitherto finance had received but little attention from Athenian statesmen, for the simple reason that little money was required where personal service was given so freely, and the rich contributed so largely to the state. The most severe of all demands upon a public purse—the maintenance of the public defence—hardly touched the Athenian revenues. The soldier furnished his own panoply, with the exception of the spear and shield, which the state provided. He was only called out when needed, and he maintained himself during the period of service. The expenses of the fleet and the cavalry fell chiefly, though not wholly, on the richer citizens. That part which was defrayed from the public purse was met by the proceeds of public lands, tolls, and imposts, and other similar sources, for direct taxation was regarded as oppressive. The funds, which were collected by the *naucrari* and afterwards by the *demarchs*, appear to have been in the keeping of treasurers, but they were disbursed by officers called *Colacretae*—a name derived from their original duty of collecting the hams and thighs of the victims offered in sacrifice.²

Management
of finance at
Athens.

The Colacretae.

¹ For the ostracism of Xanthippus, see *Ath. Pol.* c. 22. For Aristides, *ibid.*; Jerome, *Ol.* 74. 1 (484-483), *Aristides cum ignominia eicitur*; *Plut. Arist.* 3.

² *Colacretae*, from *καλῇ ἀγείρειν*. See Boeckh, *Staatshauss.* i. 213 ff. (3d ed.). In the fifth century the jurymen were paid by the *Colacretae*. See *Aristoph. Wasps.* 593, 723; *Birls.* 1540 and the Schol. They also paid the money decreed by the people for engraving documents on stone pillars (*C. I. A.* i. 45).

9. At the very moment when Themistocles was in need of funds to carry out his plan, a large additional sum came into the public treasury from an unexpected source. The south-eastern point of the promontory of Attica, from Anaphlystus and Thoricus to Sunium, was known as Laureion. It was a hilly region of little agricultural value, but the rocky soil was

Mines at
Laureion.

permeated by veins of silver and lead, which proved a source of wealth both to the community of Athens and to individual citizens. At what time mining operations were first begun in this district is unknown; we hear little of them in the sixth century, though even then laws were passed to regulate the purchase and working of the land, which was regarded as the property of the state. Any citizen who wished to sink a shaft paid a certain sum to the state for his "claim," and in addition, he paid yearly a royalty of one twenty-fourth of the silver obtained. From these mines, a large sum of money was now received—either by the sale of new "claims," or by the increased value of the produce—which it was proposed to divide among the citizens at the rate of ten drachmae to each man. But

Themistocles
applies the
surplus to
building ships.

Themistocles persuaded the Athenians to apply the funds to building a fleet, or at any rate to apply them in a way which he could turn to this purpose. On his proposal, a hundred talents were lent to one hundred of the richest citizens. If the money so lent was expended in a manner approved by the state, the loan was not to be recalled; if the expenditure was not approved, the talent was to be paid back into the treasury. In this manner one hundred ships are said to have been added to the fleet in 482-481 B.C. They were intended in the first instance for use against Aegina, but when the approach of Xerxes put an end to hostilities between the Grecian cities, these vessels, built for the destruction of a rival, proved the salvation of Greece.¹

¹ For the mines see Baedeker's *Greece*, p. 126; Boeckh, *Kleine Schrift.* v. 1 ff., *Staatshaus.* i. 377 (3d ed.); C. R. Kennedy, *Demosthenes, Against Pantaenetus*, introduction. For the building of the new ships,

10. About the same time, and probably with the same funds, Themistocles began the fortification of the Peiræus. The open bay of Phalerum, which had hitherto been the port of Athens, was quite inadequate for the increased number of ships; it was also insecure, with little protection from storms, and still less from the attack of an enemy. Immediately to the west of this bay the shore of Attica runs out in a peninsula, in which are three indentations or bays, differing in size, but each offering the utmost security, because approached by a narrow entrance. On the south-east of the peninsula is the small harbour of Munychia, immediately under the hill once crowned by the temple of Artemis. On the south is the harbour of Zea; on the west the harbour of Peiræus, a magnificent basin capable of holding three hundred ships or more. The peninsula is united to the land by a tract of marshy soil, whence it rises, a mass of rock, easily defensible, and commanding the entrance to the bay of Salamis. This rock, with its harbours, Themistocles proposed to fortify, and some progress had been made with the work when it was interrupted by the Persian invasion.

The new
harbour at
Peiræus.

Such was the beginning of the maritime power of Athens. In little more than two years, owing to the victory of Salamis, the city reached at a single bound the foremost place in Hellas. The rise was due to a fortunate combination of accidents, the war with Aegina coinciding with the increase of the revenues from Laureion; but the impulse was given by the genius and

Rapid rise of
the Athenian
power.

Herod. vii. 144, who mentions 200, which was the total amount of the Athenian fleet at Artemisium and Salamis. Plutarch (*Them.* 4) and Nepos (*Them.* 3) mention 100, and this number agrees with the account of the building given in *Athen. Pol.* c. 22. I have followed this account in the text, but I may point out that it does not agree with the words of Plutarch: *μόνος εἰπεῖν ἐτόλμησε παρελθὼν εἰς τὸν δῆμον, ὡς χρὴ τὴν διανομὴν εἰσάοντας ἐκ τῶν χρημάτων τούτων κατασκευάσασθαι τριήρεις ἐπὶ τὸν πρὸς Αἰγινήτας πόλεμον.* Whether Themistocles was opposed by Aristides in this particular proposal is unknown, but it is certain that Aristides was ostracised in, or nearly in, the same year in which the proposal was carried.

patriotism of Themistocles. How his services were requited we shall see in the sequel; for the moment even Athenian jealousy was hushed by the storm which now broke over the Hellenic world.¹

¹ That Themistocles began the fortification of the Peiræus is stated by Thucyd. i. 93, see note, p. 108. That there was a public treasury at Athens I assume from the words of Herodotus, *γενομένων χρημάτων μεγάλων ἐν τῷ κοινῷ*. Aristotle also, *Athen. Pol.* c. 7, speaks of "treasurers," etc., in the time of Solon. In what relation these treasurers stood to the *naucrari* is not clear: all that we know is that the *naucraries* were districts into which Attica was divided for financial purposes—a division made before Solon, and continued by him—and that Clisthenes substituted demes and demarchs for *naucraries* and *naucrari*. That rich men spent money on ships is evident from the way in which Themistocles managed the building of the 100 vessels—if the story is true; and in any case, in 480 B.C., Cleinias, the father of Alcibiades, who fought at Artemisium, *δαπάνην οἰκήην παρεχόμενος ἐστρατεύετο ἀνδράσι τε δηκοσίοισι καὶ οἰκήῃ νηί* (Herod. viii. 17). For Athenian finance see *infra*, c. xi.

CHAPTER III.

THE GREAT INVASION. THERMOPYLAE.

I. The defeat of Marathon aroused the Persian monarch to new efforts. He resolved to invade Hellas with an army which would make resistance impossible. Preparations were begun upon a scale hitherto unknown, even in Persia, every nation in the vast empire being called upon to furnish ships, or horses, or soldiers, or food; and for three years (489-487 B.C.) Asia was in a state of universal tumult. The arrangements were still incomplete, when an unexpected event occurred to stimulate, though it divided, the energies of Darius. After forty years of submission, Egypt, which had been conquered by Cambyzes (in 525 B.C.), attempted to recover her independence (486 B.C.). Delay was now impossible.

489-487 B.C.
New preparations in Persia.

Persian honour was at stake in the presence of a rebellious province and an unconquered enemy. Darius resolved to visit Egypt first, and to lead his army in person.

Revolt of Egypt.
486 B.C.
O1. 73. 3.

Nearly thirty years had elapsed since the expedition into Scythia (*circa* 515 B.C.), and during this long period Darius had not been absent from his dominions. In the meanwhile his sons had grown up to manhood. Before coming to the throne he had married the daughter of Gobryas, by whom he had three sons; after he became king, he took to wife Atossa, who bore him four sons, of whom Xerxes was the eldest. It was necessary, before leaving the country, to appoint a successor to the throne, or the kingdom might be rent asunder

Settlement of the succession to the Persian throne.

by the claims of rival families. In age, the eldest son of the daughter of Gobryas had an undoubted right to the succession ; but Atossa was the daughter of Cyrus ; her sons were the lineal descendants of the great founder of the empire. If less beloved by her husband than her sister Artystône, whose image Darius set up in gold, she was a woman of great character and influence, by common consent, as well as by position, the Queen of Persia. This hereditary claim was strengthened by an argument which Herodotus ascribes to Demaratus, the exiled king of Sparta, who had recently arrived at Susa. It was the rule of the Spartans, he said, that the eldest son, born after his father became king, should succeed to the throne to the exclusion of all previous children—a rule which obviously told in favour of the children of Atossa. Whatever the reasons which prevailed, Xerxes was chosen to be the future king of Persia.¹

2. A few months afterwards, in the year following the outbreak of the revolt of Egypt (485 B.C.), and before he had

Death of
Darius.
485 B.C.
Ol. 73. 4.

time to take the field, Darius died. He was sixty-two years old, out of which he had reigned thirty-six years (521-485 B.C.). The Persians spoke of him as "the petty trader,"

but his memory deserves a nobler epithet. By an act of remarkable courage he saved the empire of Cyrus, when it

His character.

was in danger of passing into the hands of an usurper ; in a long series of desperate struggles

he repressed the rebellions which broke out at his accession ; and when master of his dominions, he displayed an ability in administering them far beyond that of any other Oriental potentate. The history of the empires of the East is for the most part a dreary record of conquests and rebellions, of cruel punishments and savage desolations. No attempt was made to consolidate new territory when acquired, or to retain by policy the nations subdued by arms. Darius, on the other hand, completely organised his empire on a permanent system.

¹ Herod. vii. 1-4 ; cf. Justin, ii. 10.

Convenient roads traversed the country, protected at intervals by forts and garrisons; a post, "swifter than anything else in the world," enabled the king to receive and transmit information more rapidly than

Organisation of his empire.

any of his subjects. The empire was divided into twenty provinces, governed by satraps appointed by the king, and contributing a fixed amount to the royal treasury. In the

administration the civil and military authorities appear to have crossed and checked each other, and both were connected as closely as possible with the reigning family. However great the power of the

Satraps, scribes, and generals.

satrap of Sardis or Dascyleum, he was still a civil servant, whose chief business it was to collect the revenues and attend to the internal administration of his province; and even in the discharge of these duties he was watched by the "royal scribe," an officer who was present at every satrap's court.

The forces necessary for the defence of the provinces and the fortresses in them were under the control of generals, independent of the satraps, and holding office directly from the king. Satraps and generals alike were as a rule members of the royal family, or connected with it by marriage. Darius availed himself of the insti-

Polygamy in Persia.

tution of polygamy to strengthen his position, and unite himself with all that was powerful around him. On coming to the throne, as we have said, he took to wife Atossa, who had previously been the consort of Cambyses and of the pretender Smerdis.

The wives of Darius.

Other wives were Artystône, a daughter of Cyrus; Parmys, a daughter of Smerdis, the younger son of Cyrus; Phædyne, the daughter of Otanes; Phratagûne, the daughter of Artanes; and the wife of his youth, the daughter of Gobryas. Polygamy was, indeed, the strength and the weakness of the Persian king. It enabled him to gather round him a number of adherents whose interests were identical with his own; but this advantage was balanced, if it was not outweighed, by the rivalry of various wives and families. If the evil was felt in the lifetime of Darius, it

became far more serious at a later period under a weaker rule, and when the necessity for united action was less imperative.¹

3. Xerxes was in every respect inferior to his father. Deficient in personal courage no less than political insight, without experience in affairs or sound judgment

Xerxes

of men, a "child of the purple," he was vain, impulsive, and easily led. The profusion and cruelty which mark his character proceeded from one and the same source, —an entire disregard of the wellbeing of his subjects, whose money and lives he squandered with equal indifference. On coming to the throne he turned his attention to Egypt, which

reduces Egypt,

484 B.C.

Ol. 74. 1;

he completely reduced to subjection in the year following the death of Darius (484 B.C.).² The country, now plunged into a still lower degree of

slavery, was put under the command of Achaemenes, the king's brother. Towards the second of the two tasks bequeathed to him by his father—the invasion of Greece—Xerxes showed little inclination; but the urgent appeals of his counsellors allowed him no choice. Mardonius was eager to retrieve the disgrace which had fallen upon the Persian arms, and to recover his own position as the first general in the empire; the Pisistratidae, who had gone to Susa with Onomacritus in their train, "a soothsayer, and editor of the oracles of Musaeus,"

persuaded to
go on with the
Hellenic in-
vasion;

exerted all their powers of persuasion and prophecy to secure their restoration; while the envoys of the Aleuadae of Thessaly were profuse in offers of sympathy and assistance. In

the great drama in which Aeschylus relates the defeat of the Persians at Salamis, the poet speaks of the overthrow of the

¹ Herod. vii. 4; iii. 88; i. 209; Ctesias, *Pers.* § 19, who allows only thirty-one years to Darius. For the organisation of the empire under Darius see Duncker, *Hist. Ant. E. T.* vol. vi. c. 17. Instances in which important posts are held by relations of the Great King are common. Mardonius was the son-in-law of Darius; so were Daurises, Hymaees, and Otanes (Herod. v. 116). Artaphernes, the satrap of Sardis, was half-brother of Darius. Xerxes after subduing the revolt of Egypt puts the country in the hands of his brother Achaemenes.

² Herod. vii. 5. 7.

Persians—the destined punishment of their “insolence”—as an evil which might have been delayed to a far-off generation had not Xerxes hastened it by listening to the advice of evil counsellors.¹

Thus persuaded, Xerxes summoned a council of the noblest Persians to discuss the great project. He laid before them his plan of invasion, and supported it by all the arguments in his power. In conquering Greece he would be carrying out the wishes of Darius, punishing those who had insulted the Persian power, and pushing the boundaries of the empire to the extreme limits of the earth. Mardonius followed on the same side; the Greeks, he thought, would not even dare to take up arms against so great a force as the king would bring against them; and if they did, so much the worse for them; “at any rate let the attempt be made; nothing venture, nothing gain.”

summons a
council of
Persians.

Artabanus, the uncle of Xerxes, whom Herodotus presents to us as the good genius of Persia, was of a different opinion. Though the historian has put into his mouth, on this and other occasions, language more suited to a Greek of his own time than to the brother of Darius, it is quite possible that Artabanus represented a section of Persians who were averse to the Hellenic campaign. He reminded Xerxes of the danger which Darius had incurred in the invasion of Scythia. Had not Histiaeus opposed the proposal to destroy the bridge over the Danube, the fortunes of Persia would have been ruined. What if the Greeks should now be victorious by sea, and break down the bridge which it was proposed to build over the Hellespont? A decision involving issues so momentous should be deferred till Xerxes had reconsidered the matter: wise forethought was the best preparation for action. “Have you not observed,” he continued, “that God hurls his bolts against everything which rises above the common level, to destroy it, but what is lowly provokes him not. For God is a jealous

Artabanus
attempts to
dissuade him.

¹ Herod. vii. 5, 6; Aesch. *Persae*, 739 ff.

God, who humbles the exalted things of the earth, and often he has brought a mighty host to a miserable and disastrous end by some slight cause, a panic, or a thunderbolt, which he has cast upon them." For the moment Xerxes was furious, but on further reflection he was inclined to obey the warning. But destiny was not to be thwarted. Dreams and

Dreams and omens confirm Xerxes. visions, which appeared not to him only but also to Artabanus, deterred him from the wiser course; he resolved to go through with the invasion.¹

4. The assembled Persians at once dispersed in every direction to give the necessary orders. Each was eager to secure for himself the prizes which Xerxes had promised to the officer who supplied the best contingent to the force.

The new preparations. Four entire years were occupied with the preparations, which were not finally completed till the spring of 480 B.C.²

Twice had the Persians attempted to invade Greece, and, each time, the attempt had ended in signal disaster. On the first occasion the expedition had been wrecked on Mount Athos; on the second, the ships had failed to carry over a sufficient force to operate both by sea and land. Such disasters, though calamitous, were instructive, and measures were taken to prevent their recurrence. The danger of shipwreck was to be avoided by cutting a canal through the peninsula of Athos; the army was not to be transported over the sea, but to march as a separate force and cross the Hellespont by a bridge.

The work of cutting the canal was begun three years before the invasion took place. At the point selected the isthmus

The canal at Acanthus. 483 B.C. Ol. 74. 2. is about a mile and a half in width, and as the land, with the exception of a few inconsiderable hills, is flat, the canal could be carried in a straight line from the bay of Acanthus to Sane on the southern shore of the promontory. The workmen,

¹ Herod. vii. 6-19.

² Herod. vii. 20.

who were divided according to their nations, worked in relays, whipped to their task like slaves. Herodotus informs us that the Phoenicians exhibited a skill in excavation beyond the rest. Beginning on the surface with a breadth twice the required width of the canal, they reduced the trenches as they descended, forming the sides into a gradual slope. By this means they prevented the falling in of the earth, which doubled the labour of those who attempted to excavate their trenches with perpendicular walls. When finished, the canal was sufficiently wide to admit two triremes abreast with extended oars, but in the opinion of Herodotus the work was far less for use than for display, for it would have been quite easy to drag the triremes over the land, as was commonly done at the Isthmus of Corinth.

Superior
skill of the
Phoenicians.

The workmen who were engaged on the canal were also instructed to build bridges over the river Strymon at the "Nine Ways," a place which afterwards became famous as the site of Amphipolis. Nor was the maintenance of the army forgotten; supplies of food were accumulated at various depôts along the line of the march: at the White Coast, a promontory in the Propontis, near the base of the Thracian Chersonese; at Tyrodiza, in the territory of the Perinthians; at Doriscus; at the mouth of the Strymon; and at Therma in Macedonia.¹

Bridges over
the Strymon.

Depôts for
supplies.


5. More important by far was the construction of the bridges—for two were required—over the Hellespont. It was not the first enterprise of the kind—a bridge had been built over the Bosphorus by Mandrocles, a Samian, for the use of Darius in his Scythian campaign—but it was by far the greatest and most difficult. The site selected for the Asiatic end was Abydus; and for the European, a promontory between Sestus and Madytus. The distance between the two is given

Bridges over
the Hellespont.
481 B.C.
Ol. 74. 4.

¹ Herod. vii. 22-25. See Leake, *Northern Greece*, iii. 143 f.

by Herodotus as seven stades, which, even if we reckon by the Olympian stade of 625 feet, are equivalent to 4375 feet. At the present time the strait is much broader at this point, and even where it is narrowest, at the Castles of the Dardanelles, it is not less than 5000 feet in width. The task of construction was intrusted to the Phoenicians and Egyptians. Two bridges were built; one upon cables of white flax, by the Phoenicians; the other by the Egyptians, on cables of their native papyrus. No sooner were they completed, than a violent storm arose, which entirely destroyed them. On hearing of this disaster, Xerxes gave way to an uncontrollable outburst of passion. He ordered three hundred lashes to be given to the Hellepont, as a punishment, and a pair of fetters to be thrown into the sea, as chains for his slave. Those who administered the *Loss of the bridges.* bastinado were commanded to accompany the *Impious fury of Xerxes.* whipping with bitter and insolent reproaches: "Thou sullen water, this is the punishment wherewith our master punishes thee for the wrong thou hast done him unprovoked. Whether thou wilt or no, King Xerxes will pass over thee. Meet it is that none should offer sacrifice to thy turbid and briny stream." No action of Xerxes was more repulsive and "barbarous" in the eyes of the Greeks than this insult to "the pure and holy stream," on which they looked as on a god, with reverence and awe.

The unfortunate engineers whose work had thus been destroyed were decapitated; and others were appointed in their room, who at once set about building new *The second bridges.* bridges. Collecting a number of vessels of various kinds, they selected 360 to support the bridge towards the Euxine, and 314 to support the bridge towards the Aegean. The ships were so ranged, that they were in the line of the current, which runs through the Hellespont, but lay at an angle to the Pontus. They were held in their places by long anchors, open spaces being left through which small vessels might pass in and out from the Pontus. On these



— THE ROUTE OF XERXES. The dotted parts of the line denote those parts of the route in which the Army was divided.

London & Bombay, Longmans & Co.

London, Squire & Co. Geog. Estate



vessels were placed the new cables, two of flax, and four of papyrus for each bridge—ropes of enormous size, weighing about 50 lbs. to the foot, which were drawn taut by huge windlasses erected on either shore. Logs of wood of the proper length were then laid upon the cables, and fastened down by timbers; the logs were in turn covered with planks, upon which earth was spread; and finally a palisade was erected on both sides of each bridge to prevent the horses and cattle from taking fright at the sea.¹

6. Critalla, in Cappadocia, had been fixed upon as the rendezvous for the various contingents of the army, perhaps from some convenience of roads of which we are ignorant. Thither, in the autumn of 481 B.C., Xerxes arrived from Susa, to put himself at the head of the expedition.² Crossing the Halys, he marched to Celaenae, the ancient metropolis of Phrygia, not far distant from the sources of the Maeander, a city famous in the days of Herodotus for the possession of the skin of Marsyas, which could be seen suspended in the market-place!

The army
assembles
at Critalla.
481 B.C.

¹ Herod. vii. 33-36. In this account of the bridges there are some obscurities. Herodotus seems to think that the second bridges were built on the same site as the first. This is impossible, for if we allow only 15 feet for a trireme, 360 vessels would occupy 5400 feet, or more than 1000 feet beyond the entire width of the strait as given by Herodotus—though nearly agreeing with the actual width at the narrowest part. Secondly, the expression at “an angle to the Pontus” is obscure. If by the Pontus is meant the Euxine, the reference to so remote a mark is puzzling; if we suppose it to mean the broadest part of the Propontis, the ships could only be “at an angle to the Pontus” when stationed where the current runs athwart the strait. This is the case above Sestos, but not at the point where Herodotus fixes the bridge. Thirdly, the weight of the cables is astonishing. Each of those made of flax, if 5000 feet in length, would weigh considerably more than 100 tons, and would, therefore, be quite unmanageable when in one piece. We may suppose that the engineers of the second bridge, warned by the disaster which overtook the first, chose a site where the strait was wider and the stream less violent. They carefully adjusted the vessels to the current, and anchored them fore and aft against the winds. The cables were, no doubt, made in sections, and pieced together on board the ships.

² Herod. vii. 26.

Here the king was astonished to find himself and his host entertained by the munificence of a private person. Pythius,

Celaenae;
incident of
Pythius.

the son of Atys, and grandson of Croesus (?),
had inherited part of the great wealth of the
Mermnadæ. He had already presented Darius

with the golden plane-tree and vine, which were among the choicest heirlooms of the Persian palace; he now proposed to place his vast riches at the disposal of Xerxes. When asked how much he possessed, Pythius replied, that on hearing of the king's approach he had ascertained the amount

His enormous
wealth.

of his wealth. In coin and bullion, he had
amassed 2000 talents of silver (about £550,000,
if Aeginetan talents); and he fell short of 4,000,000 darics of
gold by 7000 darics only. The whole of this vast sum he
offered to Xerxes; his slaves and estates would be an ample
provision for his own wants. Xerxes was delighted, and
in order to show himself as generous as his host, he
not only refused to accept the offered gift, but presented
Pythius with the 7000 darics required to make up the
full sum of four millions. He also admitted him to be
one of the "King's friends." In less than six months,
as we shall see, Pythius discovered the real value of the
royal favours.¹

From Celaenae, Xerxes marched to Colossae, passing on his way the city of Anaua, and its salt-producing lake. Colossae

Colossae.

is described by Herodotus as a "large city of
Phrygia." It was remarkable for one of those

"swallows" which occur in limestone formations; the river Lycus disappearing into an underground chasm, in which it continued to flow for more than half a mile. From Colossae Xerxes marched to Cydrara, on the borders of Phrygia and Lydia, and from Cydrara, crossing the Maeander, to Cal-

latêbus.

latêbus—a city famous for the manufacture of
honey from wheat and the fruit of the tamarisk.

On leaving Callatêbus the king came upon a beautiful plane-

¹ Herod. vii. 26, 27.

tree, to which, after the Persian manner, he not only presented golden ornaments, but assigned a custodian. On the following day he reached Sardis, where he remained for the winter.

Sardis.

During his stay in this city he despatched envoys to the various cities of Greece to demand earth and water as a sign of submission to the Great King.¹

7. In the following spring, on hearing that the canal and the bridges were finally completed, Xerxes prepared to continue his march from Sardis to Abydus. When he was about to leave the city, the sun was eclipsed and "vanished out of heaven, though the sky was clear and not a cloud was to be seen." This portent struck terror into the king and his followers. The Magi were at once consulted. They had already given a happy interpretation of disquieting visions, and they were not at a loss now. The sun, they said, gave warning to the Greeks, the moon to the Persians; and as the sun has disappeared from heaven, so would the Grecian cities disappear from earth.² Xerxes was delighted, and at once proceeded on his way, but Pythius, who seems to have accompanied the king to Sardis, was by no means reassured. As all his five sons were in the army, which was marching out under these evil omens, he ventured to ask a favour of one who had recently shown himself so generous: "Have compassion on my age," he entreated, "and release from service my eldest son, that he may remain to be my stay, and watch over my possessions."

Xerxes leaves
Sardis.
480 B.C.
Ol. 75. 1.

Eclipse of
the sun.

Pythius asks
a favour.

¹ Herod. vii. 30-32.

² Herod. vii. 37. There was an eclipse of the sun on April 19, 481, but it was not visible at Sardis. Professor Airy would explain the narrative of Herodotus by reference to the lunar eclipse of March 14, 479 (*Transactions of the Royal Society*, 1853, p. 199); but Professor Newcomb rightly objects that "no known natural occurrence but a total eclipse of the sun could give rise to the circumstances described by Herodotus" (*Researches on the Motion of the Moon*, i. p. 32, Washington, 1878). Stein, ad Herod. *loc. cit.*, assumes that the annular eclipse of February 16, 478 was antedated by popular tradition so as to synchronise with Xerxes' march. See also Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.* ii. 135.

The king was furious. "Wretch!" he retorted, "have you the impudence to speak of your son, when I am myself marching against Hellas with my sons, and brethren, and kinsfolk, and friends? Are you not my slave, bound to follow me with all your house, ay! and with your wife too? Your own life shall be spared, and the lives of four of your sons—for that you may thank your hospitality; but this eldest, to whom you cling, shall die; his life shall be forfeit for your folly." Xerxes then gave orders for the eldest of the sons of Pythius to be cut into two halves, one of which was placed on the right side and the other on the left side of the road by which the troops were to march.¹

8. When at length all the arrangements were complete, the army set out from Sardis. First went the porters and beasts of burden, who were followed by a host collected from all nations, marching without distinction of race, and amounting to rather more than half the entire multitude. After an interval came a thousand horsemen selected from all the Persians, and a thousand spearmen equally select; their spears, which had golden pomegranates at the butt, were held pointing to the ground. They were followed by ten Nisaeen horses in gorgeous trappings, behind which came the chariot of Auramazda, drawn by eight white steeds, whose bridles were held by a charioteer marching on foot, for no one might mount the sacred car. Then came Xerxes in a chariot drawn by Nisaeen horses, accompanied by his charioteer Patiramphes. He was followed by a thousand of the noblest Persians, armed with spears adorned with apples at the butt, which they carried with the points upwards, and a thousand chosen horsemen. After the horse came the Ten Thousand Immortals marching on foot, of whom a thousand, dispersed round the rest, carried spears with golden pomegranates at the butt; in the remaining nine thousand the pomegranates were of silver. They were known as the "Immortals" because

¹ Herod. vii. 38, 39.

their numbers were never diminished. They were followed by an equal number of mounted soldiers, after whom was left a space of two furlongs. The rear of the army was formed by the remainder of the host marching without distinction of race.¹

The route led to the Caicus, and thence through the plain of Atarneus, along the eastern foot of Mount Cane to Carène. From Carène it struck across the plain of Thebe to Adramyttium and Antandrus.

From Sardis
to Abydus.

At this point the army left the shore, marching inland to the east of Mount Ida, near which it was overtaken by a fearful storm of thunder and lightning, and suffered great losses. On reaching the Scamander, the first river in the story of Herodotus, whose waters were insufficient for the needs of the army, Xerxes determined to satisfy his curiosity by a visit to the ancient citadel of Priam. The place was still distinguished by the worship of Ilian Athene, on whose altar the king now sacrificed a thousand cows, while the Magi, who accompanied him, poured libations to the dead. In the following night the army was disturbed by a panic, but this did not prevent it from resuming the march when the morning broke. At length—a month after leaving Sardis—Abydus was reached.²

Xerxes at
Ilium.

9. At this point the army joined the fleet. The entire armament was now for the first time united, and Xerxes could survey the whole of the vast forces which he was about to lead into Europe. In his picturesque narrative, Herodotus relates how the king, sitting on a throne of white marble, with the whole shore in sight, delighted himself with watching a contest among his ships. When he saw the Hellespont hidden with vessels, and the headlands swarming with soldiers, who extended far over the plains of Abydus, he was overjoyed, but at the next moment his exultation ended in tears.

Xerxes at
Abydus.

His agitation.

Artabanus, who was standing by, inquired the reason of this

¹ Herod. vii. 40, 41.

² Herod. vii. 42, 43.

sudden change. "I bethought me," replied the king, "that in all this vast multitude there is not one who will see his hundredth year, and I wept at the pity of our human lot."

His conversation with Artabanus.

Artabanus answered: "Sire, there are sadder things in life than this. Brief as our existence is, there is no man, here or elsewhere, whose lot is so happy, that he will not once, ay, and more than once, long for death as a welcome relief from sickness or calamity. God allows us to taste the sweetness of life,

The divine envy.

but in his envy grudges us a full draught." Reflections such as these are common enough in Greek poetry, but in placing them in the mouth of Artabanus Herodotus is once more ascribing to a Persian a sentiment which is out of harmony with the Persian character. The happiness of the Oriental monarch was not likely to be disturbed by the thought that he was exposed to the divine anger or envy. In his ears the "envy of the gods" was an unmeaning phrase. Was he not the chosen of Aouramazda, by whose favour the empire had been established?

From these reflections Xerxes and Artabanus turned to discuss the prospects of the expedition. Artabanus, who was still despondent, spoke of two enemies which the king had to fear.

Dangers of the expedition.

"Is it my army or my fleet," inquired Xerxes, "that you consider unequal to the forces which the Greeks can bring against it?" "The enemies of which I speak," Artabanus replied, "are the sea and the land; no harbour can shelter your vessels from the storm; no land can support these many myriads of men; the further you advance, the more difficult will it be to find supplies." Xerxes urged in reply that the future was at all times uncertain; some risk must be run, or men would cease to act at all. If in the past the Persian monarchs had been guided by such counsels as those of Artabanus, the empire would never have been founded. It was his duty to follow in the steps of his father, and with proper precautions he had a good hope of success. Finding that the king was not to be deterred from the invasion, Artabanus urged him to dismiss

the Ionian contingent from his fleet. Even if they were base enough to join in enslaving their own country, their assistance was of little value; and if they took the only course which was honourable, by desertion or half-hearted help they would inflict great loss on the Persian cause. Xerxes met these objections by reminding Artabanus of the conduct of the Ionians in the Scythian expedition, when it was in their power to save or destroy the Persian army. He also pointed out that their wives, children, and property would remain in his hands as sureties for good behaviour. "Wherefore be not afraid, but with a good courage keep watch over my house and dominions, for to you alone I give my sceptre in charge." Artabanus now returned to Susa. His warnings were not altogether without effect on Xerxes, who summoned the chiefs of the army, and addressed them in an impressive speech, urging the necessity of vigour and zeal against so brave an enemy as the Greeks.¹

The Ionians—
can they be
trusted?

Xerxes parts
from Artabanus.

By early dawn on the following morning the Persians were burning incense on the bridges, and strewing the path with boughs of myrtle. When the sun rose, Xerxes poured libations from a golden goblet, and with eyes fixed on the ascending orb implored the divine protection in pursuing his conquests to the utmost limits of Europe. The prayer ended, he cast the goblet into the sea with a golden bowl and a Persian scimitar. The crossing then began: the horse and foot, led by the Immortals, passed over the bridge towards the Pontus; the servants and beasts of burden over the bridge towards the Aegean. For seven days and seven nights was heard the ceaseless tramp of man and beast; for seven days and seven nights the lash fell on the laggards, and then the mighty host was safe on the shore of Europe.² At the same time the ships crossed to the opposite side of the strait.

The crossing
of the Helle-
spont.

¹ Herod. vii. 44-53.

² Herod. vii. 54-56.

10. The fleet and the army now separated. The fleet sailed to the mouth of the Hellespont, whence it struck out for the Sarpedonian headland and so passed along the coast to Doriscus. Here it was joined by the army which had marched up the Chersonese, through the city of Agora, and round the head of the "Black Gulf" by Aenus and Lake Stentoris. Doriscus was the name given to the shore and a large plain at the mouth of the Hebrus (Maritza). On his return from the Scythian expedition, Darius had built a fortress there, and left behind a garrison under the command of a Persian governor. It was also one of the depôts at which supplies had been stored for the expedition. The army was encamped on the plain, near the sea; the ships were drawn up on the shore to the west of the Hebrus and "refreshed."¹ Hitherto the forces had marched in a mixed multitude, without distinction of race; but at Xerxes' command they were now arranged by their nations, and their numbers were taken. The enumeration was accomplished by a very simple expedient. Ten thousand men were packed closely together in a body, and a line was drawn round them; on the line a wall was built, as high as a man's waist, forming an enclosure capable of holding exactly ten thousand men, and this space was filled and refilled as long as any soldiers remained. The total is put at 1,700,000 men. The horse, which were also numbered, were 80,000 strong, besides camels and chariots. The fleet was composed of 1207 vessels.²

When the army had been arranged and numbered, Xerxes desired to inspect it. Mounting his chariot he drove past the ranks, inquiring the name of every nation, which was at once recorded by the scribes who accompanied him. When he had moved from end to end of the vast array of horse and foot, he exchanged the chariot for a Sidonian vessel, in order to

Xerxes
reviews the
forces.

¹ Herod. vii. 57-59.

² Herod. vii. 60, 87, 89.

review the fleet. The ships had been drawn down to the sea, and lay with oars at paddle, about 400 feet from the shore: the prows faced the land, the marines were ranged on deck in order of battle. Xerxes, who was seated in a golden tent on the deck of his ship, slowly moved between the prows and the shore, inquiring, as before, the names of the contingents, which were duly recorded by his scribes.¹

II. Herodotus has left us a minute description of the various nations which composed the Persian army, their dress and armature. Whence he derived his account we do not know, but doubtless he had some written source of information. His description is the Catalogue of the Persian invasion, as

Account given
by Herodotus
of the Persian
army,

necessary to the completeness of the historian's work, as the Catalogue of the Ships was necessary to the *Iliad*. It is easy to throw suspicion on such a list, by suggesting that it is a descriptive account of the nations which were included in the Persian empire rather than a statement of the contingents which took part in the invasion of Greece. Whether authentic or not in this sense, the information imparted to us by Herodotus is of the greatest interest and value. If the

historian dwells on it as marking the extent of the Persian dominion, and displaying with vivid reality the motley picture presented by

valuable as a
description of
the East.

the subjects of the Great King, the ethnologist cherishes it as a sketch of the civilisation of the East in the dim period which preceded the campaigns of Alexander. Here were Persians clad in corselets of scale-armour, and protected by shields of wicker-work; their

Persians.

arms of offence were large bows, with arrows of reed, short javelins, and a dirk suspended from the girdle. On their heads they wore soft tiaras, for only the king might wear the upright *kidaris*; on their legs they wore trousers, a garment which excited the astonishment and contempt of the Greeks. They were the chosen soldiers of the ruling race, of whom

¹ Herod. vii. 100.

some would go into battle single-handed against a trio of Greeks. Their dress and armour shone with a barbaric wealth of gold and jewels. Their women followed in carriages surrounded by a multitude of attendants, for the softness and magnificence of Persian life were carried into the battlefield. Here were Ethiopians from Nubia, distinguished

Ethiopians. by their woolly hair, draped in the skins of lions and leopards, their dusky bodies painted for war with gypsum and vermillion, their arrows pointed with sharp stones, their spears tipped with the horns of antelopes. Here were Arabians, their flowing robes girded

Arabians. about them, with long recurving bows slung at the right hand. Here were dark savages from Beloochistan—the Asiatic Ethiopians of Herodotus—whose head-gear was the front part of a horse's skull, with the ears and mane attached; their shields were formed of the skins of cranes. Here were Pisidians (?), whose bronze helmets were fashioned to represent the ears and horns of oxen;

Thracians, etc. Thracians wearing fox-skins as a covering for the head, and fawn-skins as moccasins; Sacae, armed with battle-axes; Assyrians, with iron-studded clubs; Mysians, with poles burnt at the end. Conspicuous among the mounted soldiers were 8000 Sagartians from the steppes of Iran, whose only weapons were a dirk and a lasso; and a troop of Arabians mounted on swift camels.¹

The fleet was supplied by contingents from Phoenicia, Egypt and Cyprus, Cilicia, Pamphylia, Lycia, and Caria; and from the Asiatic Greeks of the Anatolian coast, who added 307 vessels (including 17 from the islands) to the 900 of the barbarians. To every ship, besides the marines furnished with the vessel, a number of Persians, Medes, or Sacae were assigned as a fighting force. We observe with interest that while drawing attention to the varieties of dress and armour among the native marines, Herodotus finds nothing to remark in the ships. Whether

¹ Herod. vii. 61-81, 83, 85.

from Egypt or Caria, from Cyprus or Ionia, the vessels are all triremes, and the triremes are all the same. Commerce and maritime intercourse had swept from the sea distinctions which prevailed on land, and the art of shipbuilding had been carried from Corinth to all parts of the Mediterranean.¹

12. Of the infantry Herodotus enumerates forty-five nations, counting each section of the Ethiopians separately, which were commanded by twenty-nine Persian leaders. Under the leaders of nations were captains of ten thousand and one thousand, whom they

Arrangement
of the army.

nominated; under these were captains of a hundred and of ten, nominated by the captains of ten thousand. By this means the authority of the twenty-nine leaders of nations was brought to bear upon every soldier under their charge. The leaders of nations were in turn subordinate to the generals-in-chief, who were six in number:

The com-
manders.

Mardonius, the son-in-law and nephew of Darius, the moving spirit of the expedition; Tritantæchmes and Smerdomenes, nephews of Darius; Masistes, a son of Darius and Atossa, and full brother of Xerxes; Gergis and Megabyzus. The ten thousand Immortals formed a separate corps under the command of Hydarnes. The cavalry was under the general command of Harmamithras and Tithæus, sons of Datis (*supra*, p. 79); the third commander, Pharnuches, had been disabled by an accident at Sardis. The ships were in the hands of four Persians: Ariabignes, a son of Darius; Achaemenes, a son of Darius and Atossa; Prexaspes and Megabazus.² Both the army and the fleet were accompanied by leaders from the various cities and nations, but these were not allowed to share in the command.

13. When the review and enumeration were ended, Xerxes was at length aware of the full extent of the forces which he had brought against Hellas. Would or could the Greeks resist him? Herodotus has thrown the situation into a dramatic form; in a conversation between

Would the
Greeks resist?

¹ Herod. vii. 89-96.

² Herod. vii. 81, 82, 88, 97.

Xerxes and Demaratus, he contrasts the Persian and Grecian points of view. "Tell me," asked the king, "will the Xerxes and Demaratus. Greeks take up arms against me? For my part I do not think that they, or all the nations of the West, unless united, could withstand such a force as mine." Demaratus replied that he would not speak of the rest of the Greeks, though all had been trained to virtue in a hard school, but of the Lacedaemonians only. *They* would listen to no overtures, but would certainly resist the Persians, even though they were alone in their resistance. Nor would any disparity of numbers terrify them. Whatever their forces, whether a thousand, or less, or more, they would take the field. "What words are these?" cried the king, with a laugh; "will a thousand men fight with these myriads? On

In spite of the disparity of numbers,

that reckoning, every Spartan should be a match for ten Persians, and you, who have been their king, and received double portions, should be a match for twenty. And how could one thousand, or ten thousand, or fifty thousand, engage with such an army as mine, when all are free and equal, uncontrolled by any single commander? Were the whole Grecian host in the hands of one man, as you Lacedaemonians are, fear might compel them to superhuman valour, or the lash might drive them against superior numbers, but without such compulsion they will never face the enemy. Nay, even if their numbers were equal, the Greeks would shrink from engaging with the Persians alone, for in my bodyguard are men who would join battle with any three Greeks." "Sire," replied Demaratus, "I knew that my words would give you little pleasure, but at your command I spoke the truth. I have no

the Spartans would certainly resist.

reason to love the Spartans; they have stripped me of my rights, and driven me into exile; all that I have, I owe to your father. I have no wish to fight with ten Persians, or with two; nay, I would not of my own free will fight with one. Yet if the necessity were laid upon me, I would readily engage with one of those soldiers, who claim to be equal to any three of the Greeks.

Fighting singly, the Lacedaemonians are as good as any troops in the world, and in a body they are far the best of all. Though free, they are not free; they have over them a master, who is the law; a master whom they fear more than your soldiers fear you. What he commands, that they do; and his command is always the same: they may not fly before any number of men in battle; they must remain in their ranks and conquer or die. If my words sound foolish in your ears, I will say no more: may all be as you wish." Xerxes laughed, and made some courteous reply.¹

The Spartans
have a master:
their law.

14. Leaving Mascames to be governor of Doriscus in the room of the officer whom Darius had appointed, Xerxes now resumed his march. The army was divided into three detachments; of which one advanced by the sea-coast under the command of Mardonius and Masistes; the second, under Tritantaechnes and Gergis followed an inland route; the third, in which was Xerxes himself, with Smerdomenes and Megabazus, held a course midway between the two. The tribes and nations which lay upon the coast were enrolled in the army without resistance; in fact, the troops were still marching through Persian territory; for after the conquests of Megabazus and Mardonius (in 515 and 492 B.C.), the whole coast as far as Thessaly was controlled by Persian officers. The road followed by Xerxes carried him past Mesambria, the most western of the fortresses which the Samothracians had built to protect their possessions on the mainland; past Stryme, a city of the Thasians; past Maroneia and Dicæa, and the lakes in the neighbourhood; past Abdêra and the mouth of the Nestus to Pistyrus. These towns lay on his left. Of the wilder tribes, which occupied the country on his right, the Satrae alone were able to preserve their freedom, and they owed it less to their own bravery, than to the lofty snow-clad hills and dense forests

March from
Doriscus to
the Strymon.

Xerxes in
Thrace.

¹ Herod. vii. 101-105.

of their home. From Pistyrus Xerxes traversed Pieria, keeping Mount Pangaeus on the right, till at length he reached the Strymon at Eion.¹

15. Though the Strymon was not the largest river the Persians had to cross on their way to Greece, it was the only river over which it had been necessary to build bridges. And as Xerxes, in spite of his outburst of rage, had not ventured to cross the Hellespont without propitiatory sacrifices, so did he propitiate the Strymon. Persians and Greeks were indeed united by a reverence for streams; and to the Greeks the Strymon was in a special degree an object of worship. The Magi sacrificed white horses to the river with the strange ceremonies of their religion. Darker rites are also mentioned; at the "Nine Ways," three miles above the mouth of the river, nine boys and nine girls of the native Edonians were buried alive in accordance with Persian custom. After these propitiations, the army crossed the bridges prepared for it.²

16. From the Strymon, Xerxes marched through Bisaltia and the Sylean plain to Acanthus. The Acanthians had been very zealous in his cause; they had taken part in the construction of the canal, and were careful to announce their services. The king rewarded them by pledges of friendship, and the present of a Median dress. But his joy at the success of the enterprise was dashed by the loss of Artachaes, one of the officers who had presided over the work—an Achaemenid of commanding stature and splendid voice. Xerxes buried him with magnificent ceremonies; the whole army assisted in heaping his cairn, which was honoured by the Acanthians as the grave of a "hero." In a similar vein of superstitious feeling the

¹ Herod. vii. 106-13, 121. When Herodotus tells us, c. 112, that Xerxes kept Pangaeus on the right, and in c. 113 that he marched past the Paeonians, Dobêres, and Paeoplae, who dwell to the north of Pangaeus, westward to Eion, he must be confounding the movements of two divisions of the army.

² Herod. vii. 114.

Thracians never destroyed or tilled the land over which the army of Xerxes passed; the road remained an object of the greatest veneration down to the time of Herodotus. The cities which lay in the route of the march had another reason to remember the invasion. The cost of the daily meal of the army—for one meal only was provided—was estimated at about 400 talents (about £110,000, if Aeginetan), a sum equal to twice the yearly income even of a rich island like Thasos, and to most of the smaller towns an intolerable and crushing burden. Herodotus describes the preparations for the meal; how for months previously cattle were fed and fowls fattened on land and water, how stores of ground wheat and barley were accumulated, how all the plate far and near was collected; and how, after the hospitality of the night, the Persians went their way carrying everything with them! Such monstrous entertainments were without a parallel. Even the dull brain of an Abderite took fire at the thought of them; Megacreon bade his citizens repair to the temples and implore their deities to spare them half the miseries of the days to come, as they had spared them now by graciously inclining Xerxes to eat but once a day.¹

The cost of
maintaining
the army.

17. At Acanthus the fleet and army separated, to unite once more at Therma, the modern Salonichi. The ships sailed by the channel prepared for them through the peninsula of Athos to Cape Ampelus, whence they crossed to Cape Canastræum and by Aeneia to Therma.² At every point on the way men and ships were collected from the cities of Chalcidice. The army seems to have marched in various detachments; one never reached Acanthus at all, but passed through Paeonia and Crestonæa to the Echeidôrus, at the mouth of which river Therma lay. Xerxes, however, took the shortest route across

From Acan-
thus to
Therma.

¹ Herod. vii. 115-120. For the conduct of the king of the Bisaltians, see *infra*, chap. iv. § 26, note.

² Herod. vii. 122, 123.

the base of Chalcidice. It was at this point in the march that the camels in the army were attacked by lions—animals which Herodotus tells us abounded in the region between the Nestus and Achelous, but were never found east of the first or west of the second river.¹

At Therma the army went into camp for some days, stretching along the whole coast from the city to the Lydias and Haliacmon. Meanwhile a third part of the forces was

Preparations
for crossing
Olympus.

occupied in preparing the route over the "Macedonian mountain," for it was the intention of Xerxes to cross the northern shoulder of Olympus, not to enter Greece by the pass of Tempe. While his soldiers were thus occupied, the king paid a visit to the famous gorge, the outlet of the drainage of Thessaly. The Aleuadae had been his warm supporters from the first;

Xerxes at
Tempe.

and when he looked on the narrow ravine and the turbid river, he seemed to perceive the reason of their eagerness. "The Thessalians are a wise nation," he remarked, "and have done well in coming to terms. How easy it would have been to throw a dam across the stream and turn the whole country into a lake."² At Therma also Xerxes was met by the envoys, whom he had sent into Greece from Sardis to demand earth

and water as tokens of submission. From them he learned that he had nothing to fear from the tribes in the immediate neighbourhood of Thessaly, the Dolopians, Enians, Perrhaebi,

The medising
Greeks.

Locrians, Magnetes, Malians, and Achaeans of Phthia, the Thebans also, and indeed all the Boeotians (with the exception of Thespieae and Plataea) were ready to submit. No envoys had been sent to Athens or

¹ Herod. vii. 124-126. Herodotus also speaks of wild oxen, whose great horns were an article of commerce in Greece, in this district.

² Herod. vii. 130, 131. Though the Aleuadae had always supported the king, and indeed urged him to invade Greece (vii. 6), the Thessalians by no means agreed with them (vii. 172). Xerxes supposed that the Aleuadae represented the nation in this matter.

Sparta, owing to the treatment which the ambassadors of Darius, ten years before, had experienced in those cities.¹

18. The invasion had been expected in Greece for months, perhaps for years, before it arrived. What measures had been taken in the face of the impending calamity? Everywhere there was discord and division; some were for resistance, others for submission, and those who had not sent earth and water to the king resented the conduct of those who had.² In this hour of difficulty and danger the Athenians proved the saviours of Greece; so Herodotus clearly and boldly affirms, in spite of the odium attaching to such an opinion at the time when he expressed it. They knew that the invasion, though aiming at the subjection of all Hellas, was in a special manner directed against Athens, yet they neither abandoned their country nor attempted to save themselves by submission.³ Their devotion was the more heroic because they received little encouragement where they might most hope for it. Of the twelve members of the Amphictyonic council, which had charge of the national shrine at Delphi, nine had sent earth and water to the king, and the Delphians themselves were inclined to dissuade from resistance. But the Athenians could not stand alone; united action was

¹ Herod. vii. 132, 133. Plutarch, *Them.* 6, informs us that an interpreter sent with the envoys was put to death by public decree at the instigation of Themistocles, because he had dared to "defile the Hellenic tongue with the commands of a barbarian." But no envoys were now sent to Athens! To this time he also refers the decree about Arthmius of Zeleia, who, on the proposal of Themistocles, was disfranchised, and his children after him, because he brought "the gold of the Medes into Greece." The decree about Arthmius was still to be seen on a stone pillar on the acropolis in the time of Demosthenes (*Phil.* iii. 41; *De fals. leg.* 271; *Aesch. in Ctes.* 258, etc.). It probably belongs to a later period, but if really proposed by Themistocles it can hardly be later than 471 B.C.

² Herod. vii. 138, οὔτε βουλευμένων τῶν πολλῶν ἀντάπτεσθαι τοῦ πολέμου, μηδὲ ζήντων δὲ προθύμως.

³ Herod. vii. 139.

absolutely necessary for defence. The first and most important step was to secure the aid of Sparta, whose movements determined the course of the Peloponnesus, with the exception of Argos, Achaea, and the remoter parts of Arcadia. With her authority those Greeks who determined to fight for the

Congress at
the Isthmus,
481 B.C. independence of their country were invited to send commissioners in the autumn of 481 B.C. to the Isthmus, to discuss the measures of resistance.

When the commissioners met it was resolved, as a first and obvious step, to put an end to disputes between the various cities, and sink all minor differences in the great bond of patriotic union. The ancient quarrel, of nearly thirty years' standing, between Athens and Aegina was made up, and in spite of past ill-feeling and treachery, the Aeginetans, as we shall see, gave signal proofs of their valour and their patriotism.¹

When the news arrived that Xerxes was at Sardis, the commissioners despatched three Greeks to ascertain the extent of his forces. These spies had no sooner reached the Lydian capital than they were discovered and put to the torture by the generals in command of the Persian army. But Xerxes, on hearing of their arrest, at once ordered them to be brought into his presence, if alive. When he discovered the object of their visit he gave command that they should be conducted through the army and shown the full extent of his forces; after which he sent them back uninjured. He hoped that the Greeks on hearing this report would cease from an opposition, which they would perceive to be unavailing; and the death of three men would have been an insignificant loss to his enemies.²

19. At the same time envoys were sent from the Isthmus to the Argives, who as yet had given no sign of their intentions, and to the more distant parts of Greece, Sicily, Corcyra, and Crete, in the hope of gaining new adherents and new strength for the good cause.

¹ Herod. vii. 145.

² Herod. vii. 146.

Argos was still suffering from the severe defeat inflicted upon her by Sparta, and though in the interim she had been able to spare a thousand men to aid the Aeginetans against the Athenians, she felt herself greatly at the mercy of her powerful neighbour. Any change, no matter what, would be a grateful relief if only it occupied the energies and attention of Sparta. When the envoys were introduced into the council-chamber at Argos, they were informed that the Argives were willing to join the patriotic party on two conditions: the Spartans must agree to a peace for thirty years, and the Argive king must be joint leader with the Spartan kings of the Hellenic forces. The peace was necessary that their children might grow up to manhood before the city was again attacked by Sparta; the claim to a joint command was merely an assertion, and a modified assertion, of the ancient right of Argos to lead the united Greeks. But the envoys were in no mood for concession. The thirty years' truce was a matter for their assembly to decide; in regard to the joint command, they gave an immediate answer. They had two kings and the Argives had but one: they would allow the Argive monarch an equal share with each of their own kings, but beyond this they would not go. The Argives regarded such a proposal as an encroachment on their rights; and as they preferred to be ruled by the barbarians than to yield to the Lacedaemonians, they bade the envoys leave the country before sunset. Nevertheless, the Argives did not openly join the invaders, a course which would have brought the armies of the Peloponnesus upon them. They were "neither for God, nor for the devil, but for themselves," and at a later time, when victory declared for the Greeks, they availed themselves of this indecision to explain and defend their want of patriotism.¹

i. To Argos.

Argos demands an equal share in the command with Sparta,

which Sparta will not concede,

upon which Argos declines assistance.

¹ Herod. vii. 148-152. The defeat of the Argives by Cleomenes cannot be placed later than 494 B.C., and may have taken place much

20. The envoys sent to Sicily applied to Gelo the tyrant of Syracuse, which was now the first of the cities of the island. They pointed out that the invasion, though nominally aimed at Athens, threatened the freedom of all Hellas; that Gelo, as a ruler of Sicily, had a large stake in Hellas; that the Hellenic forces, if united, would form a considerable power; that division implied ruin, and that the Persians, if victorious in Greece, would certainly come to Sicily. Gelo's reply was reproachful and haughty. "You come to me for help against the barbarian invaders, but when I sought your aid against Carthage, you refused it; you would not avenge the death of your king Dorieus, and for all that you have done, Sicily would be overrun by barbarians. Now you bethink yourselves of Gelo. But I will not deal with you as you have dealt with me: I will send you 200 triremes, 20,000 hoplites, 2000 horse, 2000 bowmen, 2000 slingers, and 2000 light-armed; I will supply the whole Grecian army with food so long as the war lasts: but I will do this on one condition only—that I, Gelo of Syracuse, am leader and commander of the Greeks against the barbarians. If this is not permitted me, I will neither come myself nor send a soldier." On hearing this haughty demand Syagrus of Lacedaemon broke out into a cry of indignation. "Loud would be the lamenta-

earlier. Yet in the account which Herodotus gives of the conduct of Argos on this occasion, we are told that the city had recently lost 6000 citizens at the hands of the Lacedaemonians under Cleomenes; and that, owing to their defeat, the Argives, who from the first had heard of the preparations of the barbarians, had made inquiries at Delphi of the oracle, whether they should accede to the request which they knew would be made of them. The oracle recommended a neutral policy. That is, a policy recommended, perhaps, at the time of the battle of Marathon, is used in order to justify medism in 480 B.C. Other reasons were also given for the conduct of the ancient Dorian city, but we need look no further than her hatred and fear of Sparta. It was even said that she went so far as to invite the Persians into Greece: *ἐπειδὴ σφί προὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους κακῶς ἡ αἰχμὴ ἐστῆκε, πᾶν δὲ βουλόμενοι σφίσι εἶναι πρὸ τῆς παρεούσης λύπης*. But for this there is no evidence,

tion of Agamemnon, Pelops' son, if he heard that Spartans were robbed of their command by Syracusans and Gelo. Let us have no more of this; if you will help us, you must follow our lead; if you will not follow our lead, send us no help." Gelo loftily put the insult aside, pointing out that he was master of forces many times as great as those of the Spartans. But he offered to be content with the command by land *or* sea; let the Spartans choose and he would accept the alternative. Now it was the turn of the Athenian envoys. "Hellas did not send us to you," they said, "to ask for a leader, but to ask for an army. So long as you demanded the sole command, we left it to the Spartans to reply; but now that you wish to lead the fleet, we tell you that the command is ours, if the Spartans pass it over. We will yield to them, but to no one else; ours is the greatest naval force; we are the oldest nation in Hellas; we dwell where we have always dwelt, and even at Troy our leader was famous for his skill." Gelo pithily replied: "You are likely to have more commanders than men; and as you are determined to have your own way in every-
and when this is refused will send nothing.
 thing, the sooner you return the better. Go home and announce to Hellas that the year has lost its spring." So Gelo answered for the moment, but when he heard that Xerxes had crossed the Hellespont he sent a Coan named Cadmus to Delphi, with a large sum of money, to watch the event. If the Persians were victorious, Cadmus was to make submission in the name of Gelo, and present the money to Xerxes; if the Hellenes conquered, he was to return with it to Syracuse. Herodotus tells us, as a proof of the singular honesty of the man, that Cadmus did return, and restore the entire sum to Gelo.¹

21. The envoys who visited Sicily were directed to apply

¹ Herod. vii. 145, 153-164. In another account (c. 165, f.) Gelo would have come to the rescue of Greece, even on the Lacedaemonian terms, if he had not been prevented by the Carthaginian invasion; see *infra*, c. xii.

to the Corcyraeans. They met with a reception which was all that they could wish. The Corcyraeans declared that they would not suffer Greece to be destroyed, for disaster to her involved slavery to themselves; they would send assistance to the utmost of their power. And when the time came for action, they manned sixty ships. But they gave them orders to lie-to off the coast of Messenia till the issue of the struggle was apparent. They had little hope that the Greeks would succeed; they wished to be able to say to the invader, if necessary, that their fleet, the largest next to that of Athens, had taken no part in opposing him. And if by any chance the Greeks were victorious they had an excuse ready. It was not cowardice or treachery which kept them back; they had manned sixty ships, but the Etesian winds prevented them from rounding Malea.¹

The Cretans remained. On receiving the application of the envoys they applied to Delphi for advice. "Ye fools," was the answer, "ye blame your lot for the tears which Minos in his wrath sent upon you for the aid ye gave to Menelaus, whom ye must needs assist in revenging the theft of a Spartan woman, though the Greeks gave no help in avenging the death of Minos at Camicus." This was, of course, a hint that the Cretans were to remain neutral, and take no part in affairs which did not immediately concern themselves. When seeking the lost Daedalus in Sicily—such was the legend—Minos had been put to death; a great expedition was sent from Crete to Camicus to avenge him, but without success. Two generations afterwards occurred the Trojan war, in which the Cretans under Idomeneus rendered efficient service

¹ Herod. vii. 168. The "neutrality" of the Corcyraeans had become suspected before the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, and Herodotus probably reflects that feeling in the account which he gives of the action of Corcyra at this time. The Etesian winds blow from July till towards the end of September.

to Menelaus. But on their return the island was desolated by pestilence and famine, the "cruel vengeance of Minos."¹

22. The cause of liberty had received but little support. Argos, Syracuse, and Crete declined to send any assistance whatever; Corcyra made promises which she did not intend to perform. From Achaea no aid had been asked, and none came, though the country afforded shelter to the fugitive Delphians (*infra*, p. 174). Meanwhile Xerxes was approaching. When the news came that his army was about to cross the Hellespont, the Thessalians, who by no means approved of the action of the Aleuadae, despatched messengers to the council at the Isthmus, asking for aid in keeping the pass of Tempe. They were willing to do their part for the protection of Hellas, but if assistance was not sent, they could not help joining the enemy. The Greeks complied with the request; an army was sent, 10,000 strong, by sea, to Halus in Achaea, whence it marched across the country to Tempe, and there encamped, supported by a contingent of Thessalian horse. The Lacedaemonians were commanded by Evaenetus, one of their polemarchs; the Athenians by Themistocles. But after remaining a few days they received a message from Alexander, the king of Macedon, bidding them retire; if they remained, they would be merely trampled under foot by the vast host of the invaders, who were advancing by land and sea. They also ascertained that Tempe was not the only pass leading from the north into Thessaly; there was a second route through the Perrhaebian country, past Gonnus. Under these circumstances the Greeks resolved to retire from their advanced position.

Xerxes
approaches
Thessaly.

The Thessa-
lians send to
the Isthmus
for help.

Help sent to
Tempe, but
afterwards
withdrawn.

¹ Herod. vii. 169-171. If it seems absurd that the oracle should go back for a warning to the distant events of the Trojan war, and even earlier, we must remember that in the minds of Herodotus, and the Greeks generally, the Trojan war and the Persian invasion were the two great instances of collision between the barbarians and the Greeks. The one suggested the other. So the Athenians at Syracuse refer to their commander at Troy.

They returned to their ships and sailed to the Isthmus. The Thessalians, on finding themselves alone, openly went over to the Persians.¹

23. It was perhaps at this time that the Athenians applied to Delphi for advice. They received little encouragement.

Athenian
embassy to
Delphi.

The envoys had barely entered the shrine, ere the priestess cried aloud from the sacred tripod :
“Hapless wretches ! why sit ye here ? Fly, Athenian, fly to the uttermost parts of the earth ; leave home and the high towers of thy circling city ; nor head, nor feet, nor hands remain unshaken ; the whole body is broken ; fire sweeps it to destruction, and the god of battle driving a Syrian car. Not thy fortress alone, but many others will he bring to nought ; many temples of the gods immortal will he give to consuming fire, which now stand drenched in sweat, quivering with fear, the black blood streaming down their roofs, in foresight of the misery that is to be. Go ye from the shrine, and cloud your souls with sorrow !” Such an answer plunged the envoys in the deepest distress, and perhaps they would have left the temple in despair had not a distinguished Delphian, named Timon, advised them to enter the shrine once more and petition the god as suppliants : “O prince,” they cried, “have mercy on these suppliant branches which we bear, and give us better hope of our country, else

A second
response more
favourable.

will we never leave thy shrine, but remain here till we die.” Then the priestess spoke once more, “a word firm as adamant.” “Far-seeing Zeus grants to the Triton-born (Athena) a wooden wall to remain alone undestroyed, which will aid thee and thy children. Stay not to receive the horse or the foot marching in a mighty host from the mainland, but turn and flee before them ; hereafter shalt thou meet them face to face. O Salamis divine, thou wilt bring the sons of women to the grave, at the scattering or the ingathering of the corn.”

This response, though more hopeful than the first, was

¹ Herod. vii. 172-174 ; Plut. *Them.* 7.

obscure enough to give rise to much diversity of opinion at Athens. What was the wooden wall in which the safety of the Athenians seemed to lie? The "wooden wall."

Some interpreters said it was the old wooden defences of the acropolis; others said the ships were meant, but against this opinion it was urged that the oracle alluded to some disaster at Salamis, which could only be a defeat at sea. The difficulty was removed by Themistocles. He pointed out that Salamis would not have Themistocles. been called "divine" if the words had boded ill to Athens: in that case Salamis would have been "cruel," not "divine"—it was the Persians whose sons Salamis would bring to the grave. Let the diviners say what they might, the plain meaning of the oracle was, that the Athenians must seek refuge in their ships. This interpretation prevailed; relying on the ships which had been recently built for the war with Aegina, the Athenians resolved to engage the barbarians at sea, while the Spartans met them on land.¹

On the return of the forces from Tempe to the Isthmus, it was agreed to occupy Thermopylae, the most easily defensible of all the entrances into Greece from the north, and to send the fleet to Artemisium, on the north coast of Euboea.² Each division of the forces would thus assist the other, and both would engage the enemy in a position where his overwhelming numbers would be of little advantage. The Greeks resolve to occupy Thermopylae and Artemisium.

24. The famous pass of Thermopylae is formed by the advance of Mount Oeta to the sea-coast on the south of the Malian gulf. The outline of the shore has been Description of Thermopylae. greatly altered since the fifth century B.C., owing to the alluvial deposit carried down from the hills by the Spercheus, which enters the sea at this point; what was once a narrow path is now a considerable expanse of marshy ground, largely covered with rice-fields. But Herodotus has given us a minute description, from which, compared with the

¹ Herod. vii. 140-144.

² Herod. vii. 175.

natural features of the place, we are able to reconstruct a map of the pass, as it was when Xerxes entered it. "The first city in the gulf after you leave Achaea is Anticyra, past which the Spercheus flows from the Enian country to the sea. About two and a half miles from this is another river, the Dyrras, and again at a similar distance a third, called the Black Water. Half a mile beyond the Black Water is the city of Trachis, situated at the point where the mountains recede farthest from the sea, leaving a plain of about 5000 acres in extent. In the mountains which encircle the territory of Trachis to the east of the city, there is a gorge, through which flows the river Asopus, at the foot of the hills. To the east of the Asopus is a small stream known as the Phoenix (Red Water) flowing from the same mountains as the Asopus, and falling into that river. This is the narrowest point in the pass, a path just wide enough for a waggon. From the Phoenix to Thermopylae is a distance of nearly two miles, and in this interval lies the village of Anthela, past which the Asopus flows into the sea. Round Anthela is an open space, in which lies the temple of Amphictyonic Demeter, and in the plain the Amphictyons meet. East of Anthela, the pass becomes more narrow, till at Alpeni it again consists of nothing but a narrow causeway. It is shut in by steep and inaccessible cliffs on the south, and on the north by the sea and swamps. To the Greeks it is

known as Thermopylae, but by the inhabitants and neighbours it is called Pylae."¹ This is the pass in the stricter sense. The natural strength of the place had been increased to some extent by the Phocians, who, in order to defend it from the Thessalians, had in ancient times fortified the pass with a wall, and had also turned the hot springs, from which it received its name, on the path to destroy it. This old wall, now fallen to decay, the Greeks

¹ Herod. vii. 176, 198-201. Herodotus conceives the pass as running from north to south: it really runs east and west, as stated in the text.

determined to repair, and the army was to draw its supplies from the neighbouring village of Alpeni.¹

25. In like manner Artemisium was thought a suitable station for the fleet, because at this point the strait between Euboea and Magnesia is rendered still narrower by the island of Sciathus. A fleet ranged along the shore, which was well adapted for the embarkation of the men (and the Greek crews rarely remained on board all night), would be in readiness to attack the enemies' ships as they issued from the narrow passage between the island and the heel of Thessaly; and so long as the fleet remained in this position the army at Thermopylae could not be attacked in the rear and cut off from its communication with Hellas. It was also thought a favourable omen that the place was hallowed by a shrine of Artemis.²

On hearing that Xerxes was in Pieria—the region immediately to the north and east of Olympus—the Greeks dispersed from the Isthmus, where the contingents seem to have been assembled awaiting the decision of the council, and proceeded to the posts which had been assigned to them.³

26. When the way had been prepared by his soldiers, Xerxes proceeded to enter Thessaly. Herodotus has unfortunately given us no clear indication of the route by which he marched. He intended, we are told, to pass by the safest road from upper Macedonia through the country of the Perrhaebi by the city of Gonnus, and with this object the "Macedonian Mountain" was cleared. The safest way from upper Macedonia into Thessaly is that which lies through the pass of Volustana. Xerxes could only reach this pass by ascending the Haliacmon,

¹ That the Greeks placed themselves at the eastern end of the pass seems clear from the position of the Chytroi (Herod. vii. 176) which can still be identified, and from the ruins of the wall—if it be the Phocian wall—which Gell discovered. See Stein's notes, Herod. *l.c.*; Leake, *Northern Greece*, vol. ii. ch. x., esp. p. 51.

² Herod. vii. 176. Plutarch (*Them.* 8) describes Artemisium as "a beach open to the north."

³ Herod. vii. 177.

and it would bring him into Thessaly by the valley of the Titaresius, which is considerably to the west of Gonnus, and separated from it by a range of hills (Mount Titarus). A second entrance lay through the pass of Petra to the north and west of Olympus, but this, which also opens into the valley of the Titaresius, far to the west of Gonnus, connects Pieria, not upper Macedonia, with Thessaly. The third route, the difficult mountain path leading right through Olympus by Lake Ascuris, though it opens at Gonnus, is quite im-

practicable for such an army as that which
 The passes. Xerxes led into Greece. The choice then lies between Volustana and Petra, unless both passes were used; and the expression "past Gonnus" can only mean that Xerxes entered Thessaly by the north and north-eastern routes, not by the great eastern pass of Tempe.¹

Xerxes seems to have calculated that the march from Therma to the Maliac gulf would occupy thirteen days, and

Xerxes in as the fleet would not require more than two
 Thessaly. days to sail to the gulf of Pagasae, he gave command that it should remain at Therma for eleven days after his departure. In passing through Thessaly, he matched the famous Thessalian horses against his own, and perceived with pleasure that they were far inferior. When he reached

Halus in Phthiotis, the scene of the legend
 At Halus. of Athamas and Phrixus, he satisfied his curiosity by a visit to the temple of Laphystian Zeus. Here in ancient times human sacrifices had been offered to a deity

¹ Herod. vii. 128. Cf. Tozer, *Highlands of Turkey*, vol. ii. esp. p. 17, and p. 374. The pass of Volustana or Servia is the only pass which can be described as leading from upper Macedonia into Thessaly. Leake (*Northern Greece*, iii. 332) says of it, that "being the most direct and easy passage across the Cambunian ridge, it is the natural gate between Macedonia and Perrhaebia." The pass of Petra connects the maritime plains of Macedonia (i.e. Pieria) with the valley of the Titaresius. "It is at once the most direct and least difficult of the routes across the Olympene barrier." Leake, *l.c.*, p. 337. The route by Ascuris is carefully described by Tozer, *l.c.*, Appendix f.

which claimed the firstling of man and beast, and a relic of the ancient rite remained in the curious custom that none of the race of the Athamantidae should enter the public chamber of the city on pain of being sacrificed. On hearing this Xerxes carefully abstained from entering the sacred precincts, bidding his army abstain also. From Halus he crossed Mount Othrys to Trachis, at the western end of the pass of Thermopylae.¹

27. Herodotus estimated the forces which Xerxes brought from Asia to Thermopylae at 1,700,000 foot, 80,000 horse, besides 20,000 men in charge of chariots and camels. To this he adds a further amount of Amount of
his forces. 300,000 for the forces collected on the march through Europe, making the total of the infantry exactly two millions. Even this enormous aggregate does not satisfy the Greek historian. He would add as many more for servants, and still leaves uncounted the women, eunuchs, beasts of draught and burden, and the "Indian hounds." Adding in the numbers of the men in the ships when the fleet reached Sepias on the coast of Thessaly, Herodotus puts the total of the Persian army at 5,283,220 men, for whom not less than 165,000 bushels of corn would be required daily, if every man was to have but a quart of meal. "No wonder," he exclaims, "that the rivers could not hold out against such a multitude; the wonder is that food was found for them."²

What had the Greeks to bring against this host? A mere handful of men; and even of the forces at their disposal, a small fraction was sent to maintain the pass. Numbers of
the Greeks at
Thermopylae. It was now the Olympic month, in which the Greeks, even with Xerxes in Pieria, could think of little but the great festival; the Spartans also, who

¹ Herod. vii. 196, 197. A ram appears to have been substituted for the human victim, who was, however, compelled to fly the country.

² Herod. vii. 184-189. For the blunder which Herodotus makes in his arithmetic (c. 187), see Stein's note. In 1879 the entire population of Greece amounted to less than two millions.

naturally took the lead in the army, were preparing for their own Carneia. For the moment it was resolved to send out such an army as would suffice to hold the pass, and afterwards, when their religious duties were ended, to take the field with their whole force. Three hundred men, chosen from those who had children, were sent from Sparta under the command of Leonidas, the third son of Anaxandridas, who had succeeded to the throne on the death of Cleomenes; Tegea and Mantinea sent 500 soldiers each; Orchomenus sent 120, and the rest of Arcadia 1000; from Corinth came 400, from Phlius 200, from Mycenae 80; in Central Greece the Thespians sent 700, the Thebans 400: a total of 4200 men, of which Peloponnesus furnished 3100. On reaching the pass, the Greeks appealed to the Phocians, who sent 1000 men, and to the Locrians of Opus, who came out with their whole force. The various contingents had of course their own generals, but the whole army was under the command of Leonidas of Sparta.¹

Allowing for enormous exaggeration in the estimate of the numbers which Xerxes brought into Greece, we may still venture to affirm that for every Greek at Thermopylae, the Great King could produce 100 men. On the lowest computa-

Leonidas
refuses to
retreat in spite
of the dis-
parity.

tion, the odds were overwhelming, but we cannot suppose that the reports which came to the ears of the devoted band, on reaching Thermopylae, were content with the true total.

No wonder that their courage wavered, or that a force, half of which came from Peloponnesus, should look upon the Isthmus as the proper place for resistance. But Leonidas stood firm; he refused to abandon the Phocians and Locrians, who would be the first to suffer. Yet he felt that his numbers

¹ Herod. vii. 201-206. Cf. Diod. xi. 4. There is a doubt about the meaning of *καρσεῶτας* in c. 205. Stein understands it of the so-called "knights" at Sparta, a "fixed body of 300"; but why should all the knights have children? Bähr translates "gesetzten Alters." Schweighaeuser has "constitutus ille et legitimus virorum numerus."

were insufficient, and while deciding to remain at his post, he sent to the Greeks at the Isthmus for reinforcements.¹

28. While in Thessaly Xerxes had been informed that Thermopylae was held by a handful of men under the command of Leonidas, the king of Lacedaemon. From his camp at Trachis, he sent a horseman to ascertain their numbers and preparations. The horseman rode up to the Greek army, of which he could see so much as lay outside the protecting wall. It happened that the advanced post was held by the Lacedaemonians at the time. They had placed their shields on the ground before the rampart; some were engaged in athletic exercises; some were dressing and combing their long hair. To the Persian horseman they paid no attention whatever; he was allowed to return unmolested, and carry back whatever intelligence he could. Xerxes was greatly amused at the report which his astonished messenger gave of the Spartans, and sent for Demaratus to inquire the meaning of this strange conduct. Demaratus told him that it was the habit of the Spartans, when entering on a contest for life and death, to dress their hair. "If you conquer them," he added, "and the residue which is left in Sparta, no other Greek will lift a hand against you." Xerxes would not believe that such a handful would contend with his army. "Deal with me as with a liar," replied Demaratus, "if my words do not come true."²

Xerxes
reconnoitres
the Greeks.

Demaratus
explains the
Spartan
custom to
Xerxes.

29. Xerxes allowed four days to pass in the belief that the Greeks would retire; on the fifth, enraged at their folly and impudence, he sent the Medes and Cissians with orders to bring them into his presence alive. The soldiers rushed to the attack, expecting an easy prey. They were repulsed with heavy loss. Reckless of life, they dashed forward again, and again

THERMOPYLAE.
First day.
480 B.C.

¹ Herod. vii. 207.

² Herod. vii. 208, 209.

they were compelled to retire. All through the hot summer day the conflict raged, but in vain. Then the Medes were recalled, and the Persian Immortals advanced under the command of Hydarnes. These were the flower of the army, who doubtless would carry all before them. But they failed as ignominiously as the Medes, for numbers were useless in the narrow pass, and the short Persian spear availed nothing against the longer and stouter weapon of the Greeks. The Spartans united skill with courage; by feigning flight they drew the enemy into the narrow part of the pass, and then, facing suddenly round, fell upon them in the disorder of pursuit. From his position at Trachis, Xerxes could watch the battle, and when he saw his chosen soldiers defeated in every onset, he leapt up thrice in an agony of apprehension. At length, when their utmost efforts had been foiled, the Immortals also returned, and the sun went down on such a battle as had never been fought before. The mightiest armament ever gathered together, led by men who claimed to be invincible, had been shamefully repulsed by a few resolute Greeks. With the morning day. the struggle was renewed. The Persians naturally hoped that the Greeks would be diminished in numbers; they would no longer offer resistance, or their resistance would be ineffectual. But the terrible line was as firm as ever, and after a time Xerxes desisted in despair from any further attack.¹

30. For the moment it seemed that the Great King would be held at bay at the very entrance of Greece. His troops were not only defeated; they were disheartened. Xerxes foiled. At this crisis, as so often in the history of the contest between Greek and barbarian, treachery came to the help of the enemy. Leaving the plain of Trachis by the gorge of the 'Asopus, with the mass of Mount The Anopaea. Oeta on the west and the hill of Trachis on the east, and winding round the south of Callidromus, ran a

¹ Herod. vii. 211, 212.

mountain path known as Anopaea, which connected Trachis with Alpeni in the rear of Thermopylae. Unless firmly secured this path rendered the defence of the pass useless. The secret had been long known to the Malian inhabitants of the district, and on his arrival Leonidas had posted the Phocians at the highest point of the path in order to prevent a surprise. Ephialtes, the son of Eurydemus, Treachery of Ephialtes. whose name has been for ever stamped with infamy as the Judas of Greece, now acquainted Xerxes with the existence of the path, and offered his services as guide. The king eagerly embraced the proposal; Hydarnes and the Immortals were at once selected to follow Ephialtes, and cut off the rear of the Greeks. In the gloom of the evening they set out, and, marching all night, reached the summit of the mountains at day- The march of Hydarnes, break. Here, at the point where the path struck the road leading from Alpeni to Tithronium, the thousand Phocians were posted. The mountain was well wooded, which aided the concealment of the Persians, and it was not till they heard, in the stillness of a calm morning, the trampling of feet on fallen leaves, that the Phocians became aware of the approach of the enemy.

On hearing that the force which barred his advance was not composed of the dreaded Spartans, Hydarnes drew out his men for battle. A shower of arrows was poured upon the Phocians, who withdrew to the peak of the mountain in order to secure a strong position who cuts off the rear of the Greeks. against the attack of the enemy. Here they were prepared to resist to the death, but Hydarnes, seeing the way clear before him, paid no further attention to them. He at once began to descend the hill.¹

31. Meanwhile the Greeks had become aware of their position. It was said that Megistias, the seer of the army, had found in the victims, even on the second day of the battle, indications that "death" would "come with the morn-

¹ Herod. vii. 213-216; Leake, *l.c.* ii. 53.

ing." His forebodings were confirmed in the following night by deserters, who brought news of the march of Hydarnes; and when the day broke, watchmen came running down from the heights announcing the approach of the Persians. The

Preparations
for the last
conflict.

situation was of course hopeless; to remain in the pass was to court certain death. A considerable portion of the force was allowed to

withdraw and disperse to their various cities, but Leonidas resolved to remain. A Spartan might not leave his post, least of all a Spartan king, and his duty was the clearer because the oracles had announced to Sparta that one of their kings must perish, or the barbarians would devastate the city. He

Many of
the Greeks
dismissed.

willingly agreed to the departure of the others; he even attempted to induce the seer Megistias to withdraw, but Megistias refused to save

himself, though he consented that his only son, who was in the army, should retire. Those who remained were the Lacedaemonians, the Thespians, and the Thebans.¹

When the sun rose, Xerxes propitiated the deity by offering libations, but he waited till mid-market time, the hour agreed on with Ephialtes, before he gave the signal for attack. Even then he anticipated the arrival of Hydarnes, thus giving the Greeks the opportunity of employing their entire force in resisting his onset. To guard the eastern end of the pass was

Furious attack
of the Greeks.

useless; and all supplies would be at once cut off when the Persians arrived at Alpeni. Nothing

remained for the Greeks but to sell their lives as dearly as possible. Hitherto they had remained in the narrowest part of the pass, in order to reduce the numbers of their opponents to a level with their own; now they advanced towards Trachis and fell on the masses of the barbarian host. A

¹ Herod. vii. 219-222. The Spartans had been informed by Demaratus of the impending invasion. He had written his message on a folding tablet, and covered it with wax, so that the surface was perfectly untouched; at first the Spartans could make nothing of the tablet, but Gorgo suggested that the wax should be scraped away. Herod. vii. 239.

furious struggle ensued. Urged to the conflict by the whip, trampled down by those pressing from behind, or thrust into the sea on the left, the Persians were forced blindly on against a desperate band, whose only thought was to slay ere they were slain. The spears of the Greeks were by this time broken; and they had no better weapons than their short swords. Under such circumstances the line could no longer be kept; every man fought as he could, but even so, the contest was well maintained. Many of the noblest Persians fell, among them two half-brothers of Xerxes, Abrocomas and Hyperanthas. Leonidas too Death of
Leonidas. was slain. Over his body a ferocious conflict

raged; four times the Lacedaemonians repulsed the Persian onset, until at length they succeeded in rescuing the body of their king. The fight went on till Hydarnes arrived upon the field: "And when the Greeks heard this, the struggle took another shape. They retired into the narrow part of the pass, and, going behind the wall to the hill, The final
struggle. where a marble lion was afterwards put up in

honour of Leonidas, they sat down in a body. Those who had knives used them; those who had not, fought with their hands and teeth, until they were buried beneath the stones showered upon them by the barbarians, partly from the fortified wall in front (which they destroyed), and partly from any point of vantage in flank or rear."¹

32. So ended the battle of Thermopylae. Whether it was or was not a useless waste of life; whether Xerxes was already in possession of a route into Greece Effect of the
battle. through Doris; whether a larger force could have saved the pass, we need not stay to consider. The battle was fought, and the moral effect of it was immense; the self-confidence of Xerxes was severely shaken; the armies which had overrun the eastern world had failed against a handful of Greeks; and though success had been obtained, it was due to treachery, and purchased at enormous cost.

¹ Herod. vii. 223-225.

The superiority of the Grecian soldiers to the Persians — so long accustomed to carry all before them — was abundantly proved; in a still stronger position their resistance would be insurmountable. Herodotus, as his manner is, throws these thoughts into a dramatic shape. After the

Xerxes anxious
to overcome
the resistance
of the
Spartans.

battle Xerxes again sent for Demaratus, whose predictions he had found only too true. He asked what were the numbers of the Spartans; were they all as brave as those at Thermopylae?

Demaratus replied that Sparta could put 8000

men in the field, every one of whom was as good a soldier as those who had fallen. In Laconia there were also many cities, whose inhabitants, though unequal to the Spartans,

The advice of
Demaratus

would fight bravely. "You have been a king over these men," said Xerxes, "tell me what is

the easiest way of overcoming them?" Demaratus suggested that 300 ships should be detached from the Persian fleet to occupy Cythera, the island off the mouth of the Eurotas, which Chilon had wished could be sunk in the sea, that no hostile force might ever land upon it. Such a measure would prevent the Spartans from leaving their country to help the other Greeks, and when the rest of Greece had been subdued, Sparta alone would be comparatively weak. But Achaemenes,

disregarded by
Xerxes.

the king's brother, who was in command of the fleet, urged that such a division of the forces,

especially after the recent losses at Sepias and Artemisium (*infra*, p. 164 f.), would weaken them, and render their effect less overwhelming; he even suggested that the advice of Demaratus was given with a treacherous intent. Xerxes, while refusing to listen to this accusation, nevertheless adopted the advice of Achaemenes. He resolved to advance in an unbroken line by land and sea, conquering as he went.¹

¹ Herod. vii. 234-237. The discussion seems to reflect the ideas of the Peloponnesian war, during which (in 424 B.C.) Nicias occupied Cythera and laid waste the Laconian territory. Yet Chilon had already pointed out the danger. Achaemenes, when charging Demaratus with treachery, observes: *καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τρόποισι τοιούτοις χρεώμενοι*

Before he left Thermopylae he was guilty of two actions—one of childish folly, the other of savage brutality, which express, even more vividly than the conversation with Demaratus, his disappointment at the check which his army had received, and his sense of the heavy price paid for success. (1) He caused all the bodies of his enemies to be collected together, and beside them he placed about a thousand corpses out of the 20,000 of his own men who had fallen, the rest being carefully buried and hidden out of sight, after which he sent for the crews of the Persian fleet from Artemisium, "that they might see how the king dealt with those who were foolish enough to oppose him." (2) When the corpse of Leonidas was pointed out to him, he ordered the head to be cut off and the trunk to be crucified, seeking by this means to satiate his uncontrollable rage on the man who had held his army at bay.¹

Folly and
savagery
of Xerxes.

33. In the final struggle at Thermopylae Leontiades and the Thebans took no share, though they formed a part of the Grecian army. They had been retained by Leonidas against their will, as hostages for the fidelity of their country, and when they saw the tide of battle turned by the approach of Hydarnes, they approached the barbarians with suppliant gestures, pleading that they were friends who had given earth and water to the king. They had been brought to Thermopylae by force, and

The Thebans
at Thermo-
pylae.

"Ἕλληνες χαίρουσι· τοῦ τε εὐτυχέειν φθονέουσι καὶ τὸ κρέσσον στυγέουσι. Very remarkable are the words which Herodotus places in the mouth of Xerxes as a reason why Demaratus should deal honestly with him: *πολιότης μὲν πολιτῇ εὖ πρὴσσαντι φθονέει καὶ ἔστι δυσμενὴς τῇ σιγῇ, οὐδ' ἂν συμβουλευομένου τοῦ ἀστοῦ πολιότης ἀνὴρ τὰ ἀριστα οἱ δοκέοντα εἶναι ὑποθέοιτο εἰ μὴ πρόσω ἀρετῆς ἀνήκοι· σπάνιοι δέ εἰσι οἱ τοιοῦτοι· ξείνος δὲ ξείνῳ εὖ πρὴσσαντι ἔστι εὐμενέστατον πάντων, συμβουλευομένου τε ἂν συμβουλεύσειε τὰ ἀριστα.* Compare with this what is said of the Athenians in the Funeral Speech of Pericles (Thuc. ii. 37).

¹ Herod. vii. 238 (Herodotus here observes that as a rule the Persians were remarkable for the respect which they paid to bravery even in an enemy); viii. 24, 25.

had been in no way to blame for what had happened. When their statements had been confirmed by the Thessalians, their lives were spared, but "they did not altogether prosper." Some had been slain at their first approach; the majority, including Leontiades, were, at Xerxes' command, branded in the forehead with the name and symbol of the king.¹

34. The heroic act of Leonidas and his army was commemorated by engraved pillars set up at Thermopylae at the command of the Amphictyonic Council. One of these, with pardonable exaggeration, commended the bravery of the 4000 Peloponnesians who had here fought with 3,000,000 enemies; another bade the passing stranger announce to Lacedaemon that her sons lay there, obedient to her laws. The devotion of Megistias was also recorded on his tomb by his friend Simonides of Ceos; and on the hill, within the pass, a marble lion preserved the name of Leonidas. While these honours were assigned to the dead, a severe punishment fell on the solitary survivor of the battle. Eurytus and Aristodemus, two Spartans who were suffering severely from ophthalmia, had been sent to the rear at Alpeni by Leonidas. When the news of the approach of Hydarnes reached them, Eurytus called for his armour, and bade his helot lead him into the thick of the battle, where he fell. Aristodemus returned home. Such conduct was unpardonable. No Spartan would speak to Aristodemus, or supply him with a

Monuments to
the slain at
Thermopylae.

The sole
survivor.

¹ Herod. vii. 233. It was the son of this Leontiades, Eurymachus, who led the night attack on Plataea in 431 B.C. (Thuc. ii. 2); and one hundred years later (383 B.C.) a Leontiades betrayed Thebes to Sparta (Xen. *Hell.* v. 2. 25 ff.). That the leading families at Thebes were on the side of the Persians admits of no doubt (Herod. ix. 16, 38, 86 ff.; Thuc. iii. 62; Plut. *Arist.* 18), and Thucydides describes Eurymachus as ἀνδρὸς Θηβαίων δουρατάρου. It is therefore not improbable that Leontiades was a traitor. On the other hand, the 400 Thebans, who went to Thermopylae, may not have been hostages, as Herodotus says, but a body sent by the democratic party who agreed with the views of the leading men as little as the Thessalians agreed with the views of the Aleuadæ. The author of the "Malignity of Herodotus" is very severe on this account of the Thebans, § 31 ff.

brand to light his fire; he was known everywhere as the "Runaway." We shall hear of him again at the battle of Plataea.¹

¹ Herod. vii. 229-232. Herodotus also speaks doubtfully of a certain Pantites, who had been sent as an envoy to Thessaly, and so escaped. He was disgraced on his return to Sparta, and hung himself. The numbers which Herodotus gives for the *Peloponnesians* at Thermopylae amount to 3100 only, but Diodorus, xi. 4, speaks of 1000 Lacedaemonians in addition to 300 Spartans. Herodotus may have omitted them by an oversight. He gives the total of *slain* at 4000 (viii. 25), but this includes the 700 Thespians, etc. As a whole the account given by Herodotus is no doubt the true one. Anything more absurd and extravagant than the story of Thermopylae—the night attack, the sacking of the king's tent, etc.—recorded by Diodorus, it would be difficult to imagine. Whatever his authorities, and no doubt he drew chiefly from the historians of the fourth century B.C., Diodorus rarely adds anything of value to Herodotus and Thucydides. Even when his account is more intelligible, we have the uncomfortable feeling that it has been made intelligible, and has no value as an independent testimony; cf. Appendix II.

CHAPTER IV.

ARTEMISIUM AND SALAMIS.

I. Eleven days after the departure of Xerxes the Persian fleet put out from the bay of Therma.¹ An advanced squadron, composed of the ten fleetest vessels, had already sailed as far as the island of Sciathus. There they found three Greek ships, one from Troezen, a second from Aegina, and a third from Athens, which had been sent forward to watch the enemy's movements. At the approach of the Persian squadron these vessels turned and fled. The Persians followed in pursuit, and at once captured the Troezenian. As this was the first prize taken from the Greeks, the Persians, on boarding her, selected the finest and handsomest of the marines, a man named Leon, for sacrifice at the prow of the vessel, as a first-fruits of victory. The Aeginetan ship was also captured, but not without a severe struggle, owing to the bravery of Pytheas, who fought, regardless of wounds, till he fell, a scarred and bleeding mass, upon the deck. Finding that he was still alive, the Persians took every means to save him, healing his wounds with myrrh, and binding them up with strips of linen; and when brought to the camp, he was exhibited to the admiration of the whole army. The Athenian ship ran aground at the mouth of the Peneus; the vessel fell into the hands of the Persians,

480 B.C.
Ol. 75. 1.
The Persian
fleet leaves
Therma.

An advanced
squadron pur-
sues three
Greek vessels
stationed at
Sciathus.

¹ Herod. vii. 183.

but the crew escaped and returned through Thessaly to Athens.¹

In the narrow channel which separates Sciathus and Magnesia lay a sunken reef known to the Greeks as the "Ant."

Upon this three of the ten Persian vessels were carried and wrecked. When the disaster was made known at Therma, a pillar of marble was prepared and set up to mark the danger;

Three Persian vessels wrecked on the "Ant."

and, the way thus secured, the whole fleet set sail. A fair day's voyage brought the vessels from Therma to southern Magnesia, where an open beach extended from the town of Casthanaea to the promontory of Sepias.

The triremes which sailed from Asia amounted to 1207, each of which carried a crew of 200 men, and in addition thirty soldiers as

The fleet arrives off the coast of Thessaly.

marines, chosen from the Persians, Medes, or Sacae, besides what native soldiers might be on board. The smaller vessels or penteconters amounted to 3000, of which the average crew is fixed by Herodotus at eighty men. On this estimate the Asiatic fleet was composed of 4207 vessels,

Numbers of the Persians.

carrying 517,610 men. To this we have still to add 24,000 men, the crews of 120 ships supplied by the Greeks of Thrace and the islands, which raise the total to 4327 vessels, and 541,610 men.

As there was not sufficient room on the beach for the vast crowd of ships, it was decided to draw them up off shore in eight lines, each before the other, with prows fronting to the sea. The ships in the first line were secured

to the land, those in the other seven rode at anchor. In this order they remained for the night, and so long as the sea continued calm there was no danger. The morning broke clear and bright, but ere long a furious storm of wind and rain set in from

It is overtaken by a storm which rages for three days.

¹ Herod. vii. 179-182. Herodotus thinks that the Persians were in some degree influenced by Leon's name (= *lion*) in selecting him. Pytheas reappears at the battle of Salamis. *Infra*, p. 189.

the north-east, the Hellespontias or Caicias of the Greek mariner. The crews nearest the beach, seeing the danger, drew their vessels on land, thus saving themselves and their ships; but those which were at anchor were swept from their moorings and dashed upon the coast. Some were carried on the "Ovens" under Pelion, others on the open beach, others ran aground at Sepias, others at Meliboea and Casthanaea. The wind rose to a terrible hurricane, and though the Magians attempted by sacrifices and incantations—and by offerings to Thetis and the Nereids, to whom the shore was sacred—to check the fury of the storm, it continued to rage for three whole days. So terrible was the destruction that the shore from Meliboea to Casthanaea, a distance of thirty miles, was strewn with wreckage. By the Greeks this hurricane was regarded as a fulfilment of a promise that the wind would assist them against their enemies; and the Athenians, who

The Athenians
and Boreas.

were not perhaps very particular in their points of the compass, looked at it as the work of Boreas, whom, as the husband of Oreithyia, the daughter of Erechtheus, they termed their "son-in-law." They had been commanded by an oracle to summon Boreas to their aid, and, while at Chalcis, they had offered sacrifices to him and Oreithyia, imploring them to destroy the Persian fleet as it

The Persians
arrive at
Aphetae.

had been destroyed off Athos. When the sea was once more calm the Persians drew down their vessels from the shore and sailed into the Pagasæan gulf, where they anchored at Aphetae.¹

2. The success of the advanced squadron of the Persian fleet had been made known to the Greeks at Artemisium by

The Greeks at
Artemisium.

fire signals from Sciathus. Their courage, never very high, entirely failed them at the news; and, after placing watchmen on the heights of Euboea,

¹ Herod. vii. 187-191, 193. The historian will not decide whether the wind ceased owing to the arts of the Magians, or because it was "tired out." He is also doubtful whether Boreas really did assist the Athenians, but the Athenians were less sceptical, and built a temple to the god on the banks of the Ilissus.

they retired down the strait to Chalcis. The report of the storm and of the wreck of the Persian fleet, which was brought to them by their scouts on the day after the wind began, revived their spirits. After prayers and libations to Poseidon, the Saviour, an epithet henceforth given by the Athenians to the deity, they returned with all speed, and took up their position once more at Artemisium, expecting to find the numbers of the enemy greatly diminished.¹ Their fleet amounted to 271 triremes and nine penteconters. By far the largest contingent

Numbers of
the fleet.

was provided by the Athenians, who not only furnished 127 ships, in manning which they were aided by the faithful Plataeans, but supplied twenty for their colonists at Chalcis—and this large force was subsequently increased by the addition of fifty-three triremes, which brought the Athenian contingent to 200 vessels, and the total number to 324. Next to the Athenians came the Corinthians with forty ships. The Megarians sent twenty; the Aeginetans, eighteen; the Sicyonians, twelve; the Lacedaemonians, ten; the Epidaurians, eight; the Eretrians, seven; the Troezenians, five; the Styrians, two; the Ceans, two triremes and two penteconters; the Opuntian Locrians furnished seven penteconters. Though their numbers were out of all proportion to the rest, the Athenians were not allowed to command the fleet. Even in the previous autumn, when the envoys were sent to Sicily to ask for help, the question had been raised whether the Athenians should take the command. The allies had then opposed the proposal, and now they refused to follow unless the fleet were placed under the command of a Lacedaemonian. Accustomed as they were to be led by Spartans, they did not realise the wide difference which separates warfare on land and on sea, or the immense progress which the Athenians had recently made in maritime skill. So the general of the Lacedaemonian contingent, small though it was, commanded

The fleet com-
manded by
the Lacedae-
monians.
Eurybiadas.

¹ Herod. vii. 183-192.

as admiral-in-chief, and the Athenians were patriotic enough to submit to this arrangement. However galling it might be to have their ships placed under the control of a man who perhaps had never commanded a trireme, division at this moment would have been fatal to any hope of success. The admiral chosen was Eurybiadas, who was not king of Sparta, nor even of the royal race—for not only were the Spartans reluctant to send out their kings on naval expeditions, but the rule that one king only should leave the city at a time, made it impossible for Leotychidas to lead the fleet, while Leonidas was in command of the army at Thermopylae. The Corinthians were led by Adeimantus, the son of Ocytus; the Athenians by Themistocles, whose ability and strength of will assured him a superiority in every undertaking, which no jealousy of Athens could destroy.¹

3. On their return to Artemisium, the Greeks were cheered by an unexpected piece of good fortune. On coming round the point of Magnesia, fifteen of the Persian vessels, which had been the last to leave the Thessalian coast, descried the Grecian fleet; they mistook it for their own, and before discovering the error sailed into the midst of it. The Greeks were not slow to take advantage of the accident; the entire squadron was captured. The commander was Sandôces, whom Herodotus describes as a satrap or governor (ἐπαρχος) of Cyme, in Aeolis. Other captives were Aridôlis, tyrant of Alabanda, in Caria, and Penthylus, the general of a contingent of twelve ships sent from Paphos, eleven of which had already been lost in the storm. From these the Greeks acquired what information they wanted about the Persian fleet. The prisoners were then sent in chains to the Isthmus of Corinth.²

In spite of this success, when the Greeks saw the vast

¹ Herod. viii. 1-3, 42. Herodotus expresses the opinion that the allies afterwards repented, and made the conduct of Pausanias a pretext for putting the command into the hands of the Athenians. *Plut. Them.* 7.

² Herod. vii. 194, 195.

array of ships assembled at Aphetae, their hearts sank once more. Regardless of the fate of the army at Thermopylae, indifferent to the safety of the Euboeans, they meditated a second retreat to Chalcis. The Euboeans entreated Eurybiadas to wait until they had at least placed their wives, children, and slaves, beyond the reach of the enemy; but he refused to listen to them. In their despair—so Herodotus tells the story—they went to Themistocles, and induced him by a bribe of thirty talents to remain and fight at Artemisium. Themistocles overcame the opposition of Eurybiadas by a present of five talents, but Adeimantus, who shared the views of Eurybiadas, continued obstinate. Themistocles suspected him of treachery, or affected to do so; with ironical frankness he declared aloud, on oath, that he would give him more money to fight than the king would give him to abandon the allies, and at the same time sent a messenger with three talents to his ship. By this means, observes the historian, Themistocles persuaded the generals, gratified the Euboeans, and realised a handsome sum of money for himself. By this means, he might have added, the Grecian fleet was saved from the stain of cowardice, and from the guilt of abandoning the army at Thermopylae to utter destruction.¹

The Greeks
meditate a
second retreat.

Action of
Themistocles:
his supposed
bribery.

4. It was afternoon when the Persians arrived at Aphetae, in the bay of Volo. Seeing the Greeks on the opposite shore, at a few miles' distance, they were eager to attack them, and were only restrained by the thought that if the attack were made openly, the enemy would certainly escape under cover of night. It was their hope and wish that not even a fire-bearer, *i.e.* one who carried the sacred fire for

The Persians
at Aphetae.
A squadron
sent round
Euboea to cut
off the Greeks.

¹ Herod. viii. 4, 5. Thirty talents of silver would weigh about two-thirds of a ton. How could the Euboeans convey this secretly to Themistocles, even if they could amass it at a moment's notice? Plutarch, *Them.* 7, mentions Pelagon as the envoy of the Euboeans. He adds some foolish details from Phanias.

lighting sacrifices, should escape. With the view of securing this complete destruction of the enemy, they detached a number of ships to sail round Euboea, and cut off all retreat; and the better to conceal the design, the ships were sent to the east of Sciathus, out of sight of the Greeks. Intending to take no further action on this day, or indeed till they received a signal from the squadron thus detached, they proceeded to number their ships at Aphetae.

Their movements did not remain a secret. A diver named Scyllias, who was able to escape unobserved from Aphetae, informed the Greeks that their retreat was to be cut off. The news led to fresh discussions. It was at length resolved that the fleet should stay where it was for the remainder of the day; after midnight they would retire and meet the force sent to intercept them. But as the evening drew on, and the enemy showed no disposition to attack, the Greeks were bold enough to put out to sea, and in spite of the disparity of numbers, to offer battle. They were urged to this step by Themistocles, who pointed out the advantage to be gained by attacking the ships of the enemy with a compact force. At the first signal the Greek ships were ranged in a circle, the prows pointing outwards in readiness for attack. When the trumpet sounded a second time, they dashed forward and bore down upon the enemy. The manœuvre was entirely successful. Thirty Persian ships had been captured, when night put an end to the engagement and each fleet returned to its station.¹

¹ Herod. viii. 8-11. I cannot help thinking that Herodotus had three different accounts of the battle of Artemisium before him: (1) that in which Sandoces and his fifteen ships are captured: (2) that in which the Greeks resolve to retire: (3) that in which they attack the Persians. Herodotus gives no reason why, after resolving to retire, the Greeks suddenly change their minds and attack. For the action of Themistocles, see Diod. xi. 12 (is it more than a guess?). For Scyllias, see Paus. x. 19. 1.

5. Such unexpected good fortune raised the hopes of the Greeks. Meanwhile "Providence did all that could be done" to reduce the contending fleets to an equality. Though it was midsummer, a terrible thunderstorm broke over Pelion during the night after the battle; the rain fell in torrents, which rushed and roared down the mountain gullies to the sea. So unusual a phenomenon was alarming in itself, and it came with a special significance to the Persians, already dispirited by the previous hurricane, and by their unexpected defeat. The current had carried the wrecks and corpses of the recent action to Aphetae, where they gathered round the vessels, impeding the action of the oars. It was a night of terror and alarm, even in the comparative security of the bay of Volo. But far more disastrous was the fate of the squadron which was sailing round Euboea. The wind caught it off the "Hollows," and dashed it to pieces on the inhospitable coast. Few, if any, of the ships survived the storm; the attempt to cut off the retreat of the Greeks ended in utter ruin.

The second storm: dismay of the Persians, and destruction of the contingent off Euboea.

When the morning came the Persians were content to remain unmolested at Aphetae; for a time there was no movement on either side. But as the day passed on, the Greeks, who had been reinforced by the arrival of the fifty-three additional triremes from Athens, heard of the disaster which had overtaken the squadron off Euboea. When the hour arrived at which they had put out on the previous day, they attacked the Cilician ships in the enemies' fleet. Once more they were successful; they destroyed the vessels and returned at night-fall to Artemisium.¹

Artemisium: the second battle.

6. Two days had now passed, and the great fleet had not only failed to clear the passage through the Euripus, but had been worsted in every encounter. Something must be done to retrieve the past; and further delay was useless, for there

¹ Herod. viii. 12-14.

was no longer any hope of surrounding the Greeks. The Persians determined upon a general attack. Forming their ships in a half-moon, they advanced, intending to cut off the enemy from escape. The Greeks answered to the challenge. Though the numbers were unequal, the two fleets were nearly matched in their fighting force, for the space between Euboea and the opposite coast was not large enough to allow the Persians to employ their entire strength. Their ships no sooner advanced into the strait than they were thrown into confusion, and dashed against each other, while the Greeks with their smaller numbers and greater local knowledge could put forth all their skill. The struggle was long and fierce; the loss on both sides in ships and men was severe; and when at length the two fleets separated, neither could claim a decisive victory.¹

The Greeks succeeded in securing the corpses of the slain and the wrecks of the ships. But when they returned for the night to their moorings, they found that the destruction of ships had been very great, especially among the Athenians, who had half their number disabled. As it seemed impossible to continue the struggle any longer, preparations were made for retiring, under cover of night, down the Euripus. When evening came on, the Euboeans, trusting to the protection of the Athenian ships, which they seemed to think a permanent force, drove down their cattle from the hills, where they had pastured in the heat of the day, to the lower land by the shore. Themistocles, seeing their flocks, bade the soldiers seize and kill as many cattle as they pleased; they might reasonably take what would otherwise go to the support of the Persians. At the same time, he suggested that the Greeks

¹ Herod. viii. 15-17; Diod. xi. 12, 13. In this engagement Cleinias, the father of Alcibiades, was most distinguished. He had equipped his ship at his own expense. The battle was much celebrated. Pindar spoke of Artemisium as the place where the "sons of the Hellenes laid the splendid foundations of liberty." Plut. *Them.* 8; cf. also Aristoph. *Lysistr.* 1250 ff.

should light as many watch-fires as possible, in order to conceal the secret of their retreat. His commands were readily obeyed by the soldiers, who passed the evening feasting on the flocks of the Euboeans, till the signal should be given for the retreat.¹

Meanwhile the news arrived that the army at Thermopylae had been cut down. The same day had witnessed the great battle at Artemisium, and the final struggle on shore. This intelligence hastened the departure of the fleet; the contingents at once moved off in their order, the Corinthians first, the Athenians last. But before leaving Euboea, Themistocles, who was the last to retire, caused inscriptions to be cut in the rocks at all the springs and watering-places in the island, calling on all the Ionians who were in the king's fleet to revolt. He thought that such an appeal would either induce the Ionians to come over, or, if brought to the knowledge of Xerxes, it would lessen his confidence in the Greek contingent of his fleet.²

The Greeks
leave Artemi-
sium: the
inscriptions of
Themistocles.

News of the retreat was quickly carried to the Persians. At first they were incredulous, but on finding the intelligence confirmed, they advanced at day-break with all their vessels to the shore which the Greeks had abandoned. Here they remained till mid-day, when they moved to the adjacent district of Hestiaeae. On the next day, at the invitation of Xerxes, they crossed over to Thermopylae to view the dead, and after a day spent among the corpses of the Greeks, they returned on the morrow to Hestiaeae.³

The Persians
in Euboea.

7. After the childish exhibition of the bodies of the slain at Thermopylae, Xerxes marched onwards to the south. In the account which Herodotus has preserved, he did not advance through the pass which it had cost so much blood to win, but proceeded from Trachis into Doris, which at this point projected in a narrow tongue between the territory of the

Xerxes
marches from
Thermopylae
to the south.

¹ Herod. viii. 19, 20. Had the Euboeans been more observant of the oracles of Bacis this disaster would not have fallen upon them!

² Herod. viii. 22, 23.

³ Herod. viii. 23-25 (*supra*, p. 159).

Malians and Phocians.¹ The Dorians had already sent tokens of submission to the king; they were also on terms of friendship with the Thessalians, who were acting as his guides. These considerations outweighed the fact that they were Dorians, the kinsmen of the Spartans, who had so stoutly resisted the invader at Thermopylae. Their territory was allowed to remain uninjured, and the army passed onwards down the valley of the Cephissus, for which a very different fate was in store.²

The ancient feud which separated Phocis and Thessaly had recently broken out into internecine strife. Not long before the invasion of Xerxes, though we cannot fix the time precisely, the Thessalians had reduced the Phocians to subjugation; tyrants had been placed in their cities, and 250 hostages carried away as security for good behaviour. The result was a great rebellion. The Phocians rose and slew all the tyrants in one day; the Thessalians retaliated by stoning to death the hostages and invading Phocis. Unable to resist in the field, the Phocians retired into Parnassus, the natural stronghold of the country, gathering their strength in the impregnable fastnesses of the mountain. At length they issued forth, and with the help of Tellias, a seer of Elis, they inflicted a severe defeat on the Thessalian army, both horse and foot. The memory of these events was still fresh in the minds of the Thessalians, who now determined to have their revenge.³

After the battle of Thermopylae a herald was sent to the Phocians, who had embraced the patriotic cause, asking whether they still held to their perverse resolution. "When we supported the Greeks," the Thessalians said, "we were

¹ Herod. viii. 31. Stein thinks that the army was broken into four columns, one of which went by this route.

² Ctesias gave quite a different account of the events following the battle of Thermopylae. See *Persica*, § 23.

³ Herod. viii. 27, 28; Plut. *De. mul. virt.* 2; cf. Paus. x. 1.

a greater power in Hellas than you, and now we have such authority with the barbarians, that we can deprive you of your territory, and reduce you to slavery. But we are willing to forget the past; pay us fifty talents, and we will undertake to deliver you from the impending evil." The Phocians refused the offer, declaring that they would not be traitors to Hellas, if they could help it. On receiving this reply, the Thessalians directed the Persians into Phocis. The terrified inhabitants fled to the heights of Parnassus, or to Amphissa, in Ozolian Locris, leaving their country at the mercy of the invader. The havoc was universal and complete. Devastation and fire marked the line of the advancing army; temples were pillaged and consumed; women perished by the most horrible of deaths.¹

The Thessalians invite the Phocians to "Medise."

The Phocians refuse.

Phocis ravaged.

The route of the army lay down the course of the Cephissus. When they reached Panopeis, the point at which the road to Delphi diverges, the troops were broken into two divisions; the larger half continued on its southern course through Boeotia to Athens, with Xerxes at the head; the smaller was despatched towards the west to pillage Delphi.²

Advance of the Persians.

8. It is perhaps impossible to discover with certainty the attitude which the priesthood of Delphi took up towards the invaders. In the past, the Delphians had not always stood on the side of freedom. It was at their command that the Cnidians ceased to defend their liberty against Cyrus; and at the time of the Ionian revolt, Miletus had been warned of the punishment which she would suffer for her evil deeds.³ The oracles given on the present occasion to Athens and Crete were certainly intended to prevent resistance to Persia. Yet we cannot assert that the Delphians had come to terms with Xerxes. Not only did

Delphi and the Persians.

¹ Herod. viii. 27, 29, 30, 32, 33.

² Herod. viii. 34, 35.

³ Herod. i. 174; vi. 19.

they show the greatest alarm at his approach, but when the contingents of the Greeks were hastening to Thermopylae and Artemisium, the oracle had commanded them to pray to the winds. The response had been at once communicated to the confederate Greeks—an act which, in the judgment of Herodotus, entitled the Delphians to the gratitude of the terror-stricken nations—and the Delphians themselves had erected an altar and offered sacrifice to the winds at Thyia.¹

Alarm of the
Delphians at
the advance
of Xerxes.

Whatever the hopes and fears of the Delphians had been, however indecisive their attitude, it was now clear that Xerxes had no intention of sparing them. There are passages in Herodotus which imply that the Persian invasion was to some extent a religious war. As the temple of Cybele had been burnt in the attack on Sardis, so were the temples of the Grecian gods to be destroyed by the barbarians. But it was not the desire to avenge an injured deity which prompted the Persian attack on Delphi; it was the meaner motive of pillage. The treasures of the temple were better known to Xerxes—so Herodotus informs us—than the contents of his own palace at Susa. They were, in fact, the theme of universal curiosity and admiration; especially the offerings of Croesus, whose wealth was one of the traditions of Asia.

Great fame of
the treasures
of Delphi.

When the Delphians heard of the advance of the enemy, they were in the greatest distress. On inquiring of the oracle, whether they should bury the sacred treasures or remove them, they received the answer that the god was equal to the defence of his possessions. Relieved of this anxiety, they turned their thoughts to their own safety. They carried their wives and children across the gulf of Corinth to Achaëa, after which they sought refuge in the Corycian cave, amid the inaccessible heights of Parnassus, or at Amphissa in Locris. Only sixty men and the "prophet," whose name was Aceratus

Measures
taken by the
Delphians for
security.

¹ Herod. vii. 178.

(uninjured), remained at Delphi. When the barbarian host was within sight of the temple, Aceratus observed that the sacred arms, which no one might touch, had been removed from their place and were lying in front of the temple. And no sooner had the Persians advanced as far as the shrine of Athena Pronaea, than the offended god displayed his power. A storm of thunder and lightning burst over their ranks; two enormous stones were detached from the crags of Parnassus and hurled among them; while from the adjacent temple of Athena rang the Grecian cry of onset. The panic-stricken host turned and fled, upon which the Delphians descended from their fastnesses, and fell upon them. The slaughter was prodigious; the terror extreme. Those who escaped never halted until they found themselves in Boeotia. To Xerxes they defended or excused their failure by asserting that, in addition to the disaster of the storm, two warriors of super-human size and strength had attacked them. In the minds of the grateful Delphians these warriors were no other than the native heroes Phylacus and Autonus, whose shrines lay near the temple. The two stones which caused such havoc in the Persian host could be seen in the time of Herodotus lying in the precincts of Athena Pronaea, where indeed they remain to this day.¹

Portents at
Delphi.
Storm, and
destruction of
the Persians.

9. From Artemisium the Greeks retired down the Euripus. They expected, or at any rate the Athenians expected, that the Peloponnesians would have marched out in full force to meet the enemy in Boeotia, now that Thermopylae was lost,

¹ Herod. viii. 35-39; Diod. xi. 14, who tells us that the Delphians set up a trophy near the temple of Athena, with an inscription which he quotes. The account given by Ctesias (*Persica*, § 26 f.) is quite different. He informs us that Mardonius was sent to pillage the temple after the battle of Plataea (?), and there met his death in a violent storm. On his return to Asia Xerxes wished to send Megabyzus to pillage the shrine, but Megabyzus begged off, whereupon Matacas, a eunuch, was sent, who succeeded in his mission and returned to Asia. For a similar scene at Delphi (in the invasion of the Gauls in 279 B.C.) see Pausan. i. 4. 4; x. 23. 2.

but in this they were deceived. The confederate army being chiefly, or almost entirely, composed of Peloponnesians, had resolved to make the Isthmus of Corinth the next line of defence, abandoning everything to the north of it. On reaching the Euripus, it was clear to every one in the fleet that Plataea, Thespieae, and Athens must fall into the hands of the Persians. When the ships reached Chalcis, the Plataeans, who had embarked on board the Athenian vessels, went ashore and set about removing their wives, children, and slaves to a place of safety (the Peloponnese). With a similar object in view, the Athenians prevailed on the fleet to put in at Salamis; and no sooner had they arrived than a proclamation was issued by the generals that every Athenian was to save his children and slaves as he best could. The Athenians had no longer any hope of their city; they were discouraged by unfavourable oracles, and their despair was the greater because the very gods seemed to have abandoned them. For the first time in the history of Athens, the food placed every new moon in the temple of Erechtheus for the guardian serpent had remained untouched. In these distressing circumstances they carried away their families to Troezen, Aegina, and Salamis, where they were at least removed out of immediate danger. It is a pleasure to repeat the fact which Plutarch records, that at Troezen the Athenian refugees received a warm reception. Their children were maintained and taught at the expense of the Troezenians, who also allowed them to gather what fruit they chose from the gardens and orchards in their new home.¹

When the Athenians had thus provided for the safety of their families, they began to prepare for the impending battle. By a proclamation of the generals every Athenian was ordered to go on board ship, and that this order might be carried out a sum of eight drachmas was distributed to each citizen. In the "Constitution of Athens" we are informed that the

¹ Herod. viii. 40, 41, 44; Plut. *Them.* 10; Diod. xi. 14.

necessary funds were furnished by the members of the council of the Areopagus—apparently out of their own resources, but another authority, contemporary with Aristotle, asserts that the money was discovered in the public repositories by Themistocles, when search was being made for the Gorgon's head, which formed a part of the dress of Athena. However this may be, it was certainly believed in Aristotle's time that the Areopagus took a leading part in organising the resistance to Persia, and owing to its action on this occasion the council enjoyed for some years to come a position of authority and power higher than it had ever done, at least since the establishment of the tyranny of Pisistratus.¹

At Salamis the fleet was joined by the additional ships which had assembled in the harbour of Pogon at Troezen. The Lacedaemonians had now sixteen triremes; the Corinthians forty (as before, p. 165); the Sicyonians fifteen; the Epidaurians ten; the Troezenians five; the Hermioneans three. The Athenians had one hundred and eighty (as before), and they also supplied twenty to the Chalcidians; the Megarians had twenty (as before); the Ambraciots seven; the Leucadians three. The Aeginetans sent thirty ships—the best thirty of their fleet; other twelve were engaged in guarding their own coasts, but these also subsequently joined in the battle. The Eretrians furnished seven triremes; the Ceans, two triremes and two penteconters (as before); the Naxians, four triremes, which though sent to join the Persians deserted to the Greeks. The Styrians sent two triremes (as before); the Cythnians, one trireme and a penteconter. The Melians, Siphnians, and Seriphians, who alone among the islanders had not sent earth and water to the king, contributed to the fleet so far as they were able: the Melians sending two penteconters, the Siphnians and Seriphians one

Muster of
the ships
at Salamis.

The numbers
of the con-
tingents.

¹ Plut. *Them.* 10; Arist. *Athen. Pol.* c. 23; *Pol.* v. 4=1304 a; *infra*, c. xi. § 2. The statement of Herodotus viii. 51, ὅτι ἀσθενείης βίον οὐκ ἐκχωρήσαντες ἐς Σαλαμίνα, implies that some Athenians at any rate did not receive the eight drachmas.

each. From the distant west came Phayllus of Croton, a man famous as a runner at Olympia, with a single trireme.¹

When all the ships were assembled at Salamis, Eurybiadas, who was still commander-in-chief of the fleet, called the

The generals discuss the place of battle. generals from the various cities together, to discuss the question where they should give battle. The majority were in favour of return-

ing to the Isthmus. It was now useless to attempt to save Attica: if they remained at Salamis, they would, in the event of defeat, be shut up in the island without hope of escape, but from the Isthmus they could land on their own country.²

10. In the midst of their deliberations came the news that Xerxes was at Athens. He had marched through Boeotia.

Xerxes at Athens. sparing those cities which were pointed out to him as being loyal to his cause, but destroy-

ing Thespiæ and Plataea. He was now master of Attica, and established in the city which had so long been the object of Persian hatred. A few citizens, treasurers of the temple, or poor men who had no means of escaping to Salamis, had remained behind in the acropolis, believing that in fortifying it with a barricade of wood, they were building the wooden

The defence of the acropolis, which at length is taken and burnt. wall, behind which, as the oracle announced, they would find safety. These defences were quickly destroyed by the Persians, who, from their camp on the Areopagus, discharged

burning arrows into the barricade, but the citadel continued to hold out. The Pisistratidae, who were in the train of Xerxes, attempted to overcome the resistance by offering liberal terms, but in vain, and whenever the barbarians approached the gates stones were hurled down upon them.

¹ The total number of ships on this computation amounts to 378; but Aeschylus, who in point of time is our best authority, does not rate the Greek fleet at more than 300 vessels, or 310 at the most. Herod. viii. 43-48; Aesch. *Persae*, 334. In Thuc. i. 74, the number is estimated at 400. For the twelve additional Aeginetan ships see Herod. viii. 46, with Stein's note.

² Herod. viii. 49; Diod. xi. 15.

At length an entrance was effected by a few Persians near the shrine of Aglaurus, where the rock was thought too precipitous to need defence, and the gates were opened to the army. Of the unfortunate garrison some threw themselves from the walls; others sought refuge in the temple, only to be at once cut down by swords regardless of the sanctity of the place. The acropolis was then committed to the flames.¹

At last Xerxes seemed to have achieved the victory for which the great invasion was planned, and he despatched a horseman to Susa to inform Artabanus of his success. On the next day he summoned the Athenian fugitives who were in his train, and bade them sacrifice with their native rites on the acropolis, an act which Herodotus thinks was prompted by a vision or by some remorseful feeling about the burning of the temple. When the worshippers entered the shrine of Erechtheus, they were astonished to find that the sacred olive, which to all appearance had perished in the conflagration, had put forth a shoot no less than a cubit in length in a single day.²

II. The news that Xerxes was at Athens created such alarm at Salamis that some of the generals at once prepared to depart, without even waiting for a formal resolution. Those who remained decided that the battle should be fought at the Isthmus. Night came on and the commanders returned to their ships

The olive on
the acropolis.

Debate among
the generals at
Salamis.

to carry out the plan which had been agreed upon. On reaching his trireme, Themistocles was met by his friend Mnesiphilus, who inquired what was the decision arrived at in the meeting. When he heard that the generals had resolved to fight at the Isthmus, Mnesiphilus replied: "If the Greeks once leave Salamis all hope of our country is at an end. They will go each his own way; neither Eurybiadas nor any one else will be able to control them. Return, therefore, to Eurybiadas,

Themistocles
and Mnesi-
philus.

¹ Herod. viii. 50-53. *ἐς τὸ μέγαρον κατέφευγον*—but what temple was meant is uncertain.

² Herod. viii. 54, 55.

and if by any means it is possible, persuade him to remain at Salamis." Without answering a word Themistocles went to the ship of Eurybiadas, and so strongly did he urge upon him the arguments suggested by Mnesiphilus, with others of his own, that Eurybiadas was persuaded to call the generals together once more. When they were assembled Themistocles did not wait for the admiral to bring the matter before them; he rose at once and pressed his view with great earnestness. Adeimantus of Corinth, at all times his bitter opponent, reproached him for this unmannerly haste. "In the games," he said, "those who start before the time are beaten." "Yes," retorted Themistocles, "and those who lag behind lose the prize." Then he turned to Eurybiadas, and cautiously omitting any arguments which might give offence to the allies, he compared the Isthmus with Salamis as a place for battle. At the Isthmus, the sea was open and exposed; it was the worst situation possible for a fleet whose ships were not only fewer but slower than those of the enemy. To retire thither would also involve the loss of Salamis, Megara, and Aegina. "But if you remain at Salamis," he continued, "you will have the advantage of a narrow space, in which our fewer numbers will contend with success against the larger forces of the Persians; Salamis will be saved, where our children and wives are placed for protection; and the invader will never reach the Peloponnesus. Salamis, too, is the place appointed by the oracle for victory." On hearing this appeal Adeimantus again attacked Themistocles, bidding him be silent; a man who had lost his city had no right, he said, to speak in the council, and Eurybiadas must not permit his proposal to be put to the vote. Themistocles sharply replied that as long as he commanded two hundred ships he had a city and a country far greater than the city of the Corinthians. Such a force was without an equal in Greece. He then turned to Eurybiadas, and after urging him in impressive words to

The generals
assemble a
second time.

Themistocles
and Adeiman-
tus.

Salamis com-
pared with the
Isthmus as a
place for battle.

remain and fight at Salamis, he concluded thus: "If you leave the island, we Athenians will sail to Siris in Italy, which has long been assigned to us by an oracle, and when you have lost our help, you will remember what we say." The threat to withdraw so large a contingent was decisive, for without the Athenians, the Greek fleet could not fight at all. Eurybiadas resolved to remain at Salamis.¹

Eurybiadas
resolves to
remain at
Salamis.

12. After their return from Trachis, the Persian fleet remained at Hestiaeae for three days before setting out on their voyage through the Euripus. Three days more brought them to Phalerum, which was then the port of Athens, where they joined the army. The numbers of the host were as large as ever, so Herodotus computes, both by land and sea, for what had been lost in the storms and at Thermopylae had been replaced by contingents subsequently enrolled: by Malians, Dorians, Locrians, Boeotians, in the army; Carystians, Andrians, Tenians, in the fleet.²

Arrival of the
Persian fleet
at Phalerum.

No sooner had the fleet anchored off Phalerum than Xerxes came down to the shore and summoned the tyrants of the various nations and the captains of the ships to a conference. They were assembled in the order of the rank assigned to them by the Persian monarch; the king of Sidon taking the first place, the king of Tyre the next, and the rest according to their degree. Mardonius was then sent round to collect their opinions: whether they advised an engagement at sea or not. Artemisia, the Carian queen, alone declared against it. "Spare your ships," she said; "at sea the Greeks are as much

Xerxes con-
sults his
officers: shall
they fight or
not?

¹ Herod. viii. 56-63; Diod. xi. 15; Plut. *Them.* 11.

² It is curious to find that the estimate of the Persian fleet at Salamis, given by Aeschylus—on the most liberal interpretation of his words—is identical with the number recorded by Herodotus, if we omit the contingent of 120 vessels furnished by the cities of the Thracian coast (1207 vessels). Herod. vii. 184; viii. 86; see *supra*, pp. 130, 163.

superior to your sailors as men are stronger than women. Why should you run the risk? Athens is yours; Hellas is yours; if you remain here inactive, keeping your ships off shore, the Greeks will quickly disperse to their cities. They have no food in the island, and delay will compel them to retire. Or if you advance on the Peloponnesus, the Peloponnesians in the fleet will hasten to protect their homes; they will not remain to fight for Athens. But if you risk an engagement and are defeated, the ruin of the fleet will involve the ruin of the army." The friends of Artemisia were greatly distressed at this speech, thinking that the king would be furious at such opposition to his wishes, but on the contrary, he was delighted at advice which convinced him of the wisdom and loyalty of the Carian queen. Nevertheless he resolved to fight. He attributed the defeat at Artemisium to his own absence from the scene of conflict; at Salamis the fleet would be under his eye, and cowardice would be impossible. As it was now too late for an attack, the ships were ordered to be ready for an engagement on the following day.¹


13. Among the Greeks the day had passed in alarm and discontent. The Peloponnesians, and especially the Corinthians, were by no means satisfied with the decision of Eurybiadas; their thoughts were for their own country only. When the news of the fall of Leonidas at Thermopylae reached Sparta, the inhabitants of the Peloponnesus, who resolved on resistance to Persia, had collected at the Isthmus under the command of Cleombrotus, the brother of Leonidas, and after destroying the pass by the Scironid rocks, they proceeded to build a wall from sea to sea. Every one took his share in the work; any material which could be procured was used: stones and bricks, beams of wood, hurdles filled with sand; and the building went on day and night without

Artemisia
advises against
a battle.

Xerxes resolves
to risk an
engagement.

Discontent
among the
Greeks, who
wish to retire.

¹ Herod. viii. 67-70.



interruption. This fortification was not yet completed, and now the tidings came that the Persian army was advancing to the Isthmus.¹ The sailors on board the Peloponnesian ships, who were aware of the situation, began to ask why they should fight for Athens, when danger threatened their own homes. They gathered into knots, complaining of the folly of Eurybiadas, and at length the complaints broke out into open discontent. A meeting of the generals was once more called; the previous resolution was rescinded; Salamis, Megara, and Aegina were to be abandoned.²

Perceiving that all hope of persuasion was at an end, Themistocles determined to play a desperate game. He left the council, and despatched his faithful slave Sicinnus, who was the "paidagogos" of his children, in a boat to the enemy. At Artemisium the Persians had attempted to cut off the retreat of the Greeks by sending ships round Euboea; they must be induced to make a similar attempt now by sending ships round Salamis. Sicinnus was bidden to inform the Persian generals from the Athenian commander—who was in secret a supporter of the Great King, and anxious for his success—that the Greeks had resolved to retreat from Salamis. "Now, therefore, you have the opportunity of a glorious victory; you must not allow them to escape; they are divided in opinion, and will not oppose you; some will take your side, some will not; and they will fight with each other." What was the plan of battle already contemplated by Xerxes we do not know, but orders had been given to the ships to advance from Phalerum to Salamis, into the positions assigned to them—orders which were slowly carried out as the day drew to a close, and at nightfall the fleet occupied the south-eastern end of the straits between

Themistocles
sends a mes-
sage to the
Persians
urging them to
surround the
Grecian fleet.

The advice is
taken: new
movements of
the Persians.

¹ The Argives and Achaeans took no part in this work, which was begun when the Olympian and Carnean festivals were over. Herod. viii. 70-71.

² Diodorus, xi. 16, puts the wall between Lechaeum and Cenchreae,

Phalerum and the island. But on receiving the message of Themistocles Xerxes issued new orders. Troops were at once landed on the island of Psyttaleia, at the entrance of the strait, and when midnight came on, the western wing of the fleet—which was apparently the left wing, as the ships were drawn up across the mouth of the strait—was extended so as to surround the island of Salamis, and block the north-west (Megarian) outlet of the gulf. Another squadron was stationed about Ceos, and Cynosura, the long promontory which projects from Salamis towards Peiræus, while the right wing blocked the outlet between Salamis and Attica, the whole south-eastern entrance from the island to Munychia being occupied by ships drawn up in three lines. These preparations kept the Persians busy till dawn.¹

14. After sending Sicinnus, Themistocles returned to the council. It was past midnight, and the dispute was still going on, when he received a message from Aristides summoning him from the chamber. Ten years before, the two had fought side by side at Marathon, and though in the interim Themistocles had driven him from the city, Aristides was not the man to let personal or political differences influence his conduct when the welfare of the state was in question. The people had also wisely passed a decree, when the news of the invasion reached Athens, recalling

Debate among
the Greeks:
Aristides
arrives with
the news that
the Greeks are
cut off.

¹ Herod. viii. 70, 74-76. Diod. xi. 17-19. Plut. *Them.* 12. In the account of Diodorus and Plutarch, the Egyptian contingent of 200 ships is sent round the island to block the Megarian entrance of the gulf, and the movement is also mentioned by Aeschylus (*Persæ*, 368 ff.). Herodotus may imply the same thing by the extension of the western wing of the Persians. If, however, as is commonly supposed, the western wing here mentioned is the same as the western wing in chap. 85, Herodotus cannot be understood to say anything of the blocking of the Megarian end of the straits by ships sent round Salamis. He merely mentions a movement of the right Persian wing into the strait so as to pass along the Attic shore towards Eleusis, and then circle round towards the island. How improbable such a movement is, is shown by Professor Goodwin, *Papers of the American School at Athens*, vol. i. 1882, p. 239 ff.

all citizens who had been ostracised.¹ Hearing that the Greeks had resolved to retire to the Peloponnesus he had crossed over from Aegina to Salamis. On the way he found that the Persian ships were already stationed off the west of the island in such a manner that the contemplated retreat was impossible; it was with the greatest difficulty that he was able to pass through them. This information he now conveyed to Themistocles, assuring him that any further discussion was useless, for the fleet was completely cut off by the enemy. Themistocles, who now became aware that his advice had been followed, replied that the news was good news; the action of the Persians was due to a message which he had sent to them, as the only means of forcing on a battle at Salamis. He begged Aristides to enter the chamber, and give his intelligence with his own lips; "for if I tell them," he said, "they will not believe me." Aristides complied with the request, but even his assertion was disbelieved by the majority of the generals. The discussion was beginning again, when the arrival of a Tenian trireme, which had deserted from the enemy, placed the truth of the information beyond doubt.²

15. Immediate battle was now inevitable. When the morning broke the sailors were assembled and addressed by their commanders. Impressive above all was the speech of Themistocles. He contrasted, we may suppose, the free civic life of the Greeks with the misery and degradation of the Persians, who were no better than slaves in mind and body and estate, perhaps reminding his hearers of the punishment which had overtaken Ionia thirteen or fourteen years before.

Preparations
for battle.
Speech of
Themistocles.

¹ Aristotle, *Athen. Pol.* c. 22: τετάρτῳ δ' ἔρει ἀπεδέξαντο πάντας τοὺς ὠστρακισμένους ἀρχοντας Ὑψιχίδου, διὰ τὴν Εἰρήνου στρατίαν, i.e. in July 481-480. Cf. Plut. *Aristid.* 8; *Them.* 11, where Plutarch gives us a reason for the decree—μὴ δι' ὀργὴν τῷ βαρβάρῳ προσθεῖς ἑαυτὸν ἀνατρέψῃ (Aristides) τὰ πράγματα τῆς Ἑλλάδος.

² Herod. viii. 78-82. This Tenian vessel, together with a Lemnian ship, which had deserted at Artemisium, brought up the total of the Greek fleet to 380.

He ended with an appeal to his men to choose the better part. The order was then given for battle, and the sailors went on board together with the marines, of whom there were eighteen on each Athenian vessel, four being archers.¹ The Athenians were stationed on the left or western wing; the Lacedaemonians and Aeginetans on the right. The ships no sooner put out to sea than they were attacked by the Persians, on whose right, leading the way into the strait, were the Phoenicians, on the left the Ionians and other Grecian subjects of the king. Startled by the sudden onset, the Greeks began to retire and run their ships aground, when an Athenian vessel dashed forward and charged a ship of the enemy; the two were entangled by the shock, and as each side came to the aid of their friends, the conflict became general.²

16. The line of battle extended from Salamis to the Heracleum on the opposite shore—a distance of about a mile.

THE BATTLE OF
SALAMIS.
480 B.C.
Ol. 75. 1.

The advantages of the situation were entirely on the side of the Greeks, who were not slow to take advantage of them. The line was kept; the ships were managed with admirable skill and order. On the other hand, the barbarians, whose vast fleet became more and more crowded as it advanced into the narrows, were quickly reduced to a confused and helpless mass, without organisation or control. From the hill of Aegaleos, which overlooks the bay, Xerxes watched the struggle. His presence encouraged his fleet to greater efforts; every sailor thought that the king's eye was upon him, and that his name might be written down on the tablets in which was recorded every achievement which attracted the attention of Xerxes. Among the bravest of the brave were the Ionians,

¹ Plut. *Them.* 14.

² Herod. viii. 53, 54. At the moment when the Greeks went on board, the ship which had been sent to Aegina for the Aeacidae returned to the fleet; how it was able to pass through the Persian ships Herodotus does not say. Diodorus xi. 18 puts the Lacedaemonians on the left wing with the Athenians.

and especially the Samians, whose commanders were subsequently distinguished by peculiar marks of honour. Some Phoenicians who had been forced ashore at the foot of Aegaleos, endeavoured to throw the blame of their defeat upon the Greeks, but at the moment when they brought the accusation a Samothracian vessel struck and sunk an Athenian trireme. The victors were in turn attacked by an Aeginetan ship, but though their vessel was sunk, the marines climbed from the wreck upon the Aeginetan trireme and secured it for themselves. At the sight of this heroic action, Xerxes at once gave orders that the Phoenicians should lose their heads, as a punishment for calumniating men who were better than themselves.¹

The Greeks
in the Persian
fleet.

The rout began with the advanced (right) wing of the Persian fleet, where the Phoenicians were ranged opposite the Athenians. The ships were either driven to the shore or compelled to retire towards the mouth of the strait, where they met the remainder of the fleet still streaming into the narrow entrance. The advancing and retreating ships came into collision, not a few vessels being run down by their friends; the oars were broken or could not be used; the ships swung broadside to the Greeks, and were exposed to the full stroke of their bronzen prows. Foremost in the work of destruction were the Athenians on the left, and the Aeginetans on the right; the first destroyed the ships in the strait, the second, who were nearer the entrance, struck down those who attempted to escape. The slaughter was prodigious, and it was greatly increased because the Persians, being unable to swim, perished in the waves if their ships

Defeat of
the Persians.

The Athenians
and
Aeginetans.

¹ Herod. viii. 85-90; Diod. xi. 17, 18. Diodorus has a story about a Samian who swam over to the Greeks with a message from his countrymen that they would desert in the action. Plutarch, *Theb.* 13, gives two accounts of the position of Xerxes' throne; Phanodemus declared that it was *ὑπὲρ τὸ Ἡράκλειον, ἢ βραχεὶ πόρῳ διείργεται τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἢ νῆσος*, Acestodorus that it was *ἐν μεθορίῳ τῆς Μεγαρίδος ὑπὲρ τῶν καλουμένων Κεράτων*. Herodotus says *ὑπὸ τῷ οὐρεὶ τῷ ἀντίῳ Σαλαμῖνος, τὸ καλεῖται Αἰγάλεως*.

sunk before reaching land. To render the havoc more complete, Aristides landed on Psyttaleia with a number of soldiers, and cut down all the Persians who had been stationed there on the previous evening to prevent the escape of the Greeks, or who had fled to the island for refuge. So the battle raged till the evening. Many of the noblest Persians fell; among them Ariabignes, a brother of Xerxes. A large number of ships were captured or destroyed, including the very flower of the fleet, for as the Phoenicians penetrated furthest into the strait, they suffered most. The confidence of Xerxes was utterly shaken by this new disaster; the vast numbers, on which he relied, proved as powerless on sea as they had been on land. As at Trachis, so on Aegaleos, he had watched his soldiers merely to witness their utter and miserable defeat.¹

Very few details of the fighting in the battle have been preserved. Besides the incident of the Samothracian vessel already recorded, we are told that Artemisia, when pursued by an Attic ship, ran down and sunk a friendly vessel of the Calyndians—a disastrous blunder, which turned out greatly to her advantage. The Attic ship ceased to pursue a vessel which had destroyed one of the enemy, and when Xerxes,

¹ Herod. viii. 89, 91, 95. In connection with the landing of Aristides on Psyttaleia, which he places at the beginning of the battle, Plutarch (*Arist.* 9) relates an incident which, if true, offers a parallel on the Greek side to the slaughter of Leon by the Persians at Artemisium. Among the captives taken by Aristides on the island were three sons of Sandauche, the sister of Xerxes. These were at once sent to Themistocles, who at the bidding of the prophet Euphrantides, and in accordance with an oracle, sacrificed them to Dionysus Omêstês. The story is also told, at some greater length but without any mention of Aristides, in Plutarch, *Them.* 13, where we are informed that Themistocles was compelled to make the sacrifice by the people, who invoked the god and dragged the victims to the altar. Cf. *Id. Pelop.* 21. Plutarch may be wrong in saying that the victims were captured by Aristides on Psyttaleia without being wrong in the rest of the story. His authority was, however, Phanias of Lesbos, a worthless writer, though Plutarch describes him as ἀνὴρ φιλόσοφος καὶ γραμμάτων οὐκ ἄπειρος ιστορικῶν.

who had seen the incident, was informed that the Calyndian ship was a Grecian trireme, he was filled with admiration of Artemisia's courage. "My women are men," he exclaimed, "and my men are women." As the unfortunate Calyndians perished to a man, no one was able to correct the mistake. In the hot pursuit of the Persians, an Athenian and an Aeginetan vessel ran side by side. On the Athenian ship was Themistocles; the Aeginetan was commanded by Polycritus, the son of that Crius who had compelled Cleomenes to retire from Aegina, when he came to punish the city for sending earth and water to Darius (p. 78). At this moment Polycritus had caught a Sidonian trireme, and as he drove his prow into the hostile ship, he called aloud to Themistocles: "Is this the Medism which you charge upon us?" The Sidonian vessel proved to be that which had captured Pytheas at Artemisium.¹

17. Such was the battle of Salamis, so far as we can put together a connected account of it from somewhat conflicting statements. The essential features are best preserved in the immortal lines of Aeschylus, who himself fought in the Athenian fleet. His description, which is that of a patriot and a poet, is put into the mouth of a Persian, who relates the story to queen Atossa, at Susa. The hesitation of the Greeks, the alarm and confusion of the preceding night, disappear from his verses. He tells us how the Persians were deluded by Themistocles; what measures they took to prevent any escape of the Greeks; how they observed with astonishment that no escape was attempted. When the morning broke, the secret was revealed. A sound arose, echoing from the island rocks, which made the ears of them that heard it to tingle—it was not the cry of belated fugitives, but the paean of warriors hastening to battle, and "round about the shores the trumpet's note ran like a leaping flame." When the word was given, the Greeks at once smote the surf

Themistocles
and Crius.

Description of
the battle by
Aeschylus.

¹ Herod. viii. 87, 88, 92; *supra*, p. 162.

with their oars, and swam into sight, the right wing leading, in perfect order of battle. Loud rose the cry: "On, on, ye sons of Hellas; strike for home, and wife, and child; strike for the temples of your gods and the graves of your fathers: the hour is come." The Persians answered cry with cry, and the battle began. A Grecian galley struck down a Persian vessel, shattering her prow; ship dashed into ship. For a time "the stream" of the Persian host resisted all attack; but when the mass of ships pressed into the strait, they could no longer aid each other; they were struck by their own bronzen prows, and their carage swept away. The Greeks gathered round and beat down the helpless mass; the ships were overturned; the sea was hidden with wrecks and corpses; the shores and shoals were thick with dead. Every ship turned recklessly to flight, while the Greeks with broken oars or fragments of wreckage smote and slew the men like fishes in a net. Far out to sea their shrieks and cries resounded till the shadows of night closed on the scene.¹

18. We may dream of the thoughts which passed through the mind of Themistocles, when at length he returned to Salamis on that summer night. For days he had contended against the selfishness and stupidity of his colleagues; what he could not gain by open persuasion of his friends, he had been compelled to achieve by secret deception of the enemy. He had played high, but he had won. He could not, indeed, suppose that the victory was as final as it proved to be, for in spite of its losses the Persian fleet was still immeasurably superior in numbers. He could not foresee that Salamis would be a name of glory to the end of time; "divine" in a sense which no oracle could predict. But he could reflect that his decision had been justified; the policy which he had supported for years had been shown to be the true policy for Athens to adopt. For it was

The victory of
Salamis due to
Themistocles.

¹ Aesch. *Pers.* 355 ff.

due to him and to him alone, not merely that the Greeks fought at Salamis, but that they had a fleet to fight with. He had met with much opposition; he had made many enemies; but at length he had reaped his reward. Though Athens was in flames and Attica desolated, the Athenians were still unconquered. Athens would rise from her ashes a new power, mistress of an irresistible fleet; a new era would open before her, an era of conquest and commerce, in which she would stand forth without a rival, the foremost city of Greece.

But while we render to Themistocles what is his due in this glorious work, we must not forget the Athenian people. Without them he would have been powerless. He was not a favourite with all classes at Athens; men did not love him the more because they knew that it was foolish to disregard his judgment, and dangerous to thwart his will. But he had gained the ear of the people. In practical matters that man is truly great who knows how to combine for any given end the forces which exist around him. And this is what Themistocles did. He saw that the Athenians were at heart a sea-faring nation, and he combined this love of the sea, which perhaps he was the first to detect, with the democratic spirit which had become so vigorous a force in the last generation. The masses who were too poor to serve in the army, because unable to provide themselves with the necessary accoutrements, were now able to support their country's cause as sailors in her fleets. As sailors they became a power in the state; nay, the fate of Hellas lay in their hands.¹ They had many faults; they made great mistakes; but their hearts were aglow with that love of freedom, in which, in the long history of the world, the good will always outweigh the evil.

Bravery and
patriotism of
the Athenians.

¹ Thuc. i. 18, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπιόντων τῶν Μήδων διανοηθέντες ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἀνασκευασάμενοι ἐς τὰς ναὺς ἐσβάντες ναυτικοὶ ἐγένοντο. Ib. 93, τῆς γὰρ δὴ θαλάσσης πρῶτος ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν ὡς ἀνθεκτέον ἐστίν (Themistocles).

19. Legends naturally gathered round the famous battle. In one of these the victory was connected with the Eleusinian mysteries. When the Athenians had abandoned Attica, and the country was being ravaged by Persian soldiers, Demaratus, the exiled king of Sparta, chanced to be in the Thriasian plain together with Dicaeus, an Athenian exile in high repute among the Persians. Looking towards the shore, they were astonished to see a great cloud of dust, such as a multitude of 30,000 men might raise, moving from Eleusis, and while they were wondering at the cloud, they heard a voice which resembled the sacred Iacchos-song. Demaratus, who knew nothing of the mysteries, asked his friend what the sound meant. Dicaeus explained the custom of the mysteries, and added that the voice was an indication of divine help, advancing from Eleusis to the Athenians and their allies. "If the cloud descends on the Peloponnesus," he said, "danger is in store for the king's army; if it passes towards the ships at Salamis, the Persian fleet will be lost." When Demaratus heard this, he bade Dicaeus keep his own counsel; he would lose his head, if Xerxes were informed. The cloud and the voice passed away to Salamis, from which the two friends foresaw the destruction of the Persian fleet.¹ In a second legend the Greeks were said to have been urged into battle by the apparition of a woman, whose voice was heard throughout the fleet, crying: "What ails you; how long will ye hold back?" In a third, we are told that Adeimantus, the Corinthian, turned and fled, followed by his ships; but when they arrived off the temple of Athena Scirus, in Salamis, they were met by a boat. The sailors in the boat called to Adeimantus, reproaching him as a traitor, and declaring that the Greeks were already victorious. As Adeimantus was still incredulous, they offered themselves as

Legends of
Salamis:

1. The vision
at Eleusis.

2. The vision
of the woman.

3. The Athen-
ian legend of
the Corinth-
ians.

¹ Herod. viii. 65; cf. Plut. *Them.* 15; cf. *Phoc.* 28. In Herodotus this vision is seen before the battle is fought; in Plutarch it is seen on the day of the battle.

hostages; let their lives be forfeit, if their words proved false. Upon this Adeimantus returned, but only to find the battle at an end.¹

20. In the night preceding the battle a contingent of the Persian army had been ordered to advance towards the Peloponnesus, perhaps with a view of securing the coasts of the Megarid, and cutting off any Greeks who might be driven ashore there.

Xerxes
resolves
to retreat.

This contingent was now recalled to Athens, where it was joined by Xerxes and those Persians who had escaped from the ships. The king had still a larger fleet at command than the Greeks, but he had no intention of risking a second engagement. Terrified at the thought that the Ionians would destroy the bridges at the Hellespont, he determined to retreat at once; but he wished his intention to be concealed, not only from the Greeks, but from his own army. To throw them on a false scent, he began the construction of a mole or passage between the mainland and Salamis, as though he were about to attack the island with his army. Several large Phoenician vessels were also lashed together to form a raft and floating fortress, for the support and defence of those engaged in the work. At the same time he gave orders to renew the battle at sea. Meanwhile he despatched messengers to carry the fatal news of his defeat to Susa. But a few days had elapsed since he had announced the capture of Athens, filling his capital with delight at the long-desired success. The rejoicings were now changed into sorrow. Instead of streets spread with myrrh, offerings of frankincense, sacrifices and banquets, there was lamentation and mourning and the rending of garments, and an agony of terror for the safety of the king.²

¹ Herod. viii. 94. This was an Athenian legend, for which no support could be found, either at Corinth or elsewhere in Greece!

² Herod. viii. 70, 97-99; Plut. *Them.* 16. According to Ctesias, *Pers.* 26, Xerxes began the mound before the battle, and so Strabo, p. 395. It left the mainland at the Heracleum (Ctes.); on the site of the πορθμός ὅσον διαστάδιος (Strabo).

Mardonius was not deceived ; he knew that the king would retreat ; he knew also what his own part in the invasion had been ; he expected to be made the scape-goat for its failure. He determined to remain behind, if possible, and attempt the subjection of Hellas by land. Hitherto the army had been successful ; it was the fleet which had failed. The reasons which he gave to Xerxes when pressing his request upon him were specious. The fleet was composed of Phoenicians, Egyptians, Cilicians, and Cyprians ; in the army was the flower of Persia. The failure of the one by no means implied the failure of the other. On this ground he begged to be allowed to remain in Hellas with a force of 300,000 soldiers, with which he undertook to reduce the country to slavery. Xerxes was favourably inclined to the proposal ; it offered a prospect of success ; it ensured his own safety ; but before coming to a decision he asked the advice of Artemisia. The queen in reply pointed out that if Mardonius was successful, Xerxes would reap the fruit of his success ; if he failed, it was no great matter, so long as Xerxes himself was safe. Upon this the king placed his children in the charge of Artemisia, who undertook to convey them to Asia, and sending for Mardonius, bade him choose his soldiers. In the night he gave orders for the fleet to retire to the Hellespont with all speed, in order to secure the bridges. The instructions were obeyed with alacrity ; so panic-stricken were the sailors, that on approaching a part of the Attic coast called Zoster they mistook some small rocks for Grecian vessels, at the sight of which they fled in wild confusion till they discovered their error.¹

21. On the following morning, the Greeks, seeing the Persian army in its old position, supposed that the fleet was still at Phalerum, and drew down their ships to renew the

¹ Herod. viii. 100-107. The "children" intrusted to Artemisia were νόθοι.

contest. When they perceived that the fleet had gone away in the night, they immediately started in pursuit. They reached Andros without overtaking the enemy.

Pursuit of the
Persians by
the Greeks.

A council of war was now held. Themistocles wished to continue the chase and break the bridges, before the king's forces had time to escape. Eurybiadas on the other hand was urgent that the Persians should be allowed to retreat unmolested. If they remained in Greece they would not only carry on the war, but would be a point of support to medising Greeks; their supplies would also be drawn from the country. This view was shared by the rest of

The pursuit is
abandoned at
Andros.

the generals from Peloponnesus. Their territory was still unravaged. They wished it to remain unravaged. But the Athenians, who had nothing to lose and much to avenge, were so strongly on the side of Themistocles that they were willing to continue the chase alone. This, however, he would not permit; he doubtless perceived the enormous danger which attended any division of the Hellenic forces at such a moment. "Our success," he said, "has been a happy accident; we owe it to the gods and heroes, not to ourselves. Let us go back to re-establish our homes and cultivate our fields; when the spring comes we can sail to the Hellespont and Ionia."¹

22. Herodotus, who is persistently the enemy of Themistocles, informs us that this advice, so admirable in itself, and so creditable to the genius and patriotism of the Athenian leader, was given in order that Themistocles might "have a place of refuge with the king should any disaster overtake him at the hands of the Athenians, which in fact was the case." He tells us that when it was decided to discontinue the pursuit Themistocles sent Sicinnus once

Supposed
treachery of
Themistocles:
his second
message to
the king.

¹ Herod. viii. 109. Plutarch, *Them.* 16, says nothing of the pursuit to Andros, but represents Themistocles and Aristides as discussing the breaking of the bridges at Salamis. Aristides would even build a second bridge to get Xerxes out of Hellas.

more to Xerxes to inform him that he had restrained the Athenians from chasing his ships and destroying the bridges, so that he could now return at his leisure. Sicinnus was conveyed to Attica in a boat by a crew who could be trusted to preserve the secret under the most extreme tortures; when the message was delivered they returned to Andros.¹ Plutarch, who relates the same incident, states that the message was sent from Salamis through Arnaces, one of the king's eunuchs, and gives the purport differently. The Greeks have resolved to break down the bridges, and Themistocles, out of regard for the king, urges him to hasten back at once, while he delays the Greeks.²

This action of Themistocles has been warmly discussed, and not without reason, "for our opinion of his character depends on the view which we take of it. Years afterwards, as we know from Thucydides, he secured the favour of the Persian king by reminding him of the service which he had rendered him after the battle of Salamis, by preventing the destruction of the bridges. The variation in the details given by later authors must not be allowed to weigh against the evidence of Herodotus and Thucydides; there can be no doubt that Themistocles did send a second message to Xerxes, whether it was sent from Andros or Salamis, through Sicinnus or Arnaces. But though we accept the fact we are not bound to put upon it the interpretation which Herodotus suggests, or even the interpretation which Themistocles himself put upon it at a later time. We must judge the incident

Was his conduct really treacherous?

¹ Herod. viii. 110.

² Plut. *Them.* 16. Diodorus, xi. 19, states that the message was sent from Salamis, through Sicinnus: he agrees with Plutarch in the sense of it, but leaves out all reference to the motive with which it was sent. Justin, ii. 13. 6, 7, says: "Themistocles timens ne interclusi hostes desperationem in virtutem verterent et iter, quod aliter non pateret, ferro patefacerent, satis multos hostes in Græcia remanere dictitans, nec augeri numerum retinendo oportere, cum vincere consilio ceteros non posset, eundem servum ad Xerxem mittit certiooremque consilii fecit, et occupare transitum maturata fuga jubet."

by the circumstances under which it occurred. If the Greeks would not carry on the war, it was of the utmost importance that Xerxes should evacuate Attica, for by occupying Athens he would have increased the difficulties of the Athenians tenfold. With the disappearance of the Persian fleet all danger for the Peloponnesians was at an end; they would not risk their lives to restore Attica to the Athenians, and the Athenians could not win it back for themselves. From this point of view Plutarch's explanation of the sending of the message is far-sighted and correct. It was honestly sent with the intention of inducing Xerxes to leave Attica. And the form in which Plutarch puts the message is perhaps the true one—even to the part which Themistocles claims to have played. What could he say more effective than this? "The bridges are not broken down; but the Greeks have resolved to sail to the Hellespont and break them: I will delay their voyage as long as I can; but your safety lies in immediate retreat." Such a message as this would set Xerxes on his march at once, and such a message could be sent without leaving any stain on Themistocles as a traitor to the Greeks.

But under different circumstances Themistocles put a different construction on his conduct. His desire at that time was to secure the protection of the Persian king, of whose favour he would seem to have little hope. With this view he ascribed his action after the battle of Salamis to a motive which might have prompted it, and those who wished to fix the charge of Medism upon him were only too ready to bring forward this proof of the truth of their accusation.

Such appears to me to be the explanation of the so-called treachery of Themistocles. To suppose with Grote, who follows Herodotus, that Themistocles may have been so sensible of his devious career that he thought it wise to secure a refuge for himself even at this point in it is impossible, for two reasons. We have no evidence that the career of Themistocles, up to this time at any rate, had been devious, though he had made many enemies; and it is quite

Herodotus
misled by his
antipathy to
Themistocles.

incredible that at such a moment of unparalleled triumph he anticipated a crisis when he would have to seek a refuge from his own citizens. In my opinion the motives ascribed to Themistocles by Herodotus on this occasion are without historical foundation, and due to that writer's prejudice—a prejudice founded on legends of the later history of Themistocles, which lived in the memory of his enemies.¹

23. Xerxes required no second hint to hasten the execution of the design which he had already formed. As the season

Xerxes and
Mardonius
retire to
Thessaly,

was too far advanced to allow Mardonius to open a campaign in the Peloponnesus, he resolved to conduct the entire army back to Thessaly, where, in the neighbourhood of

friends and allies, Mardonius could remain for the winter. Supplies would be furnished in abundance by the Aleuadae, and should the Greeks attempt an attack Mardonius would receive them on ground of his own choosing. After the lapse of a few days the retreat began: a rapid march through Boeotia, and through the pass which had been so hardly won, brought the army back to Thessaly. At such a distance from Attica Xerxes could with prudence allow his forces to be divided. Mardonius began to select his army; he chose the Immortals, but without their commander, who refused to

where Mar-
donius selects
an army of
300,000 men.

leave Xerxes, the best armed of the Persians including the thousand horse soldiers, the Medes, Sacae, Bactrians, and Indians; these were taken *en masse*—horse and foot—and in

addition Mardonius selected from the rest of the forces every soldier who attracted his attention by his superior stature, or by his reputation. The army thus chosen amounted to 300,000 men; but Mardonius could also count on the forces which the Macedonians, Thessalians, and Boeotians, with the adjacent tribes, would supply—forces now dismissed to their homes, but ready to re-assemble in the spring.²

¹ How were the Athenians to return to Attica (c. 109), if Xerxes retreated "at his leisure" (c. 110)?

² Herod. viii. 113. *Supra*. p. 126.

24. Xerxes now pressed forward on his way, taking with him 60,000 men from the soldiers of Mardonius, under the command of Artabazus, as an escort to ensure his safety as far as the Hellespont. The sick in his army were left to the care of the Thessalians, Macedonians, and the Paeonians of Siris, with whom on his march to Greece he had left the sacred chariot of Auramazda. So hasty was the retreat that in forty-five days after leaving Attica Xerxes reached the Hellespont, a distance of 550 miles; in six weeks he had traversed the route along which he had taken more than three months to advance. This haste availed him nothing, so far as the bridges were concerned, for they had already been broken by a storm; but his ships were at hand when he reached the coast, and on these he crossed to Abydus.¹

Xerxes continues his retreat.

The pressure of the march was now relaxed; the wearied and famished troops were allowed to rest; and on arriving at Sardis the king proceeded to make arrangements for the winter. The larger contingents of the fleet—the Egyptians and Phoenicians—were disbanded; the remainder, reduced by desertion and losses to less than half their original strength, were sent to winter at Cyne and Samos. The army went into quarters at Sardis and Miletus, where 60,000 men were stationed under the command of Tigranes, as a support to the fleet on the island of Samos² (*infra*, p. 235).

Xerxes arrives at Sardis: where he makes arrangements for the winter.

25. So rapid a retreat could not be accomplished, even under favourable circumstances, without great suffering, and

¹ Herod. viii. 115, 117, 126. The historian tells us that the king of the Bisaltians, who had no wish to be the slave of Xerxes, retired at his approach into the fastnesses of Mount Rhodope, forbidding his six sons to take any part in the expedition. The young men disobeyed the command and joined Xerxes. When they returned the savage father put out the eyes of all the six.—The Paeonians gave the chariot to the Thracians, and when Xerxes demanded it on his return, declared that the horses had been stolen while at pasture.

² Herod. viii. 130; ix. 96; Diod. xi. 27. Another version of the retreat is given in Herod. viii. 118-120. Cf. Justin, ii. 13. 8.

the circumstances of the present retreat were anything but favourable. On their advance the Persians had passed like a desolating fire over the cities and fields of Thrace, Chalcidice, and Pieria. The stores of grain had been exhausted; the abundance of months and years had been consumed at a single

Great suffer-
ings of the
Persian army
on the retreat.

meal. No care or thought had been taken for the return; no preparation could now be made for it. The famine among the troops was terrible; everything that was eatable was eaten. From city to city the soldiers hurried on; the first to arrive at a new station might pick up a meal, the last found nothing, and turned in the rage of hunger to the grass of the field or the bark of the trees. The rigours of a Thracian winter were now setting in; the frosts, if yet slight, were keenly felt by the ill-clad, ill-fed men, accustomed to the warmth of the glowing South. Aeschylus draws for us a terrible picture of the famous retreat: of the hunger, thirst, and cold, and above all, of the disastrous crossing of the half-frozen Strymon, the Beresina of the Persian invasion. "Men who had never bowed the knee then cried to earth and heaven for mercy, and happiest was he to whom death came the quickest." The picture is perhaps exaggerated, but we cannot doubt that the loss was great and the misery extreme. Even when the survivors were safe in Asia, the sudden change from famine to abundance brought on diseases by which numbers perished.¹

26. The disasters of the Persians were not even now at an end. After accompanying Xerxes to the Hellespont,

Artabazus at
Olynthus and
Potidaea.

Artabazus slowly returned towards Thessaly. When he arrived at Potidaea, the Corinthian colony at the head of the isthmus of Pallene, he found the city, and indeed the whole peninsula, which

¹ Herod. viii. 115-117; Aesch. *Pers.* 450 ff.; Justin, ii. 13. 10-12. That the account is exaggerated is probable from the fact that Artabazus, even after his losses at Potidaea, commanded a force of 40,000 men; and if the cold had been severe he could hardly have entered on military operations on his return from the Hellespont.

it commanded, in revolt. Olynthus also at the head of the Toronean Gulf was suspected of disloyalty. Artabazus at once laid siege to the cities. Olynthus, which at this time was in the possession of some Bottiaeans whom the Macedonians had expelled from the shores of the Thermaic gulf, was quickly captured; the inhabitants were massacred; the town was given up to the Chalcidians, over whom Critobulus of Torone was established as tyrant. Potidaea resisted bravely. An attempt was made by a party in the town, led by Timoxenus, the general, to deliver the place into the hands of the Persians, but happily the plot was discovered and suppressed. For three months the siege lingered on; Artabazus had no ships, and as the walls of the city ran down to the sea on either side of the isthmus, it was impossible to cut the place off on the side which looked towards Pallene. Yet so long as this side remained open supplies and troops could be brought into the town while any remained in the peninsula. Success was all but hopeless, when an accident seemed likely to bring the town into the power of the besiegers. The sea suddenly retired from the land for a considerable distance, leaving a marsh between the water and the city. It was now possible to pass from the mainland under the walls and attack the town from the peninsula. The army was immediately ordered to advance, but when two-fifths of the whole had crossed, the sea returned as suddenly as it had subsided. An immense wave overtook the army which was still marching by the walls. Some were drowned; others were slain by the Potidaeans, who issued out of the city in boats. Artabazus returned to Mardonius with the survivors. Since he left Thessaly he had lost one-third of his corps of 60,000 men. The pious Potidaeans attributed the movement of the sea to the wrath of Poseidon, whose image and temple, situated in a suburb of the city, had been desecrated by the Persians.¹

The siege of
Potidaea.

Great destruc-
tion of the
Persians.

¹ Herod. viii. 126-129.

27. When it was decided not to continue the pursuit of the Persians, the Greeks in the fleet turned their forces against their own renegade countrymen. The first to feel their vengeance were the Andrians, who had furnished forces to the king. The island was now besieged; a sum of money was demanded, partly as a fine for past misconduct, and partly to meet the expenses of the ships which had fought in the defence of Hellas. The Andrians refused to pay. The island was starving, they said; it had long been the chosen home of Poverty and Distress, deities who were more than a match for Power and Persuasion, the goddesses who were now ranged against them. Their resistance was successful; the forces which had overthrown the Persian fleet failed to reduce a Greek city of third-rate importance—just as nine years before the conqueror of Marathon had failed at Paros. After some time spent in a fruitless siege, the fleet returned to Salamis, but that they might not return empty-handed, they exacted a sum of money from Paros, and doubtless from other islands. As they sailed past Euboea they revenged themselves on Carystus by devastating the territory of the city, which now suffered for joining the Persians, as in 490 B.C. it had suffered for adhering to the Greeks.¹

28. When the fleet returned to Salamis a division was made of the spoils of war. The first duty was to send offerings to the gods who had shown the Greeks such signal favour. Three Phoenician triremes were selected for dedication, one at the temple of Poseidon at the Isthmus, another

¹ Herod. viii. 111, 112, 121; Plut. *Them.* 21. Herodotus would have us believe that Themistocles pocketed the sums received from Paros and other islands as a fee for diverting the fleet from them. He even goes so far as to assert that he received money from the Carystians, though their territory was laid waste none the less! This is written in the spirit of Timocreon of Rhodes, who asserts that Themistocles took three talents as a fee for restoring him to his country—and failed to do so. It is surely more reasonable to suppose that the Greeks exacted fines from the cities which had joined the invader: see Stein ad Herod. *l.c.*

at Sunium to Athena, a third to Ajax at Salamis. The spoils were then apportioned, a tithe being set apart for Delphi, out of which was erected a colossal statue of bronze, eighteen feet in height, and bearing in the hand the prow of a ship. From Salamis the fleet proceeded to the Isthmus, where it joined the army.¹

Division of
the spoil:
dedication
of offerings.

In the minds of the Greeks a battle was always regarded as a contest or competition in which prizes were won. There was not only the great prize of victory which fell to one or other of the combatants; there was the prize of valour for the state which had done most for Hellas, and for the man who had done most for his country—a prize which neither defeat nor death could take away. In this spirit the Hellenes of the fleet and army now met to decide which city and which warrior should receive the first prize. To us, who read the history of Herodotus, the decision would seem to be a foregone conclusion. The Athenians had furnished more than half of the whole fleet; they had shown the most unflinching zeal in the good cause; to them more than to any single nation, beyond all contradiction, the victory was due. How great then is our astonishment to find that they fell into the second place, the first prize being given to the Aeginetans. Who were the judges we do not know; but we cannot forget that the Aeginetans were allies of the Spartans and members of the Peloponnesian confederation, while the Athenians stood alone and without support. We know that the allies had from the first been jealous of the Athenians, refusing to follow if the lead were placed in their hands; and we may reasonably

The Greeks
assign the
prizes of
valour.

The first prize
is given to
Aegina; the
second to
Athens.

¹ Herod. viii. 122. When sending the tithe to Delphi the Greeks asked of the god whether he was satisfied with his share. He replied that he had received full measure from the rest of the Greeks, but the Aeginetans still owed him the prize of valour in the battle of Salamis. Upon this the Aeginetans sent an additional gift of three golden stars affixed to a mast.

suppose that the Spartans, alarmed at the vigour of the Athenians, were not displeased to have an opportunity of soothing the feelings of the island, which ten years before had suffered so severely from the duplicity of Cleomenes.

Prizes for personal valour.

The same feelings ruled the distribution of the prizes for personal valour; the first fell to Polycritus of Aegina, the second to Ameinias of Athens, who had been the first of his countrymen to charge the enemy, and Eumenes.¹

It remained to award the prize of merit among the various commanders. In this decision the commanders themselves voted, each giving in two names, one for the first, the other for the second place. The votes were recorded in the most solemn manner on the altar of Poseidon. When the names were read it was found that each voter had chosen the first place for himself; but all were unanimous in giving the second prize to Themistocles. The value of such a vote was unmistakeable; but the jealousy of the commanders prevented a decision. When each found himself supported by his own vote only he sailed away from the Isthmus, and the prize was not awarded at all.²

The prizes of the commanders not awarded.

29. So the fleet dispersed for the winter. The army which was now under the command of Cleombrotus, the younger brother of Leonidas (Leotychidas, the second king of Sparta, is never mentioned in 480 B.C.), attempted to complete the building of the wall across the Isthmus, which had been begun in such haste

The Grecian army at the Isthmus.

¹ Herod. viii. 93; Plut. *Them.* 17; Diod. xi. 27. Diodorus asserts that the decision in favour of the Aeginetans was intended to humiliate the Athenians—which is probably true. When they discovered that the Athenians were seriously annoyed, the Spartans, who were afraid of Themistocles, sought to smooth the difficulty by paying him peculiar honours. This, however, led to a coolness between the Athenian people and Themistocles, who was replaced by Xanthippus in the military operations for the next year; see *infra*, p. 269, n. 2.

² Herod. viii. 123.

when the news of the fall of Leonidas reached the Peloponnesus, but before they had made much progress the work was brought to an end by an eclipse, or some obscuration of the sun, which was regarded as an evil omen. They returned to their various cities at once. Soon afterwards Cleombrotus died.¹

Death of
Cleombrotus.
Oct. 480 B.C.

30. In spite of the decision at the Isthmus, Themistocles was now the foremost name in the minds and mouths of men. When he went to Sparta to receive from the Lacedaemonians the honours which the Greeks had refused to bestow, he received a crown of olive, the reward which had been conferred on the Spartan commander. He was also presented with a chariot, the best which could be found in the city, and on his departure he was accompanied to the border of the land by a chosen band of three hundred Spartans—an honour never repeated by Sparta. Very different was the reception which met him at Athens. Timodemus of Aphidna, a man of no eminence, and maddened by the honours given to Themistocles, declared that the great general owed his distinctions to Athens, not to himself. "Fellow," retorted Themistocles, "had I been a citizen of Belbina I should not have received these honours from Sparta; nor would you, though an Athenian."²

Themistocles
at Sparta and
at Athens.

¹ Herod. ix. 10, *θυομένῳ οἱ* (Cleombrotus) *ἐπὶ τῷ Πέρσῃ δὲ ἥλιος ἀμυνώθη ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ*. The "obscuration" was apparently the partial eclipse of Oct. 2, 480 B.C. See Busolt, *G. G.* ii. 186 n. 2. Mr. W. E. Plummer, of the University Observatory, who has kindly looked into this matter for me, writes "that the sun was only about half eclipsed, and an eclipse of only half the sun is not a very conspicuous matter." Herodotus therefore is accurate in his language.

² Herod. viii. 124, 125. The story is told with slight variation by Plato, *Rep.* p. 329; Plut. *Them.* 18.

CHAPTER V.

PLATAEA AND MYCALE.

I. WITH the spring of 479 B.C. the campaign opened which was to decide the fortunes of Greece. Mardonius had passed the winter in Thessaly, where the presence of his large army. (300,000 men, if we are to believe the account of Herodotus), though burdensome to the country, afforded a strong support to the Aleuadae. This ambitious family, as we have seen, had been very active in bringing the Persians into Greece, and by the help of the overwhelming army of Xerxes they had been able to force their policy on an unwilling nation. The defeat of their cause at Salamis did not shake their position, but they must have hailed with delight the proposal of Mardonius to winter in their country; and when the time came for new movements they displayed the greatest zeal in his cause.

Before entering on the final struggle Mardonius resolved to consult the oracles of the districts through which he was about to pass. He despatched a Carian named Mys (Mouse), an Asiatic acquainted with Greek, with orders to visit all the oracles to which he could obtain access. The precise object of the mission was kept a secret, but we may follow Herodotus in supposing that Mardonius cannot have had any other thought in his mind than the issue of the campaign, in which he had ventured so great a stake. Mys visited Abae, in Phocis, though the Persians had burnt the temple there in the preceding summer, and Lebadea, where he prudently engaged a

479 B.C.
Ol. 75. 2.
Mardonius
in Thessaly.

Mys is sent to
consult the
oracles.

native of the country to enter the cave of Trophonius on his behalf. At Thebes he consulted Ismenian Apollo, whose will was made known through burnt sacrifices, and Amphiaraus, paying an alien to sleep in the temple, which no Theban could use for consultation. The greatest surprise awaited him at the shrine of Ptoan Apollo—a shrine The oracle of Ptoan Apollo. which though situated near Acraephia was under the control of Thebes. He was accompanied thither by three Thebans, chosen by the people, and furnished with a tablet, on which to write down the responses from the lips of the "prophet." To the astonishment of all, the answer came in a barbarous tongue. Mys rose to the occasion; declaring the words to be good Carian, he snatched the tablet from the Thebans and wrote them down for himself.¹

2. Whatever the nature of the responses, they did not encourage Mardonius to open the campaign immediately. He thought it necessary to feel his way. Forgetting the enmity which the Great King cherished against the Athenians, above all other Greeks, and the defeat which they had recently inflicted upon him—forgetting also his own promise to subjugate Greece, he now despatched Alexander of Macedon to Athens to offer terms of alliance. Mardonius invites the Athenians to an alliance. Alexander was connected with the Persians by the marriage of his sister Gygaea with Bubares, the son of Megabazus; he had also rendered some service to Athens, for which he had been appointed *proxenus* of the city. On these grounds he was regarded as a trusty and influential envoy, who, if any man could, would win the Athenians for Mardonius. And if the Athenians were won, it was not likely that any further resistance would be offered at sea, while on land the troops of Mardonius were far

¹ Herod. viii. 133-135. The historian makes merry over the name of Mys. Plutarch, *Aristid.* 19, who agrees with Herodotus that a Carian was sent by Mardonius to the cave of Trophonius, asserts that a Lydian was sent to the temple of Amphiaraus. To this Lydian it was foretold in a dream that Mardonius would be killed by a stone—a prediction which was fulfilled. Cf. Id. *De defect. orac.* 5.

superior to any force which the Greeks could bring against him. On his arrival at Athens, Alexander stated the offer of Mardonius, who professed to speak with the authority of the Great King. "These are the words of Mardonius. 'A message has come to me from the king, saying, I forgive the Athenians all the wrongs which they have committed against me; and this is my command: Give them back their land, and let them choose another land as large, wherever they will, remaining under their own laws; and with respect to the temples which I burnt, if they will join thee, rebuild them all.'" Mardonius urged the Athenians to accept this offer, pointing out the immense resources of Persia. If one army were defeated, another still larger would take its place. Was it not far wiser to accept alliance with the king on fair and equal terms than to lose their country and "run a race for existence"? Alexander supported the proposal by arguments of his own. He had been the friend of the Athenians in the past, and as a friend he came to them now. They were no match for the the king's power, which was in fact irresistible. Others would give much to gain what was offered to them, and if they refused the terms of Mardonius they would at last find themselves isolated in the highway of invasion with medising Greeks on every side.¹

On hearing of the mission of Alexander, the Spartans were in the greatest anxiety. An oracle had warned them that they with the rest of the Dorians were destined to be driven out of Peloponnesus by the combined Athenians and Persians. They at once despatched envoys to Athens to counteract the evil; and, in the account of Herodotus, these envoys were actually present when Alexander made his proposals, for the Athenians had purposely protracted the negotiations that the Spartans might hear their answer to Mardonius. They at once spoke in reply, beseeching the Athenians not to listen

Alexander of
Macedon at
Athens.

Alarm of the
Spartans:
their envoys
at Athens.

¹ Herod. viii. 136-140.

to the offer. It was unjust that those who were the principal cause of the disasters which had overtaken Hellas should leave the less guilty to their fate. And how could Athenians, who had been the champions of freedom, now take a part in enslaving Hellas? They sympathised with the Athenians in their calamities; they lamented their wasted harvests and ruined homes; they were willing to give shelter and support to their wives and slaves while the war lasted. "Do not listen to Alexander," they cried, "or allow him to beguile you into accepting the offer of Mardonius. He is a tyrant, speaking in the cause of a tyrant, and you know very well that barbarians are liars and not to be trusted."¹

In their reply the Athenians addressed themselves first to Alexander. They remarked that there was no need to point out the disparity between the forces of Athens and Persia, which was only too obvious. Yet

Reply of the
Athenians.

they were resolved to resist to the uttermost, and no persuasion could alter their determination. "Go back," they said, "to Mardonius and tell him, that so

long as the sun holds on his way in heaven

They refuse
the offer.

the Athenians will never come to terms with Xerxes. With the help of the gods and heroes whose shrines and homes he has pillaged and burnt, we will go out and defend ourselves. For yourself, we acknowledge you to be a friend, and we wish to treat you as such, and therefore we ask you never again to bring such messages to Athens; do not, on the plea of rendering us a service, ask us to act as godless traitors."

Then they turned to the envoys from Lacedaemon. The fears of the Spartans were natural, but they had a poor opinion of Athenian spirit if they thought that any bribe, however great, of gold or territory would induce them to join the Medes in enslaving Hellas. "Our idols and temples are in ruins, shall we allow them to

Their answer
to the
Spartans.

be unavenged? We are all one nation, bound together by ties of race and language, sharing in the same sacrifices and

¹ Herod. viii. 141-142.

temples, and cherishing the same customs ; shall the Athenians be the traitors ? Let the Spartans know that so long as one Athenian survives we will never come to terms with Persia. For your kind offer of support we thank you, but we prefer to bear our burden as best we can. All we ask is that you will be in readiness to meet the invader, who is certainly at hand, and join us in Boeotia for the protection of Attica."¹

3. On receiving the defiant message of the Athenians, Mardonius at once began his march to the south. The way was open. The conquests of Xerxes in the preceding autumn and the hearty co-operation of the Aleuadae, of whom Thorax of Larissa

was now the head, had removed every obstacle which lay between him and the confines of Attica. He rapidly advanced into Boeotia, compelling every tribe which he passed to send a contingent to his army. But his eagerness was not shared by some of his warmest and most capable supporters. When

He arrives
at Thebes.

he arrived at Thebes his friends urged him to remain in Boeotia, a country admirably suited for his forces, and abandon any further military operations for the present. Their advice showed that they were well acquainted with the vulnerable points in the politics and morals of their countrymen. "So long as the confederate powers remain united they are invincible, but if you do as we suggest they will fall an easy prey. Send presents to the

Advice of the
Thebans,
which Mar-
donius rejects.

men of most influence in the allied cities ; you will thus create division ; a strong party will support you, and the discontented will be overpowered." Such advice could not be

followed without considerable delay, and to Mardonius, still a young man, and smarting under the memory of defeat and disaster, delay was intolerable. He was eager to reach Athens before the inhabitants could leave the city ; he longed to signal across the sea to Sardis the performance of

¹ Herod. viii. 143-146 ; *supra*, p. 26, note. Cf. Plut. *Aristid.* 10, in whose account Aristides as usual plays the leading part.

his promises and the subjugation of the rebellious Hellenes. He determined to march upon Athens.¹

Meanwhile the Athenians had received intelligence of the approach of their enemy. For a time they remained in the city in the hope that the Spartans would join them in Boeotia. It was reasonable to expect that those who had charged the Athenians so strictly not to listen to the overtures of Mardonius, who had been so warm in their sympathy, so generous in their offers of assistance, would respond to the pathetic

The Spartans
send no help
to Athens,

appeal which had been made to them, and save Athens from a second desolation. But the Spartans had no intentions of the kind. The wall across the Isthmus, which had been begun in the preceding autumn, was now approaching completion: why should they risk a battle in Boeotia when they could remain behind that defence? The festival of the Hyacinthia also was at hand, and it was the custom of the Spartans to set their duty towards the gods before their obligations towards men. They put the Athenians off with one excuse after another, until at length the news came that Mardonius was in Boeotia. Once more the Athenians were driven to their ships. They made no attempt

which is now
captured a
second time.

to secure the northern passes in Cithaeron and Parnes, but retired at once to Salamis. Mardonius entered Attica without opposition, and took possession of Athens ten months after the city had been occupied by Xerxes. It was a "cheerless victory," for not a single Athenian fell into his hands.²

4. From Salamis the Athenians sent envoys to Sparta to remonstrate on their breach of the agreement. They were joined by representatives from Megara and Plataea, and arrived during the celebration of the Hyacinthia. When admitted to an audience they reminded the ephors of the offers of Mardonius—offers which every instinct of self-preservation and interest would have induced the Athenians to accept, but

¹ Herod. ix. 1-3.

² Herod. ix. 3, 6, 7.

which the Spartans had urged them to refuse in the name of liberty and patriotism. They contrasted the previous alarm of the Spartans, when they thought themselves in danger, with their present indifference to the danger of others. Such conduct could not

Athenian
envoys at
Sparta.

but provoke resentment; yet it was possible in some degree to redeem the past. If Boeotia had been lost a battle could still be fought in the Thriasian plain. Let an army be at once sent to join the Athenians there. The ephors delayed their answer from day to day till ten days had elapsed, after which the envoys, disgusted and hopeless, resolved to depart from the city. They took leave of the ephors in words of bitter reproach. "You Lacedaemonians remain at home and amuse yourself at the festival regardless of your allies, and therefore the Athenians, who have been deceived by you, and have no one to help them, will make such terms as they can with the Persian. When they are his allies, and willing to

The Spartans
at length send
assistance.

follow where he leads, you will learn what treatment he has in store for you." To their astonishment the ephors replied with a solemn oath that a force had been sent out against the invader, and was already some distance on its way to the Isthmus. The envoys immediately returned to Salamis.¹

This change of front was not due to any patriotic or unselfish sentiment on the part of the ephors, but to a clearer perception of their own interests. On the day before the final audience, Chileus of Tegea, whose influence at Sparta was greater than that of any other alien, received from the ephors a full account of the points at issue between them and the Athenians. He at once observed that if the Athenians became the allies of Persia, the wall at the Isthmus, which had been pushed forward with the utmost rapidity while

Advice of
Chileus to
the ephors.

¹ Herod. ix. 7, 8, 11. Plut. *Aristid.* 10. He informs us that in the account of Idomeneus, Aristides went to Sparta; but in the "decree of Aristides," Cimon, Xanthippus, and Myronides were the envoys mentioned.

the envoys were detained at Sparta, would be rendered useless, and on this ground he strongly urged the ephors to grant what was asked before any fatal step was taken. The ephors were persuaded; in the following night they sent out a force of 5000 Spartans, each accompanied by seven helots, under the command of Pausanias, the son of Cleombrotus.¹

An additional force of 5000 Perioeci was bidden to accompany the envoys from Sparta. Each of these would probably be attended by a helot, so that the total force now marching with all haste to the Isthmus amounted to 50,000 men.²

Pausanias
sent to the
Isthmus.

5. When Mardonius found that the Athenians had escaped him, his thoughts turned once more to conciliation. He may have supposed that the second loss of house and home would break the spirit which had hitherto proved indomitable; he may have heard of the selfish indifference of the Spartans, and believed that the Athenians would in their just resentment

Embassy of
Mardonius to
the Athenians
in Salamis.

listen to his overtures. He was certainly aware that without a navy he could not attack them; his thirty myriads of soldiers lay helpless in sight of Salamis, and there was not the smallest hope that the Persian fleet would return to renew the contest on those dreaded shores. A Hellespontian Greek, named Morychides, was sent to Salamis to repeat the offers previously made through Alexander. He was introduced into the council-chamber—for the Athenians, though exiled from their city, still retained the forms of their constitution—and delivered his message. One voice alone was raised in his support: Lycidas proposed that

Proposal of
Lycidas,

the matter should be laid before the people, "whether he had been bribed to say so, or because it was honestly his opinion." The council broke up, and the

¹ Cleombrotus himself had died in the preceding autumn, after withdrawing the allied troops from the Isthmus, and Plistarchus, the son of Leonidas, who was heir to the throne, was too young to take the field.

² Herod. ix. 9, 10, 11.

anxious crowd, who waited outside, were made acquainted with what had happened. Their rage was cruel. Morychides who is slain, was allowed to depart uninjured, but Lycidas and his family was stoned to death. Even the women caught also. the infection of fury; on hearing the tumult and learning the cause they rushed with wild cries to the house of Lycidas and stoned to death his wife and children.¹

6. The Argives had promised Mardonius to prevent the Spartans from sending aid to Athens. But the secret and prompt action of the ephors, and the enormous numbers of the force which left Sparta, made it impossible for them to fulfil their agreement. They could only send a messenger to

Athens to inform him "that the youth had gone out from Sparta, and that the Argives could not prevent it." Mardonius at once resolved to leave Attica: the ground was unfavourable for the movements of cavalry, and

if defeated, it would be difficult for his army to escape should the enemy seize the northern passes. He determined to retire to Thebes, where the ground was favourable, and he would have the protection of a friendly city. Hitherto he had done no injury to the country or the town in the hope that the Athenians would come to terms, but he held his

hand no longer. The farms and homesteads were laid waste; the city was set on fire; any temple or fortification or house which had escaped in the previous occupation by Xerxes, or had been rebuilt in the interim, he levelled with the ground.²

He was already on his way when the news came that a Lacedaemonian force, a thousand strong, had advanced to Megara. Was it possible to cut these off before the main body of the army came up? Mardonius resolved to make the attempt, and wheeling round at the head of his cavalry he overran the whole of the Megarid, as far as Pegae, on the Corinthian Gulf—the most

Mardonius on hearing of the advance of the Spartans leaves Attica.

Devastation of Athens and Attica.

Mardonius in the Megarid.

¹ Herod. ix. 4, 5.

² Herod. ix. 12, 13.

westerly point reached by his army—but we hear nothing of any collision with the enemy. When he was informed that the Greeks were gathered at the Isthmus, he began his retreat in good earnest. So apprehensive was he that the western passes into Boeotia might be occupied or contested that he abandoned the direct route from Megara to Thebes, by Eleutheræ and Oenoe, and led his forces up the valley of the Attic Cephissus. The bulk of the army may have passed round the eastern foot of Parnes, but Mardonius himself was met at Decelea by the neighbouring inhabitants of the valley of Asopus, whom the Boeotarchs had sent to be his guides. They conducted him to Sphendaleis, the extreme limit of Attica, and thence to Tanagra on the northern bank of the river. Here he remained for the night; on the next day he directed his course westward and crossed the Asopus to Scolus, a hamlet lying on the northern slope of Cithaeron.¹

He retires into Boeotia.

As he was now in Theban territory, he resolved to encamp by the Asopus, and there remain till the Greek army should advance. For the protection of his force he constructed a camp, ten furlongs square, on the northern bank of the river, fortifying it with trees cut down on the neighbouring farms, for the risk of defeat was too great to allow him to spare even a friendly territory. The rest of his army seems to have occupied both banks of the river, reaching from Erythræ on the east into the territory of Platea on the west. The headquarters of the army were at Thebes, about five miles north of the Asopus, but easily reached by convenient roads.²

He encamps on the Asopus in Theban territory.

7. The Thebans, as we have seen, had warned Mardonius how dangerous was the enterprise which he was undertaking; and, though he had disregarded their advice, he was evidently not without apprehensions; he had made a final attempt to win the Athenians from the confederate cause; he had thought it necessary to build a

Caution of Mardonius.

¹ Herod. ix. 14, 15; Paus. i. 44. 4.

² Herod. ix. 15.

fortified camp on the Asopus, in spite of the proximity of a strong and friendly city. The same spirit of depression overclouded the hearts of his officers. With fifty of his captains he was entertained by Attaginus, a Theban, at a sumptuous banquet, to which fifty Greeks were also invited from among the chief supporters of the Persian cause, a Persian and a Greek being placed side by side on every couch. Long afterwards, one of these Greek guests, Thersander of Orchomenus, told Herodotus that the Persian who lay beside him had addressed him in the Greek tongue, over their wine, and with a solemn appeal to the bond of common hospitality had bidden him remember the words he was about to utter. "You see this great company," he continued, "and you know how large is the force encamped by the river; of all these, before many days have passed, but a few survivors will remain." He ended weeping, and when Thersander urged him to communicate his fears to Mardonius, he added, "It is impossible to escape the fate ordained for us; advice is useless; many Persians know this as well as I, but there is no escape, and we go with the rest. Yet there is nothing in life so bitter as the thought of evil which we cannot avert."¹

8. Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians had encamped at the Isthmus. Here they were joined by contingents from the rest of the Peloponnesians who had resolved to fight in the good cause. The combined forces proceeded to Eleusis, and after uniting with the Athenians, who had returned from Salamis, marched onwards into Boeotia. Their route lay past Eleutherae and Oenoe, and crossed Cithaeron at the Oak Heads, above Plataea. Finding the Persians encamped on the Asopus, they drew up their army at some distance to the south, on the slope of Cithaeron in the neighbourhood of Erythrae, and remained on the defensive.²

Advance of the
Greeks from
the Isthmus
to Boeotia.

They encamp
on Cithaeron.

¹ Herod. ix. 16. Compare the story of Dicaeus, *supra*, p. 192.

² Herod. ix. 19.

When he saw that the enemy would not leave their position, Mardonius sent his cavalry against them under the command of Masistius. The attack was severe, and kept up with unremitting vigour. The Greeks suffered greatly, especially the Megarians, who lay at the point where the ground was most accessible for horse. They appealed to Pausanias for help, declaring that they could hold their post no longer unless assistance was sent. Pausanias did not wish to expose his Spartans to the attack of cavalry, and a similar feeling restrained the rest of the Peloponnesians. It was left to the Athenians to send three hundred chosen soldiers under the command of Olympiodorus, the son of Lampon, to the front, supported by a body of archers. "These were they who resisted the attack and stood in the forefront of the Greeks at Erythrae."

Mardonius
attacks the
Greeks with
his cavalry.

The battle now raged more fiercely than ever; troop after troop dashed forward only to be repulsed. At length the horse of Masistius, who rode at the head of his company, was pierced by an arrow. The horse reared and threw his rider to the ground. The Athenians lost not a moment; they secured the horse and showered their blows on Masistius, but their efforts were useless, owing to the coat of scale armour which he wore concealed beneath his scarlet tunic, until a soldier, perceiving the cause of the resistance, despatched him with a blow in the eye. The Persians did not at once discover their loss, and it was only when the troop rode back after the charge to make room for another that their leader was found to be missing. A furious and combined onset was now made to recover the corpse. The Athenians summoned the rest of the army to their assistance, and there followed a short, sharp struggle, which lasted till the heavy armed infantry came up. The Persians then withdrew with some loss, leaving the corpse in the hands of the Athenians; and, after debating whether they should renew the contest, they finally returned to Mardonius. The death

Death of
Masistius.

The Persians
discontinue
the attack.

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Mardonius attacks the Greeks with his cavalry.

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Death of Masistius.

The Persians discontinue the attack.

of Masistius was a severe blow to the Persians. Next to Mardonius he held the highest place in the estimation of his countrymen and his king. He was lamented in the Persian manner, with the loud and prolonged wailing characteristic of an oriental funeral. "All Boeotia rang with the cry." The very horses and cattle were shorn in token of the universal sorrow.¹

9. To the Greeks the result of this first engagement was most encouraging. For the moment their exultation was childish. They placed the body of Masistius on a cart, and carried it through the lines, while the soldiers crowded from their ranks to look at the magnificent and splendid corpse. They then resolved to leave their present position for one lower down in the plain and nearer Plataea. They had shaken off their fear of the Persian horse, which had hitherto kept them at Erythræ; and the Plataean ground was at once more convenient and better supplied with water. Marching along the slope of Cithaeron past Hysiae, they took up a new position nearer the Asopus. Hitherto their front had been to the north, it was now to the north-east, extending from the spring of Gargaphia on the right to the shrine of the hero Androcrates and the Asopus on the left, on ground which was partly level and partly broken by low hills. Here they ranged themselves according "to their nations." Their enemies, perceiving this movement, advanced up stream along the northern or north-eastern bank of the Asopus. The two armies were divided by the river—a slight barrier, which at this season of the year (July) might be crossed without wetting the knee, but sufficient in the mutual alarm to form a line of separation.²

10. The original force which marched from Eleusis had been increased by constant additions: those who had wavered had decided for the patriotic cause when they saw it largely

¹ Herod. ix. 20-25,

² Herod. ix. 25, 31.

supported ; those who had been inactive had been stung into action by the example of others. Herodotus puts the grand total of the Greek army at 110,000 men, of whom 33,700 were heavy armed soldiers. They were drawn up in the following order.

Numbers and
arrangements
of the Greeks.

On the right were the Lacedaemonians, and next to them the Tegeatae. Then followed the Corinthians, by whom were ranged their colonists from Potidaea ; next in order were the Arcadians of Orchomenus, the Sicyonians, the Epidaurians, and after them the Lepreatae, the contingents from Mycenae and Tiryns, the Phliasians, the Hermioneans. These were followed by the Eretrians, Styrians, Chalcidians, Ambraciots, the Leucadians, Anactorians, and Paleans of Cephallenia. Then came the Aeginetans, the Megarians, and Plataeans, and last of all on the extreme left were the Athenians. This post had been claimed by the Tegeatae, on the ground that their achievements in the past gave them a right to the second place in the army, the first being unanimously conceded to the Spartans. But on hearing the arguments on both sides, the Lacedaemonians decided in favour of the Athenians. To soothe their wounded honour, the Tegeatae were allowed to range themselves next the Lacedaemonians.¹

Contention for
the post on the
left wing.

Mardonius also drew up his forces on the other side of the Asopus. On his left, opposite the Lacedaemonians, were the Persians, whose numbers were so great that, although arranged in deeper files, their front extended beyond the Lacedaemonians to the Tegeatae. But Mardonius, on the advice of the Thebans, took care to mass his best soldiers against the Spartans, leaving the weaker opposite the Tegeatae. Next to the Persians were the Medes, who with the Bactrians covered the whole Greek line from the Corinthians to the Phliasians. Then followed the Indians and Sacae, who extended from the Hermioneans to the Aeginetans. On the right, opposite the

Arrangement
of the Persian
army.

¹ Herod. ix. 26-30 ; Plut. *Aristid.* 12.

Athenians, Plataeans, and Megarians, were placed the medising Greeks—the Locrians, Thebans, Thessalians, and a body of a thousand hoplites furnished by the Phocians who could not escape from Mardonius and the Thessalians. In addition to these larger nations there was a number of smaller tribes, whose position is not specified. Herodotus also remarks that the Egyptian soldiers, who had not formed a part of Xerxes' army, had been disembarked from the ships at Phalerum and retained by Mardonius. The horse were ranged separately.

Numbers of
the Persians.

The numbers of the invading army amounted to 300,000 men; of the medising Greeks no accurate account could be given, but Herodotus reckons them at 50,000 men, thus making a grand total of 350,000 soldiers to match the 110,000 soldiers of the Greeks, of whom barely more than a third were heavy armed soldiers.¹

II. On the next day both armies sacrificed for battle. Each had secured the services of eminent seers, for even Mardonius, now that he was on Grecian soil, felt that he must rely on Grecian deities for support. On neither side were the

The battle
delayed by
unfavourable
omens:
Mardonius
seizes the
Oak Heads.

omens favourable for attack: on both they were favourable for defence. For eight days the delay went on; and meanwhile the Greek forces were constantly increased by new additions pouring through the pass of Cithaeron, through which also supplies were furnished in abundance. To the more active spirits in the army of Mardonius such delay was intolerable. Pointing to the increasing numbers of the enemy, Timagenidas of Thebes urged his chief to seize the pass with a troop of horse. His advice was not without effect; on the following night Mardonius despatched his cavalry to the Oak Heads, as the pass which connected Oenoe and Plataea was called. At the point where the road reaches the more level ground they came upon a train of cattle bringing in large supplies from the Peloponnesus. These they attacked with

¹ Herod ix. 31, 32.

oriental ferocity, slaughtering convoy and cattle alike till they were weary, when they returned with what remained of the train to their camp. Part of the force was left to guard the pass, thus cutting off the Greeks from any supplies in this direction.¹ Notwithstanding this success, the delay went on; two more days passed by and no attack was made on either side, though nothing but the Asopus divided the armies, and the Persian horse caused the Greeks constant annoyance.

It was now the eleventh day since the armies had marched into position. Mardonius discussed the situation with Artabazus. To his great indignation he found that his second in command was opposed to active measures. Artabazus urged that the Persians should not risk an attack. Let them

Mardonius
and Artabazus : their
views opposed
to each other.

return to Thebes, where they had ample supplies, and follow the advice which the Thebans had given them on their advance. By a lavish use of presents among the leading men in the Greek cities they would quickly bring them over to their side, and the game would be won without a struggle. Mardonius regarded such pusillanimous proposals as unworthy of the Persians. He resolved to disregard the warnings of his Grecian seer, and sacrifice after the Persian manner. But the same uneasy spirit which had caused him to send round to the oracles for advice before entering on his campaign possessed him still. Summoning the captains of his own battalions, and the generals of the Greeks who were with him, he asked if they were aware of any oracular response which foretold the destruction of the Persians in Greece. No one admitted that he had heard of any prediction of the kind. Mardonius went on to state that he was aware of an oracle which foretold the ruin of the Persians if they pillaged Delphi, "and therefore," he added, "we will neither march against the temple nor destroy it—for thus we shall ourselves escape destruction."

Mardonius
resolves to
attack.

¹ Herod. ix. 38-40.

He then gave orders for an attack on the next day (the twelfth).¹

12. In the following night a horseman rode up to the pickets of the Athenian army, and, without announcing his name, asked to be allowed to speak with the generals. On hearing the request, the generals at once returned with the messengers who had brought it. The stranger begged them to keep his communication secret from every one but Pausanias: it was only his great love for Hellas which had induced him to undertake his dangerous task. He then informed them that Mardonius could not obtain favourable omens, and that, weary of delay, he was resolved to sacrifice no more, but to attack when the day broke. "Be prepared therefore," he said; "and, even if Mardonius delays, hold your ground; he has provisions for a very few days only. Should the war end as you wish, remember the risk which I have run in your cause, and aid me in liberating my country. I am Alexander, king of Macedon." The horseman then retired, and the generals carried the information to Pausanias, who, with the Lacedaemonian troops, was on the right wing opposite the Persians. Pausanias was filled with alarm at the prospect of an attack from the Persians. He at once proposed that the Athenians and Spartans should exchange places, urging that the Athenians were accustomed to the Persians and their mode of fighting, and would, therefore, be a better match for them, while the Spartans could readily undertake the Boeotians and Thes-
Alexander of Macedon visits the Grecian camp.
Changes and counter-changes in the arrangement of the forces.
salians. The Athenians agreed; it was only the fear of displeasing the Spartans which had prevented them from making the same proposal when the lines were first drawn up. When the day dawned the change was made. It was at once detected by the Boeotians, who carried the news to Mardonius. Immediate orders were

¹ Herod. ix. 41-43. Yet Herodotus has himself recorded the unsuccessful attack on Delphi in the previous year. According to Ctesias, Mardonius was slain at Delphi—*supra*, p. 174.

given for a corresponding change to be made in the Persian ranks, upon which the Spartans, perceiving that they would gain nothing, returned to their old position. The incident induced Mardonius to delay a general attack till he had sent a challenge to the Spartans, offering to decide the quarrel by a combat between the Persians and Spartans alone. To this challenge no answer was made.¹

On the return of the messenger, Mardonius ordered his cavalry to attack. They rode along the whole line, hurling their javelins and shooting their arrows with terrible efficiency. Above all, they succeeded in choking the spring of Gargaphia, the source on which the Greeks relied for water when they were driven back from the Asopus. The Greeks were now in the greatest distress. For three days, owing to the occupation of the pass over Cithaeron by the Persians, they had been cut off from supplies from the Peloponnesus; they were now cut off from the Asopus and Gargaphia. As it was impossible to remain in such a position, a conference of the generals was held, at which it was decided, if the attack was deferred till the next day, to retire to a new line of defence, about a mile and a quarter nearer Plataea, where two arms of the Oeroe enclosed an "island." Here there would be water in abundance, and the deep channels of the surrounding rivulets would defend them from the attacks of the horse. At the same time half of the force was to be sent to recover the pass of Cithaeron.²

13. For some reason which is not quite clear Mardonius did not order a general attack as Alexander had stated. Whether he was still uneasy about the omens, or whether he hoped that the Greeks could be worn out with want of food and water, or was satisfied with the refusal of the Spartans, we cannot decide. All through the day his cavalry kept up their

Attack of the
Persian horse

Destruction
of Gargaphia.

The Greeks
decide to
retire to the
"island."

Mardonius
still delays
a general
attack.

¹ Herod. ix. 44-48; Plut. *Aristid.* 16.

² Herod. ix. 51.

charges, causing the Greeks the greatest distress and trouble, but when the night came the decisive engagement had still to be fought. The Greeks seized the opportunity to retire. So eager were they to be out of the reach of the Persian horse that the centre of the army, comprising the entire line between the Tegeatae on the right and the Athenians on the left, rushed past the "island," to the temple of Hera, under

Retreat of the
Greek centre :
difficult posi-
tion of the
wings.

the walls of Plataea, two and a half miles from their old position. This cowardly and headlong retreat left the remaining portions of the army—the right and left wings—in a very dangerous position: the Athenians were in the plain, the Spartans higher up the slope, and neither could easily communicate, much less act, with the other. To add to the disaster Amompharetus, the captain of a Spartan company, refused to leave his post. He had not been present at the conference of the leaders, at which it was decided to

Amomphar-
etus and
Pausanias.

change the ground, and with Spartan obstinacy he refused to retreat before a foe. Pausanias was in great perplexity: he could not leave Amompharetus to certain destruction, nor could he stay behind when he had ordered the rest of the army to retire. The Athenians meanwhile, who seem to have doubted whether the Spartans really intended to retreat, sent an herald to see what they were doing. The herald found them in the midst of the quarrel with Amompharetus, who still refused to stir from his position. Pausanias requested the Athenians to close up and act with him; and when the day broke he retired through the hilly ground, followed by Amompharetus, who saw that if he remained he would be left alone. The Spartan forces were finally united at the river Moloeis near the temple of Demeter, in what was called the Argiopus, a place apparently a little higher up the slope of Cithaeron than the "island," but at the same distance (a mile and a quarter) from the former position of the Greeks. The Athenians, who had less fear of the cavalry, retired through the plain nearer the Asopus.¹

¹ Herod. ix. 52-56; Plut. *Aristid.* 17; Diod. xi. 30.

14. When the Persian cavalry saw that the Greeks had removed from their old position they at once pressed forwards after them. Mardonius thought the battle as good as won; he pointed out to his Thessalian allies that the dreaded Spartans, who were supposed never to retreat before an enemy, had not only changed their place on the previous day, but had now retired from their line. Nothing remained but to pursue them and exact the penalty of vengeance for all the injury done to Persia. Then he led his forces across the Asopus in quick march, directing his course to the Lacedaemonians, who were in sight on the upper ground, and followed by the rest of his troops, every man pursuing at the top of his speed without any order or arrangement.¹

Mardonius,
seeing the re-
treat of the
Greeks, orders
a general
attack.

When the horse attacked him, Pausanias at once sent to the Athenians for assistance. They were lower down in the plain, and had not been perceived by Mardonius owing to the intervening hills. The Athenians prepared to go, but before they could move they were themselves attacked by the Boeotians, who were watching them from the opposite bank of the river. The two wings of the army were thus separately brought into conflict with the enemy—the Athenians near the Asopus, the Spartans higher up on the slope of Cithaeron. The numbers with Pausanias were in all 53,000 men, but of these only 11,500 were heavy armed soldiers; opposed to him was the flower of the Persian army, perhaps 100,000 strong at a reasonable computation. While the enemy's horse, inspired with the success of the previous day, attacked wherever the ground allowed them, he was without a single horseman. After the Spartan custom, he sacrificed to obtain an omen for battle, but the omen was unfavourable; he was compelled to remain idle in his ranks; and meanwhile his soldiers fell beneath the arrows of the Persians, who had now come

BATTLE OF
PLATAEA.
479 B.C.
Ol. 75. 2.

Position of
the army.

Pausanias
is delayed by
adverse omens.

¹ Herod. ix. 58.

within reach, and planting their shields on the ground as a defence, discharged their missiles in vast quantities. It was at this moment that Callicrates, whom Herodotus describes as the handsomest of all the Greeks who came to Plataea, was mortally wounded. As he was carried to the rear he complained to Arimnestus of Plataea that though he was willing to die for Hellas he grieved that he had not been able to put forth his hand and achieve some notable deed. Pausanias was in despair. At length looking towards the temple of Hera he invoked the aid of the goddess; his prayer was answered; the omens permitted an attack, and Pausanias

The charge of
the Spartans.

gave the word. Like wolves let loose, the strong athletic Greeks swept down upon the foe. Through the hail of arrows they went, forcing the Persians to drop their bows and fight hand to hand. For a moment they were delayed by the wicker shields; but when these were borne down Greek and Persian met in close conflict. A long and severe struggle raged round the shrine of Demeter. The Persians were as brave as the bravest; but their weapons were far inferior to those of the Greeks, and they had not been drilled to fight together in ranks like the Spartans. They dashed forward in bands of ten or twelve, seized the long spears of the Greeks and broke them, but in vain. Mardonius, conspicuous on a white horse,

Defeat and
flight of the
Persians.

and surrounded by a thousand chosen Persians, was in the very thickest of the fray; while he lived, the Persians held their own, and slew many of the Spartans; but when he fell, struck down by a stone from the hand of the Spartan Arimnestus, and his brave companions perished round him, resistance was at an end. In wild disorder the troops rushed down the slope to seek the shelter of the fortified camp beyond the Asopus; behind them, slaying without mercy and without stint, followed the terrible red-coats.¹

¹ Herod. ix. 59-65, 72. The Spartans wore *φοινικίδες* in battle. Plut. *Aristid.* 18; Diod. xi. 31.

Meanwhile the Athenians on the left wing had fought a stubborn battle with the Boeotians. Three hundred of the best and bravest Thebans were slain before the line was broken and put to flight. A great part of the army—including, it would seem, the Thessalians, Phocians, and other Greeks, never struck a stroke, but betook themselves to flight when they saw the Persians routed. Artabazus also, who had been unwilling to risk an engagement, no sooner saw how the tide turned than he abandoned the camp, and with 40,000 men hastened northward with all possible speed. He had already prepared his troops to obey at a moment's notice whatever orders he gave; had Mardonius prospered, he would have endeavoured to share the glory of his victory; he could now claim to have saved 40,000 Persian subjects from destruction, and his conduct was highly approved at Susa.¹

The Athenians
and Thebans:
Retreat of
Artabazus.

15. In spite of the breach in the Greek line, the wings had been victorious. The battle was already over when the news came to those who had retired to the Heraeum that Pausanias was engaged and had defeated the foe. As eager to advance now as they had been before to retreat, the Corinthians, without waiting to form a line, ran up the slopes and hills to the temple of Demeter. The Megarians and Phliasians took a lower road into the plain, doubtless intending to join the Athenians, but unfortunately they were sighted by the Theban cavalry; who at once dashed upon them. Six hundred were slain, and the rest pursued to Cithaeron. The disaster was, however, too slight to have any effect upon the fortunes of the day. "They perished and no one heeded it," is the cold remark of Herodotus on their fate.²

The Greek
centre.

Slaughter of
the Megarians
and Phlias-
ians.

The fugitive Persians reached the entrenched camp in time to man the walls and barricade them as best they could

¹ Herod. ix. 66-68; viii. 126.

² Herod. ix. 69.

before the Lacedaemonians came up. Thus protected, they were able to defend themselves with success, for the Lacedaemonians were unaccustomed to attack fortified positions. With the arrival of the Athenians the struggle became more even; for a long time the Persians kept their walls, but at length the Athenians succeeded in making a breach, through which the Tegeatae immediately pressed forward into the camp. Here a fresh slaughter began; the enemy had now lost all spirit, they no longer held together or offered resistance, but ran hither and thither in abject panic. The Greeks were in no mood to spare them. When evening closed no more than 3000 were left of the 260,000 barbarians who had begun the attack. On the other hand, the loss among the best troops of the Greeks was very slight. Of the Spartans there had fallen ninety-one, of the Tegeatae eleven, of the Athenians fifty-two. These numbers are probably accurate, and when we reflect on the immense disproportion, we may perhaps believe that the total of the Persians slain is greatly exaggerated. Whatever it was, the army was annihilated, and the Persian cause in Hellas was ruined beyond restoration.¹

Immediately after the battle, the Greeks were joined by contingents from Mantinea and Elis. Their rage was great when they found that the conflict had been decided without them. The Mantineans wished to pursue Artabazus, but this Pausanias would not permit. Both the Mantineans and Eleans on their return home sent their leaders into exile.²

16. The amount of the spoil was immense. By the orders of Pausanias it remained untouched till collected by the Helots. Dispersing through the camp, the ignorant serfs discovered tents filled with gold and silver, metals they had perhaps never seen, gilded couches, bowls and goblets of gold and silver; on the wagons were bags filled with gold and silver

Conflict at the
fortified camp.

Terrible
slaughter of
the Persians:
slight loss
among the
Greeks.

The spoil of
the Persians
collected by
the Helots.

¹ Herod. ix. 70.

² Herod. ix. 77.

plate; from the dead they took armlets and bracelets, and swords with golden handles. In such wealth no account was made of the richly brodered carpets and garments, which were scattered on every side. A tenth of the whole was set apart for the Delphian god, from which was constructed a golden tripod supported by a bronze pedestal of entwined snakes.¹ On the pedestal were inscribed the names of those Greeks who had taken part in resisting the Persians. From a second portion of the spoil a colossal statue of Zeus, fifteen feet in height, was set up at Olympia, and on this also the names of the patriotic Greeks were recorded. A third portion was devoted to a bronze statue of Poseidon, ten and a half feet in height, which was placed at the Isthmus. The rest of the spoils were divided among the victors according to their merit, the share of Pausanias being ten times as much as that of any other Greek.²

The tripod at Delphi, the pedestal of snakes, and the inscription.

The statues of Zeus and Poseidon.

When speaking of the spoil, Herodotus tells a story which is worth repeating for the light which it throws on the character of Pausanias. Xerxes, when he fled from Hellas, left behind his own equipment for the use of Mardonius. When Pausanias saw the luxurious hangings, the gold and silver plate and tables, he gave orders to the servants of Mardonius to prepare a banquet for him with the same magnificence with which they had been accustomed to prepare it for their master. Then he ordered his own servants to prepare the usual Spartan dinner, and summoning the Greek generals he pointed to the contrast. "Behold," he cried, "the folly of the Mede, who, when he could dine at such a table, came to take our scanty meal away." This was

The tent of Xerxes: Pausanias on the luxury of the Persians.

¹ The golden tripod was melted down in the Phocian war of 356-346 B.C., but the pedestal remained at Delphi till the time of Constantine the Great, when it was removed to Byzantium and placed in the Hippodrome, where it still remains.

² Herod. ix. 80, 81. For the tripod and pedestal see Röhl, *I. G. A.*, p. 28; Paus. x. 13. 9; and for the statue of Zeus, Paus. v. 23. 1, 2. For the names inscribed, see Rawlinson, Herod. iv. 467 ff.

perhaps the first time that Pausanias had realised the wealth and luxury of Persian life, and the impression which the sight made on him was never effaced.¹

17. The bravest of the brave on this memorable day was Aristodemus, the survivor of Thermopylae (p. 160). The ignominy which had been heaped upon him after his return to Sparta had stung him to frenzy; reckless of life, he dashed forwards from the rank, and "achieved glorious deeds," till he was cut down. But as it was obvious that he had sought for death as a release from shame, the prize of valour was not awarded to him; it was given to Poseidonius, Philocyon, and Amompharetus, "Irens" of the Spartans, who had fallen on the field.²

The next step was the burial of the dead. When this had been duly accomplished the Greeks determined to march upon Thebes and punish those who had been the supporters of the Medes and enabled them to take up such a firm position in Boeotia. Ten days after the battle they proceeded to the city and demanded a surrender of the leading men of the medising party, more especially of Attaginus and Timagenidas. For a time the Thebans refused to give them up, but when their territory was laid waste and their walls harassed with continual attacks, Timagenidas himself came forward and advised the city to agree to the demands made on them, unless the Greeks would be satisfied with a penalty in money paid by the Theban state. The state, he said, had joined the Medes, and if a fine was imposed it was just that the state should pay it. The Thebans assented. But the Greeks insisted on the surrender of the persons mentioned. Attaginus escaped in the night; Timagenidas and others were carried off to Corinth, where they were at once executed. No trial was allowed; the hope of softening or averting the sentence by bribes, which had induced Timagenidas to make his proposal, proved altogether fruitless.³

¹ Herod. ix. 82.

² Herod. ix. 71.

³ Herod. ix. 66-88. The Thebans described their government at

The remnant of the Persian forces under Artabazus pressed hastily onwards to the north. On reaching Thessaly he was hospitably entertained, but he dared neither remain nor avow his real position. He pretended that Mardonius was close behind, bade the Thessalians prepare to receive him, and passed on. He directed his course through the interior of Macedon and Thrace, wishing equally to avoid the Greek allies and the Persian fortresses on the coast. Many of his soldiers were cut down by the natives, many perished with thirst and hunger. With the remainder he reached Byzantium, and crossed over in boats to Asia. His soldiers were the last of the mighty host which had occupied seven days and nights in marching over the Hellespont.¹

Retreat of
Artabazus.

18. We are informed by Plutarch that after the battle of Plataea the Athenians would not permit the Lacedaemonians to erect a trophy.² So sharp was the contention that war was on the point of breaking out between the cities, when Aristides persuaded his fellow-generals, Leocrates and Myronides, to allow the matter to be decided by the Greeks. An assembly was called, in which Cleocritus of Corinth proposed to remove the difficulty by awarding the prize of valour to the Plataeans, of whom neither the Lacedaemonians nor the Athenians could be jealous. This proposal was at once accepted by Aristides, and afterwards by Pausanias. Eighty talents were then set aside for the Plataeans, out of which was defrayed the cost of the temple of Athena with the statue and the pictures which Plutarch asserts were to be seen in undiminished splendour in his own day. At the command of the Pythian oracle an altar was built to Zeus Eleutherius, and that the sacrifices might be

Contention
about the prize
of valour at
Plataea: it is
awarded to
the Plataeans.

this time as a *δυναστεία*. Thuc. iii. 62, *ἡμῖν γὰρ ἡ πόλις τότε ἐτύγχανεν οὔτε κατ' ὀλιγαρχίαν ἰσόνομον πολιτεύουσα οὔτε κατὰ δημοκρατίαν*· ὅπερ δὲ ἐστὶ νόμοις μὲν καὶ τῷ σωφρονεστάτῳ ἐναντιώτατον, ἐγγυτάτῳ δὲ τυράννῳ, *δυναστεία δλίγων ἀνδρῶν εἶχε τὰ πράγματα*.

¹ Herod. ix. 89.

² Plut. *Aristid.* 20; cf. Herod. ix. 71.

offered with peculiar sanctity, the deity commanded that all the fires in the district should be extinguished, because polluted by the barbarians, and clean fire brought to the new altar from Delphi. The command was obeyed; every fire in and about Plataea was duly quenched. Meanwhile Eulichidas, a Plataean, repaired to Delphi, where after solemn purifications, with a chaplet of laurel on his head, he took fire from the altar, and ran back with it to Plataea, a distance of 1000 stades (125 miles), arriving before sunset. The effort was more than mortal strength could endure; when he had greeted his citizens and placed the fire in their hands, Eulichidas fell lifeless to the ground.¹ An assembly was then held of all the Greeks, at which it was decreed, on the proposal of Aristides, that commissioners, political and religious, should meet at Plataea every year; that a great quinquennial festival should be established, to be called the Eleutheria; that a force of 10,000 infantry, 1000 horse, and 100 ships should be kept constantly in readiness for war against the Persians; and that the Plataeans should be regarded as a peculiar people, inviolate and sacrosanct, whose business it was to offer sacrifice on behalf of Greece. The Plataeans on their part undertook to offer a yearly sacrifice to the dead who had fallen in their country—a sacrifice which was still offered in Plutarch's day. On the sixteenth of Maemacterion, the Boeotian month Alalcomenius, at daybreak, a procession left the city for the tombs. At the head went a trumpeter, who was followed by wains laden with myrtle and chaplets; then came a black bull for sacrifice, and behind a number of youths, the sons of free citizens—for no slave might take part in paying honour to those who had died in the cause of freedom—carrying pitchers of wine and milk, and jars of oil

¹ Plut. *Aristid.* 20. How the temple statue and pictures survived the destruction of Plataea by the Thebans I do not understand.

and ointment. Last of all came the chief magistrate of the city. During the rest of the year this officer might not touch steel or wear any but a white robe, but now he appeared in a purple garment, sword in hand, and bearing a water-jar taken from the city archives. Drawing water from a spring he approached the monuments of the dead, which he washed and anointed. The bull was then slain on the funeral pyre, and when prayers had been offered to Zeus and Hermes of the under-world, the magistrate solemnly invited those who had died for their country to partake in the banquet. Last of all he mixed a bowl of wine, and after libation poured, pronounced the toast: "I drink to the men who died for the freedom of the Greeks."¹

19. Plutarch's account of the battle, though largely in agreement with that of Herodotus, differs from it, not only in the greater prominence given to Aristides, a trait running through the whole, but also in some important particulars which cannot be reconciled with the older and more authentic version.

Discrepancies between Plutarch's account of the battle and that of Herodotus.

(1) When the two armies lay opposite each other, before the first attack of the Persian horse, Aristides sent to Delphi for advice. He was informed that if he offered sacrifice to a number of local gods and heroes, and engaged with the enemy on Athenian soil, in the plain of Eleusinian Demeter and Korê, the Athenians would gain the day. He was about to lead his forces back to Eleusis, when Arimnestus, the Plataean general, was warned in a dream that this was not the meaning of the oracle. After much inquiry some old inhabitants of Plataea were found, who pointed out a very ancient shrine of Demeter

(2) The story of the shrine of Demeter.

¹ Plut. *Aristid.* 21. In Thuc. iii. 58, the Plataeans mention the yearly offerings which they pay to the dead, with some slight variations from Plutarch: ἐτιμῶμεν ἐσθήμασί τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις νομίμοις, ὅσα τε ἡ γῆ ἡμῶν ἀνεδίδου ὀραία, πάντων ἀπαρχὰς ἐπιφέροντες, and in ii. 71 they assert that Pausanias not only confirmed the city in its independence, but undertook to defend it against unjust attack or enslavement. Of the standing army which Plutarch says was proposed by Aristides no trace exists.

and Korê under Mount Cithaeron. Aristides at once led his troops to the place, which was also more secure from the attacks of the Persian horse owing to the rugged nature of the ground. In order that the conditions laid down in the oracle might be observed in every particular, the Plataeans agreed by a public resolution to remove the boundaries which divided their land from Attica, and throw the temple with its precincts into Athenian territory. By these means the Athenians were enabled to fight on Athenian territory and in "the plain of Eleusinian Demeter and Korê."¹

(2) While the forces were lying inactive a conspiracy was formed in the Athenian army. A number of men of high birth and great wealth, who owing to the war had lost both their influence and their money, met together in a house in Plataea, where it was arranged to put an end to the democracy, or, if this could not be done, to betray the cause of the Greeks to the enemy. When Aristides heard of it, the conspiracy had spread widely; he could not venture to disregard it, and, on the other hand, the time did not admit of a severe and protracted inquiry. He arrested eight of the principal traitors; of these, two—the chief leaders in the conspiracy—Aeschines and Agesias by name, escaped and left the army; the remainder were dismissed with an exhortation to wipe out the charges made against them in the impending battle, which would be a better tribunal to test their loyalty than any law-court.²

¹ Plut. *Aristid.* 11. If the account in Herodotus is correct, Plutarch has confounded the first position of the Athenians with the place at which the final conflict between the Spartans and Persians took place. He also places the shrine of Androcrates near the shrine of Demeter, which will not agree with Herodotus who places it on the Greek left, or with Thucydides, who says that it was on the way from Plataea to Thebes: see my note on Herod. ix. 25.

² Plut. *Aristid.* 13. Nothing is recorded elsewhere of this conspiracy, which reminds us of the state of affairs at the time of the battle of Tanagra.

(3) Plutarch will not allow that Herodotus is right in asserting that the Greek centre took no part in the battle. It is true that in his final account of the battle even he mentions only the Athenians and Lacedaemonians (with whom the Tegeatae were ranged), but the total number of the slain is allowed to counterbalance this evidence. That total is given at 1360, while of the Athenians there fell no more than fifty-two, of the Lacedaemonians ninety-one, of the Tegeatae sixteen (so Plutarch)—making 159 in all. Plutarch also points to the monuments raised over the dead, and to the inscriptions and epigrams written in their honour, rejecting the statement that the tombs at Plataea were cenotaphs erected at a later time to save the credit of the Aeginetans and others in the eyes of future generations.¹

(3) The part played in the battle by the Greek centre.

20. While Pausanias was destroying the Persians in Boeotia, the Grecian fleet carried the war into Asia. From Salamis the Persian ships had retired to the Hellespont, where they conveyed the king from the Chersonese to Abydos, after which

The Persian fleet assembles at Samos.

they dispersed for the winter, the main body to Cyme and others to Samos (p. 199). With the ensuing spring (479 B.C.) they once more assembled at Samos, and new generals were assigned to the Persians and Medes, who now formed the majority of the marines. The great defeat of the previous year was still fresh in their memories; they had no thought of again venturing to the west, but contented themselves with keeping a close watch over Ionia. Their forces were not such as to justify bolder action. Of the 1200 vessels of the preceding summer they had now no more than

¹ Plut. *Aristid.* 19. Cf. Id. *De Herod.* *Mal.* 42. The slaughter of the 600 Megarians and Phliasians mentioned by Herodotus accounts for half the total mentioned by Plutarch. When Plutarch asserts that the Aeginetans, Corinthians, and others were allowed to share in the spoils of Plataea and to have their names written on the trophies, he forgets that Herodotus does not deny that they were at Plataea, but only that they shared in the final contest.

300, and of these a part were Ionian. Mardonius and his army were the centre of their hopes: he would conquer Greece and keep the Greeks occupied nearer home.

After deciding the prize of valour at the Isthmus, in the autumn of 480 B.C., the various contingents of the Greek fleet

The Greek
fleet at
Aegina.

had gone home for the winter. When spring returned they re-assembled at Aegina, numbering 180 vessels, which were placed under the

command of Leotychidas, the Spartan king. The Athenian contingent was led by Xanthippus. Neither Eurybiadas nor Themistocles was continued in the command, a remarkable change, of which the reason is not clear, though we may conjecture that the Spartans were afraid of encouraging the success of a commander, who was not even of the royal stock, and Themistocles had already drawn on himself the envy of

Visit of the
envoys from
Ionia.

his fellow-citizens. Meanwhile a conspiracy had been formed in Chios to remove Strattis, the tyrant of the city, but owing to the

treachery of one of the seven conspirators the plan had failed, and the remaining six left the island. These Ionians now appeared at Aegina, entreating Leotychidas to come over and liberate their country. With much difficulty they

The Greek
fleet moves
to Delos.

induced him to advance to Delos, but beyond this he would not go. So completely had the continental Greeks been swept from the eastern

Aegean that Samos seemed to them as distant as the pillars of Hercules, and in their terror they imagined all the sea beyond Delos to be held by Persian soldiers.

Such was the position of the two fleets in the spring of 479 B.C. The Persians were at Samos waiting to hear the news of the victory of Mardonius, but afraid to cross over and co-operate with him; the Greeks were at Delos, with no desire to venture further to the east. Had the dauntless spirit of Themistocles been among them, their view of the situation would have been very different.

21. A mere accident brought the fleets so widely separated into collision. Envoys from Samos came secretly to Leoty-

chidas at Delos, who declared that the Ionians would revolt at the mere sight of the Grecian fleet; that the Persians would never venture on a conflict, or if they did, would fall an easy prey, for their ships were damaged and unseaworthy. These arguments were supported by appeals to common gods, and to the duty of rescuing Greeks from slavery. At length, Leotychidas, "whether he wished for an omen, or by divine inspiration," asked the speaker his name. "Hegesistratus" (leader of a host), was the reply. Without waiting for more, Leotychidas exclaimed: "I accept the omen that leads our host. Pledge yourselves that the Samians will aid us and we will go." The Samians at once took oaths of alliance with the Greeks, and the next day, as the omens proved favourable, the fleet stood across to Samos and anchored near the Heraeum at Calamisa.¹

The Samian
envoys at
Delos:
Hegesistratus.

The Persians on hearing of their approach left the island for the opposite coast. They had sent away the Phoenician ships, and had no intention of risking a battle at sea. A large land force, under the command of Tigranes, had assembled at Mycale, a high promontory which runs out from the mainland towards the island of Samos, and with the help of this army the generals of the fleet intended to draw up their ships and secure them by a rampart. With this view they sailed to the southern side of the promontory and sought the land between two small streams known as the Gaeson and Scolopoeis, at a point where in old days Philistus, one of the original colonists of Miletus, had founded a temple to Eleusinian Demeter. Here they drew up their ships and surrounded them with a defence of stones and wood, protected by a palisade.²

The Persian
fleet retires
from Samos
to Mycale.

22. When the Greeks heard that the Persians had retired

¹ Herod. ix. 90, 96.

² Herod. ix. 96, 97. This Gaeson cannot be the same as the river mentioned in Athenaeus as being near Myus.

from the island they were filled with vexation. Their prey had escaped them and they knew not which course to take for the best. After some deliberation they

Leotychidas
advances to
Mycale
and gives
orders for an
attack.

resolved to sail upon Mycale. The retreat of the Persians filled them with courage, and they determined to engage with them if possible.

On reaching the coast they found that no one put out to meet them: the Persian ships were drawn up on shore, the infantry ranged along the beach for their protection. Leotychidas at once sailed along within a little distance of the shore calling on the Ionians to join those who had come to rescue them from slavery, and giving out "Hebe," as the password of the day. He then ordered the Greeks to disembark and attack the Persian lines.

The Athenians and those ranged with them to the amount of about half the entire force were fortunate enough to land on

a level beach, where they could at once engage.

BATTLE OF
MYCALE: the
Athenians and
Persians.
479 B.C.

The Persians, after their usual custom, had planted their wicker shields on the ground to form a barricade, and so long as this line was maintained they fought bravely and on equal terms.

Enraged at the delay and eager to strike a decisive stroke, the Athenians and those next them threw themselves on the shields, dashed them aside, and rushed in a mass upon

Defeat of the
Persians.

the Persians, who, after a vigorous resistance, were at length driven into their fortified camp.

The Greeks were not to be shaken off; hotly pursuing, they entered the camp together with the enemy, "and when the camp was taken the barbarians no longer thought of resistance but betook themselves to flight, with the exception of the Persians, who collected in small knots and fought with the Greeks as they entered the fortress." At this moment the

The Lacedaemonians.

Lacedaemonians came upon the scene, who, owing to the uneven nature of the ground, had

been prevented from taking any part in the first onset. The arrival of these new forces quickly put an end to the conflict. The Persians were cut down or put to flight, with

the loss of two of their generals; the survivors escaped to Sardis.¹

In the Persian army were many Ionians from Samos and Miletus. Suspecting their fidelity, the Persians had taken away their arms from the Samians, and had removed the Milesians from the camp to keep the passes which led to the heights of Mycale.

The Samians and Milesians in the Persian army.

These precautions were necessary, but they proved fruitless. In spite of their want of armour, the Samians, when they saw the Greeks victorious, assisted them to the utmost of their power, and their example was followed by the rest of the Ionians in the camp. The Milesians, so far from guiding the fugitives to safety, led them back to the enemy, or joined themselves in the work of destruction. "And so for the second time Ionia revolted from the Persians."²

The Greeks completed their victory by burning the camp and ships of the Persians, after which they returned with the spoil to Samos.

23. The defeat of Mycale was not such an overwhelming disaster to the Persians as Plataea or Salamis, but it probably caused even more alarm, and it was certainly not less important in the results which followed from it. It carried the Greeks

Effect of the battle of Mycale.

to the eastern side of the Aegean, and was the first step towards the liberation of the Asiatic colonies. So far from invading Hellas with success, the Persians were unable to keep the Greeks from their own shores, or to retain their hold on the Greek colonies in Asia. The Ionians were at length encouraged to shake off the dominion which had so long oppressed them; the Great King was left with hardly a ship in the Aegean; there was nothing to prevent the Greeks from revenging on Persia the havoc and destruction caused by the great invasion.

It was currently believed in the time of Herodotus that the battle of Mycale was fought on the self-same day as Plataea.

¹ Herod. ix. 102-105; Diod. xi. 34-36.

² Herod. ix. 99, 103, 104.

That pious historian tells us that at the moment when the Greeks were advancing upon the barbarians a rumour ran through the host that their countrymen were victorious over Mardonius, and the rumour was confirmed by a herald's staff which was found amid the breakers. Such an indication of divine sympathy naturally roused the spirits of the soldiers and sent them with greater eagerness into the battle. After the conflict was over it was discovered that the Greeks had enjoyed divine protection; as at Plataea, so at Mycale, the thickest of the battle was fought in the precincts of a shrine of Demeter.

Mycale and Plataea fought on the same day: both in the precincts of Demeter

24. Before he allows us to take leave of the monarch who had endeavoured to force his power upon Hellas, Herodotus conducts us to the palace of Susa, to be present at a scene which illustrates the darker side of oriental despotism. After his flight from Greece, Xerxes remained for a

Xerxes and the wife of Masistes.

time at Sardis. In this interval, he conceived a passion for the wife of his brother Masistes, but his advances were disregarded, and the presence of her husband secured the woman from violence. For the present the king contented himself with marrying the daughter of Masistes to his own son Darius, in the hope that he might by this means prepare the way for his own schemes. After the marriage the court returned to Susa, and with the rest went the bride and bridegroom. A sudden change now came over the inclinations of Xerxes; regardless of the marriage which he had brought about, he pursued the daughter instead of the mother, and unhappily he succeeded in his

His intrigue with the daughter of Masistes.

object. The connection was discovered by Amestris, the wife of Xerxes, a woman whose savage spirit delighted in cruelty and torture. Her revenge was terrible, and it was directed not against the object of Xerxes' passion, but against the innocent mother who had repulsed him. It was by her arts, Amestris thought, that Xerxes had been entrapped. On

the day when the king celebrated his royal birth-feast she besought him to give her the wife of Masistes, and Xerxes, though he suspected her design, was unable to prevent it, for on that festival no request could be refused. No sooner had Amestris got the woman into her power than she caused her to be mutilated by the bodyguard of the king. Her breasts were cut off and thrown to dogs; her nose, ears, and lips were removed; her tongue was cut out; and in this state she was sent to the house of her husband. Masistes had meanwhile received orders from Xerxes to put away his wife, and on refusing had been warned that he would not be allowed to live with her. He suspected mischief and hastened home to find his fears only too fully verified. He at once left Susa with his sons for Bactria, where he was satrap and much beloved, intending to raise a revolt, but before he could reach the province he was overtaken by the forces of Xerxes and slain with his sons and his army.¹

Death of
Masistes.

25. A speaker in Thucydides remarks that the Persians owed their defeat to their own blunders rather than the courage or skill of the Greeks. The remark is true. From first to last the invasion was conceived and carried out without any real knowledge of the task which lay before the invader. A vast multitude of men and ships was collected without thought of the difficulty of maintaining or even using them; the Greeks were allowed to occupy the best positions; and defeat was almost courted by unnecessary attacks under adverse circumstances. The advice of men who knew the Greek temper, and the points where they feared defeat, was always disregarded in favour of those who recommended a line more worthy of Persian traditions. We must also allow that in some points the Persians were very greatly at a disadvantage. Their armour was far less effective

The defeat of
the Persians
due partly to
their own
folly,

¹ Herod. ix. 108-113.

than that of the Greeks; even those who were the best armed, the Persians and Medes, were inferior to the Athenian and Spartan hoplite. Their spears were far shorter, their shields were mere wicker-work, and though a few men were provided with corselets of scale-armour this was by no means generally the case. Their drill was even more defective than their armour. The choicest Persian troops appear to have been trained for show rather than for use in the field. There was nothing among them at all comparable to the rapid and harmonious movement of the Spartans. Even the Athenians derived from their out-door life and early training a strength and endurance far superior to that of the forces brought against them. But whatever weight we ascribe to these causes, there is no doubt that the splendid victories which at this time brought the Greeks into the foremost rank of military nations were also due in a large measure to the spirit which animated their resistance. It was not merely that one side were fighting for themselves, the other in the cause of a tyrant—for the Persians at any rate were probably quite as patriotic as the Greeks; but the habit of submission to a master on the one hand, and of tyranny over less favoured nations on the other, was a bad preparation for a struggle with men, every one of whom cherished above anything on earth the sense of a free and independent civic life.

partly to their
inefficient
armour and
drill,

but chiefly to
the superior
spirit of the
Greeks.

CHAPTER VI.

GREECE IN 479-477 B.C. PAUSANIAS.

I. THE victory of Mycale brought the conquerors face to face with a difficult but all-important problem. What was to be done with the Greeks in Ionia? It seemed impossible to keep a fleet stationed off the coast for their protection, and without some protection what hope was there of delivering them from the dominion of Persia? The question was discussed on the return of the fleet to Samos after the battle. The leaders of the Peloponnesians proposed to cut the knot by abandoning Ionia altogether, and removing the inhabitants to the ports of the medising Greeks of the peninsula, whom they were ready to expel for the purpose. In those new lands the Ionians could carry on their trade as before, and they would be within easy reach if assistance were required. To this proposal the Athenians would by no means assent. They refused at any cost to allow Ionia to be depopulated. They reminded the Peloponnesians with some heat that the cities in question were Ionian and not Dorian; it was for those who had sent the colonists out to decide upon their fate. The Peloponnesians gave way; and forthwith the Samians, Chians, Lesbians, and other islanders who were in the fleet, were received into the alliance with solemn pledges of allegiance.¹

479 B.C.
Ol. 75. 2.
The Greeks
at Samos.

The Athenians
resolve to
undertake the
defence of
Ionia.

¹ Herod. ix. 106. The scheme of the Peloponnesians would have conveniently disposed of the Argives.

This decision implied that the Greeks were no longer content with the independence of their own country, but aimed at the liberation of their kinsmen in Asia. It is possible that now, as at the time of the Ionian revolt, the Peloponnesians saw more clearly the difficult nature of the task. For them at any rate it was impossible to carry on a war at the eastern side of the Aegean without a much larger fleet than they possessed; and the fate of the Dorians in Asia, to which they were always indifferent, was not likely to rouse them to excessive efforts. But the Athenians had made immense strides in the last twenty years. It was not now a question of sending out a miserable expedition of twenty vessels; they had a fleet at command which had twice defeated the forces of the king. That the Ionian vessels which mustered in such strength at Lade had been utterly destroyed, and could not therefore be added to their own fleet was perhaps overlooked in the triumphant feeling that Xerxes had hardly a ship to call his own in the Aegean.

2. With these allies in their train the united fleets left Samos for the Hellespont with the intention of breaking down the great bridges. Adverse winds detained them for a time at Lectum, and when they reached Abydos they became aware that the bridges were no longer in existence. As the object for which they had sailed northwards was no longer before them, Leotychidas and the Peloponnesians returned home. The Athenians on the other hand were not satisfied with their success; they wished to recover the Chersonese, which they looked on as an Athenian possession, and with this view they began the siege of Sestos. On their way northwards they had been joined by new allies from Ionia and the Hellespont, who had recently revolted from the king and were willing to assist in the siege.¹

¹ Herod. ix. 106, 114; Thuc. i. 89. Though Thucydides is more concise than Herodotus, his account in no way contradicts the older historian. I have discussed Kirchhoff's view of the events which followed the battle of Mycale (*Rhein. Mus.* xi. 1 ff.) in the *Classical Review*

3. On the approach of the Greeks the inhabitants of the neighbouring towns flocked to Sestos, which was the strongest fortress in the Chersonese; among the rest Oeobazus, a Persian resident in Cardia, who had collected in his city the fragments of the great cables of the bridges. The satrap or governor (*ὑπαρχος*) of the district was Artayctes, a man of evil reputation for his defilement of the temple of Protesilaus at Elaeus. As he had taken no measures for the protection of the Chersonese, in the belief that the Greeks would never venture there, he now found himself closely besieged without any adequate supply of provisions and with a large additional population to support. But the walls of Sestos were more than strong enough to resist the attack of the besiegers, and when autumn came and the place was still standing, a change clouded the spirits of the Athenians. Weary of the delay, they clamoured to return to Athens where their presence was greatly needed for rebuilding their ruined homes. Xanthippus was firm: he refused to abandon the siege unless he was recalled by definite orders. The famine was now so great in the city that even the leathern straps of bedding were turned into food, and it was only when this miserable supply failed that the resistance came to an end. Forming themselves into two companies under Artayctes and Oeobazus the Persians slipped out at the rear of the town under cover of night and fled into the country. At daybreak on the next morning the Greek inhabitants opened the gates to the Athenians, who at once occupied the walls with part of their forces, and sent the larger half in pursuit of the fugitives. Oeobazus escaped as far as Thrace, where he was sacrificed by the Apsinthians as a chosen victim to their deity Plistôrus, the

Siege of
Sestos.
479-478 B.C.

The city
capitulates.

(iii. 387). It is impossible to doubt, unless we reject Thucydides altogether, that many of the Ionians on the mainland and of the Hellespontine Greeks now joined the alliance, and the evidence of Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens* proves that the phoros was fixed by Aristides at the very beginning of the league (478-477 B.C.).

rest of his company being indiscriminately slaughtered. Artayctes was overtaken in the neighbourhood of Aegospotami, and after a short resistance was captured and brought together with his son in chains to Sestos. The consciousness of his crimes filled him with alarm. He offered large sums of money as a recompence for the pillage of the temple, and still larger for the life of himself and his son, but in vain. Xanthippus listened, not unwillingly, to the citizens of Elaeus, who in their rage insisted on a signal and even barbarous punishment. Artayctes was carried to the shore of the Hellespont, and there while yet alive was nailed to a board and left to perish. His son was stoned to death before his eyes.¹ After the capture of Sestos the Athenians returned home with the spoil, among which were pieces of the cables from the bridges of Xerxes. The siege had lasted through the winter.²

4. When the Athenians had sailed from Aegina in the spring of 479 B.C. they had left Athens in a state of alarm and agitation: Mardonius was advancing into Attica, and the attitude of the Peloponnesians, from whom alone help could be expected, was far from encouraging. When the fleet returned in the spring of 478 B.C. they found the city—which in the interval had been utterly laid waste—not only free from all danger from the enemy, but surrounded with a wall which enabled her to bid defiance to a second attack. The country might be overrun, the Spartans might fail to send assistance, but Athens would never again be the spoil of the invader.

This change was due to Themistocles. As we have said, the great general took no part in the military operations of the year which began in July 479 B.C. But we cannot doubt that he was elected one of the ten generals, and his absence from the field may be due to his occupation with other

¹ Herod. ix. 115-120.

² Thuc. i. 89; Herod. ix. 121.

matters which he alone saw to be necessary.¹ After the battle of Plataea, the Athenians were of course at liberty to return to their desolate city; and it was fortunate for them that the climate of an Athenian summer makes little demand on physical endurance. There was no shelter for woman or child: all the labour that had been spent in the previous autumn and spring in repairing the ravages of Xerxes was utterly lost. The lesson was a bitter one, but it was not given in vain.

Themistocles
urges the
necessity of a
strong wall.

Whatever the state of the walls of Athens at the time of the invasion, the Athenians acted throughout on the conviction that they were not worth maintaining.² New fortifications on a scale far larger than anything in existence were necessary if Athens was to be safe from desolation. This was clear to Themistocles, who accordingly at once proposed that such a wall should be built. So high was the spirit of the people, so firm their conviction of the wisdom of the advice, that before they completed the restoration of their ruined houses they went to work at the wall.³

The news was at once carried to the Peloponnesus, where it created much uneasiness among the allies of Sparta. Already Leotychidas had returned home from the Aegean

¹ But cf. *supra*, p. 236; *infra*, 269, note.

² On this subject see Bauer, *Themistocles*, p. 4, n. 2. U. v. Wilamowitz-Müllendorff, *Aus Kydathen*, p. 97, says, in his heightened way, "Marathon und Salamis ist bei einem befestigten Athen undenkbar." He allows that there were walls in the time of Cylon (p. 100), but thinks that they were pulled down in the time of Pisistratus or Hippias (pp. 105, 106). In the invasion of Cleomenes there is no mention of walls: Aristotle, *Athen. Pol.* p. 51 (chap. 19), καταλείψας τὸν Ἰππίαν εἰς τὸ καλούμενον Πελαργικὸν τεῖχος ἐπολιόρκει μετὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων. Cf. Herod. v. 64. That there were walls of some kind in 479 B.C. is I think clear from Thuc. i. 93, μείζων δὲ περίβολος πανταχῇ ἐξήχθη: *ib.* 89, τοῦ τε γὰρ περιβόλου βραχεία εἰστήκει. Cf. Herod. ix. 13. The statement in Isocrates, who declares (*Panathenaicus*, § 50) that the Athenians left their city διὰ τὸ μὴ τετειχίσθαι κατ' ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον, is of little value; see Bauer, *l.c.*

³ Thuc. i. 89, 90 ff.

with tidings of the ambitious designs of the Athenian fleet. A few years previously Athens had looked to Sparta for help and guidance in all matters of Hellenic interest; now she was taking a line of her own, and rising into a position not only of independence but of equality. The situation was not the less vexatious because Athens had given no reasonable grounds of complaint. In liberating Ionia and attacking Sestos she was only supporting her kinsmen and recovering her possessions; in building a wall she was but exercising the right of every Hellenic city to defend herself. She could point to the example of her nearest neighbours on either hand, to Thebes or Corinth. At the same time it was quite clear that a strongly fortified Athens would create a new centre in Hellas—a centre of Ionian influence, which might counterbalance Sparta as a centre of Dorian influence—an impregnable city outside the Peloponnesus, and perhaps opposed to Peloponnesian interests. On these grounds the allies were importunate in their demands that Sparta should take some step to avert the evil; and if she were herself perhaps indifferent to the action of Athens, she could not remain deaf to the appeals of her confederates. She resolved to try what could be effected by good advice. Envoys were sent to the Athenians to remind them that Sparta had no walls, and to point out the danger which walls brought with them. So far from restoring their own wall, the Athenians should join in razing to the ground the walls of all the other cities outside the Peloponnesus. An invader would then have no fortified place to occupy as his headquarters, as Mardonius had occupied Thebes, and Peloponnesus would be a sufficient refuge for all.¹

Opposition of
the Pelopon-
nesians.

Sparta sends
envoys to stop
the building
of a wall.

¹ Thuc. i. 90. It may be asked: why should the Peloponnesians resent the building of the wall if Athens had been protected by a wall before 480 B.C.? The answer is that the Athenians after 480 B.C. were very different from the Athenians before that date. Cf. Thuc. i. 90, φοβουμένων τοῦ τε ναυτικοῦ αὐτῶν τὸ πλῆθος, ὃ πρὶν οὐχ ὑπῆρχε, καὶ τὴν ἐς τὸν Μηδικὸν πόλεμον τόλμαν γενομένην.

5. The situation was a difficult one. Without her fleet Athens was not in a position to carry the matter with a high hand, and it was of the utmost importance that nothing should be done which could afford even a tolerable pretext for violent interference. Themistocles was equal to the occasion. On his advice the Athenians affected to look at the question from a Hellenic point of view, and promised to send envoys to Sparta to discuss it. No sooner were the Spartans out of Athens than he revealed his plan. The wall was to be built up at once, and with all possible speed. Every one, man, woman, or child, must give a hand to the work; and materials were to be procured from every source, without sparing any building, public or private. Meanwhile he proposed that he should at once be sent to Sparta, and that his colleagues in the embassy, Aristides and Habronichus, should join him when the wall had reached the lowest height necessary for effective defence.

Themistocles
outwits
Sparta.

To Sparta he went. Barely a year had elapsed since he had been escorted from the city with peculiar honours, and he was still in great favour there. He did not at once appear before the authorities, preferring, as he said, to wait for his colleagues, who had been unexpectedly detained. Meanwhile rumours came to Sparta of the real state of affairs. Walls could hardly be built at Athens without the knowledge of the Megarians, and from Megara the information could quickly be passed onwards through the Peloponnesus. When the Spartans called the attention of Themistocles to these rumours, his colleagues had already arrived with the news that the wall was defensible. Further delay was unnecessary. Themistocles at once bade the Spartan authorities send to Athens and ascertain for themselves the real state of the case; at the same time he instructed the Athenians not to let the envoys return till himself and his colleagues were safe at home. He then informed the ephors that Athens was provided with a

He is sent to
Sparta as an
envoy,

and keeps the
Spartans in
suspense till
the wall is
built.

wall and could protect herself. He pointed out with great force that when they abandoned their city the Athenians were allowed to decide for themselves. They were equally good judges of their own interests now, and they were resolved to have a wall. As members of the Great Alliance, which had been formed to resist the invader, their counsel would have more weight when their city was on a level with the rest. Let the allies who wished to see Athens without walls begin by pulling down their own.¹

Here the matter ended so far as the cities were concerned. The Spartans were annoyed, but the walls were an accomplished

Beginning of
dissension in
the Great
Alliance.

fact. Any attempt to destroy them was out of the question, for the memory of the great services of Athens in the cause of freedom was too fresh to admit of open hostilities. But though the Spartans and Athenians still continued to be on friendly terms, the cities had already entered on divergent lines. The union of Hellas passed away with the crisis which had called it into existence. And we can hardly doubt that Themistocles lost all credit at Sparta, or that the friendly feeling of the past was now changed into bitter hatred. Unhappily for himself he had enemies at home who could co-operate with his enemies abroad in bringing about his destruction.

The extent of the wall thus hastily raised was not less than six miles.² It crossed from the Museum hill to the hill of the Nymphs, in such a direction that it included the

¹ Thuc. i. 91; Diod. xi. 39, 40; Plut. *Them.* 19; who adds that according to Theopompus, Themistocles bribed the ephors not to oppose him. Plutarch also gives the name of Polyarchus of Aegina, as sent expressly to Lacedaemon to give information of the building of the wall. Aristotle, *Athen. Pol.* c. 23, speaks of the "rebuilding" of the wall as the joint work of Themistocles and Aristides.

² Thuc. ii. 13, where forty-three stadia are given, exclusive of the space between the long wall and the Phaleric wall, and for this space we may allow five stadia. The Scholiast on Thuc. *l.c.* allows seventeen stadia, but apparently on a theory that the total circuit was sixty stadia (43+17). See Baumeister's *Denkmäler*, Art. *Athen*, p. 148; Aristodemus, v. 4, in Müller, *F. H. G.*, vol. v. p. 8.

terraces of the "Pnyx" and a large number of the rock houses which form so interesting a feature in this part of the environs of Athens. On the west side of the city were two gates, the Peiraeen and the Dipylon or double gate, the principal entrance to the city, from which roads ran to Eleusis and to

Extent and
direction of
the wall of
Athens.

the Academy. On the north the chief gate was the Acharnian; on the east the Diocharean, beyond which lay the Lyceum and Cynosarges; but the direction taken by the wall in these quarters of the city is very uncertain. Towards the south the wall ran by the banks of the Ilissus, including the Olympeium, but not including the spring of Callirrhoe, till it once more reached the hill of the Museum. Thucydides tells us that the walls were built of any materials which came to hand, the foundations being laid just as each workman pleased. As the circuit of the wall was considerably extended, the line ran through many places of sepulture, which at Athens, as generally in ancient cities, were outside the walls; and the monuments and columns there ready to hand were used without any hesitation for the work. What time was occupied in the building we do not know; but if we allow three or four months, and more is unlikely, the result was an astonishing proof of the activity and devotion of the Athenian people.¹

6. Themistocles was not content to see Athens surrounded by a wall. Some years before the present date, during his archonship, he had begun the fortification of Peiraeus, with the intention of providing the Athenians with a safer station for the fleet, which he had created, than was possible in the open roadstead of Phalerum (*supra*, p. 113). To the completion of this task he now addressed himself. The

Fortification
of the
Peiraeus.
478-477 B.C. ?
Ol. 75. 3, 4.

¹ Thuc. i. 93. His statement is confirmed by some inscribed stones found in the walls. Miss Harrison, *Mythology*, etc., p. 8, says that the only satisfactory piece of the wall which can now be seen is near the Dipylon, but in Leake's time more could be traced. She speaks of the "fine polygonal masonry of the lower portion of the fragment." Possibly the wall was afterwards rebuilt near the great gateway by Cimon or others.

whole circuit which he embraced in the fortification was nearly seven and a half miles.¹ He intended to have built such a wall as would defy attack, but he did not succeed in carrying it to more than half the projected height. It was, however, wide enough to allow two wagons to pass each other upon it; and, according to Thucydides, the whole wall was built of solid stone, hewn square and clamped together with iron and lead on the outer face, no rubble or mortar being used to fill up the middle portion. A work of such magnitude could not be completed within less than a year, and perhaps 477 B.C. is the earliest date that we can fix for it. The cost must have been enormous, but doubtless the spoils of Plataea were in part devoted to this object.²

The fortification of the Peiraeus was of course a part of the great plan of Themistocles by which he sought to turn Athens into a maritime city—the mistress of the Aegean. Had he been able he would gladly have induced the inhabitants to give up their old city and make the port their stronghold.³ But the sacred associations of the acropolis, the temples and shrines of Athens, the memory of the past, were too powerful to allow such a change. For the present Athens and Peiraeus stood apart, each strongly fortified, but with some five miles of open country between them.

Themistocles
wishes to
make Athens
wholly a
maritime city.

¹ Thuc. ii. 13.

² Thuc. i. 93. Duncker, *G. A.* vii, 186 n. 3, thinks that Thucydides was mistaken in his description of the materials of the wall. At the present time grooves can be seen cut in the solid rock to receive the stones of the faces of the wall; these grooves are 0·70 metres wide, i.e. the two are 1·40 metres wide, and this occurs at a point where the entire wall is 3·3·69 metres wide. The middle portion extending to 2 metres is filled up with earth and rubble. Von Alten, in Kaupert und Curtius' *Karten*, Heft i. p. 11. But the walls of Themistocles were destroyed in 404 B.C. and new walls were built after the battle of Onidus. I do not see that Duncker has proved that the traces described by von Alten are the foundations of the Themistoclean wall.

³ Thuc. i. 93, τὸν Πειραιᾶ ὠφελιμώτερον ἐνόμιζε τῆς ἄνω πόλεως, κ.τ.λ.

Still pursuing the same object, Themistocles persuaded the Athenians to pass a law by which twenty new triremes should be added to the fleet every year. 477 B.C.
 Even if we allow no more than ten years for the life of a trireme, and this is doubtless too short a time, the law would keep up the effective strength of the Athenian marine at 200 vessels. While thus providing for the fleet he sought to attract traders to Athens, being well aware of the value of commerce for his ideal maritime city, and with this view he offered very favourable terms to any foreigner who would settle in the city, a policy in which he seems to have followed the example of his two great predecessors, Solon and Clisthenes.¹ Lastly, as if to show that the spirit of liberty was once more established in Athens, new statues of Harmodius and Aristogeiton were erected in the market-place of the city in the room of the old ones which had been carried off by Xerxes to Susa.²

Such was the splendid activity of Themistocles in the years 479-477. No wonder that on the Olympic festival of 476 B.C., when, for the first time after the days of gloom and alarm in which the Greeks had met in 480 B.C., all Hellas was gathered at the Alpheus, the great Athenian was the observed of all observers. Men forgot to watch the contests of the athletes while they gazed upon him, and proud were those who, knowing him only by sight, were able to point him out to strangers. Wherever he moved he was greeted with tumults of applause, and, though his labours in his

¹ Diod. xi. 43 (477 B.C.), τοὺς μετοίκους καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας ἀτελεῖς ποιῆσαι. A ship of English oak seems to have, or to have had, a life of more than thirty years. "The Bonaventura, a vessel of 600 tons, was built in 1560. She was with Drake in his expedition to the West Indies in 1586. She carried his flag at Cadiz in 1587. She was caught in a gale in the beginning of 1588 and ran on a sandbank, and after a hard life of twenty-eight years the Admiral said there was not in the world a stronger ship." Froude, *Hist. Eng.* xii. 359. But cf. Thuc. vii. 12.

² *Marmor Par.* Ep. 54 (477 B.C.); Arrian, *Exp. Alex.* iii. 16, vii. 19; Paus. i. 8. 5. The old statues were the work of Antenor, the new ones of Critias.

country's cause had been great, he confessed that on this day he received his full reward.¹

7. In the summer of 478 B.C. the war against Persia was renewed. Ionia and the Hellespont had revolted, it was true,

Renewal of
the war with
Persia.
478 B.C.

but the Bosphorus was closed so long as the Great King retained possession of Byzantium.

The passage of the Strymon was still watched by a Persian garrison at Eion; in the south the fleets of Phoenicia and Egypt were at the king's disposal. It was still open to him to collect forces in Cilicia and send them across the Aegean; or to cross the Bosphorus into Thrace. And if, on the one hand, the safety of Greece was not yet secured, on the other, private interests as well as public demanded a renewal of the war. Athens needed a supply of corn from the north, but the supply would never come while the Persians held Byzantium. Above all, the success of Leotychidas acted as a spur to the ambitious spirit of Pausanias, who wished to maintain his position as leader of the allies, even if he did not already meditate the treacherous designs which he was soon to reveal.

The new squadron consisted of twenty Lacedaemonian vessels and thirty Athenian, with a number of allies. The

Pausanias
sent out with
a fleet.

Athenians were commanded by Aristides, with whom, no doubt, Cimon was associated; the

Lacedaemonians by Pausanias, who was also of course high admiral of the whole fleet. He directed his course to Cyprus, perhaps in search of the remains of the Persian fleet, perhaps with a view of inspiring confidence in

He sails to
Cyprus and
Byzantium.

the islands of the southern Aegean, of which Rhodes was the chief. As we hear of no general engagement we may assume that the

Persians made no attempt to defend the island. It is certain that the greater part of it was overrun by the invaders, but the subjugation cannot have been very complete. No permanent settlement was made, though some of the Greek

¹ Plut. *Them.* 17.

princes may have been placed in a stronger position. From Cyprus the fleet sailed to Byzantium, which was captured after a siege and occupied by Pausanias.¹

Pausanias was not a man to disparage his own merits. In the inscription placed upon a large bowl of bronze which he set up in honour of Poseidon, at the point where the Euxine enters the Bosphorus, he described himself as "ruler of wide Hellas." He had already indulged in similar language in the inscription written on the pedestal of the tripod which had been dedicated at Delphi, after the battle of Plataea (*supra*, p. 229), but the Lacedæmonians had erased the words and replaced them with the names of the cities which had taken part in the war.² The Greeks would never for a moment allow that the leaders of their forces, however great their merits might be, should claim as their own what was the work of all. When the great Miltiades, after the battle of Marathon, asked from the people the honour of a crown of olive, Sophanes, a famous man at arms among the Athenian soldiers of the time, rose up to protest: "When you alone have won the victory, Miltiades, you alone may take the prize." But what was impossible in the centre of Hellas was possible on the shores of the Bosphorus. And by this time Pausanias had already decided on his course.³

8. Byzantium had been garrisoned by Persian troops, many of whom fell into the hands of the victor. Among them were men of great note, friends and kinsmen of the king. Pausanias saw his opportunity. He secretly sent the Persians back to Xerxes, giving out to the Athenians and the allies that they had made their escape. He could now claim to have rendered the king a service, but he did not stop here.

His increasing egotism.

Pausanias enters into negotiations with Xerxes.

¹ Thuc. i. 94.

² Herod. iv. 81. Nymphis in Müller, *F. H. G.* iii. 15, says that the bowl was there before Pausanias' time. Thuc. i. 132.

³ Plut. *Cim.* 8. Another reading of the name is Sochares (for Sophanes); see *supra*, p. 104.

Gongylus, an Eretrian, who had been his accomplice in the escape of the Persians, was charged with a letter to the Great King, of which Thucydides has preserved the text. He wrote as follows: "Pausanias, the Spartan commander, desiring to do you a service, sends back the
 His letter to Xerxes. captives of his spear. And I propose, if it seem good to you, to marry your daughter, and to bring Sparta and the rest of Hellas under your command. I think that I can accomplish this if we take counsel together. Should you approve of my proposal, send a trusty person to the sea-coast through whom we can negotiate."¹

Xerxes waived the proposed alliance, but at once appointed Artabazus, the survivor of Plataea, to be satrap of Dascyleum in the room of Megabates, the previous
 Xerxes' reply. governor. With him he sent a letter sealed with the royal seal, in which Pausanias was urged to carry out his plan with all vigour and haste; money and troops would be furnished at his call, and in everything Artabazus would co-operate most zealously.

The reception of this letter quite turned the brain of Pausanias. He already looked on himself as a Persian subject, and arranged his life as a Persian satrap. When he left Byzantium for a tour in Thrace he appeared equipped in Median style and surrounded by a body-
 Pausanias' misconduct at Byzantium. guard of Medes and Egyptians. Towards the allies, even towards those associated with him in the command, his conduct became overbearing and intolerable. The common soldiers were flogged, or compelled to stand the whole day supporting an iron anchor; no one was allowed to get himself a bed of straw, or fodder, or water, before the Spartans had satisfied their wants. When Aristides remonstrated in the name of the allies, Pausanias turned aside and

¹ Thuc. i. 128. Pausanias wished to occupy towards Xerxes the same position which Mardonius had occupied towards Darius, and to succeed where Mardonius had failed. Herodotus, while doubting the truth of the story, asserts that Pausanias sought the hand of the daughter of Megabates, who was satrap of Dascyleum, v. 32.

said he had not time to listen to him.¹ The natural result followed. Contrasting the rude brutality of Pausanias with the courtesy and justice of the Athenian commanders, the captains and generals of the allies, with Uliades of Samos and Antagoras of Chios at their head, requested them to assume the command of the fleet. Aristides refused to act until the allies had taken some definite step which would lead to a final breach with Pausanias. This condition was quickly fulfilled; the allies seized the first opportunity to treat Pausanias with public contempt, upon which the Athenians consented to become their leaders.²

The allies go
over to the
Athenian
leaders.

9. The Spartans were quickly informed of the situation. They immediately recalled Pausanias, who, traitor though he was, did not venture to disobey orders. On his return an inquiry was made into his conduct, which led to his punishment for some injuries committed against private persons, but the main charge, that of treacherous communications with Persia, could not be proved, at any rate to the satisfaction of his judges. As it was obviously dangerous to continue him in his office, a new leader, Dorcis by name, was sent out with a small force in his place. The allies, however, were weary of the Spartans, and when Dorcis appeared they refused to accept him as their leader. He returned home, carrying with him, no doubt, the contingents furnished by Peloponnesus to the allied fleet.

Pausanias
recalled.

This was the end of the Spartan leadership in the war with Persia. The Lacedaemonians sent out no more commanders. They were afraid that those whom they appointed would be corrupted, as they had found to be the case with Pausanias. "They had had enough of the Persian war, and they thought the Athenians

The Spartans
abandon the
leadership of
the alliance.

¹ Thuc. i. 129, 130; Plut. *Aristid.* 23; *Cim.* 6. The pathetic story of Cleonice seems to belong to Pausanias' second stay in Byzantium.

² Plut. *Aristid.* 23.

were fully able to lead, and at that time believed them to be their friends."¹

In the narrative of Diodorus we are informed that the decision of the Spartans was not arrived at without considerable discussion. There were two parties in the city. The younger men, in their indignation that Sparta should be thrust from her position, called loudly for war with Athens; but the older citizens, who saw what injury foreign service was doing to Spartan institutions, were opposed to it. The war-party relied on an oracle which warned them not to allow the "leadership to become lame," and on the great increase of power and wealth which would flow to Sparta from foreign conquest. At this crisis Hetoemaridas, a Heraclid by descent, and a member of the Gerousia, succeeded in persuading both his fellow-senators and the people that Sparta could reap no advantage from her position at sea, upon which it was decided to abandon the command to the Athenians.²

IO. We may here anticipate the course of the narrative a little, in order to follow the fortunes of Pausanias to their close. After his acquittal he was no longer employed in the public service of Sparta. This was a diminution of his power, but he was too

Subsequent
career of
Pausanias.

¹ Thuc. i. 95; Plutarch, *Aristid.* 23, supports Thucydides, with additional praise of the Spartans, *μᾶλλον αἰρούμενοι σωφρονούντας ἔχειν καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἐμμένοντας τοὺς πολίτας ἢ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀρχειν ἀπάσης.*

² This story may be true, but there are some reasons for doubting it. (1) It presupposes a more hostile feeling between Athens and Sparta than the narrative of Thucydides leads us to expect; (2) The oracle about the "lame leadership" was quoted at Sparta at the beginning of the fourth century B.C. in reference to Agesilaus; (3) The suggestion that Sparta would acquire wealth by her command at sea agrees better with the age of Lysander than the age of Pausanias; (4) The Spartans always hung back in the Persian war; we see by the action of Leotychidas that they cared little about it when once the enemy was out of Greece. Why should they be so anxious now to carry it on? Diod. xi. 50, who, however, puts the discussion in the archonship of Dromoclides, 475 B.C. This is two or three years later than the date indicated by Aristotle.

deeply enchanted with the prospect before him to abandon his plans. From Hermione on the coast of Argolis he took ship in a single vessel and returned to the Hellespont, on the pretext of fighting in the Hellenic cause. He was allowed to enter Byzantium once more, and it seems that he remained there for some time, during which he acquired a certain degree of power. Debarred from the command of the Grecian fleet, he nevertheless was able to domineer over the Byzantians, and to pursue his negotiations with Persia. Plutarch tells us that he compelled the parents of a high-born maiden named Cleonice to send their daughter to him in the night. When she came to his chamber she begged those who were in charge of the door to put out the lights, and entered the room in darkness. As she approached the bed where Pausanias lay asleep she stumbled and threw down a lamp. Pausanias started up in terror, seized his dagger, and struck. The blow pierced the maiden, who fell mortally wounded. From this time forward her ghost haunted Pausanias; and when he was driven out of the city, as he eventually was, owing to his manifest treachery, by Cimon and the Athenians, he visited the oracle of the dead at Heraclea, and summoned the spirit of Cleonice, in the vain hope of making atonement. Her only reply was that he would "find release from his troubles at Lacedaemon."¹

His second
stay at
Byzantium.

Story of
Cleonice.

He is driven
out of the city.

From Heraclea he retired to Colonae, a town in the Troad, whence he could conveniently carry on his communications with the satrap of Dascyleum. News of his conduct there was in time brought to the ephors at Sparta, who resolved once more to recall him to the city. A herald was sent to Colonae with a *scytale*, or Spartan staff, on which was inscribed an order "that he should accompany the officers home, or the Spartans would declare war upon him." Pausanias thought it prudent to obey;

Retires to
Colonae,
whence he is
again recalled
to Sparta.
470 B.C. ?
Ol. 77. 3.

¹ Plut. *Cim.* 6.

it was to his advantage to disarm suspicion, and his wealth would enable him to silence his accusers. On his return the ephors threw him into prison, but as no trial had been held and no sentence passed, he soon found means to come out. He at once challenged those who had accusations to bring to make them in open court. The authorities were in a difficult position; they had the strongest suspicions that Pausanias had employed his time at Byzantium, both before and after his first recall, in treasonable negotiations with Persia, and they could point to very plain indications that he wished to live a life which was impossible in Sparta. Worse than all, they were informed that he was intriguing with the Helots, whom he had promised to emancipate if they would help in his designs. But they had no certain proof, and without this they hesitated to take an irremediable step against one who was not only a Heracleid of the royal race but the most successful general in Sparta and the guardian of the infant king Plistarchus.

II. At length a favourite servant, a native of Argilus in Macedonia, turned informer. Observing that of the messengers whom Pausanias sent to Asia none ever returned, Information of the Argilian. he opened the despatches placed in his hands, in alarm for his own safety. He found as he expected that directions were given for his death. He at once showed the letter to the ephors. Their suspicions were of course confirmed, but still they wished to hear something from the lips of Pausanias himself: a despatch might be forged, and there was the greater fear of this, because the servant, in order to hide his opening of the letter, had in fact forged the seal of Pausanias. A plan was arranged by which the truth was brought to light. The servant, as if in fear for his life, took sanctuary at the temple of Poseidon on the promontory of Taenarus, in the south of Laconia. Here Pausanias at Taenarus. he built a hut, divided by a wall into two compartments, in one of which he concealed the ephors while he was visited by Pausanias in the other. The conversation which passed between him and his master was so arranged as to leave no doubt whatever of the guilt of Pausanias.

The ephors returned to Sparta intending to arrest him. But even now they were not really in earnest in their work. They did not send to his house or attempt to take him by surprise, and when they met him in the street one of the body gave him a sign of warning, which enabled him to escape for the moment. He turned and fled. Before the pursuers could come up he had taken refuge in a chamber adjacent to the temple of Athena of the Brazen House, and within the sacred precincts. Here he was at least safe from violence. But Spartan cruelty was a match for Spartan superstition. Unwilling to remove the suppliant, the ephors found means to defeat his object. They unroofed the chamber and removed the doors; and seizing an opportunity, when he was within, they built up the doorway and left him to starve. It is said by later writers that his own mother laid the first stone in this iniquitous work. When he was at length on the point of death they drew him out of the sacred place; if it was sacrilege to remove a suppliant, it was pollution for any one to die in a temple. He was no sooner removed than he expired. Not long afterwards the Spartans appear to have felt some scruples about the manner in which they had dealt with him. They consulted Apollo of Delphi, who, besides other instructions, informed them that they had brought a curse upon themselves, and must offer two bodies in place of one. This was the curse of Athena of the Brazen House. The Spartans endeavoured to expiate their offence by erecting two bronze statues of Pausanias as offerings to Athena.¹

He escapes
from arrest
into the temple
of Athena,

where he is
starved to
death.

There is little doubt that Pausanias was guilty. In his disordered mind he had probably formed a plot for the utter ruin of Sparta and Hellas—a plot in which the Helots were to rise at a moment when Greece was attacked by Persia in overwhelming force. The plot failed partly through his own folly, and partly because

Character of
Pausanias.

¹ Thuc. i. 128-134; Diod. xi. 45.

domestic troubles broke out in Persia (see *infra*, p. 308), but he did not mean it to fail. Had he been openly brought to trial and condemned by a competent court he would have deserved his fate, but the vacillation and superstition which brought him to a lingering death excite our pity for him, while they provoke our contempt for the Spartans. The conqueror of Plataea deserved a better fortune than to be the servant of such masters as the ephors of Sparta. When we turn from his death to his life we see in him a signal example of the strength and weakness of the character of his nation. As a leader of the Spartan forces he was prepared to fight to the death, but no sooner had he obtained a glimpse of the luxury of oriental life than Sparta and her teaching were forgotten.¹

¹ We cannot give any precise date for the events of Pausanias' life after 478-477 B.C., assuming that he left Byzantium for the first time in that year. Recent writers tell us that on his first recall he intrusted Byzantium (which he never surrendered to the Athenians) to Gongylus (see Busolt, *G. G.* ii. p. 378), with whom and his Persian adherents he succeeded on his return in recovering Sestos from the Athenians. In Byzantium he remained for seven years (Justin, ix. 1. 3, *per septem annos possessa fuit*; but he also says that Pausanias founded the city!), when Cimon drove him out, and also reconquered Sestos. This view rests on the story quoted from Ion of Chios in Plutarch, *Cim.* 9, in which Cimon is said to have divided the spoil from the capture of Sestos and Byzantium. In the narratives of Herodotus and Thucydides, Sestos was taken in 478 by Xanthippus, and Byzantium in 478-477 by Pausanias; in neither case had Cimon anything to do with the booty. Still I cannot venture on the strength of such an authority as Ion—or possibly a pseudo-Ion—to assume a second capture of Byzantium and Sestos by the Athenians (see *Classical Review*, iii. 389). The narrative of Thucydides leads us to suppose that Pausanias had no great authority on his return to the Hellespont. No doubt his wealth enabled him to occupy a high position and to oppress the inhabitants of the city; but that he held it as a fortified post, I doubt. If he had, the Persians would have shown more vigour in his cause. It is true that Thuc. i. 131 uses the words *βία ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων ἐκπολιορκηθεὶς* of his second removal from Byzantium, a phrase which implies forcible expulsion, but we must remark that the words are used in a peculiar context—of Greeks expelling a Greek, who was supposed to be on friendly terms.

Thucydides tells us that after the death of Pausanias the Spartans

found information in his papers which incriminated Themistocles. Themistocles was then at Argos under a sentence of ostracism—and Diodorus puts the ostracism in 471 B.C. But this helps us little in the chronology of Pausanias; for we do not know how long Pausanias had been dead when the Spartans attacked Themistocles, or how long Themistocles had been ostracised when Pausanias died. In any case two things are remarkable: (1) that Pausanias should have negotiated so long with Persia, as he appears to have done, with so little effect; (2) that he should have acquired even so much power as he did in his second stay in Byzantium.

CHAPTER VII.

PELOPONNESUS IN 477-465 B.C. THEMISTOCLES.

I. OUR knowledge of the affairs of the Peloponnesus for the thirteen or fourteen years which followed the recall of Pausanias from Byzantium is very slight and uncertain, but the general course of events is clear. Sparta's position as leader of the Grecian forces, which she had justified on the battle-field of Plataea, was shaken by a number of disasters and mistakes, until at length an unexpected calamity brought the city to the verge of destruction. Part of this decline was due to the treachery of Spartan officers, of which we have already seen a pitiable example in the conduct of Pausanias; part to a spirit of disaffection among the Peloponnesian states, which it is not easy to explain.

It was of course a backward step to renounce the leadership of the united fleet, a step which must be retrieved, unless Sparta was to sink into insignificance, by increased activity in her position as leader of the alliance on land. When the plenipotentiaries from the patriotic states met at the Isthmus in 481 B.C. they had passed a resolution, pledging themselves to punish those of the Greeks who without sufficient cause had joined the side of the invader.¹ No

Decline of
Sparta.
477-464 B.C.
Ol. 75. 4-79. I.

Punishment
of the
"medising"
Greeks.

¹ Herod. vii. 132. The word used for the punishment is *δεκατεύειν*, which Stein translates "to devote in person and property." That it denoted something more severe than the mere consecrating a tenth of the property seems clear from Xen. *Hell.* vi. 3. 20; 5. 35, *νῦν ἐλπίς τὸ πάλαι λεγόμενον δὴ δεκατευθῆναι* *Θηβαίους* which Diodorus expresses by *ἐξανδραποδισθῆναι*, xv. 51.

steps had as yet been taken to redeem this pledge, and unless Sparta led the way no steps would be taken. Here then was an opportunity upon which she might seize to assert her old supremacy.

Among the "medising" Greeks none were such flagrant offenders as the Thessalians, or at any rate the Aleuadae, who, in spite of opposition on the part of the ^{The} people, directed the affairs of the nation. ^{Thessalians.}

These princes had not only done their utmost to bring the Persians into Greece; they had availed themselves of the forces of Xerxes to satisfy their hatred on the luckless Phocians; they had maintained the army of Mardonius in the winter of 480-479 B.C., and conducted it on its way to the south in the ensuing spring. In this case it was impossible to plead necessity, for even at the accession of Xerxes, when he had not yet decided on the invasion of Greece, they sent envoys to his court, who joined with the Pisistratids and others in urging the expedition upon him. If Greece intended to purge the land of traitors, she had every reason to begin with the Aleuadae.¹

In 476 B.C. a Peloponnesian force was sent into Thessaly under the command of Leotychidas, the hero of Mycale. The army, which apparently landed at Pagasae, had marched through the country and successfully overthrown two despots or "dynasts," Aristodemus and Angelus; the whole country seemed to be at its mercy, when hostilities

Invasion of
Thessaly by
the Pelopon-
nesians.
476 B.C.?
Ol. 76. 1.

came to a sudden end. The cause of the change was soon detected. Leotychidas had been won over by a large bribe from the Aleuadae; even in the camp he was found seated on a sleeve filled with coins. Though his treachery was detected before it led to serious consequences, the army seems to have been unable to act without him: the whole expedition was abandoned and the forces returned to Sparta. Leotychidas was brought before a court and condemned.

¹ Herod. ix. 1. 58; vii. 6. 172, 180.

Whatever the sentence was, for this is not recorded, he avoided it by retiring to Tegea, where he died in 469 B.C.

Corruption of The Spartans revenged themselves by razing
Leotychidas. his house to the ground. At his death, the throne passed to his grandson, Archidamus.¹

Of the results of the expedition to Thessaly it is difficult to judge. We know nothing of the "dynasts" whom Plutarch asserts to have been deposed by Leotychidas; we do not even know whether they belonged to the Aleuadae; and, therefore, we can form no opinion of the effect of their deposition on that family. That the Aleuadae were rendered bitter enemies of the Spartans, at any rate for a time, may be assumed as certain. When Athens and Sparta became estranged in 462 B.C., Athens entered into an alliance with Thessaly, which is a sufficient proof that Thessaly and Sparta were not then on good terms. On the other hand, the force sent to aid Athens at the battle of Tanagra deserted in the action, and the attempt to restore the Thessalian prince Orestes to his throne, which the Athenians made soon afterwards, was a failure. It is probable that there were divisions in the country, which prevented a uniform policy. The Aleuadae were eager to

¹ The date is uncertain. Diodorus, xi. 48, puts the death of Leotychidas in 476 B.C. On the other hand, Archidamus did not begin to reign till 469 B.C.; and Pausanias, iii. 7. 9, puts his accession immediately after the exile of Leotychidas Ἀρχίδαμος δὲ ὁ Ξευξίδαμου μετὰ Λεωτυχίδην ἀπελθὼντα εἰς Τεγέα ἐσχέ τὴν ἀρχήν. These authors may have confounded the exile of Leotychidas: with his death. We are told (Diod. l.c.) that Leotychidas reigned twenty-two years; as he came to the throne about 491 B.C., this brings us to 469 for his death. For the invasion, Plut. *De Her. mal.* 21. For the bribery, Herod. vi. 72. παρὲν δὲ οἱ πάντα ὑποχείρια ποιήσασθαι ἐδαροδόκησε ἀργύριον πολλόν; cf. Paus. iii. 7. 9. I presume that he entered into some kind of peace which the Spartans did not venture to break. Busolt, *Gesch. Griech.* ii. p. 355-356, and Duncker, *Gesch. Alt.* viii. p. 63, are of opinion that the Peloponnesians sailed to Pagasae, and then marched up the country, which may be true. They connect with this expedition the story told by Plutarch (*Them.* 20) of the proposed destruction of the Grecian fleet by Themistocles, but for this there is no evidence whatever.

have the support of Athens, as the enemy of Sparta, and the common people on quite other grounds were friendly to her ; but the class of the nobles, being strongly oligarchical, held to Sparta.¹

2. It is quite possible that, in thus coming forward as the champions of Greek freedom, the Lacedaemonians cherished some private designs of strengthening their own influence in northern and central Greece, as a counterpoise to the power of Athens. The union of the fleet under the Ionians seemed to require a union of the Dorian forces on land. This view becomes the more probable when we find Sparta entering on another line of attack on Thessaly, apparently after the failure of the invasion. At a meeting of the council of the Amphictyony her envoys proposed that all those members of the league who had gone over to the Persians at the time of the invasion should be expelled and deprived of their rights. The blow was of course aimed at the Thessalians, Thebans, and Argives, for it was impossible to maintain that the insignificant tribes, who formed the majority of the members of the league, were free agents in their dealings with Xerxes. The proposal was in harmony with the oath sworn at the Isthmus, and sounded patriotic enough. But Themistocles came forward with the most strenuous opposition. He pointed out that if all the cities which had "medised" were declared enemies, the whole of Greece would be reduced to dependence on one or two great powers. There were only thirty-one cities on the side of the patriots, and of these many were quite insignificant. He may also have pointed out that if Sparta became the dominant power in the council she would not only have a greater authority at Delphi than

Sparta proposes to purge the Amphictyony.

The proposal is opposed by Themistocles and defeated.

¹ In Thuc. ii. 22 we find Thessalian cavalry taking the side of Athens in the first invasion of Attica, in accordance with "the ancient alliance"; and in iv. 78 we are told that the common people were always well disposed towards the Athenians, though the "tradition" of the country was strongly in favour of a close oligarchy.

she already enjoyed, but she would be in a position to direct the politics of central Greece, and establish a nucleus of Dorian influence there. As to Argos, her position was low enough; any further humiliation would only strengthen the power of Sparta in the Peloponnese. The views of Themistocles prevailed: the proposal was thrown out, much to the chagrin of the Spartans, who never forgave him for this new act of opposition. The subsequent policy of Sparta—her repeated marches into Phocis, and, above all, the foundation of Heraclea in 426 B.C., show how clearly Themistocles divined her aims.¹

3. It may have been about this time that a plan which the Corinthians formed for increasing their influence in their colony of Leucas brought them into collision with the island of Corcyra. Corcyra had not indeed gone over to the Persians at the invasion, but she had rendered no assistance to Greece, and Corinth may have availed herself of the feeling to which this conduct gave rise to assert her claims to a monopoly of the trade with the Leucadians—a colony with which she was on singularly good terms. But here again Themistocles came in to thwart the designs of a Peloponnesian city. Being chosen to decide the point in dispute, he gave his verdict in favour of Corcyra. The Corinthians were condemned to pay a fine of 20 talents (£4000), and Leucas remained an open port for Corinthians and Corcyraeans.²

Thus we see Themistocles opposing the Peloponnesians at every opportunity. His whole energies were directed to promoting the interests of Athens at the expense of Sparta. And for this reason an incident of which we only hear in later writers may not be without foundation. We are told by Plutarch that Themistocles came before the Athenians

Quarrel between Corinth and Corcyra decided by Themistocles. 476 B.C. ?

Proposal of Themistocles to burn the Grecian fleet.

¹ Plut. *Them.* 20. On this as on other occasions we see that national patriotism was of far less importance in the mind of Themistocles than opposition to Sparta.

² Plut. *Them.* 24; Thuc. i. 136. The date is uncertain.

asserting that he had formed a plan which would raise the city to a position of supreme power, but the plan was of such a nature that it could not be divulged to the assembly. The Athenians bade him communicate it to Aristides : if Aristides approved, it was to be carried out ; if he objected, it must be dropped. Themistocles then pointed out that it would be quite easy to burn the Peloponnesian fleet as it lay at anchor in the harbour of Pagasae, and thus to annihilate, at one stroke, all opposition to Athens at sea. Aristides, on hearing this, informed the Athenians that the plan was indeed what Themistocles had described it to be, but it could not be carried out without the grossest perfidy. Upon this report it was decided that the plan must be dropped.¹

4. The Spartans had now discovered the real designs of Themistocles ; they found in him their most deadly enemy. On every hand he had thwarted them : they saw Athens surrounded with walls ; the Peiraeus fortified ; the Thessalians, Thebans, and Argives rescued from their vengeance. We can hardly doubt that they did their utmost by every kind of intrigue to shake the position of their opponent in his own city. And whether the result was owing to their suggestions or not, it is unhappily true that the Athenians were gradually brought to regard their greatest citizen with dislike and suspicion. As Cimon and Aristides gained in power Themistocles declined, until at last in 471 B.C. ostracism was demanded, and he was banished from the city.² At the

Change in
the feeling
of Athens
towards
Themistocles.
476-471 B.C.

¹ Plut. *Them.* 20 ; *Arist.* 22 ; Cic. *De Off.* iii. 11. 49 ; see Duncker, *Gesch. Alt.* viii. 66. Plutarch *l.c.* says that the plan was conceived when the fleet was wintering at Pagasae, after the departure of Xerxes. In 480 B.C. the fleet returned to Aegina, but in the winter of 479 it may have been at Pagasae. Duncker, as I have said, connects the plan with the invasion of Thessaly by Leotyichidas. Cicero speaks of the Lacedaemonian fleet at Gytheum.

² Diodorus, xi. 54, puts the ostracism in the archonship of Praxiergus, 471 B.C. Cicero, *De Amic.* 12. 42, puts it twenty years after the banishment of Coriolanus, which took place in 491 B.C. Diodorus, xi. 27, has a curious story to account for the singular fact that Themistocles never held military command after 480-479 B.C. He says that

causes of this change we can only guess. It is quite possible that the Spartans were able to bring great pressure to bear upon their friends in Athens, among whom Cimon was now taking a leading place, by pointing out that a development of the policy of Themistocles could have no other result than a breach with Sparta.¹ It is possible, also, that Aristides, though he was willing to sink all personal quarrels at the moment of his country's danger, was not inclined to give Themistocles a second opportunity of procuring his expulsion from the city.² And we may well believe what Plutarch and

others tell us, that Themistocles provoked the
 Causes of the change. anger and resentment of his citizens by his insufferable arrogance. He did not forget the part he had played in the battle of Salamis, or that it was owing to him

that the Grecian fleet was victorious on that
 Arrogance of Themistocles. memorable day. He marked his sense of his own importance by erecting a temple to Artemis Aristobule,³ "Artemis best in council," and naming two of his daughters Mnesiptolema and Nicomache.⁴ We may also remember that Themistocles, to a greater degree than any of his rivals, was without a following. He belonged to none of the great

when the Athenians were indignant at the preference given to the Aeginetans in awarding the prize after the battle of Salamis, the Lacedaemonians, afraid that Themistocles might do them an injury, *ἐτίμησαν αὐτὸν διπλάσιαις δωρεαῖς τῶν τὰ ἀριστεία εἰληφύτων*. And when Themistocles accepted their presents, *ὁ δῆμος τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπέστησαν αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῆς στρατηγίας καὶ παρέδωκε τὴν ἀρχὴν Ξανθίππῳ τῷ Ἀρίφρονος*. Is this more than a guess of Ephorus?

¹ Speaking of the affair at the Amphictyonic council, *Plut. Them.* 20, adds *ἐκ τούτου μὲν οὖν μάλιστα τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις προσέκρουσε* διὰ καὶ τὸν Κίμωνα προήγον ταῖς τιμαῖς ἀντίπαλον ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῷ Θεμιστοκλεῖ καθιστάντες. *Id. Cim.* 16: Cimon *ἠξήθη* ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἥδη τῷ Θεμιστοκλεῖ προσπολεμούντων καὶ τούτου ὄντα νέον ἐν Ἀθήναις μᾶλλον ἰσχύειν καὶ κρατεῖν βουλομένων.

² *Plut. Cimon.* 5, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ αὐτὸν ἠξήσεν Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου, τὴν εὐφύιαν ἐνορῶν τῷ ἥθει, καὶ ποιούμενος οἷον ἀντίπαλον πρὸς τὴν Θεμιστοκλέους δεινότητα καὶ τάλμαν. Cf. *ib.* 10.

³ *Plut. Them.* 22. There was a portrait or bust of Themistocles in this temple, on which Plutarch remarks, *φαίνεται τις οὐ τὴν ψυχὴν υἱόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ὕψιν ἡρωϊκὸς γενόμενος*.

⁴ *Plut. Them.* 32.

parties in the state; on the contrary, his actions had involved him in a series of quarrels with the leading men of his time. His influence was personal.¹ He was acceptable only so far as he was useful. When the hour of danger was over, many who had thought him a necessary man would follow his lead no longer.

5. Plutarch informs us that Themistocles met with opposition from Cimon and Aristides because he wished to "exalt the democracy."² Unfortunately he has not told us what were the measures which Themistocles brought forward for this purpose, and this omission is the more to be deplored because in Plutarch's narrative the one great democratic measure of the period following the Persian wars was certainly due to Aristides (but see *infra*, p. 386). It is possible that the arrogance of Themistocles, his enormous estimate of his own services, bred a suspicion that he meant to rule the city as the head of the democracy. Even before the battle of Salamis he had got rid of his rivals and directed the policy of the state; if he were successful in getting rid of them once more, what limits would he place on his ambition? It is possible, too, that the line of policy taken up by Ephialtes and Pericles in regard to the Areopagus was sketched for them by their great predecessor, even though we reject the story that he led the way for Ephialtes in the attack on the council in 462 B.C. Lastly, we may venture to suggest that the favour which Themistocles had shown towards resident aliens rendered it possible to charge him with the intention of admitting many of this class to the franchise, as Clisthenes had done before him. In this period of national exaltation

Themistocles
and the
democracy.

¹ He is said to have known every Athenian by name. Plut. *Them.* 5.

² Plut. *Cim.* 10, Cimon Θεμιστοκλεῖ πέρα τοῦ δέοντος ἐπαίροντι τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἀντίβαινε μετ' Ἀριστείδου. Id. *Them.* 3, Aristides ἡναγκάζετο τῷ Θεμιστοκλεῖ τὸν δῆμον ἐπὶ πολλὰ κινεῖν καὶ μεγάλας ἐπιφέρωντι καινοτομίας ἐναντιοῦσθαι πολλάκις. In *Athen. Pol.* (p. 66) Themistocles and Aristides are at variance, though both are leaders of the people.

it would be most distasteful to the Athenians to admit new blood into the city, and those who regarded him as a would-be tyrant would see in this measure a step to that end.¹

However this may be, in the spring of 471 B.C. he was driven into exile. He retired to Argos, where he took up his abode.

Themistocles
at Argos.
471 B.C.
Ol. 77. 2.

The dubious part which the Argives had played in the Persian invasion did not prevent him from entering into friendly relations with them, any more than the conduct of Coreyra had prevented him from deciding in her favour against Corinth. Argos hated Sparta, Themistocles hated Sparta; both were on the watch to do their enemy an injury; if Themistocles, now an alien from his country, was more than content to seek refuge in Argos, we can hardly doubt that in spite of past suspicions and jealousies the Argives were glad to see the great Athenian in their city. They would remember that he had opposed Sparta in her attack on the medising members of the Amphictyony, an attack which was aimed at Argos as well as northern Greece. To Sparta, on the other hand, the residence of Themistocles at Argos was little less than a calamity. For some years past, so far as we can discover, for the chronology is very uncertain, the Peloponnesus had been agitated by internal dissensions and changes; Sparta more especially had found herself the object of a constant and increasing hostility. In the year 475 B.C. (?)² she was at war with Tegea, her nearest neighbour on the north, her faithful ally on the field of Plataea. The cause of the quarrel is not known, but we may suggest that it was in some way connected with the refusal of the Tegeatae to surrender Leotychidas, who, after his condemnation (p. 265), had taken sanctuary there, in the temple of Athena Alea. The Tegeatae applied to the Argives for help in their resistance; a battle was fought, in which the

¹ Plut. *Them.* 22, distinctly says that the ostracism was intended *κολούειν τὸ ἀξίωμα καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν* of Themistocles.

² For the date see Duncker, *G. A.* viii. p. 123 n.

Spartans were victorious, but as Leotychidas was never given up, the victory cannot have been very decisive.¹

6. Soon afterwards a change took place in the west of Peloponnesus which was not for the advantage of the Spartans. Down to the time of the Persian War, Elis and Sparta had been firm friends; it was with the help of Sparta that the Eleans had spread their dominion over Pisatis and Triphylia, till their territory extended to the borders of Messenia. The whole of the fertile region south of the Alpheus—with the exception of Lepreum, a town which stoutly Changes
in Elis. maintained its independence and proved a

fertile source of strife—was owned or governed by the inhabitants of Elis proper, or Hollow Elis, and tilled for them by Perioeci.² With the spoils of their conquests they had not only enriched themselves, but had added new splendours to the festival of Olympia. But when asked to take up arms for Greece, they were by no means eager to respond. We hear nothing of them at the congress of 481 B.C., nothing in the movements of 480 B.C., till they gathered in full force at the Isthmus to assist in building the wall.³ Even in the year 479 B.C., they lingered behind the rest of the Peloponnesians, and it was not till the Greeks had annihilated the Persians at Plataea that their contingent appeared upon the scene—too late for assistance or for honour. The exasperated soldiers threw the blame on their leaders, whom on their return home they drove into exile.⁴ Such an action is not

The Eleans in
the Persian
invasion.

¹ Herod. ix. 35; Paus. iii. 11. 7. Even the alliance of Tegea and Argos continued, if Strabo is right (p. 377) in asserting that the Tegeatae assisted Argos against Mycenae.

² There seems to have been a difference between the Perioeci of Triphylia, who were allowed to preserve their communes and local government, and those of Pisatis, or at least of the central and eastern portion, who were little better than serfs or tenants-at-will; Gilbert, *Handbuch*, ii. pp. 99; Busolt, *Forschungen*, pp. 54-62. The distinction between ἡ κοινὴ Ἑλῆς and ἡ περιουκὶς Ἑλῆων is supported by Thuc. ii. 25.

³ Herod. viii. 72.

⁴ Herod. ix. 77.

merely evidence that the feeling between the soldier class in Elis, and those who led them, was far from harmonious; it proves that the soldiers were able to give expression to their wishes. Perhaps it was with a view of softening this growing

Consolidation of Elis. bitterness in the interest of the oligarchs, that the Lacedaemonians placed the name of the

Eleans among the patriotic states on the Delphian tripod, and the Olympic statue, which commemorated the victory of Plataea. But the Elean people were not so easily comforted for the disgrace which their leaders had brought upon them. They would have no more of this incompetent government. They demanded a city as a centre of the nation. When the

A great city is built. people were gathered together into a city, the delay which was possible under a careless and

selfish aristocracy, scattered over a number of towns, would be possible no more. So a city was built on the banks of the Peneus, at a place called Elis, which was apparently the home of the ancient family of the Oxyliadae, and the meeting-place of the oligarchical council which had hitherto directed the policy of the country.¹ Along with this consolidation of the people, it is probable that the government of the country underwent a considerable revolution. We are never told, in so many words, that Elis was governed by a democracy in the fifth century, but we know that it changed from a very strict oligarchy—an oligarchy within an oligarchy, as Aristotle terms it, and restricted to a few families—into a government which took

Change in the constitution of Elis. the democratic side in the divisions created by the peace of Nicias in 421 B.C. In the earlier

form of the constitution the council consisted of ninety members; in 420 B.C. we hear of a council of 600, a number exceeding that of the council at Athens. We cannot fix the date of this change with certainty, but the

¹ Under the archonship of Praxiergus, 471 B.C., Diodorus tells us that the Eleans, who had hitherto lived in a number of small cities, were gathered into the city called Elis (xi. 54); cf. Strabo, p. 336, ὅψέ δέ ποτε συνήλθον εἰς τὴν νῦν πόλιν Ἑλῖν μετὰ τὰ Περσικά, ἐκ πολλῶν δήμων.

building of the great city marks a crisis in the history of the country, at which such a revolution would be likely to occur. In the new constitution we hear of *Demiurgi*, and of *Thesmophylakes*, or guardians of the law. The first title is too general for us to draw any conclusions from it; the second implies that the Eleans took measures to protect their laws from innovation.¹

It was perhaps a concession to Spartan feeling that the Eleans did not surround their new city with a wall,² but no concession could make the change which we have described welcome on the banks of the Eurotas. That change was the result of an independent spirit; it was symbolised by the centralisation of a considerable power; and independence and centralisation were at once dreaded and suspected by Sparta, especially within the limits of Peloponnesus. She could not but feel that her influence was on the decline, even in the nation which she had raised to eminence, and with which she had long been on terms of intimate friendship. With her eastern neighbours she was always on the worst of terms, and now the west also seemed to be drawing away from her.

Effect of the
changes in
Elis on
Sparta.

7. It may have been about this time that a similar change took place at Mantinea. We know that the plain, which lies immediately north of Tegea, was inhabited by five communities, of which one was the Ptolis or citadel—the place of refuge in the time of danger. These five communities, we are told, were combined into one, under Argive influence.

Consolidation
of the com-
munities of
Mantinea
under Argive
influence.

It is true that our authority leaves the date of this consolida-

¹ The *Perioecic* cities remained as before, yet about this time many cities seem to have been reduced to a lower degree of dependence; Herod. iv. 148. In Thuc. v. 47 the *Demiurgi* are distinguished from *οἱ τὰ τέλη ἔχοντες*. *Demiurgi* are found in Mantinea (democratical), and Larissa (oligarchical) and elsewhere. *Epidemiurgi* was the name given to the magistrates sent by Corinth (oligarchical) to Potidaea; Thuc. i. 56. Aristotle regards *νομοφύλακες* as savouring more or less of oligarchy. *Pol.* 1298 b 29.

² *ἀρείχιστος*; Xen. *Hell.* iii. 3. 37.

tion quite uncertain, yet when we remember the declining condition of Argos, during the century which preceded the Persian War, a decline which culminated in her defeat by Cleomenes of Sparta, we can hardly suppose that she was then taking an active part in Arcadian politics. On the other hand, Argos was in alliance with Tegea in 475 B.C. as we have seen; and she would then be in a position to influence the neighbouring city.¹ She was herself endeavouring to unite the whole of the valley of the Inachus round her; she would naturally wish to lead the Mantineans on the same path.

Like the Eleans, the Mantineans had arrived too late on the field of Plataea; like them, they had driven their leaders into exile on their return; but, unlike them, they had not been allowed a place on the national memorials of the victory.² On these grounds there was some reason for domestic disquiet in the communities, and for aversion to the leading city of the Peloponnesus. We may therefore conjecture that with the consolidation of the city Mantinea became more democratical than before. Whether this hypothesis is correct or not, it is certain that in 421 B.C. Mantinea was a moderate democracy.³ To this constitution Aristotle is alluding, when he tells us that in "some democracies, although they do not all share in the appointment of officers, except through representatives elected in turn out of the whole people, as at Mantinea; yet if they have the power of deliberating, the many are contented. Even this form of government may be regarded as a democracy, and was such at Mantinea."⁴

¹ Strabo, p. 377. For *πρόλις* see Pausan. viii. 12. 7. On the whole subject, cf. Duncker, *G. A.* viii. 130, who is far too confident; Gilbert, *Handbuch*, ii. 125; Bursian, *Geog.* ii. 209.

² Yet they had sent five hundred soldiers to Thermopylae; Herod. vii. 202.

³ Thuc. v. 29, 47. We hear of a council, and Demiurgi, and other officers, of which two are specified, the Theori and the Polemarchi.

⁴ Arist. *Pol.* vi. 4. 4=1318 b. Early in the fourth century B.C. Mantinea was compelled by Sparta to break up again into the

8. At this critical moment Themistocles appeared at Argos. Nothing could be more disastrous to the Spartans than his presence there. They were divided from their allies in the north of Peloponnesus by Tegea and Mantinea; a spirit of agitation was at work in Arcadia; Elis was insecure, and Argos was recovering strength. Of all men in Greece, Themistocles was the most capable of using this ferment for his cherished plan of humiliating Sparta. He saw his opportunity, and he seized it. When we hear that he visited other parts of Peloponnesus from Argos, we cannot doubt what was the object of his journeys.¹ Within a few years, at the latest, of his ostracism, all the cantons of Arcadia, with the exception of Mantinea, united in an attack on Sparta. The danger with which Cleomenes had threatened the city in the last year of his life at length took shape, and at a time when Sparta seemed to be without a leader. The great generals, who had won victories in the past, were at hand no longer: Pausanias, if not already condemned, was in Asia Minor; Leotychidas, if alive, was at Tegea, on the side of the enemy. The reigning kings were Plistoanax, still a minor, and Archidamus, the grandson of Leotychidas, who came to the throne in 469 B.C.

Themistocles
at Argos.

United attack
of Arcadia
on Sparta.

The battle was fought at Dipaea, in the territory of the Maenaliens. The advantage of numbers was greatly on the side of the Arcadians, who are said to have assembled in myriads, while the Spartans cannot have had more than six or seven thousand men. But the Arcadians were without any organisation; their army was composed

Battle of
Dipaea:
defeat of the
Arcadians.
469 B.C.?
Ol. 77. 4.

communities, out of which the city was formed, and this dismemberment was followed by a reaction towards aristocracy, Xen. *Hell.* v. 2. 7. We must, however, allow that Mantinea was probably a democracy before the date fixed for the synoecismus; at any rate the reforms which Demonax of Mantinea introduced at Cyrene were of a strongly democratic character; Herod. iv. 161. It is worth noticing that while the coins of Elis do not seem to go back beyond the time of the synoecismus, the coins of Mantinea are carried back to 500 B.C. Head, *Hist. Num.* 353, 376.

¹ Thuc. i. 135.

of a number of contingents led by separate chiefs, who were probably slow to recognise the importance of a central command; the Spartans were drilled and disciplined with a systematic subordination of authority more perfect than that of any other army in Greece. We are also informed that Archidamus took especial pains to animate his soldiers with the belief that the Dioscuri were present to help them. The conflict ended in a complete victory for the Spartans.¹

9. The result might have been different if the Mantineans had joined the rest of the Arcadians, or if the Argives had come to their help now, as they came to the help of the Tegeatae in the previous war. For the absence of the Mantineans we can give no satisfactory reason, though we may suggest that their constant feuds with Tegea prevented them from taking an active part in any movement in which Tegea was engaged; or that they regarded a united Arcadia as an obstacle to some private schemes of aggrandisement,

The consolidation
of Argos.
468 B.C.
Ol. 78. 1.

such as they pursued in the Peloponnesian war. The Argives were occupied with important operations nearer home—operations in which they induced the Tegeatae to take a part, not-

withstanding the war with Sparta. Seeing the Spartans engaged with the Arcadians, they resolved to carry out the plan which they had long cherished, of reducing all the neighbouring Argive cities to dependence on Argos. After the defeat by Cleomenes, the "slaves," as Herodotus calls them, *i.e.* the disfranchised inhabitants or serfs, had acquired possession of the city, but when the younger generation grew up, quarrels broke out between them and the usurpers.

Mycenae and
Tiryns.

Though driven out of Argos, the slaves succeeded in establishing themselves at Tiryns.² On the advice of Cleander, a prophet from Phigalea in Arcadia, they subsequently attacked the Argives; the war went on for

¹ Herod. ix. 35, who informs us that Tisamenus was the seer for the Spartans at Dipaea, as he had been in the war with Tegea. For Archidamus and the Dioscuri, see Polyænus, i. 41.

² Herod. vi. 83.

some time with varying fortune, but in the end the Argives gained a hard-won victory. Notwithstanding this success, Argos was by no means mistress even of the valley of the Inachus. In spite of her opposition, Mycenae sent a contingent of eighty men to Thermopylae, and, at the battle of Plataea, Mycenae and Tiryns supplied a combined force of 400 heavy-armed soldiers.¹ Such independent conduct on the part of the ancient cities—so famous in legendary Greece—did not promise well for the extension of the power of Argos, but she had been nursing her strength, and she now resolved to make the most of her opportunity. Diodorus tells us that in the archonship of Theagenides—468 B.C.—the Argives determined to attack the Mycenaeans. They were afraid of the spirit of the famous city, and remembered that against their wish she had sent forces to Thermopylae. Knowing that no assistance could be sent from Sparta, they summoned their allies from Cleonae and elsewhere, and encamped against the city of Agamemnon. The walls of Mycenae were strong; the Mycenaeans were brave soldiers; and it was only after hard fighting and long delay—aided by famine—that the Argives took the town. A tenth of the land was consecrated; the rest was divided among the victors. Those Mycenaeans who did not escape, or come to terms with the Argives, were sold into slavery.² The same fate awaited Tiryns. Strabo informs us that the city was

The Argives
attack
Mycenae.

Destruction
of Mycenae.

¹ Herod. vii. 202, ix. 28.

² Diod. xi. 65. He attributes the absence of the Spartans to the earthquake, which however did not happen till 464 B.C., four years later than the archonship of Theagenides. Busolt, *G. G.* ii. p. 440, takes the lower date for the reduction of Mycenae, thinking that it accords better with the presence of the Tegeatae at Argos. See Strabo, pp. 372, 373, who adds the strange statement that Mycenae was so utterly destroyed that no traces of it remained. Diodorus merely says that it remained uninhabited to his time. Paus. vii. 25. 6; *ib.* viii. 27. 1; he tells us that some of the inhabitants of Mycenae went to Argos, others found shelter with Alexander, king of Macedon, at Cerynea in Achaea, and at Cleonae.

destroyed by the Argives owing to "its disobedience," but whether the disobedience is the attack made at the instigation of Cleander is uncertain. On their expulsion the Tirynthians retired to Epidaurus and Halieis on the coast of Argolis. The same policy was pursued with less famous cities, Hysiae, Orneae, Midea, and others, until Argos was mistress of the whole country, and as a large number of the conquered inhabitants were brought to the city, it increased greatly in size and population.¹

IO. These successes of her ancient and bitter enemy would go far to counterbalance the recent victory over Arcadia in the minds of the Spartans. Their position was perhaps even worse than they knew. By this time Pausanias must have set on foot those intrigues with the Helots, which in time, though he perished, were not without fruit. The extent of the mischief was unknown, but when the Helots were in question the Spartans had always reason to fear the worst. With their habitual cruelty they now tore some fugitives, who had taken sanctuary in the temple of Poseidon at Taenarus, from the altar and cut them down: an act which left misgivings in minds not less superstitious than ruthless, and brought upon the nation the "curse of Taenarus," as the death of Pausanias had brought upon it the "curse of Athena of the Brazen House."²

II. Such were the dangers gathering round Sparta in the years when Themistocles was established at Argos. So long as he remained there, security and peace were out of the question. He might even win his way back to power, and lead against the Spartans the combined forces of Athens and Argos. Besides, the Spartans were smarting under the disgrace which Pausanias had brought upon them, while Themistocles,

¹ Strabo, pp. 372, 373; Paus. viii. 27. 1; Herod. vi. 83.

² Thuc. i. 128; Paus. iv. 24. 5, 6.

though in exile, was still a great name in Greece. They resolved to drag him down in the infamy which had overwhelmed their own general, and put an end at once to his reputation and his life. Among the papers which came into their hands at the death of Pausanias, they professed to find evidence which implicated Themistocles, and immediately sent to Athens demanding that he should be put on his trial for "Medism."¹

It is not improbable that even before his ostracism the Spartans had attempted to bring some charge of this nature against Themistocles. His attitude towards the "medising" states—Thessaly, Thebes, and Argos—though dictated by his policy towards Sparta, might be presented in a false light, and perhaps his secret and tortuous conduct at the battle of Salamis was remembered against him. Later authors speak of two distinct charges; on the first of which he was acquitted, but condemned on the second; and though Thucydides says nothing of this, his account is so concise that many details must have been omitted.² How-
 ever this may be, he was now definitely charged with complicity in the plans of Pausanias, and an indictment for treachery was brought against him, in the Athenian assembly, by Leobotas, the son of Alcmaeon. The attack was of course supported

Two distinct charges of "Medism" may have been brought.

Accusation brought against Themistocles by Leobotas.

¹ Thuc. i. 135.

² Diodorus xi. 54 speaks of an attack before the ostracism, but as he connects this with the guilt of Pausanias, his account is somewhat doubtful: Pausanias cannot have died before the ostracism of Themistocles. The second charge (according to Diod. ch. 55) was brought in the time of the ostracism; and the trial was to take place not at Athens ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ συνεδρίου τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ὅπερ εἰώθει συνεδρεῖν ἐν τῇ Σπάρτῃ κατ' ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον. We know nothing of such a synod at Sparta, and if the congress at the Isthmus is meant, as appears to be the case from what follows, Diodorus is grievously wrong in his chronology. Plutarch, *Them.* 23, says that a γράφη προδοσίας was brought against Themistocles, when ostracised by Leobotas, supported by the Spartans, by whom the Athenians were persuaded to send men to arrest him that he might take his trial ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλησι.

by Sparta and by the friends of Sparta at Athens, of whom Cimon was the chief. Aristides is said to have taken no part in the matter; he stood apart, leaving events to take their course, but giving no sign that he sympathised with either side.¹ The accusation was probably brought in the form of an *eisangelia*—a process employed against those who attempted to destroy the constitution—which had the effect of bringing the case before the popular assembly to be decided by a popular vote. Themistocles was not present to defend himself; he is said to have written a letter, pointing out that his past conduct, however much it might expose him

to the suspicion of tyranny, betrayed no desire of Themistocles. to subjugate Athens to Persia. So far as 466 B.C.?

Pausanias was concerned, he was indeed aware of his plans, but he was by no means concerned in them, nor had he encouraged them.² But the influence of his enemies was too strong, and Themistocles was condemned. The punishment of traitors was severe. If arrested they were put to death, and their bones cast out of the country; their property was confiscated; their children deprived of civic rights; their very houses were pulled down, and the site marked by a pillar recording the offence. In the case of Themistocles some part of the sentence seems to have been remitted; his house at any rate was not destroyed. A good deal of his property was secretly sent away by his friends, but the amount confiscated is said to have reached 80 or 100 talents (£16,000 or £20,000).³

12. No sooner was the sentence passed, than a body of Athenians and Spartans were sent to Argos to arrest Themistocles. The Argives were of course quite unable to defend him against such a combination, and he was well aware that his life was at stake. He sought refuge with the Corcyraeans;

¹ Craterus in Müller, *F. H. G.* ii. p. 619. Plut. *Aristid.* 25 seems to confound Alcmaeon and Leobotas.

² Plut. *Them.* 23; Diod. xi. 55.

³ Plut. *Them.* 25.

but here also his pursuers followed him. Afraid to keep him, the Coreyraeans carried him over to the mainland opposite their island. Still the officers followed on his track. In his distress he found himself compelled to seek shelter with Admetus, the king of the Molossians, whose interest he had once opposed at Athens. Admetus happened to be from home when he arrived. On the advice of the queen, he placed himself as a suppliant on the hearth of the house, with the young son of Admetus in his arms. When the king returned Themistocles told him who he was, and how he was pursued; he entreated him not to take advantage of his helpless state to avenge the opposition which he had offered under far different circumstances. He might have deprived Admetus of some advantage in negotiation, but Admetus would deprive him of his life. Admetus accepted the supplication and took Themistocles under his protection. When the officers arrived in pursuit, he refused to give him up, and soon afterwards sent him at his own request to Pydna, in Macedonia, on his way to the Persian king.¹

Flight of
Themistocles.

He seeks
refuge with
Admetus.

From Pydna he set sail in a merchant vessel for the opposite coast. Misfortune still pursued him; a storm carried his ship into the Athenian fleet, which was at that time besieging Naxos, and he was in danger of falling into the hands of those whom he most wished to escape. He sent for the captain, told him who he was,

Themistocles
off Naxos.

¹ Thuc. i. 136; Plut. *Them.* 24. Plutarch adds that Epicrates sent out his wife and child to join him in Epirus, for which Epicrates was brought to trial by Cimon and put to death. The authority for this is Stesimbrotus, a worthless anecdotist, who contradicts himself by saying that Themistocles sailed from Epirus to Hiero, and requested his daughter in marriage. How long Themistocles was in Epirus is unknown, in fact we have only two fixed dates in regard to the close of his life—the ostracism in 471 B.C. and the arrival in Asia a little before the death of Xerxes in 465 B.C. Hiero died in 467 B.C. Diodorus, xi. 56, tells us that Admetus was terrified by the Lacedaemonian officers (τοὺς ἐπιφανεστάτους Σπαρτιατῶν) and persuaded Themistocles to steal away by night, etc.

—for he had been careful to conceal himself from every one,—and bade him save his life, otherwise he would accuse him of aiding his escape for a bribe. The captain agreed, and gave orders that no one should leave the vessel while she was off Naxos. After lying there for twenty-four hours in a rough sea off the Athenian station, the ship was able to pursue her course, and Themistocles was safely landed at Ephesus.¹

13. It was probably in the last year of the reign of Xerxes that Themistocles arrived in Asia. His position even there was by no means secure, for the Great King had put a price of 200 talents (£40,000) on his head. For some time he would seem to have remained in concealment; and during the interval he received from his friends the sum of money which he had accumulated at Athens and Argos. Out of these funds, we are told, he liberally rewarded the captain who had saved his life; he was also enabled to put in practice the plans which he had formed. In the story narrated, though with variations, by Diodorus and Plutarch, we are informed that he was conveyed in a palanquin, or woman's carriage, to Susa. On his arrival there he was brought to Artabanus, the king's chamberlain, who assured him that he could not come into the royal presence without the prostration and homage which was demanded by Persian custom. Themistocles expressed his readiness to comply with the rules of the court, upon which Artabanus asked his name, but this he refused to give to any one but the king.² To the

Themistocles
at Ephesus.
466-465 B.C. ?

His journey
to Susa.

¹ Thuc. i. 137; Plutarch, *Them.* 26, says that he landed at Cyme.

² Plut. *Them.* 27, on the authority of Phanias, a pupil of Aristotle. "Thucydides and Charon of Lampsacus inform us that Xerxes was dead when Themistocles arrived, and that it was his son to whom he came. Ephorus, Dino, Clitarchus, Heraclides, and many others, say that he went to Xerxes. Thucydides agrees better with the chronology, but the dates do not exactly agree." Plut. *l.c.* The date is fixed as nearly as one can fix it by the colony to Ennea Hodoi. This was sent out in 465-464—and before this we have the battles of Eurymedon and the siege of Naxos, which cannot have been later than 466-465. Xerxes was slain in 465.

king he was taken, and, when obeisance had been made, the interpreter bade him say who he was. He boldly declared he was Themistocles the Athenian, who had done Persia much harm, but also much good, by enabling Xerxes to escape out of Greece. He had been banished from his country, and was now at the service of the king. It was an anxious moment, when he ended; his life hung in the balance; there were Persians at hand who would gladly have cut him down. But the kings of Persia were at all times eager to receive the exiles whom Hellas drove into their arms. In his joy at seeing the great Athenian in Susa, Xerxes prayed that Arimanius—the spirit of evil—would at all times put it into the hearts of his enemies to banish their greatest men. The day closed in sacrifices and rejoicing, and even in the night, Xerxes thrice started from his sleep, crying, “Themistocles the Athenian is with me.”¹

We cannot say how much, if any part, of this scene is true. Thucydides tells a much plainer tale. After some time spent in Ephesus, Themistocles went up the country with one of the Persians who dwelt on the sea-coast. He then sent a letter to Artaxerxes, who was recently come to the throne at the time of his arrival, of which the precise words were preserved. “I, Themistocles, have come to you; I, who of all Hellenes did your house the greatest injuries so long as I was compelled to defend myself against your father, but still greater benefits when I was in safety and he in danger, during his retreat. And there is a debt of gratitude due to me”—here he claimed that the bridges over the Hellespont had not been destroyed owing to his influence. “Here then am I, able and willing to do you many other services, and persecuted by the Hellenes on your account. Let me remain a year, and then explain to you in person the reason of my coming.”² The king bade him wait a year as he proposed, and Themistocles used the interval to acquire as much knowledge as he could

His reception
by the king.

The account
of Thucydides:
Themistocles’
letter to
Artaxerxes.

¹ Plut. *Them.* 28; Diod. xi. 56.

² Thuc. i. 137.

of the manners and language of the country, after which he went to the court, and became a greater man there than any Hellene had been before—greater than Demaratus, the exiled king of Sparta, who had accompanied Xerxes on his march to Hellas. He was made governor of Magnesia, on the Maeander, and this city (which brought in a revenue of 50 talents (£10,000) was assigned to him for bread; in like manner, Lampsacus was assigned to him for wine, and Myus for meat.¹

He is settled
at Magnesia.
464-463 B.C.?

The king had hopes that Themistocles would assist him in enslaving Hellas, but the hopes were doomed to disappointment. So long as the Persian armies were employed in crushing the rebellion in Bactria, which broke out on the accession of Artaxerxes, Themistocles was allowed to remain quietly in Magnesia,² but when at length the Athenians took part in the revolt of Egypt, and Hellenic triremes were once more despatched to Cyprus and Cilicia, he was called upon to make good the promises upon which the king had received him. It was too late. According to the simple narrative of

Themistocles
fails to aid
the king.

Thucydides, a disease carried him off, but even in his day another version was current.

His death,

Either because the task imposed upon him was hopeless, or because his resentment had cooled, or owing to the memory of the glorious past, Themistocles resolved that he would take no part in the subjugation of Hellas. Summoning his friends as to a feast, he sacrificed to the gods, drank a draught of bull's blood, and so ended his life. Whatever may have been the manner of his death, a splendid

¹ It is difficult to see how Themistocles could derive much benefit from the two cities last mentioned, as they were members of the Delian league. The king, no doubt, ignored the league, and Themistocles was expected to get what he could, or go without. The favour shown to Themistocles would appear to have aroused jealousy; we hear of a night-attack on him on his return from Susa to the coast. *Plut. Them.* 30.

² *Plut. Them.* 31.

monument was erected in his honour in the market-place of Magnesia, and even in the time of Plutarch, Themistocles the Athenian, a personal friend and fellow-student at Athens under Ammonius the Peripatetic, enjoyed certain privileges from that city.¹ But his friends maintained that his bones had been brought home and laid in Attic earth, and in after times the tomb of Themistocles and tomb. was pointed out on the shore of the Gulf of Salamis; it was forgotten then that the ashes of a traitor could not be buried in his native land.

14. We have no contemporary sketch of Themistocles except the verses of Timocreon, a Rhodian poet, famous for his evil tongue. If we are to believe this scurrilous writer, he had received from Themistocles a promise Character of Themistocles. that he should be carried back to Rhodes—apparently soon after the battle of Salamis—but this promise was not fulfilled, because Themistocles was offered three talents from the poet's enemies to neglect it. Timocreon Timocreon's sketch. repaid the wrong done to him in a poem of which a fragment has been preserved. "If you on your part commend Pausanias, or Xanthippus, or Leotyichidas, I commend Aristides as the very best man that ever came out of sacred Athens: for as for Themistocles, Leto abhorred him; a cheat, a rogue, a traitor is he, who for the sake of filthy lucre would not carry back his friend Timocreon to his home in Ialysus; no! he pocketed his three talents, and away he sailed—may the crows get him!—restoring some men unjustly, expelling others, slaying others, and all for lucre's sake. Then at the Isthmus he gave a shabby entertainment of cold meat, and his guests ate and wished bad luck to Themistocles."² At a later time, when Themistocles had

¹ Thuc. i. 138; Plut. *Them.* 31, 32.

² Timocr. *Frag.* 1, Bergk; Plut. *Them.* 21. The phrase ἡχθαρε Ἀάτῳ refers doubtless to Demeter as *κουροτρόφος*, the nurse of children: Themistocles was a miserable wretch from his cradle! Timocreon's own character is given in the famous lines of Simonides—

πολλὰ πίων καὶ πολλὰ φάγων καὶ πολλὰ κάκ' εἰπὼν
ἀνθρώπους κείμει Τιμοκρέων Ῥόδιος.

been condemned for Medism, Timocreon could not conceal his delight; he had apparently fallen under a similar charge himself, but now he was no worse than Athens' greatest general. "Timocreon is not the only one," he cried, "who has plighted faith with Medes. There are rogues in the world as well as he; I am not the only fox which has lost his tail."

Next of our witnesses in point of time, and far superior to Timocreon in value, is Herodotus. That great historian was no friend to Themistocles; he never mentions him with favour; more than once he accuses him of bribery, on grounds which are certainly not convincing (see *supra*, p. 167), and he intimates that in his message to Xerxes he was playing a double game. Of this, which was probably the view current in Cimonian Athens, and among the circle of the Alcmaeonids, we have already spoken.

Thucydides has placed on record a judgment which does full justice to the extraordinary intellect of Themistocles. He was distinguished, he tells us, above all other men by his

The judgment
of Herodotus
adverse to
Themistocles.

natural force; he could rely, in any emergency, on his own native quickness, and without study could divine the events of the remote

future. His judgment could dispense with experience; and what he had in hand he could explain to others with singular clearness. "In a word, Themistocles, by natural power of mind, and with the least preparation, was of all men the best able to extemporise the right thing to be done." But on the conduct and the patriotism of Themistocles, Thucydides says not a word; nowhere has he written a syllable which enables us to decide whether in his judgment the greatest of

Character of
Themistocles
in Thucydides.

Athenians was condemned justly or not.¹ It is of course impossible to deny that in his letter to Artaxerxes, Themistocles claimed the credit

of services which he had not rendered, or had rendered perforce; and that he ascribed his conduct to a motive by

¹ Thuc. i. 138.

which it was not governed. But by this time the die was cast, and a case must be made out to put before the king. If we go back to the days before the final sentence of the Athenians was passed, and ask what proof there is that Themistocles was an accomplice of Pausanias, we are compelled to say that there is none. The evidence in favour of the accusation was supplied by Sparta at a time when the Spartans wished by every means in their power to get rid of Themistocles; and it was accepted at Athens, when Themistocles was absent from the city, out of favour with the people, and cordially hated by the leaders of the day. That Themistocles went far beyond his contemporaries in his designs we are very ready to believe: he probably saw Athens a mighty empire, extending from Sicily to Rhodes, from Byzantium to Cyprus: perhaps he saw himself the leader and controller of this wide dominion. He felt conscious that no one could realise the dream but himself, and for this reason a personal aggrandisement seemed to underlie all his policy. But at heart he was neither a tyrant nor a traitor. The sentence passed upon him was due to a combination of party spirit and stupidity, which it is melancholy to contemplate; and in a very few years those who had played into the hands of Sparta by his ostracism and condemnation had bitter reason to repent the step which they had taken. On the other hand, we must allow that the Spartans gained greatly by his removal. Had he been at Argos or at Athens when the Helots revolted in 464 B.C. it would have gone hard indeed with Sparta.

Little evidence
in proof of
the charge
against him.

15. The date of the death of Themistocles may be placed about 453 B.C. (p. 108). Before this time one of his great rivals had been exiled from Athens, and the other was dead.¹ Of Cimon we shall speak in another chapter; of Aristides there is little to record. The circumstances of his last years, the time and date and place of his

Aristides.

¹ Plutarch speaks of the year 478 B.C. as "a little before the death of Aristides," but the story quoted below about the play of Aeschylus seems to prove that he was alive in 467 B.C.

death, are unknown. After his services in the formation of the Delian league and the assessment of the tribute (ch. viii.), he gradually passes into the background to make room for the younger and more energetic Cimon. In the age of Alexander,

Story of Craterus. Craterus preserved a story—unauthenticated by any document—that after the exile of Themistocles a mob of sycophants arose at Athens, who put the best men on their trial, and were supported in their attacks by an insolent democracy. One of these men, Diophantus by name, charged Aristides with receiving bribes from the Ionians in his assessment of the tribute. He was condemned to pay 50 minae (£175), and being unable to do so he retired to Ionia, where he died. In another account he was said to have died in the Pontus, when engaged in the public service; in another, to have died at Athens, admired and honoured by his citizens. This statement is

Story of the "Septem contra Thebas." at least supported by the story, which Plutarch records, that when the *Septem contra Thebas* was brought out by the poet Aeschylus in 467 B.C., and the actor repeated the noble lines in which Amphiaraus is described—

οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν δίκαιος, ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλει,
βαθείαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενος,
ἀφ' ἧς τὰ κεδνὰ βλαστάνει βουλευματα

—the whole audience turned to look at Aristides as the man to whom the praise most fitly applied.¹ His tomb was seen at Phalerum, built by a grateful city, for he died so

The poverty of Aristides. poor that there was nothing left, even for funeral expenses. His daughters were dowered by the state: his son Lysimachus received a gift of land and a sum of money. The poverty continued to the third and fourth generation. Even in the time of Demetrius of Phalerum (317 B.C.) his female descendants received a daily allowance from the state.²

¹ Plut. *Arist.* 26. Cf. *ib.* 3. Our texts of Aesch. give ἄριστος.

² Plut. *Arist.* 27. Cf. Demosth. *Leptin.* p. 492.

There is but one opinion about Aristides among his contemporaries. He is the man without reproach—Aristides the just. As we have seen, Timocreon is loud in his praises; and Herodotus records the memorable judgment, that in his opinion—and he had made it a matter of inquiry—Aristides was the best and most upright of the men of his time.¹ Thucydides expresses no opinion about him, yet he intimates that his assessment of the tribute in the Delian league was one which even the cities which paid the tribute regarded with satisfaction. In Plutarch's time Aristides had become an ideal: he was not only the most just of Athenians, the founder of the Delian league, the author of equality in Athens—but also a great general, who practically secured victory for Greece on the battle-field of Plataea. Plutarch rejects with indignation the story of Craterus, that he was condemned—even unjustly—for bribery. Amid the corruption of his time he stands out clear with Cimon, Ephialtes, and Pericles. If he swerved at all from the strictest conduct, the wrong was done in the service of his country. When the Delian league became too plainly an Athenian empire, he bade the Athenians lay upon his head the guilt of broken oaths; and when the chest was removed from Delos to Athens, he acquiesced, saying it was expedient if not honest.²

Aristides began life as an associate of Clisthenes, that is, as a reformer in the direction of democracy. At that time he was no doubt convinced that the safety of Athens lay in

¹ Timocreon, *frag.* 1. Herod. viii. 79, τὸν ἐγὼ νενόμικα πυνθανόμενος αὐτοῦ τὸν τρόπον ἄριστον ἄνδρα γενέσθαι ἐν Ἀθήνῃσι, καὶ δικαιότατον.

² Plut. *Arist.* 25, on the authority of Theophrastus. In the *Athen. Pol.* of Aristotle Aristides is renowned for his honesty, yet he nevertheless urges on the Athenians the policy of appropriating the funds of the league! On the removal of the chest, see *infra*, c. x. I have not thought it worth while to repeat the story told by Plut. (*Arist.* 4), on the authority of Idomeneus (of Lampsacus, a contemporary of Epicurus), that Aristides when ἐπιμελητὴς τῶν δημοσίων προσέδωκεν convicted Themistocles and others who had held the office before him and with him of embezzlement, etc.

her army, and that the Spartan soldier was the typical soldier of Greece—the ideal whom all should strive to imitate.

Aristides a
democrat,
but with
limitations.

He lived to see Athens saved by her fleet; he changed with the change, and showed his sense of the services of the sailor class. Whether he would have gone further and approved of an extreme democracy is more doubtful. Our authorities on this point are inconsistent. On the one hand we are told that he resisted the attempts of Themistocles to increase the power of the democracy; on the other that he was the founder of the policy which was afterwards developed by Ephialtes and Pericles.¹

¹ For Aristides and Ephialtes see *Athen. Pol.* c. 41. Ephialtes is there said to carry out the policy begun by Aristides, but the view taken of Aristides in that treatise (and a good deal besides) is in many respects unsupported by the testimony of antiquity.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE DELIAN LEAGUE, 477-464 B.C.

I. WHEN the Spartans recalled Pausanias from Byzantium in the autumn of 478 B.C., the rest of the Peloponnesians, who had sent contingents of ships to the great alliance, withdrew them also, leaving the Athenians and their allies to continue the war, as they had been left to carry on the siege of Sestos in 479 B.C. Nothing daunted, they resolved, as before, to go on with their task, and in order to carry it out with greater method and effect, a league was formed for the purpose of "devastating the king's country" and obtaining compensation for the losses which he had inflicted on Greece. This was the Delian League, which must be carefully distinguished on the one hand from the Spartan Confederacy, on the other from the Great Alliance of 481 B.C.

Formation of
the Delian
league.

Of this important transaction Thucydides gives us but a meagre and obscure account. He informs us that the Athenians, when elected to the leadership by the consent and choice of the allies (p. 237), proceeded to determine which of the cities should supply money, and which should supply ships for the war against the barbarians; to fix the amount of tribute, and to arrange for its collection. A synod or congress, which met in the temple of Apollo at Delos, was formed of representatives from the various cities; all were equally represented; all were independent; small or great, every city had the same vote, and, to that extent, the same power in the decisions of the league. In the same temple the chest of the league was placed, under

Arrangements
of the league.

the superintendence of the Hellenotamiae, a new board of officers created for the purpose—officers who were, however, Athenians, and elected at Athens. At the first taxation the amount of tribute was assessed at 460 talents (£92,000).¹

How the league was summoned, and what power was given to the majority in coercing the minority, we are not informed. What is clear is, that the league was, in the first instance, a collection of equal and autonomous states, of which Athens was the leader. The members were in no way subject to Athens, whose power was derived solely from the votes of the synod, without which, apparently, no money could be spent, and no expedition could be undertaken. Athens herself derived no benefit from the league, for though the Hellenotamiae were Athenians and elected at Athens, the treasury of the league was placed at Delos, under the control of the synod. She was indeed incomparably the strongest power in the league, but her vote counted for no more than that of the most obscure island of the Aegean which sent a representative to the board.

The historian goes on to tell us that the original independence of the allies was almost entirely destroyed by Athens in the interval between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. The Naxians were the first who were enslaved "contrary to the agreement; the turn of the rest came later." This enslavement was the consequence of the defection of the allies, who for various reasons attempted to break away from the league; some neglecting to pay tribute or to furnish ships; others failing to render military service.² The Athenians insisted on keeping them to their bargain, and when persuasion was ineffectual, they used force. Then the majority, disliking military service and absence from home, agreed to contribute a regular sum of money instead of ships, a change in the original form of the league which could not fail to destroy the equality of the members.

Equal position
of all the
states.

Progress of
the Athenians
in the league.

Causes of
revolt.

¹ Thuc. i. 96.

² Thuc. i. 99.

The money thus contributed was used by the Athenians for building ships, which, as they became a part of their own fleet, and subject to their control, increased the Athenian navy in the same proportion as the allies became more and more helpless, until at length Athens attained an irresistible preponderance in the league.

From this account, we gather that at the foundation of the league there were allies who contributed ships, and others who contributed money. Each of these classes was independent, for the payment of money Changes in
the league. did not imply a loss of *αὐτονομία* or independence. The amount of tribute was fixed at 460 talents; and this amount, we are able to affirm, was apportioned by Aristides among the various cities.¹ By degrees a number of cities which wished to withdraw from the league were compelled against their will to continue in it, thus losing their independence of action; and a large number, which originally supplied ships, preferred to pay the cost of them in money—a fatal step, which threw such a preponderance of power into the hands of Athens that she became absolute mistress of the league.² The allies who paid money were not released from the obligation of military service on land; the Milesians, for instance, who paid tribute, aided the Athenians against Corinth and Cythera; and we often hear of large forces of hoplites from the allies in the Athenian service. When, therefore, Thucydides says that the cities agreed to pay money instead of furnishing ships, because they “disliked military service and absence from home,” the words can only refer to service at sea.³

When he speaks of the allies of Athens at the time of the

¹ Thuc. v. 18; the words refer to the *φόρος* of 460 t. mentioned in i. 96; cf. Aristot. *Athen. Pol.* c. 23.

² Apparently we ought to distinguish, at this period of the league's history, between the money paid as tribute and the money paid as compensation.

³ For Milesians in the Athenian army see Thuc. iv. 42, 53. For other allies see v. 84, vi. 43, etc.

great Sicilian war,¹ Thucydides draws a clearly marked distinction between the *independent* allies who furnished ships, and the *subject* allies, who were tributary. The payment of money has now become a symbol of subjection. How the change came about is not clear. We can only guess that where money was paid upon compulsion—and this is assumed to be the case in all those cities which had lost the means of independent action—the payment was looked on as a proof of subjection. In the original arrangement of the league this was not the case, and under the terms of the peace of Nicias certain cities of Chalcidice were at once independent and tributary.²

2. The account which Plutarch has given of the early history of the league does not agree with that of Thucydides.

Plutarch's
account of the
league not in
harmony with
that of
Thucydides.

In his life of Aristides, he informs us that the Greeks had paid some kind of contribution to the expense of the war during the leadership of the Lacedaemonians, but when the new alliance was formed under Athens they wished to pay

a fixed sum, city by city, and for this object they requested that Aristides might be sent to examine their territories and revenues, and draw up a scheme of payment.³ This was done, and Aristides fixed the total at 460 talents. Plutarch goes on to compare this sum with the 600 talents of tribute received at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war—attributing the increase to Pericles—and with the far higher sums imposed after the death of Pericles, a comparison which involves us in some difficulty. For if the sum fixed by

The assess-
ments.

Aristides can be compared with the sum paid in the time of Pericles, it would include the money paid as compensation for ships: but by comparing it with the sum paid under the leadership of the Lacedaemonians,

¹ Thuc. vii. 57.

² "The said cities shall be independent, but shall pay the tribute which was fixed in the time of Aristides."—Thuc. v. 18.

³ Plut. *Aristid.* 24. ἀποφορά is the name given to the older contribution.

Plutarch has indicated that it was a tax on all alike, over and above the contributions of ships and men. And this seems to be his meaning in the life of Cimon, where he speaks of the later history of the league. The allies, he says, paid their tribute, but they did not furnish men and ships according to the agreement. They were weary of service, and thought that a continuance of the war was unnecessary, when the barbarians had been driven out of the Greek cities, and reduced to harmless inaction. So they neither manned ships nor sent soldiers. The Athenian commanders, who were by no means inclined to take this view, were for compelling the allies to fulfil their obligations, but Cimon advised a more conciliatory course. He contented himself with taking money and empty ships from those who were averse to military service, pointing out that the arrangement was greatly to the advantage of the Athenians, who were thus enabled to maintain at the cost of the allies a fleet which made resistance on their part impossible.¹

In this account the allies are supposed to contribute money, ships, and soldiers. The change from the original to the later form of the league consists in the fact that many allies who supplied ships and soldiers ceased to do so, and either paid money only, or furnished empty ships, with a sum of money in lieu of sailors. These compensatory payments were therefore an addition to the original *phoros*, as fixed by Aristides, and quite distinct from it; and the amount of money received by Athens must on this arrangement have been greatly in excess of 460 talents.

Contributions
of the allies:
all pay money.

Now in the time of the Peloponnesian war, it is as clear as our evidence can make it, that the cities which furnished ships did not pay money; that those which paid money did not furnish ships; and these last supplied heavy-armed soldiers, when called upon to do so. Of empty ships we never hear a word. It follows then that the arrangements of the league in its early stages, which are presupposed by the account of

In the
Peloponnesian
war some
allies do not
pay money.

¹ Plut. *Cim.* 11.

Plutarch, cannot be reconciled with the arrangements in practice at the time of the Peloponnesian war.

3. There remains the evidence of the monuments. This, however, is not available till the year 454 B.C., twenty-four

Evidence

of the

monuments.

years after the foundation of the league. From

that time onwards for many years we can tell,

with more or less accuracy, according to the

state of the inscriptions, the amount of certain contributions paid by the allies to Athens. But we have no means of judging whether these sums cover the whole amount which the allies contributed; or in what relation the amounts recorded stand to the total sum of tribute, as it was assessed by Aristides.¹ The inference has indeed been drawn that the income for the league cannot have reached the sum of 460 talents till after the battle of Eurymedon (466 B.C.), when the cities of the Carian district were brought into it, a date long subsequent to that at which Aristides was called in to make his assessment. But it cannot be proved that some at least of the Carian cities were not members of the league before the battle of Eurymedon; and, in fact, we have no means of knowing with any sort of precision what cities were members of the league at its foundation; or how much they paid. The inscriptions are of great value when we come to describe the later arrangements of the league, but they throw little or no light on the first formation of it.

4. The conclusions which we seem able to draw from this tangled evidence are these:—

(1) The assessment of Aristides was an arrangement covering the whole league, and not confined to a part of it.

Probable

conclusions.

It represented in *money value* the total contri-

bution of the allies to the war. Plutarch is

wrong in confining it to the amount paid *over and above* the

¹ For instance, no traces whatever are found in these inscriptions of any money paid by Samos to Athens after the reduction of the island in 439 B.C. Yet we know that she paid a heavy indemnity, and in Thuc. vii. 57 she is mentioned among the tributary cities.

contribution in ships and crews; and Thucydides must not be interpreted to mean that it was the amount paid by those *only*, who did not furnish ships and crews.

(2) In the first instance the allies who paid money were nevertheless independent members of the league; the loss of independence therefore meant something more than the contribution of money instead of ships, though at a later time it coincided with it. It meant forced contributions; the presence of Athenian troops in the allied cities; assessment by Athenian officers, and the like.

(3) The allies who furnished ships and crews, were not bound to furnish men for service on land.

(4) From the very first foundation of the league some of the allies did not furnish ships, but only money and soldiers.

5. With the increase of the power of Athens the synod of Delos naturally fell into decay. Of what use were common deliberations when the results could not be carried into execution without the consent and Decay of the synod. aid of one city? How could the members be equal, when the league was kept together by compulsion? A short twelve years had elapsed from the foundation when the principle that each member should be *ισόψηφος* was set at defiance by the reduction of Naxos. The synod no doubt continued to exist, but under such circumstances it can hardly have served any other purpose than the announcement of the plans of the Athenian generals, and the assessment of the money or ships to be provided by the various allied cities. Even this shadow of power passed away when the chest was finally conveyed to Athens—an event which cannot be placed later than the year 454 B.C. From this time forward the meetings, if any took place, were probably summoned at Athens; Delos with its old associations passed out of sight till it became necessary to use the island as a rallying-point for the Ionians.

The change which transferred the confederation into an empire was perhaps inevitable. At its first foundation the

league was regarded as indissoluble. Lumps of iron were sunk in the sea, when Aristides took the oaths from the allies, to mark the lasting nature of the compact; and this compact it was the business of the confederacy, and of the Athenians, as the chief executive power, to maintain. In many of their actions they probably had the majority of the league with them. At the revolt of Samos in 440 B.C. when the supremacy of Athens was already clear to every eye, Chios and Lesbos were firm supporters of the city; they

The league
becomes the
Athenian
empire.

perceived that the independence of Samos would lead to complications with Persia, and they had no wish to fall back into their old position as subjects of the king. At the same time it is obvious that the Athenians gained and meant to gain by the change. Before the foundation of the league, they were thought, even by so favourable a judge as Herodotus, to have intrigued for their position as leaders, the iniquities of Pausanias being no more than a pretext for their ambition.¹ In a similar spirit they would take advantage of any defection, in payment or service, to reduce the number of their rivals in the synod; they learned to look on the contributions of the allies as money belonging to them, so long as the purposes of the alliance were fulfilled; and they did not hesitate to keep control over the subject cities by interfering in their government. These selfish aims were kept more steadily in view, as war with Sparta took the place of war with Persia in Athenian policy, until at last the allies, who had joined in an equal confederation to attack the barbarians, found themselves compelled to follow Athens in making war upon the Greeks.

6. The capture of Eion, which is mentioned by Thucydides as the first achievement of the Delian league, was the most important event in the series of operations by which the Persians were finally expelled from

¹ Herod. viii. 3.

Europe.¹ At the time of the first conquest, in the reign of Darius, lieutenant-governors had been established in strong fortresses throughout the Persian possessions in Thrace and the Hellespont, in order to keep them in subjection, and these posts were maintained even after the destruction of the Persian fleet and army in the Great Invasion. The most important were Doriscus, at the mouth of the Hebrus, which was held by Mascames, and Eion, at the mouth of the Strymon, where Boges was in command. From both these officers the allied fleet now met with a desperate resistance. In spite of repeated attempts to dislodge him, Mascames retained his post, and it was not till his death that the Persians were driven from the Hebrus.² Boges was not so fortunate. The town of Eion, which commanded the bridge over the Strymon, was a most important strategical post; it was the key of the whole country, which could not be allowed to remain in the hands of the enemy. The expedition was intrusted to Cimon, who now appears for the first time in an independent command. He landed his forces, defeated the Persians who came out to meet him, and shut them up in the town, which he immediately invested. In order to make it impossible for the besieged to receive any supplies from the neighbouring Thracians, who appear to have been not unfriendly to them, he laid waste the territory round his lines and drove the inhabitants into the interior. Nothing daunted, Boges continued to resist; even when escape was impossible and famine imminent, he refused the overtures of Cimon, that he should leave the place unharmed and retire into Asia. When at length the famine was so severe that he could no longer hold the town, he determined to die at his post. Causing a large pyre to be built, he slew his children, wives, concubines, and servants, and threw their bodies upon it; after which, when

Persian
officers in
Thrace.

Cimon at
Eion.

Desperate
resistance of
Boges.

¹ Thuc. i. 98.

² Herod. vii. 105-107, κατέσταναν γὰρ ἔτι πρότερον ταύτης τῆς ἑλάνσιος ὑπαρχοι ἐν τῇ Θρηίκῃ καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου πανταχῇ.

he had strewed all the gold and silver in his possession in the Strymon, he cast himself into the burning mass. Nothing remained for the conqueror but an empty stronghold, with a few famished inhabitants.¹

The language of Thucydides would lead us to suppose that no colony was sent out from Athens to occupy the conquered territory of Eion, but when we compare his account with that of Plutarch and others we find reason to believe that his silence merely veils the disaster which overtook the first attempt of the Athenians to acquire the banks of the Strymon. A colony was sent out under the command of Lysistratus, Lycurgus, and Cratinus, but the colonists had scarcely arrived before they were destroyed by the Thracians, who had no intention of yielding up their fertile territory to the liberators of Greece (in the archonship of Phaëdon, 476-475 B.C.). Whether the town and fortress of Eion were maintained by the league in spite of the destruction of the colonists, is uncertain.²

7. The conquest of Eion was followed by the recovery of the Thracian coast. We know that the cities of Argilus, Stageirus, Acanthus, Scôlus, Olynthus, and Spartôlus paid the tribute fixed by Aristides, and we may fairly assume that a large number of the towns, which subsequently formed the Thracian district of the league, were incorporated at this time. The efforts of the Greeks were supported by those of Alexander, king of Macedon, who seized the opportunity to recover complete control of his dominions, including all the cities of the coast, except Methône, from Chalcidice to Olympus. With the exception of Doriscus, which Mascarnes was still

¹ Herod. *l.c.*; Plut. *Cim.* 7; Paus. viii. 8. 9. Pausanias tells us that Cimon destroyed the walls of Eion by turning the river upon them, in the same manner as Agesipolis destroyed the walls of Mantinea by the help of the river Ophis. Herodotus says nothing about this.

² Thuc. i. 98. Of Eion he says ἡνδραπόδισαν; of Scyros in the next sentence ἡνδραπόδισαν καὶ ἔκτισαν αὐτοί. For the colony see Plut. *Cim.* 7, and esp. Aeschin. 2, 31, with the Scholiast.

holding, and perhaps a few towns in the Chersonese, the Persians were now expelled from Europe, after an occupation of about forty years (515-475 B.C.).¹

8. In his life of Theseus Plutarch tells us that, after the battle of Marathon, the Athenians resolved to worship Theseus as a hero. With this purpose in view they consulted the oracle of Delphi (in the archonship of Phaëdon, 476-475 B.C.), by which they were bidden to bring the bones of Theseus from the island of Scyros, where he was known to have perished, to Athens.

The bones of
Theseus.

In order to fulfil the command of the oracle, it was necessary to expel the Dolopian inhabitants from Scyros—as they forbade any search for the sacred relics. An unprovoked attack might have been successful, but the Athenians shrank from an act of such unqualified aggression, and the piracy of the Dolopians soon supplied the necessary pretext. A number of Thessalian mariners who had put in at Ctesium were plundered and thrown into prison by the islanders. On their escape they brought the matter before the Amphictyonic council, which chose to treat it as an affair lying within their jurisdiction, and imposed a fine on the Dolopians.² The Dolopians refused to pay as a city, insisting that those who had been guilty of the outrage should be called on to refund what they had stolen. The Thessalians then requested Cimon to carry out the Amphictyonic decree. This was precisely what the Athenians wanted. Cimon at once responded to the appeal; the island was conquered; the inhabitants were sold into slavery, and the territory divided among Athenian colonists (in the archonship of Apsephion, 469-468 B.C.).

The Athen-
ians called
upon by the
Thessalians
to attack
Scyros.

The island
conquered and
"colonised."
469 B.C.
Ol. 77. 4.

¹ For the cities see Thuc. v. 18; for Mascames, Herod. vii. 106. Doriscus is not found among the cities which paid tribute. For the towns in the Chersonesus, see Plut. *Cim.* 14.

² Bürgel, *Amphiktyonie*, pp. 83, 199, 247.

The island thus secured, the search for the relics of Theseus began, and by divine guidance Cimon was himself conducted to the grave where they were buried—bones of more than human size, and a spear beside them. These he placed on his own trireme, which had been adorned with peculiar magnificence, and returned to Athens in all the splendour of victory and success. The people gave him a most enthusiastic reception; he had not only achieved a great conquest, and acquired territory for Athens, but he was bringing with him the pledge of future prosperity.

The relics were deposited in a temple, and a great festival was instituted in honour of Theseus on the eighth of Pyanepsion (Sept.-Oct.), the day on which he had returned in triumph from Crete with the boys whom he had saved from the Minotaur. "In other months also," Plutarch continues, "Theseus was worshipped, and always on the eighth day, either because he returned from Troezen on the eighth of Hecatombæon, or because the number eight stood in a peculiarly close relation to him as the reputed son of Poseidon, whom we worship on the eighth day. For eight is at once the double of the first square, and the first cube of an even number, thus denoting the firm solidity associated with that deity, whom we entitle the Firmly-planted, and the Earth-upholder." The temple of

Temple of
Theseus at
Athens.

Theseus became the asylum of all who were oppressed and maltreated, however humble their estate, and more especially of slaves when injured by their masters. Such powers of protection were properly assigned to one who in his day had been a knight-errant, redressing wrongs and helping the helpless, and whom it was now the fashion to regard as the champion of Athenian democracy.¹

The worship of a national hero in the Greek cities arose out of the wish to acquire or preserve the protection of a great name; above all, to secure some kind of sanction for the national policy of the city. It was for this reason that

¹ Plut. *Thes.* cc. 35, 36.

the Spartans, when consolidating their position as leaders of the Peloponnesian confederacy, brought home the bones of Orestes from Arcadia to serve as a proof that the leadership once enjoyed by the Pelopids had now descended to the Heracleids.¹ It was for this reason that Clisthenes of Sicyon, when he wished to put an end to the connection of Sicyon with Argos, attempted to expel from his city the hero Adrastus, whose presence was a symbol of the ancient union. And when the city of Amphipolis went over in the Peloponnesian war from the Athenians to the Lacedaemonians, the change was accompanied by a change in the hero of the city, Hagnon, the founder of the Athenian colony, being displaced by Brasidas, who had inaugurated the connection with Sparta. Similar motives prevailed in the present case. The Athenians had recently become the leaders of a great league, which had for its avowed object the liberation of the Greeks and the punishment of their oppressor. The league was moreover a naval one, and the leading city was the foremost supporter of democratic principles in Greece. For such a league and such a leader no more suitable hero could be found than Theseus, the reputed son of Poseidon, the destroyer of monsters, the liberator of Athens, the founder of democracy. By bringing his bones to Athens and paying him honour as a hero, the Athenians gained the sanction of his name for their new position and their new policy.

Causes which led to the recovery of the bones of Theseus.

9. The return of Cimon is said to have taken place at the time when the tragedies were being acted at the festival of the great Dionysia (March). The competition on this occasion excited an unusual degree of attention; a young poet named Sophocles had obtained a chorus from the archon for the first time, and was matched against the veteran Aeschylus, whose play of the *Persae*, so flattering to Athenian pride, had been brought out only four years previously. The decision on the merits of the plays acted at the Dionysia rested with five judges, chosen by a

Cimon's return to Athens.

¹ See Busolt, *Lakedaim.* p. 49 f.

most elaborate process, in order to avoid the suspicion of corruption, but their judgment was controlled to some extent by the audience; they could hardly pronounce a verdict which was quite opposed to popular feeling.¹ In the present contest the sympathies of the audience were pretty evenly divided between Aeschylus and Sophocles; and each side

He and his
fellow-generals
called upon
to decide
between
Aeschylus and
Sophocles.

pressed their wishes with such extraordinary eagerness that the archon (Apsephion) hesitated to draw the lots which would decide the names of the five judges. Calling on Cimon, and his nine fellow-generals, who had just entered the theatre to offer libations to Athena, he swore them in as judges, one for each tribe. They accepted the duty, and decided in favour of Sophocles.²

Among the many spectators of the splendid return of Cimon there were probably some who, observing that the Athenians had recently attempted to colonise Eion with citizens of their own, and were now appropriating the whole of Scyros—territories acquired by the common action of the league—were little inclined to join in the enthusiasm which greeted the relics of the Athenian hero. The strict equality of all the members, which was made so prominent a part of the Delian association, was already disappearing before the energy and ambition of the leading state.

10. The next event in the history of the league was the

The Cary-
stians
compelled to
join the
league.

attack upon Carystus, the Dryopian town on the south coast of Euboea. What induced the Athenians to take this step is not recorded; but as Thucydides informs us that the rest of Euboea was not involved in the war, we may conjecture that

¹ Haigh, *The Attic Theatre*, p. 45 ff.

² Plut. *Cim.* 8; *Thes.* 36. I tell the tale as Plutarch has told it; but (1) there is no good reason why an oracle given in 476-475 should remain inoperative till 469-468; and (2) the statement, which Plutarch adds, that Aeschylus left Athens in disgust at his defeat and retired to Sicily, is proved to be wrong by the fact that his *Septem* was brought out in the next year. That the bones of Theseus were conveyed to Athens admits of no doubt.

Carystus had refused to become a member of the league. When Datis landed on the coast of the island in 490 B.C., the town was compelled to surrender by the Persians, but the lesson then learnt was remembered, and in the invasion of 480 B.C., Carystus, with the islands of Andros, Tenos, and others, joined the invader. For this reason, the territory of the Carystians was laid waste by the Grecian fleet after the battle of Salamis, in spite of the money paid to avert the disaster. Such treatment was not likely to conciliate the feelings of the Carystians, a hardy race, who appear in the Peloponnesian war as among the bravest of the Athenian allies. But the Athenians were by this time far too powerful to allow an isolated city of Euboea to pursue an independent course. They went to war with the recalcitrants. A vigorous opposition was offered, and after some time the belligerents came to terms, Carystus consenting to be enrolled in the league. One incident only of the war is recorded. Herodotus informs us that the Athenian Hermolycus, who won the prize of valour at Mycale, and was moreover a distinguished athlete, fell in battle at Cyrrus in Carystia, and was buried at Geraestus.¹

Hermolycus.

II. The compulsory embodiment of Carystus in the league was followed by still more high-handed action on the part of the Athenians. Before the Persian invasion—at the time of the ill-fated Ionic revolt, the island of Naxos was far the most flourishing of the Cyclades. She was not only able to place 8000 hoplites in the field, but she had acquired some kind of sovereignty over the neighbouring islands, and indeed over the whole of the Cyclades.² In the war with Persia she had been the last to submit to the barbarians—remaining unconquered till Datis crossed the Aegean in 490—and the first

Revolt of
Naxos.

¹ For Datis at Carystus, Herod. vi. 99; for the events of 480, *ib.* viii. 66, 112. For Hermolycus, Herod. ix. 105; Paus. i. 23. 10. For the war, Thuc. i. 98, χρόνος συνέβησαν καθ' ὁμολογίαν.

² Herod. v. 28, 30, 31. The Naxian ships, four in number, deserted from Xerxes and joined the Greeks at Salamis. Herod. viii. 46.

to throw over her forced allegiance. This great city, which had hitherto been an independent member of the league, now broke into open revolt. What were the circumstances which led to this step we do not know, nor can we say whether the movement was supported by any party in the Delian synod; Thucydides states emphatically that the island was "enslaved contrary to the agreement," but unfortunately he does not enable us to determine the cause and the degree of the enslavement. All that we know is that after a siege Naxos was reduced to the condition of a subject, and her ships were taken from her. The siege of Naxos was rendered famous by the fact that Themistocles, on his voyage from Pydna to Ephesus, narrowly escaped falling into the blockading fleet. The date of the reduction seems to be 466 B.C.¹

12. After his return to Susa, Xerxes apparently abandoned, for the time, all thoughts of avenging his defeat on Greece by any direct attack. As we have seen, he became involved in domestic quarrels. We also hear of a revolt of Babylon, the stubborn city, which cost her conquerors so dear. The revolt was crushed by Megabyzus, the son of that Zopyrus who had won the city for Darius, and a severe punishment overtook the rebellious people. The great temple of Belus (Merodach), the pride of the city, was destroyed; the golden image of the god was carried away; no Babylonian was henceforward allowed to carry arms. Megabyzus received the most distinguished marks of the royal favour; he was allowed to marry the king's daughter, and received a present of a golden "mill," weighing six talents (about 300 pounds). The king found occupation of another kind in building a castle at Celaenae, in Phrygia, and in adding to the royal palace at Persepolis.²

¹ For the siege, cf. Aristophanes, *Wasps*, 354, and Thuc. i. 137. For the revolt, etc., Thuc. i. 98.

² *Supra*, p. 240. For the revolt of Babylon, Ctes. *Pers.* 21, 28. Herod. i. 183; Strabo, p. 738; Plut. *Reg. Apoth.* 2 (Xerxes). Arrian,

Nevertheless the conquest of Greece was not forgotten. The overtures of Pausanias aroused new hopes. The great invasion of 480 B.C. had failed because Xerxes and Mardonius had trusted too much to sheer force; had they listened to the counsels of Demaratus and the Thebans the result might have been different.

Hope of a new
invasion of
Greece.

But now the very man who had destroyed the Persian army was willing to throw his weight into the scale of Persia. What might not be achieved if at a moment when Peloponnesus was rent with internal dissensions, another great blow was struck by the Persian king?

These plans were no doubt delayed by the troubles in the eastern provinces, and they were to some extent frustrated by the foolish conduct of Pausanias and the development of the Delian league. At the head of the combined

Grecian forces, Pausanias would have been a valuable ally to Persia, but without the fleet, his power was limited to intrigue. It soon became

Pausanias of
little real
service to
the king.

apparent that whatever commotion he might excite in the Peloponnesus, there could be no common action between him and Persia, unless the Persians could put a strong fleet upon the sea. Since the fatal day of Mycale few Persian ships had been seen in the Aegean; the navies of the Ionian cities and islands were either destroyed or in the service of the Greeks. Yet the Phoenician and Egyptian fleets, which had taken no part in the final conflict, were still uninjured; the conquests of Pausanias in Cyprus had not been

A new attack
on Greece
resolved upon.

followed by any permanent occupation of the island in Hellenic interests. It was still possible to gather together an armament in the eastern Mediterranean, and if by this time Pausanias had been removed from the scene, Xerxes might hope much from the divisions which had

Anab. vii. 17. 2, states that the temple was destroyed. Herod. *l.c.* speaks as if it were in existence. It may have been restored in the twenty years between the revolt and the visit of Herodotus (470-450 B.C.). For the buildings, Xen. *Anab.* i. 2. 9; Duncker, *G. A.* viii. 192, f.

arisen in Hellas. Perhaps he was aware that Themistocles was no longer at Athens.

13. Once more (466 B.C.) the Persian army was assembled and a fleet prepared to convey it to Greece. The point chosen for embarkation was the mouth of the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia, a point equally convenient for the mariners of Phoenicia and Egypt, and for the land forces collected in the Cilician plain. These movements did not escape the notice of Cimon, who for some time previously had been engaged in the south of Asia Minor, devastating and conquering the country, and bringing over the cities to the Delian league.¹ When he heard that the Persians were in Pamphylia, he weighed anchor from Cnidus with a fleet of 200 vessels, which he had specially prepared to carry as many hoplites as possible by broadening the beam, and connecting the decks, fore and aft, with gangways.

On his way he put in at Phaselis, an ancient Greek colony on the coast of Lycia, but the inhabitants refused to receive him. He at once began an attack on the city, and was laying waste the territory, when the Chians in the fleet, between whom

and the Phaselitæ there was an old friendship, persuaded him to abandon hostilities, the Phaselitæ agreeing to pay the sum of ten talents and join in the expedition. Cimon then continued his voyage eastwards. The Persian fleet seems to have consisted of 350 vessels under the command of Tithraustes, which was supported by an army under Pherendates, the control of the entire force being in the hands of Ariomandes, the son of

Gobryas. The Persians were by no means eager for an engagement. They were still waiting for a reinforcement of eighty Phoenician vessels to come up from Cyprus, and for this reason they kept their ships close in shore, at the mouth of the river, under the protection of the army. Cimon saw that

Cimon sails
to the
Eurymedon.

Phaselis.

Battles of the
Eurymedon.
466 B.C.
Ol. 78. 3.

¹ Plut. *Cim.*, 12.

immediate action was necessary. Disregarding the army, he bore down upon the fleet. A naval engagement was impossible. The Persians after a mere feint went ashore, and sought the protection of the army, allowing the vessels, to the number of 200, to fall into the hands of the Athenians, who also slew many of the sailors. But Cimon was not satisfied; he resolved that his victory should be complete. He saw that his men, in spite of the exertion which they had undergone, were still fresh and vigorous, eager for action and filled with contempt for the enemy. Without a moment's delay he bade them disembark and rush upon the Persian camp. A severe engagement followed, in which many distinguished Athenians fell, but at length the barbarians were utterly routed. They turned and fled in wild confusion, leaving their tents a spoil for the enemy. Even this success failed to satisfy the Athenian general. As soon as it was possible, he manned his ships once more and went in search of the eighty Phoenician vessels which were expected from Cyprus. He came up with them at Hydron, while still ignorant of the defeat of the Persians and uncertain what course to take. These also he attacked and utterly defeated, destroying the vessels and a large part of the crews. Such disasters were more terrible even than the events of 480 B.C.; in three successive battles, within a few hours, the army of Persia had been put to flight, and her fleet utterly destroyed.

Destruction
of the fleet.

Destruction
of the camp.

Destruction of
the Phoenician
fleet.

The battles of the Eurymedon were the most crushing blow ever struck at Persia by Athens. From this time forward we hear no more of any plans for the invasion of Hellas. The great schemes framed with the help of Pausanias were for ever wrecked. The immediate effect of the battle was to establish the influence of the Delian league in Caria and Lycia, and to free the southern Aegean from the presence of Persian vessels. Yet we observe with surprise that Cyprus is not annexed. The island must have been at

Effect of the
battles of
Eurymedon.

Cyprus.

Cimon's mercy, but, so far as we know, no attempt was made to land on it; no Cyprian city joins the league. This cannot have been from ignorance of the value of the island, for not only did Pausanias make it the first object of his attack in 478 B.C.; but in 460 B.C. a large fleet was sent out thither and again in 449 B.C., when war was renewed with Persia, Cyprus was the scene of a great battle.¹

Such a victory was, of course, an ample justification of the policy of Athens in holding the league together even by force, and at the same time it raised the city and her great commander to a higher eminence than ever. The whole of the Aegean was now in the control of the Athenians, who could also count on the enthusiasm of those Greeks whom they had recently freed from the yoke of Persia. The next event recorded in Greek history shows us the use which they made of their powerful position.

14. At the time of the capture of Eion (as we have stated) the Athenians had attempted to plant a colony on the banks of the Strymon. The place was not only important strategically; it was rich in timber and precious metals; it commanded the trade with Thrace. The attempt had been defeated, but the plan was not abandoned. In the ten or twelve years which had elapsed—

¹ For the battles of Eurymedon see Thuc. i. 100, who gives the meagre facts; two battles on the Eurymedon on the same day; and puts the captured vessels at 200. In the details I have followed Plutarch, *Cim.* 12, 13. Plutarch mentions another version which puts the number of the Persian ships at 600. Diod. xi. 60, 61 puts the force of Cimon at 300 vessels, which was increased by subsequent additions, yet in the battle Cimon has 250 ships against 340. In the first engagement (which takes place off Cyprus) Cimon captures "more than 100 ships." The second battle was a surprise; Cimon putting his forces on the captured vessels and dressing them in Persian attire; and the attack took place by night (as it commonly does in Diodorus; see his account of Thermopylae). Cimon returns to Athens with 340 vessels—i.e. the entire Persian fleet—and 20,000 captives, besides prodigious spoil. Of the separate defeat of the Phoenician vessels Diodorus says nothing.

years during which they probably maintained a station at Eion—the Athenians had doubtless acquired more information about the gold mines in Mount Pangaeus, and the advantages to be obtained from trading with the Thracians. They also saw with vexation that these prizes were passing into the hands of the enterprising Thasians, or the still more enterprising king of Macedon. Even The Thasians. in the time of Darius, the Thasians had established colonies—Stryme, Galepsus, Oesyne, and Datum are mentioned—on the mainland, and they derived an annual income of 80 talents (£16,000) from their mines in Scaptê Hylê. In 492 B.C. they had submitted to Mardonius without a blow, but in the following year, on the suspicion that they intended to revolt, they were compelled to pull down their walls and surrender their fleet. After the expulsion of the Persians from Europe, they had joined the Delian league, and under its protection they recovered their ancient prosperity. The walls were rebuilt; the ships replaced; the mines and the Thracian market once more became a lucrative source of revenue. But the Athenians had not long Demands of Athens. returned from the Eurymedon when they quarrelled with the Thasians about the mines which they possessed on the mainland, and demanded a share in the profits of the Thracian trade.¹ The Thasians naturally refused to obey; and openly renounced their allegiance to Athens and the league. Cimon. Revolt of Thasos.
463-464 B.C.
Ol. 78. 4. was at once sent out to reduce the rebellious city. He had no difficulty in defeating her navy, of which he carried thirty-three ships to Athens, and in landing on the island. But the walls of Thasos were strong, and as usual in ancient warfare, when a city was attacked, it was necessary to await the slow results of famine.

¹ Thuc. i. 100. We do not hear that the Athenians acted in this matter on behalf of any neighbouring state, which felt aggrieved by the Thasians, and indeed the attempt to plant a colony shows that they were acting in their own interests.

At the same time that Cimon left Athens a great host of 10,000 colonists was collected and led out under Leagros to occupy the banks of the Strymon. The colonists were successful in obtaining possession of the place called Nine Ways from the Edonian inhabitants; and for a time all went well with them. But an attempt to penetrate further into the country brought upon them the opposition of all the Thracian tribes of the district. A desperate struggle took place at Drabescus, in which the colonists were cut down to a man, and once more the Athenians found themselves driven from the coveted region. A memorable incident of the battle was the death of Sophanes, who had done great things for his city at Aegina and Plataea.¹

15. When the siege had lasted for some time, the Thasians in their distress sent envoys to Sparta to ask for assistance. It was true that the Spartans and Athenians were still allies, but the ambition and power of Athens were becoming a serious menace to Greece, and Sparta might be induced to act as the champion of Hellenic freedom. The Spartans in spite of the existing alliance acceded to the request. They could not of course attack the Athenians by sea, but it was possible by an invasion of Attica to create a diversion which would draw the Athenians from Thasos. They resolved to make the attempt, and in the greatest secrecy, without any open proclamation of war, they were preparing for the invasion, when an earthquake occurred, so terrible in its results that Sparta was laid in ruins. The Helots seized the opportunity to revolt, and thus the Spartans, instead of invading Attica, found their own country occupied by rebels. Thasos was of course left to her own resources: all hope of assistance was at an end. After a siege of two years the island was compelled to accept the terms

¹ Thuc. i. 100; Diod. xi. 70; Plut. *Cim.* 14; Herod. ix. 75, who puts Datum for Drabescus. *Supra*, p. 255.

imposed by Athens, who demanded that her walls should be razed, and her claims to her possessions on the mainland surrendered. In 462 B.C. Cimon returned to Athens.¹

16. For the last six or seven years—since the removal of Themistocles and the death of Aristides—Cimon had been the foremost man in Athens. His winning manners made him popular in social gatherings; his liberality gained him favour with the people; his brilliant successes made him the idol of the army and the fleet. But he was not without opponents. There were many who were far from sympathising with his admiration for Laconian manners and institutions; an admiration which he was never weary of expressing. Others remembered, in spite of his loyal service to the state, that he was connected with the great family of the

Cimon's rise
to power.

The opposi-
tion.

Philaidæ, and by no means inclined to a further development of democracy. In his constant absence from Athens, these opponents had been able to combine and arrange a plan of attack. A new and very illustrious adherent had recently joined them, Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, of whom we now hear for the first time in

Pericles.

Athenian politics. He was the younger son of the commander at Mycale, and Agariste, the niece of Clisthenes, the reformer, and great-granddaughter of the ruler of Sicyon. On both sides he belonged to the first families of Athens. His father was of the race of the Buzygæ, the ancient family which was charged with the supervision of some of the most sacred religious rites at Athens; his mother was an Alcmaeonid. At this time he was about thirty years of age, and already he seems to have determined on the policy which he followed for the rest of his life. In spite of his noble origin, he gave his support to the party which

¹ The revolt of Thasos occurred some time, but how long we do not know, before the earthquake at Sparta, which Pausanias places quite definitely in the year July 464–July 463. It must have taken place in 465 or 464. The colony was sent out twenty-eight years before the colony of Hagnon (437 B.C.), i.e. in 465 B.C.

desired the extension of the democracy, as Themistocles and Aristides, and his own ancestor Clisthenes had done before him. But he resolved to go further than they had gone. The rule of the people was to be a reality; the influence of the great families, which had hitherto been an important element in the government, was to cease.

His aims.

Perhaps he looked forward to a time when he should be able to enlist the people so strongly on his own side as to become the sole manager of Athens, but for the present it was necessary to direct his energies to the removal of the obstacles which stood in the way of his plans. Among these Cimon was the chief. If *he* could be removed his party would be sensibly weakened, for Cimon was so far ahead of any other man on his side that it would be impossible to fill Cimon charged his place. With this object in view Pericles with bribery. and others brought forward a charge of bribery

against him on his return from Thasos, alleging that he had received money from Alexander of Macedon for neglecting to secure territory for Athens on the mainland opposite Thasos. The Athenians had perhaps reason to be suspicious of Alexander, who since the retreat of Xerxes had been steadily advancing the borders of his kingdom towards Thrace. By this time he had probably acquired the mines near Lake Prasias, from which he derived a talent a day of revenue,¹ and the Athenians could not but contrast his success with their own failures. But if there was a case against Alexander, there was none against Cimon. He could appeal to his life and actions; he had never made wealth his aim; his help and sympathies had always been devoted to a state which had little to give in return—not to Thessalians and Ionians, who could enrich their friends. The charge was felt to be so frivolous that it was not seriously pressed, and Cimon was acquitted.²

He is
acquitted.

¹ Herod. v. 17; Thuc. ii. 99.

² Plut. *Cimon*, 14; Arist. *Athen. Pol.* c. 27, Περικλέους—πρώτου εὐδοκμήσαντος ὅτε κατηγόρησε τὰς εὐθύνas Κίμωνος στρατηγούοντος νέος ὢν.

CHAPTER IX.

THE HELLENIC WAR 460-445 B.C.

I. The calamity which overtook Sparta in 464 B.C. was one of the greatest which ever befell the city. A succession of earthquakes, during which wide chasms opened in the earth and masses of rock fell from Taygetus, destroyed the houses, until, as we are told, no more than five were left standing. Twenty thousand of the inhabitants perished.

The earthquake at Sparta: revolt of the Helots. 464 B.C. Ol. 79. 1.

In this hour of terror, when every one was dazed at the ruin around him, or seeking to rescue some remnants of his property, King Archidamus was the saviour of the city. Hastening himself to open ground, he bade a trumpeter give the signal for the Spartans to assemble and prepare to receive the enemy. By this stratagem he drew the citizens out of the falling ruins, as he intended; and, what was no less important, though he did not intend it, he got together a force which repulsed the attack of the Helots. For on hearing of the disasters of their hated masters, a vast multitude of these serfs at once armed themselves as best they could, and swarmed to Sparta. The whole of Messenia was in revolt; even two of the Perioecic cities, Thuria and Aethraea, joined the rebels. Though the firmness of Archidamus had checked the first onset, Sparta found herself involved in a war for existence.¹

¹ Diød. xi. 63, 64; Thuc. i. 101, 102; Plut. *Cim.* 16. The date is fixed by Pausanias in the archonship of Archidemides 464-463. Paus. iv. 24. 5.

The situation was most critical. If Arcadia, which had shown herself so hostile in recent years, were to join the rebels, there was little hope for the city of Lycurgus. But the recent defeat at Dipaea had been a severe lesson to the Arcadians; and, happily for Sparta, Themistocles was not at Argos to take advantage of the moment. There was no general rising; no common plans were formed, such as would certainly have been arranged five or six years previously. Nevertheless the Messenians, though unaided, were a formidable enemy. They gathered at Ithome, the ancient stronghold of their race, whence they issued forth in numerous sallies; in one engagement Arimnestus (*supra*, p. 226) and 300 Spartans were slain. Sparta found it necessary to appeal to her allies for assistance. The appeal was warmly met. That Aegina, a member of the Peloponnesian confederacy should send help, is not remarkable; but we learn with surprise that Plataea despatched one-third of her fighting force to the rescue. Supported by these reinforcements, the Lacedaemonians succeeded in shutting up the Messenians in Ithome. But here their success ended; all attempts to capture the fortress failed. At Athens alone could the skill be found which would enable them to break through the wall of the enemy. To Athens, therefore, the Spartans ventured to apply, in spite of the recent plan for the invasion of Attica.¹

2. Even in the days of Aristophanes the Athenians had not forgotten how Periclidias appeared before them in his red cloak, with a pale face, entreating assistance in this time of need.²

¹ Herod. ix. 64; Diod. Plut. *ll. cc.* For the assistance rendered by Aegina, Thuc. ii. 27; iv. 56; by Plataea, *ib.* iii. 54. It is clear from Thucydides that the siege had gone on some time before the Athenians were sent for: *μάλιστα δ' αὐτοὺς ἐπεκάλεσαντο ὅτι τειχομαχεῖν ἐδόκουν δυνατοὶ εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ πολιορκίας μακρὰς καθεστηκυίας τούτου ἐνδεὰ ἐφαίνετο.*

² *Lysistr.* 1137 ff. Aristophanes declares that Cimon *ὄλην ἔσωσε τὴν Λακεδαιμόνα*, but as a matter of fact he was sent back without accomplishing anything

Athens was not a member of the Spartan confederacy ; she was merely an ally under the Great Alliance of 481 B.C., which had not yet been dissolved. She was not therefore under any obligation to support Sparta in this war. It was merely a question of policy whether assistance should be sent or not ; a question on which opinions were divided. The Spartan party, led by Cimon, the same party which had attacked Themistocles, were of course strongly in favour of granting the request ; the democratic party, which were now led by Ephialtes, were bitterly opposed to it. Cimon could appeal to the past in which Athens and Sparta had fought side by side in the cause of Grecian freedom ; he would not stand by, he said, and see Athens deprived of her yokefellow. The democrats could urge that the interests of Athens demanded the humiliation, if not the destruction, of Sparta ; it was folly to assist her. Let events take their course.¹

Debate at Athens : it is decided to send assistance.

Cimon gained the day. He was at once sent out with a force of 4000 hoplites to assist in the siege of Ithome. The Spartans, weary of the long delay, were doubtless extravagant in their expectations of the results which the force would achieve. At last they would be able to take full vengeance on the rebels who had so long defied their utmost efforts. The greater was their disappointment when the siege still lingered on ; when the Athenians were found as helpless as themselves. With the failure came a change in their feelings towards their allies. Were they doing their best ? Were they not secretly in sympathy with the Messenians ? Periclididas had probably informed his countrymen of the difference of opinion at Athens, and of the attitude of Ephialtes ; they were well aware of the feelings which Themistocles cherished towards Sparta ; they were conscious of their own treachery ; they had perhaps

Cimon is sent to Ithome, which he fails to take. 462 B.C. Ol. 79. 3.

Cimon is sent back.

¹ Plut. *Cim.* 16. Later writers condemn Cimon, Xen. *Athen. Rep.* iii. 11.

an ill-defined dread of democracy, as something subversive of the existing state of Greece. "They reflected that the Athenians were alien in race, and fearing that if they were allowed to remain, they might be tempted by the rebels in Ithome to change sides, they dismissed them, while retaining the other allies."¹

3. This rude and churlish behaviour naturally created a great revulsion of feeling among the Athenians. Though the Spartans gave out that they had no longer any need for their services, they perceived that they had been dismissed for some secret reason. The democratic party were now placed in a strong position. Ephialtes had been completely justified in his contention that Athens and Sparta could not draw together.

The Athenians made no secret of their indignation. As a thorough-going anti-Laconian policy was difficult, if not impossible, so long as Cimon remained at Athens, the first step was to get rid of him. If ostracism were demanded, there was little doubt on whom the vote would fall, in the

Cimon is
ostracised.
461 B.C.
Ol. 79. 4.

present state of public feeling; and by this means in the spring of 461 B.C. Cimon was driven into exile. Ten years before he had helped to bring about the ostracism of Themistocles, hoping thereby to promote his own philo-Laconian policy. The wheel had come full circle, and he was now himself ostracised by the party which he had then defeated. But the Athenians did not stop here. They renounced the alliance with Sparta, which had existed since 481 B.C., and contracted an alliance with Argos—at all times the bitter enemy of Sparta, and recently restored to a considerable degree of power. With the Argives to accompany them, the Athenians then repaired

The Athenians
form alliances
with Argos
and Thessaly,
renouncing
the alliance
with Sparta.

¹ Thuc. i. 102.

to Thessaly, and formed a joint alliance with the Thessalians.¹

In contemplating these changes we cannot help being struck by the transient nature of the patriotism which was evoked by the events of 481-479 B.C. Then the "medising" Greeks were condemned to severe penalties; solemn oaths were sworn, binding the patriots to take vengeance on those who had betrayed their country. But after the lapse of three or four years we find Themistocles using all his influence to save the traitors from the vengeance of the Spartans. In the Amphictyony, at Argos, perhaps also at Coreyra, he pursues the same policy; the offences against Hellas are forgotten, if only he can give effect to his opposition to Sparta. And now his party, throwing aside all reserve, enters into alliance with the two nations, which more than any others deserved to feel the full weight of Athenian resentment. Argos and Thessaly were not only traitors to the unity of Hellas; they were charged with bringing the Persians into Greece; and whatever may have been the case with Argos, the charge was true of the Aleuadae of Thessaly. To the Spartans these new alliances were of course most irritating. The Thessalians were not likely to have forgotten the invasion of Leotychidas, or the attempt to exclude them from the Amphictyony; the Argives had been in alliance, more or less close, with the rebellious Tegea. And now Athens had joined them, selecting the moment when the whole force of Sparta was engaged in the struggle at Ithome. Under such circumstances the feeling between the two cities must have been extremely bitter; though there was as yet no declaration of hostilities, a Hellenic war might break out at any moment.

Evanescent
nature
Greek patriot-
ism.

¹ Thuc. i. 102; Plut. *Cim.* 17. We are informed by Plutarch (*Cim.* 15) that the attack on the Areopagus was made when Cimon was absent on military service. The attack was made in 462-461 (Arist. *Athen. Pol.* c. 25), and therefore Cimon's expedition to Ithome may fall after mid-summer 462 B.C., and his ostracism in the following spring.

4. With this prospect in view it is reasonable to suppose that the Spartans would bring the siege of Ithome to an end as quickly as they could. Yet in the account of Thucydides the rebels are not only able to hold out to the tenth year, but even when compelled to capitulate they are allowed to leave the Peloponnesus unmolested on condition that they will never set foot in it again. There is, however, good reason for doubting whether the numeral in Thucydides may not be interpreted as the fourth, rather than the tenth year. For if the Messenians did not capitulate till the tenth year after 464 B.C. they were still unsubdued when the Spartans invaded Phocis in 457 B.C. This is highly improbable in itself, and the author of the treatise on the Athenian state distinctly asserts that the Messenians had been crushed when the Lacedaemonians attacked the Athenians. The lenient terms are explained by Thucydides as due in part to a response of the Delphian oracle, which bade the Lacedaemonians "allow the suppliant of Ithomaeon Zeus to go free," a response which was the more likely to receive attention because the recent earthquakes were attributed by the Spartans to the anger of Poseidon, from whose sanctuary at Taenarus some suppliant Helots had been torn for execution.¹ But we may reasonably assume that the Spartans, seeing the hostile attitude of Athens, allowed the rebels lenient terms in order to bring the revolt to an end as soon as possible. They commemorated their success, such as it was, by erecting a statue of Zeus at Olympia.²

¹ Thuc. i. 103; *supra*, p. 280.

² Thuc. i. 103; Xen. *Rep. Athen.* iii. 11. For the numeral in Thucydides see Jowett and Classen, *ad loc.* For the statue see Paus. v. 24. 3. Fragments of the inscription have been preserved, *I. G. A.* 75. The order of events in Thucydides implies that the capitulation of Ithome followed soon after the alliances of Athens with Argos and Thessaly, and the words *κατ' ἔχθος ἥδη τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων* in which he gives the reason why the Messenians were placed at Naupactus, imply that the quarrel was recent. Justin, iii. 6. 2, ff. probably follows Diodorus, who extends the siege to ten years.

The exiled Messenians were received by the Athenians, who placed them at Naupactus, a town near the mouth of the Corinthian gulf, which they had recently taken from the Ozolian Locrians. In thus giving shelter to the fugitives on such a site the

The Messenians placed at Naupactus.

Athenians aimed a blow not only at the Lacedaemonians but also at the Corinthians, who were the foremost among the Lacedaemonian allies. On the one hand the deadliest enemies of Sparta could at any moment be landed on the Peloponnesus; on the other, the merchantmen of Corinth could not pass in or out of the gulf without the permission of Athens, if she chose to place her ships of war at the newly acquired station. Why or how the Athenians took Naupactus we do not know, but the acquisition of the city was one of the earliest steps in that fatal quarrel between Corinth and Athens, which, more than any other single cause, brought about the Peloponnesian war.¹

5. For some time past the Megarians and Corinthians had been at variance about the boundaries of their respective territories; and, as was inevitable, Megara found herself no match for her formidable neighbour. Under such circumstances she

Quarrel between Corinth and Megara.

would naturally look to Sparta for redress, as the head of the Peloponnesian confederacy, of which both Corinth and Megara were members. But Sparta was in no mood to enter into the quarrels of other cities; she had enough and more than enough on her hands with her own domestic troubles.

The Megarians then went to Athens, now the declared rival of Sparta, and put the case in her hands. The appeal met with a ready response. Nothing, in fact, could be more opportune. By the separation of the Megarid from Attica Athens was not only exposed to invasion from the Peloponnesus, but a route was always open between Boeotia

The Megarians apply to the Athenians, who occupy and protect their territory.

¹ Thuc. i. 103; Paus. iv. 24. 7. Diod., xi. 84, says that Naupactus was taken by Tolmides in 456 B.C.

and Peloponnesus. In the present position of affairs it was most important for the city to re-form her frontier in this direction. Athenian troops were at once sent to the aid of the Megarians, and with their consent garrisons were placed in the two ports of their city; in Pegae on the Corinthian gulf, and Nisaea on the Saronic gulf. Nisaea was also connected with Megara by long walls, built by Athenian labour, and protected by Athenian soldiers. By this means Athens extended her frontier to the passes of Geraneia, on the borders of Corinth, and secured a station for her ships on the Corinthian gulf. The Isthmus could not now be crossed; the seas on either side were watched. "This," says Thucydides, "was the main cause, in the first instance, of the intense hatred which the Corinthians entertained towards the Athenians."¹

The reception of a revolted member of the confederacy was a further step in the alienation of the Peloponnesus and Athens. Even if the Spartans chose to remain inactive, the Corinthians were not likely to acquiesce in the situation. An outbreak of war in Hellas was imminent. Nevertheless the Athenians continued to prosecute the war with Persia. A fleet of 200 ships was at this time engaged at Cyprus and on the Phoenician coast; but on receiving an appeal from Inaros, the king of Libya, who had raised the standard of revolt in Egypt, the ships were ordered to proceed to the Nile, and the great war began, which after six years ended so disastrously for Athens (*infra*, p. 349).

6. At home the Athenians pursued their career of aggression regardless of results. On the eastern coast of Argolis lay the small town or community of Halieis. Unimportant in itself, the place was a suitable station for any power which desired to control the navigation of the Saronic gulf. In the hands of the Athenians Halieis might become a rival

War in Hellas
imminent:
Athenian
expedition to
Egypt.
459 B.C.
Ol. 80. 2.

The Athenians
at Halieis:
advantages of
the place.

¹ Thuc. i. 103; Diod. xi. 79.

to the neighbouring towns of Epidaurus and Hermione; and now that Argos and Athens were allies, the Argives might hope, with the assistance of the Athenian fleet, to recover the control of the eastern coast of Argolis, as they had already recovered the control of the valley of the Inachus. Even Aegina might once more become a dependency, as in the days of Phaedon. There were other reasons also, which made the acquisition of Halieis desirable to the Athenians and Argives. The town was not only inhabited by the Tyinthians, whom the Argives had expelled from their home, but it appears to have been brought into some close connection with Sparta. To the Corinthians and Epidaurians, on the other hand, nothing could be more disastrous than an Athenian settlement in this region. Already Athenian ships were at Pegae, watching the entrance to the western port of Corinth; from Peiraeus and Nisaea they commanded the northern half of the Isthmus; if they were settled at Halieis the Saronic gulf would be entirely in their hands.

When therefore they landed on the Argolic coast, the Athenians were met by a combined force of Corinthians and Epidaurians, aided by three hundred hoplites from the rest of Peloponnesus. That they were defeated seems certain; for the authority of Diodorus, who gives the victory to the Athenians, cannot be allowed to outweigh the almost contemporary evidence of Thucydides. But the defeat was not severe enough to preclude the hope of establishing a settlement on the coast; and we afterwards find the Athenians in possession of Troezen, a still better station than Halieis. The repulse was also compensated by a victory over the fleet of the enemy at Cecryphaleia, a small island off the coast, between Epidaurus and Aegina. Insignificant in themselves, these skirmishes are not insignificant in Grecian history. They were the first overt acts in the disruption of the Hellenic alliance which had been formed at the Isthmus in the autumn of 481 B.C. for the defence of Greece. For years it had been

Defeat of the
Athenians at
Halieis: their
victory at
Cecryphaleia.

evident that Greece was parting into two camps, but now for the first time had hostilities broken out.¹

7. The next movement was one of far greater importance, opening a new scene in the long drama, in which we perceive, Athens and Aegina. only too vividly, the dire effects of neighbourly hatred and commercial rivalry among the Greeks. Since the general pacification of 481 B.C. Athens and Aegina had desisted from their ancient feud (*supra*, ch. ii.), but now, owing perhaps to an appeal from the Corinthians, who would not fail to point out that 200 ships of the Athenian fleet were occupied in Egypt, Aegina joined in the war. An obstinate battle was fought off the island between the fleets of the two cities and their allies. The Athenians were victorious, capturing no fewer than seventy of the ships of the enemy. They then landed on Aegina under the command of Leocrates, and proceeded to besiege the city. The Peloponnesians sent over the small force of 300 hoplites, which had been assisting the Epidaurians, but they were of no avail; Aegina was closely blockaded.

Defeat of the
Aeginetans,
and blockade
of Aegina.
459 B.C.

Meanwhile the Corinthians, believing that the whole force of the Athenians was now employed, resolved to create a diversion by seizing the passes of Mount Geraneia, which divided Megara and Corinth, and invading the Megarian territory. The Athenians were equal to the occasion. Without moving a man from Aegina, they collected a force of their oldest and youngest men, *i.e.* of the men usually exempted from foreign service, and sent it to Megara under the command of Myronides, a general who had gained distinction in the Persian war. A battle followed in which neither side could claim a decisive victory; the Athenians erected a trophy on the field, but so bitter were the reproaches with which the Corinthians were received on their return by

The Athen-
ians and
Corinthians in
the Megarid.

¹ Thuc. i. 105; Diod. xi. 78. For Halieis and Sparta, Herod. vii. 137.

the older men who had remained behind, that in twelve days' time they went back and erected a Corinthian trophy. When they saw this, the Athenians, who were still at Megara, sallied out and slew those who were busy with the trophy; the rest of the army they defeated and put to flight. In their eagerness to escape, a considerable number of the Corinthians, missing their way, rushed into a plot of ground which was encircled by a great ditch without any means of exit. The Athenians, who saw what had occurred, immediately blocked the entrance with their hoplites, and having caught their enemies in a trap, stoned to death every man who had entered the enclosure. The rest of the Corinthian army escaped, but the loss was considerable and the lesson severe. It was obvious that Megara was not to be recovered by force of arms.¹

8. While such was the action of the Athenians abroad, it was clear from their conduct at home that they intended to secure the position which they had gained. They had already built walls to connect the town of Megara with the port of Nisaea; they now proposed to unite Athens and Peiraeus in the same permanent manner. Of the two walls which were contemplated, one extended from the north-west edge of Peiraeus to the wall of Athens, a distance of rather more than four and a half miles; the second ran in a direction almost due south from Athens to the eastern edge of Phalerum, a distance of four miles. Such a work could not be carried out in a single year; and there is in fact reason to suppose that the foundations of the walls were laid by Cimon (before his ostracism in 461 B.C.). The object of the fortification is clear. When thus united with the sea, Athens would be impervious to attacks on land. Even if the Peloponnesians succeeded in passing the Megarian frontier and

The long walls
at Athens.
459-457 B.C.
Ol. 80. 2-4.

¹ Thuc. i. 105, 106; Diod. xi. 79, who tells us that the second battle took place ἐν τῇ λεγομένῃ Κιμωλία. See also *C.I.A.* i. 433 = Hicks, *Manual of Historical Inscriptions*, No. 19.

invading Attica, they could inflict no damage on the city. They could lay waste the corn-fields of Thria, or the olive-gardens by the Cephissus; they could consume the harvest and carry off the cattle; but they could not separate Athens from the sea.¹

9. It was time for Sparta to stir, if she intended to keep her allies round her. Her reputation was declining; her

The Phocians
attack the
Dorians of
Parnassus.-
457 B.C.
Ol. 80. 4.

inactivity formed a strong contrast to the extraordinary energy of Athens, for which no task seemed too heavy. More especially the recent action of the Athenians seemed to shut her out from any participation in the affairs

of central Hellas. So at least the Phocians thought; they took advantage of the situation to attack the Dorians, who dwelt in three or four communities on the northern slopes of Mount Parnassus, and captured one of their towns. The Lacedaemonians could not, of course, allow a state which they acknowledged as their "mother-city" to be laid

The Spartans
in Phocis.

waste, least of all by a second-rate power like Phocis. Nicomedes, the son of Cleombrotus, who was regent at the time for Plistoanax, the young son of Pausanias, was at once despatched with a force of 1500 Spartans, and no fewer than 10,000 of the allies. Crossing the Corinthian gulf, he marched against the Phocians, whom he quickly compelled to restore the captured town, on such terms as he chose. He then retired into Boeotia.

The Spartans
in Boeotia.

But now a difficulty arose. How were the Spartans to return? They had crossed the gulf on their way out, but they could not expect to do this a second time, for the Athenians were preparing to intercept them. To cross Geraneia was still more impossible; the passes were always guarded by Athenian troops, and orders had been given to strengthen the garrisons. For the present it seemed best to remain in Boeotia.²

¹ Thuc. i. 107; ii. 13; i. 143; Plut. *Cim.* 13. The third wall, running parallel to the Peiraeus wall, was added later by Pericles. Plato, *Gorg.* 455 c.

² Thuc. i. 107.

10. The delay was not without advantage. If Boeotia could be raised from the degradation into which the country had sunk after the battle of Plataea; if the cities could be combined into a solid power, the state would form an excellent counterpoise to Athens in central Greece. The natural focus of the country was of course Thebes. In 480 B.C. that city had been governed by one or two families, who had been instrumental in bringing the Persians into Boeotia. After the battle of Plataea, the leaders of these families had been executed or expelled, but, so far as we can ascertain, an oligarchy still continued in power. The city had fallen into great discredit; the old Boeotian league was practically dissolved, many cities claiming to be entirely independent. Even in Thebes the divisions which existed at the time of the Persian war must have been greatly aggravated; democracy could not fail to gain ground, when oligarchy had proved so treacherous and so feeble. Under such circumstances the presence of a Spartan army was welcome enough to the oligarchical party. With their help it might be possible to recover their lost position, and make Thebes once more the ruling power in Boeotia.¹

11. This was not the only result of the presence of the Lacedaemonians in Boeotia. The policy of Athens, external as well as domestic, was not approved by all the citizens. The ostracism of Cimon and the limitation of the powers of the Areopagus had already excited the oligarchs to desperate action (*infra*, p. 381). They wished to see some check placed on the development of the "demos," which now, as in the days of

Conspiracy at Athens to overthrow the democracy.

¹ Diod. xi. 81. See Moritz Müller, *Gesch. Thebens*, Leips. 1879, p. 58 ff. Duncker, *G. A.* viii. 316, and others, think that a democracy succeeded the overthrow of the dynasty at Thebes in 479 B.C. The passage relied upon is Aristot. *Pol.* v. 2. 6=1302 b 28, which is supposed to imply that a democracy existed at Thebes before Oenophyta. But if this had been the case we should have heard more of the democracy in the speech of the Thebans, Thuc. iii. 61 ff.

Clisthenes, was carrying all before it. More especially was the extreme section of them opposed to the building of the long walls, which implied a complete change from Athens as the head of Attica to Athens as a maritime city, relying wholly on her fleet. Their influence was no doubt far less in the Peiraeus than it was in the city, as it was far less in the city than in the country. They foresaw that a union of the port and town would give a new accession of strength to the concourse of artisans and sailors. For these reasons they entered into negotiations with the Spartans in order to secure their assistance in maintaining or recovering the position of their party—negotiations which could be carried on the more readily as the Spartans were now at Tanagra, a town in the extreme south of Boeotia, on the borders of Attica.¹

Pericles and his friends took the alarm. They resolved to attack the enemy in the field before attack was rendered

The battle
of Tanagra.
457 B.C.
Ol. 80. 4.

useless by treachery in the city. They called on the Argives, who sent 1000 heavy-armed soldiers besides a body of Cleonaeans, and on the Thessalians who sent a troop of horse.

Soldiers also came from the cities of the Delian league. When these contingents were added to the whole available troops of the city the collected forces amounted to 14,000 men. With this army the Athenians ventured to cross the borders of Attica and attack the enemy at Tanagra. After a severe contest the battle ended in favour of the Spartans, a result chiefly due to the treachery of the Thessalians, who went over in the midst of the engagement, thus depriving the Athenians of the assistance of which they stood in especial need against the excellent cavalry of the Boeotians. After the victory the Lacedaemonians were at liberty to return home by land; they marched through Megara and the Isthmus, laying waste the country as they

¹ Thuc. i. 107. The oligarchs were at this time deprived of Cimon, who was not opposed either to the maritime power of Athens or to the building of the long walls.

went. As a thank-offering for their victory they suspended a golden shield in front of the temple at Olympia.¹

The battle of Tanagra was the first occasion on which Sparta and Athens had been in open conflict since the time—sixty years before—when Cleomenes had led his forces to Athens to expel Clisthenes. It does not appear that the Spartans entered Boeotia with any intention of attacking the Athenians; the lamentable result was due partly to the Athenian oligarchs, who wished to call in the aid of Sparta for their own support; partly to the desire of the democrats to cut off the Spartan army before it could return home. It arose out of that factious spirit which ultimately divided Greece into oligarchical and democratical parties, each eager to destroy the other at any cost.

Effect of
party spirit
in Greece.

12. Bloody though the battle of Tanagra was, the victory cannot have been very decisive, or the Spartans would have been able to support their friends at Athens and prevent the building of the long walls.² At any rate they made no other use of it than to carry their troops out of the country. No measures were taken to secure Boeotia from the Athenians or to prevent Athens from again occupying Geraneia. Diodorus even asserts that after the engagement a truce of four months was concluded between Athens and Sparta. Yet it was clear that a territory lying between Phocis and Attica, both of which countries were at the time bitterly hostile to Sparta,

Tanagra not
a decisive
battle.

¹ Thuc. i. 107; Plut. *Cim.* 17; *Per.* 10. For the Cleonaeans *C. J. A.* i. 441; Paus. i. 29. 7. For the golden shield, Paus. v. 10. 4; *I. G. A.* addend. 26 a. Diodorus (xi. 80-82) has two distinct accounts of the battle of Tanagra in two years. In the first, in which the battle lasts two or three days, the result is doubtful. The Thessalians are said to attack the Athenians (in the night!) while bringing supplies from Attica. This account was read by Pausanias, see i. 29. 9. The second confuses Tanagra with Oenophyta (and Coronea?), though Diodorus afterwards distinguishes the two, c. 83.

² See Plato, *Menez.* 242 B. In later authors the battle is undecided. Diod. xi. 80, 81. Cf. Justin, iii 6.

was in some danger. The result of this carelessness soon became apparent. Sixty-two days after the battle of Tanagra the Athenian forces were again in Boeotia under the command of Myronides. The battle took place at Oenophyta, not far from Tanagra, and ended in a most decisive victory for Athens. The whole of Boeotia was reduced to subjection by this single blow; and pursuing their success the Athenians made themselves masters of Phocis, while the Locrians of Opus, who may have fought in the allied army against Athens, were kept in submission by the surrender of one hundred of the richest of their citizens.¹

If we may trust Diodorus, Thebes alone among the Boeotian cities was able to preserve her independence after this crushing defeat; and even at Thebes the oligarchy was removed in favour of a more popular form of government. The rest of the cities not only ceased to be autonomous, but were compelled to furnish troops for the Athenian army: they were subject allies, no less than the members of the Delian league. Those citizens who refused to submit to these terms were driven into exile. After such a decisive stroke, the conspiracy at Athens was completely silenced; no further opposition was offered to the building of the walls, which seem to have been completed in this year (456 B.C.).²

Not long after, the Aeginetans, who had been closely besieged since their great defeat at sea (*supra*, p. 326), were compelled to capitulate. They surrendered their ships, dismantled their walls, and agreed to pay tribute to Athens as members of the Delian league. This was a serious loss to the Peloponnesians. If the Aeginetan

¹ Thuc. i. 108. Thucydides says τῆς τε χώρας ἐκράτησαν τῆς Βοιωτίας καὶ Φωκίδος, but does not mention any hostilities between Athens and Phocis; Diodorus, xi. 83, says τοὺς Φωκεῖς καταπολέμησας. He confuses this campaign with the attempt to restore Orestes, in which Phocians served in the Athenian army!

² Diod. xi. 83. Thuc. iii. 62; i. 113, 111. Arist. *Pol.* v. 2. 6 = 1302 b.

fleet was not so large as the Corinthian, and this is doubtful, the Aeginetans were the better and braver sailors. The prize of valour had been awarded to them at Salamis; their wares were known from Palestine to Campania; their traders penetrated the remotest valleys of Arcadia. The helpless condition of the Peloponnesian league in the face of vigorous action was never more plainly demonstrated than by the loss of Boeotia and Aegina; never was the selfish policy of Sparta placed in a clearer light. Bitter indeed must have been the vexation of Corinth when she saw the Athenians not only established on the coast of Argolis and in possession of the ports of Megara, but also masters of new resources by land and sea.¹

13. It was a proud moment for Athens. On land she controlled continental Greece from the pass of Thermopylae to the Isthmus. Phocis and Megara were allies; Boeotia and Locris were subject to her power. At home the long walls secured her from serious attack; in the Peloponnesus, Argos was her ally; she had planted a foot on the north-east coast of Argolis. Near the mouth of the Corinthian gulf she held Naupactus. On sea she was without a rival. The Delian confederacy, which was rapidly becoming the Athenian empire, extended from Byzantium to Phaselis, from Miletus to Euboea. Aegina, her old rival, was humbled; the Spartans, the only power now capable of vigorous opposition, were little better than caged wolves.

Great extent of
the Athenian
power at
this time.
456 B.C.
Ol. 82. 1.

In the internal politics of Athens the battle of Tanagra had a very important effect. When the Athenian army was in Boeotia, Cimon appeared in the camp requesting permission to take his place among the soldiers of his tribe; he wished to prove that his friendship with the Lacedaemonians was not inconsistent with loyalty to his country. The request was refused. There was no

The recall
of Cimon.

¹ Thuc. i. 108. For Aegina's trade, see Bursian, *Geogr. von Griech.* ii. 80. The siege appears to have lasted nearly three years, 459-456 B.C.

place for an ostracised citizen in the Athenian army, even though it lay beyond the limits of Athenian territory. Thus repulsed, Cimon adjured those of his followers who were most suspected of sympathy with Lacedaemon to clear his name and their own from any suspicion of treachery. They responded to the appeal, and, faithful to the death, fell in the battlefield to the number of 100. Such a proof of patriotism could not be denied or ignored. Pericles, who was himself present at the battle, brought forward a proposal for cancelling the decree of ostracism, and Cimon was allowed to return to Athens.¹

14. The Athenians pursued their advantage. In the summer succeeding the fall of Aegina a fleet was sent out under Tolmides, who, like Myronides, had seen service in the Persian invasion, to ravage the coasts of the Peloponnesus. Sailing to the south-west coast of Messenia he attacked the town of Methone, and when the Laconian troops came up to defend it he at once re-embarked his men, doubled upon his course, and burned the Lacedaemonian dockyards at Gythæum, not far from the mouth of the Eurotas. After this act of audacity, which filled Greece with astonishment, Tolmides resumed his voyage to the west. Landing in Aetolia he seized the town of Chalcis, a colony of the Corinthians, near the mouth of the Evenus, whence he sailed homewards up the Corinthian Gulf. Perhaps it was at this time that Athens acquired the power over Achæa which we find her exercising from this date till the thirty years' peace. Such an acquisition would greatly increase her command over the gulf, a command which the events of the previous year had shown to be necessary if the Peloponnesians were to be excluded from continental Greece. But Sicyon still remained, the most important port in the gulf after Corinth, owing to her direct communication with Phlius and the heart of the Peloponnesus. To Sicyon, therefore, Tolmides

Tolmides off
the coast of
Peloponnesus.
456 B.C.
Ol. 82. 1.

Attack on
Sicyon.

¹ Plut. *Per.* 10; *Cim.* 17.

directed his course. He landed in her territory and defeated her army; but he was unable to take the city. From Sicyon he returned to Athens.¹

This was the turning-point in the fortunes of Athens. For ten years her career had been one of success, broken only by the reverse at Tanagra. But now she became aware that the great armament which she had sent to the assistance of Inaros in Egypt was in serious danger (p. 352). The catastrophe did not come for a year or two, but the prospect was gloomy enough to cloud the spirits even of the most hopeful.

15. About this time an attempt was made to re-establish Athenian influence in Thessaly. Orestes, the son of Echeecratidas, whom Thucydides calls king of the Thes-salians, had been expelled from Pharsalus. He appealed to Athens for help. A force was sent out under Myronides, the hero of Oenophyta, to restore him, but nothing was accomplished. Though the army, which was chiefly composed of Phocian and Boeotian allies, succeeded in reaching Pharsalus and plundering the country, it failed to take the city; and so annoying were the attacks of the Thessalian horse that the soldiers could not venture from their camp. In a short time they returned home bringing Orestes with them.²

Attempt to
restore Orestes
at Pharsalus.
454 B.C.?
Ol. 87. 3.

16. Soon afterwards the Athenians made another attack on Sicyon. Under the command of Pericles, 1000 hoplites marched to Pegae, whence they crossed on board the vessels stationed there, to the Sicyonian coast. A battle took place on the river Nemea, in which the Athenians were victorious. The Sicyonians were driven into their city,

Pericles at
Sicyon,
453 B.C.
Ol. 87. 4.

¹ Thuc. i. 108. The date is not certain, but late summer 456, or spring 455 B.C. are the alternatives. Diodorus, xi. 84, has written a farrago of nonsense; and of the same stamp are Aeschin. *F. L.* § 75, and Paus. i. 27. 5.

² Thuc. i. 111; Diod. xi. 83. This incident, like the desertion of the Thessalian horse at Tanagra, points to an oligarchical reaction in Thessaly; *supra*, p. 266.

but here the success of the invasion ended. The Athenians failed in their assaults upon the walls, and on hearing of the approach of a Lacedaemonian army, Pericles thought it prudent to retire. Collecting reinforcements from the neighbouring Achaean cities, which were now under Athenian control, he sailed down the Corinthian gulf to the mouth of the Achelous, and landed his troops in the territory of Oeniadae, which he ravaged. But here also he found himself helpless before the walls of a city, and after some delay he returned home. He had exhibited the energy of Athens at a time when such an exhibition was greatly needed, but he had made no permanent addition to her power. This expedition, like that of Tolmides, is a proof how eager the Athenians were at this time to obtain control of the Corinthian Gulf, a policy which was not likely to diminish the hatred and alarm of Corinth,¹ already exasperated at the conduct of Athens in receiving Megara into her protection.

Under any circumstances the most important city near the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf, for such Oeniadae was, could not see without alarm the aggression of the Athenians, but it is possible that she had by this time suffered heavily from the interference of Athens in western Greece. In his *Messeniacae*, Pausanias has given a very vivid account of an attack made by the Messenians of Naupactus on Oeniadae. Eager to possess themselves of the fertile territory of the city, the exiles, who had but recently been placed at Naupactus,

Attack of the
Messenians on
Oeniadae.
459 B.C. ?
Ol. 80. 2.

¹ Thuc. i. 111; Plut. *Per.* 19; Diod. xi. 88. In Diodorus the expedition to Oeniadae is given twice, c. 85 and c. 88. In the first version we are told that Pericles brought over all the cities of Acarnania, except Oeniadae, to Athens; but this did not happen till after 440 B.C. Thuc. ii. 68. It is worth notice that while Thucydides, Diodorus, and Plutarch mention 1000 hoplites, Thucydides gives no number of ships; Diodorus gives fifty, Plutarch 100. The command of the Corinthian Gulf would have materially benefited Athens (1) by making it impossible for the Peloponnesians to cross into central Greece; (2) by cutting off the connection of Corinth with the West.

marched against it, drove the inhabitants into the walls, and besieged them with the greatest vigour and skill. Finding that they could not resist with success, the citizens resolved to save their wives and children by a timely surrender of the city. For a year the Messenians occupied Oeniadae. Then the entire nation of the Acarnanians came to the rescue. After some hard fighting the Messenians were in their turn shut up in the town and compelled to endure a siege. They held out for eight months, when, their provisions failing, nothing remained but to leave the city under cover of night. The plan was detected, but it was not abandoned. With heavy losses they fought their way into the territory of the Aetolians, whence they reached Naupactus.¹ The date of this attack is uncertain, and the details may be spurious, yet no reason can be given why the Messenians, the devoted friends of Athens, should not have endeavoured to secure Oeniadae in the interval between their settlement at Naupactus and the campaign of Pericles.²

17. When at length the news arrived of the destruction of the army in Egypt, the Athenians must have felt that the situation was grave indeed. What use would Persia make of her success? Would she assume the defensive and endeavour to recover what she had lost at the Eurymedon, or perhaps to avenge the defeat of Salamis?

What would the feeling of the allies be? Would they regard the defeat of the Athenians in Egypt as an indication of declining power?

Disaster
in Egypt.
453 B.C.?
Ol. 81. 4.

The expenses of the war seem to have compelled Athens to impose heavier contributions on the subject cities, and symptoms of the discontent, which was soon to break out on the Asiatic coast, may have shown themselves. If she was to retain her hold on the Delian confederacy, it was necessary for her to appear once more in the East with an imposing force.

¹ Paus. iv. 25.

² See Oberhummer, *Akarnanien*, p. 82 ff.

At home also the distress must have been great. For nearly ten years Athens had been at war—more or less active —with the Peloponnesus, and though her success had been brilliant, the cost had been severe, and the solid gain comparatively little. The recent expeditions, though they had shown that Athens was all-powerful by sea, had not added to the strength of the city. Oeniadae and Sicyon had repelled the forces which had conquered Boeotia and Aegina. Meanwhile the energies and resources of the city, both in men and money, had been taxed to a degree which threatened exhaustion.

Under such circumstances, peace with Sparta was almost a necessity for Athens. What forces she possessed were required for the recovery of her prestige in the East, on which the very life of the Delian league was largely dependent. The great commander, whose name would inspire confidence among the allies, was still in the city, and, in spite of the repulse of 462 B.C., Cimon was on friendly terms with Sparta; a *persona grata*, through whom negotiations could be opened. By his intervention a truce was concluded between the two cities for five years (451 B.C.)¹ The shortness of the time is an indication that neither side looked on the present situation as tenable. But the Spartans were irritated and discouraged by the naval expeditions which harassed their coasts; the loss of Aegina and the humiliation of Corinth had seriously impaired the fleet of the confederacy. To us it seems almost ludicrous that two belligerent cities should make a peace which was obviously nothing more than a breathing space in which to prepare for the renewal of hostilities on more favourable terms, but in Grecian politics such arrangements were by no means uncommon.

When it was known at Argos that Athens had entered, or was about to enter, into a truce with Sparta, it became

Heavy strain
of the war on
Athens.

Peace con-
cluded for five
years between
Athens and
Sparta.
451 B.C.
Ol. 82. 2.

¹ Thuc. i. 112.

necessary to reconsider the situation. If Argos remained unprotected, when Sparta was freed from any fear of attack by Athens, she might have reason to expect the worst. The work of the last fifteen or twenty years, during which she had slowly consolidated her power, might be undone in a single battle.

Argos and Sparta conclude a peace for thirty years.

Moreover, she had gained nothing by her alliance with Athens. That city, it was clear, sought her own advantage, and not the advantage of Argos. Under such circumstances it seemed prudent to enter into negotiations with Sparta. In 481 B.C. Argos had proposed a peace for thirty years; she now renewed the offer. Sparta accepted it, knowing that the truce with Athens was nothing more than a cessation of hostilities, and desiring to be secure on the side of Argos when the war broke out again. A peace was concluded between the two cities; and in spite of the subsequent commotions which shook Hellas, it ran out to the full term, coming to a close at the end of 421 B.C.¹

18. For two years before the truce was concluded between Athens and Sparta the "Hellenic war" was practically at an end, and for two years after nothing occurred to disturb the peaceful condition of affairs, the Athenians being now occupied with the great expedition to Cyprus and other schemes. But

The "Sacred War."
448 B.C.
Ol. 83. 1.

in 448 B.C. an event took place which showed that Sparta and Athens were still rivals for the supremacy in Greece. In this year the Phocians made an attempt to secure possession of the temple at Delphi, which lay in their territory. They had long regarded it as of right belonging to them, and relying perhaps on the power of Athens in central Greece, and on the security of the peace, which seemed to give that power the sanction of Sparta, they now seized it for themselves. The Delphians appealed to the Spartans, who at once responded. Troops were once more sent across the bay of Corinth, and Delphi was restored to the Delphians. In

¹ Thuc. v. 14, 28.

return for this timely assistance the Lacedaemonians received the right of consulting the oracle first; their name was inscribed on the front of the great bronze wolf which stood near the principal altar at Delphi. No sooner had they departed than Pericles, marching to Delphi at the head of a force of Athenians, gave the temple once more to the Phocians. The honour of first consultation was now granted to the Athenians; their name appeared on the right side of the bronze wolf. Thus were Athens and Sparta presented as competitors at the central shrine of Hellas. For the moment no result followed; but it was now plain to the allies and subjects of the Athenians in central Greece that in any revolt against Athens they could reckon on the support of Sparta. These movements were dignified with the name of the "Sacred War."¹

19. It was not long ere the revolt came. While we hear of distant expeditions and colonies sent out from Athens, nothing is recorded of any measures by which her authority was secured in Boeotia.² That authority rested on the presence of a democracy in the various states, a democracy which was resolved that Boeotia should not be subject to Thebes, even though it must be subject to Athens. The people had been raised to power by the expulsion of their opponents, but Athens had taken no steps to render the exiled oligarchs powerless for mischief. They gradually returned home, and formed a party, especially in the north of Boeotia, where Chæronœa and Orchomenus and some other towns declared against the Athenian supremacy. It was an anxious and difficult moment for Athens. To send a small force might entail defeat; to send a large one would require time, and meanwhile the forces of the enemy were

Revolt of
Boeotia.
446 B.C.
Ol. 83. 3.

¹ Thuc. i. 112; Plut. *Per.* 21. The Lacedaemonians seem to have separated the Delphians from the Phocian league, and made them into an independent community. Strabo, p. 423.

² Diodorus, xi. 85, says that Tolmides was in Boeotia in 453 B.C., but he gives no details.

being increased by a number of Locrians and exiles from Euboea. Tolmides, who ranked second to none as a general at this time, was in favour of immediate action. Pericles thought the numbers of the army insufficient, and foresaw the disastrous consequences of a defeat. His fears were disregarded. Tolmides carried the day. With an army of auxiliaries and one thousand Athenian troops, for the most part volunteers from the higher families, he set out for Charonea. By rapid and energetic action he was enabled to capture the town, which he garrisoned, but here his success ended. He found his forces too small for the numbers which gathered round him. Retreat was inevitable; and retreat was the signal for the enemy to attack. As he passed the town of Coronea on his way to Haliartus, the rebel forces fell upon him and inflicted a severe defeat. His army was destroyed; many were slain, among them Tolmides himself, and Cleinias, the father of Alcibiades; many were taken prisoners, and remained as hostages in the hands of the enemy. The Boeotians were now able to demand what terms they pleased. They refused to restore the captives unless the Athenians evacuated Boeotia. The conditions were accepted; the Athenians left the country, defeated and humiliated, while the oligarchs, their bitter enemies, returned to every city, burning with the fierce hatred of exiles. From this time forward union or common action between Athens and Boeotia was impossible. The Phocians also and the Locrians, finding themselves cut off from Athens, declared their independence. Thus, without being able even to put her whole force in the field, Athens saw herself deprived of all her continental power. A single day had removed her frontier from Thermopylae to Cithaeron; a single day had secured the triumph of oligarchs and oligarchical feeling in central Greece.¹

20. The battle of Coronea was probably fought in the spring of 446 B.C. The summer had even worse news to

¹ Thuc. i. 113; Diod. xii. 6; Plut. *Per.* 18; Paus. i. 27. 5.

bring. The island of Euboea had formed a part of the Delian confederacy from the first; for more than thirty years it had been the faithful ally of Athens, and for two generations Athenian citizens had been settled as colonists in it. But the oligarchs of Boeotia appear to have been able to inspire the oligarchs of Euboea—the remnant of the old proprietors who sixty years before had suffered so severely at the hands of Athens—with their own courage and hope. Exiles from Euboea had taken part in the liberation of Boeotia; could not the island also shake off the yoke of the oppressor? The moment seemed favourable now that all central Greece was independent. Sparta would doubtless support the attempt; perhaps she had already pledged herself to do so as soon as the five years' truce expired, or even sooner, for the Spartans were not over-scrupulous about agreements, when it was possible to make an effective attack on the enemy. So Euboea revolted. Her action was part of a wider plan. No sooner had Pericles crossed over to the island than Megara followed the example of Euboea, an act for which she had secretly prepared by introducing a force of Corinthians, Sicyonians, and Epidaurians into the city. Most of the Athenian garrison were massacred; the few survivors were driven into Nisaea. And when the way over the Isthmus was thus opened, the Spartans hastened to take advantage of it. Plistoanax, the king of Lacedaemon, prepared to invade Attica with a Peloponnesian force. Thus Athens was surrounded on every side, and a combined attack on the city seemed inevitable.¹

Athens had no army to put in the field which could for a moment stand against the enemy if they had time to unite. Pericles saw where the danger lay, and also how it was to be met. On receiving the news of the intended invasion, he returned in haste from Euboea,

¹ Thuc. i. 114; Diod. xii. 7 and 22. The revolt of Megara points to an oligarchical reaction in the city, but in 428 B.C. a number of oligarchs were in exile. Thuc. iii. 68.

which, owing to his command of ships, he had pretty much at his mercy, to Attica. The effect of his return was quickly felt. The Peloponnesian army was already on the Thriasian plain near Eleusis, and had begun to devastate the country, when suddenly, without any apparent reason, before engaging with any Athenian troops, it returned home. In the minds of the Spartans this strange event required no explanation: their king and his adviser, Cleandridas, must have been bribed to leave Attica. The suspicion was probably correct; Pericles himself at a later time refused to account for all the money which had passed through his hands as general, merely answering to all inquiries that he had spent a large sum on "a necessary purpose." This necessary purpose was supposed to be the withdrawal of the Peloponnesian army from Attica. The Spartans fined their king fifteen talents on his return, a sum which he was unable to pay. In fear for his life he fled to the temple of Zeus Lycaeus in Arcadia, where he lived for nineteen years in a dwelling so constructed that he could at any moment seek the protection of the sanctuary. The throne passed to his son Pausanias, who was still a minor. Cleandridas did not even venture to return to Sparta; in his absence he was condemned to death and his property confiscated; we shall hear of him subsequently at Thurii.¹

Plistoanax
retires and
is fined.

21. Pericles was now able to return to Euboea. He took over a force of fifty triremes and five thousand hoplites, with which in a very short time he reduced the island to submission. If any assistance had been promised from Boeotia, none was sent; yet without it the Euboeans were quite unable to enter into a contest with Athens. In the extreme north of the island the Hestiaeans, who dwelt in the neighbourhood of Artemisium, succeeded in capturing an Athenian vessel, of which the crew was immediately slaughtered,

Pericles in
Euboea.
446-445 B.C.
Ol. 83. 3.

¹ Thuc. i. 114; ii. 21; v. 16; Plut. *Per.* 22, 23; Aristoph. *Clouds*, 859; Ephorus, *Frag.* 118. Theophrastus, ap. Plut. *l.c.*, asserts that Pericles sent ten talents yearly to Sparta.

but we do not hear of any organised resistance. Pericles came, and saw, and conquered. Once more in possession of the country, he proceeded to make arrangements which should secure it for the future. The Hestiaeans received a severe punishment. The inhabitants were expelled from the country, and their territory was divided among a number of Athenian colonists, who were sent out to form a stronghold of Athenian influence in the north. Inscriptions exist in which we find traces of some regulations affecting the trade of the new colony, and rules for the settlement of small actions at law by the appointment of local judges.¹

On the Euripus, Chalcis became the centre from which the Athenians held the country. In the sixth century, they had established no fewer than 4000 of their citizens on the rich lands taken from the Chalcidian oligarchs, but the inhabitants had been allowed to return to their city as an independent community. This was permitted no longer. The oligarchs were expelled,² and an entirely new constitution was given to Chalcis, by which the city became a dependency of Athens. The decree in which the new regulations were drawn up has been preserved; and, as in the case of Erythrae, *infra*, p. 371,—but far more distinctly owing to the better state of the inscription—we can still read the very words which determined the relations of the subject to the sovereign city. The document runs thus :—

It was decreed by the council and people : the Antiochid tribe

¹ Thuc. i. 114; Plut. *Per.* 23. The number of the colonists is variously given at 1000, Diod. xii. 22; and 2000, Theopompus, *Frag.* 164. The new settlement is often called Oreus, cf. Thuc. vii. 57, viii. 95, when Oreus remains loyal in the general revolt of Euboea (*ταύτην δὲ αὐτοὶ Ἀθηναῖοι εἶχον*). The exiles found a home in Macedonia; Theopomp. *l.c.* The inscription is given in *C. I. A.* i. 28, 29: we learn from it that the trade route between Athens and Hestiaeæ ran by Oropus and Chalcis.

² Plut. *Per.* 23.

was presiding : Dracontides was chairman : Diognetus proposed as follows :—

The council and dicastæ at Athens are to swear in the terms of the following oath :—“ I will not expel the Chalcidians from Chalcis, or lay the city waste. I will not disfranchise any private citizen, or banish him or arrest him, or put him to death, or take away his property without a trial, without the consent of the Athenian people. Nor will I put any measure to the vote against the community or against any private person, without summons duly served. Any embassy that comes to Athens I will bring before the council and people within ten days, if possible, when I am one of the Prytanes. These terms I will guarantee to the Chalcidians while they are obedient to the Athenian people.”

The Oath of
the Athenians.

Envoys must come from Chalcis, and with the commissioners they must take the oaths from the Athenians, and make a list of those who swear them. The generals must take care that all swear the oath.

The Chalcidians shall swear in the following terms :—“ I will not revolt from the people of the Athenians, in any way or shape, in word or deed, or be an accomplice in revolt. If any one revolts I will inform the Athenians. I will pay the Athenians the tribute, which I can persuade them (to accept), and I will be a faithful and true ally to the utmost of my power. I will help and assist the Athenian people, if any one injures them, and I will obey their commands.”

The Oath of
the Chalci-
dians.

All the Chalcidians of full age shall take the oath. Any one who refuses to take it shall be disfranchised, and his goods shall be confiscated, and a tenth shall be given to Zeus Olympius. Envoys shall go from Athens to Chalcis, and, together with the commissioners in Chalcis, they shall administer the oaths, and write down a list of the Chalcidians who take it.

Articles further proposed : Prosperity to the Athenians. Let the Athenians and Chalcidians take the oaths precisely as the Athenian people has decided in the case of the Eretrians, and let the generals see that they are taken at once. Let the people at once choose five commissioners to go to Chalcis and take the oaths. With regard to the hostages, let the answer to the Chalcidians be that at present the Athenians will make no change in the decree already passed, but at a suitable time they will, after deliberation, make such reconciliation as is considered

The Decree
concerning
Chalcis.

advantageous for the Athenians and Chalcidians. The aliens resident in Chalcis, who are not Athenians (μη τελῶσι Ἀθηναῖζε), and any one who enjoys immunity from the people of Athens, shall be citizens of Chalcis, like the other Chalcidians. This decree and this oath shall be written up at Athens by the clerk of the council on a stone pillar, and placed in the acropolis at the expense of the Chalcidians; and the council of the Chalcidians shall write it out and set it up at Chalcis in the temple of Zeus Olympius. This is the decree touching the Chalcidians.

Archestratus proposed: The rest to be as Anticles has moved; but further: The Chalcidians are to fix their own punishments in Chalcis, as the Athenians do at Athens, except in cases of banishment, death, and disfranchisement; on these there shall be an appeal to Athens to the Heliæa of the Thesmothetæ, according to the decree of the people. In regard to the safe-keeping of Euboea, the generals shall take the best measures they can for the security of the Athenians.¹

It is clear from this decree that similar arrangements had been made at Eretria, as no doubt they were made in the rest of the cities of Euboea. We observe that the Euboea a subject island. Athenians do not deal with the island as a member of the confederacy: she is a conquered territory, a subject of Athens, and bound to serve Athenian interests without reference to any other. They are also careful to reserve for the decision of their own courts all those cases at law which involve loss of life or citizenship. More plainly here than elsewhere do we see the head of the alliance formed after the battle of Mycale emerging into the tyrant city which entered into the Peloponnesian war.

22. By the prompt and complete reduction of Euboea Pericles rendered a great service to Athens, but even after this success her condition was sufficiently deplorable. Reverses of Athens. Four years had elapsed since Cimon's death, and already she had sunk far below the military eminence which she then occupied. Operations against Persia were not so much as thought of. The land empire was irretrievably lost; the way

¹ C. I. A. iv. 27 a; Dittenberger, *Sylloge*, No. 10; Hicks, *Hist. Inscript.* No. 28.

from Peloponnesus through the Isthmus was again open. The allies in Argos and Thessaly were estranged; Euboea, the greatest and nearest of the members of the Delian league, had been in open revolt. And this was not all. From the quota-lists of the tribute paid by members of the league, which have been preserved in inscriptions, we find that about this time a large number of cities either withdrew from the alliance or failed to pay. In Caria and Lycia more especially there were many defections; the retirement of the Greeks after the battle of Cyprus left the allies in these districts more at the mercy of the Persian satraps.¹

So sudden a fall from the height of her prosperity naturally produced a feeling of despondency at Athens. It was clear that she could not now keep her allies in hand and sustain the burden of a war in Hellas. At all costs she must come to terms with Sparta.

In the winter of 446 B.C. ten plenipotentiaries—among whom were Callias, Chares, and Andocides, the grandfather of Andocides, the

Peace for
thirty years
between
Athens and
Sparta.
445 B.C.
Ol. 83. 4.

orator—were sent to Sparta to negotiate. Through them a peace for thirty years was concluded between the cities² on the following conditions: The Athenians renounced all their acquisitions in Peloponnesus—Nisæa, Pegæ, Trœzen, and Achæa. For the rest, each state was to retain its possessions; the Athenians were not to admit Lacedæmonian cities, and the Lacedæmonians were not to admit Athenian cities into their league without the permission of the other side, but any city which was independent of either alliance might join whichever of the two it pleased.³ The Aeginetans were apparently to remain independent, but to pay a certain con-

¹ See Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.* ii. 555. The average number of the Carian cities in 454-441 is given by Köhler, *Urkunden*, p. 133, as 54; as printed by Kirchhoff, *C. I. A.* i. No. 239, the list of Ol. 84. 4. (441 B.C.) requires forty-three names only, and the list is nearly perfect.

² Thuc. i. 115; Andoc. *de Pace*, 6. Callias was proxenus of the Spartans. Xen. *Hell.* vi. 3. 4. It is the same Callias of whose journey to Susa we hear in Herodotus; cf. *infra*, p. 365.

³ Thuc. i. 115, 35, 40.

tribution to the Athenian alliance—that is, they were not to be reduced to the condition of the Euboeans.¹ The Argives had no part in the peace; they were already allies of Lacedaemon, and they might, if they liked, make a separate alliance with Athens.² Should any differences arise between the cities they were to be settled by arbitration.³ The terms of the peace were engraved on stone and set up at Athens, and in the shrine of Apollo at Amyclæ. A bronze copy was also to be seen at Olympia.⁴

¹ Thuc. i. 67. In the list of 436 B.C. Aegina pays less than in 454 B.C., see Kirchhoff, *l.c.* p. 233.

² Paus. v. 23. 4.

³ Thuc. i. 140.

⁴ Paus. *l.c.*

CHAPTER X.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS 459-445 B.C.

I. THE LAST CONFLICTS WITH PERSIA.

I. At the moment when her conduct at home rendered a collision with the Peloponnesians inevitable, Athens did not hesitate to re-open the war in the east. In the last year of Darius, Egypt had revolted from Persia, but the revolt was quickly crushed by Xerxes, and the province, which was now reduced to a lower degree of servitude than ever, was placed under the government of Achaemenes the king's brother. After the murder of Xerxes in 465 B.C., the first year of his successor, Artaxerxes, was occupied with suppressing conspiracies and organising his kingdom, after which a rebellion in Bactria carried him to the eastern edge of his empire. To the oppressed Egyptians an opportunity seemed to have arrived for shaking off the hated yoke. Inaros, the son of Psammetichus, the king of Libya, which formed a part of the Egyptian satrapy, acting in concert with Amyrtaeus, an Egyptian, seized Marea, a Persian outpost on the south-western shore of the Mareotic lake. Here he raised the standard of revolt. The Egyptians gathered round him; Achaemenes was driven out of his satrapy; and Inaros became master of the country. For a short time he was allowed to retain his position, but in 459 B.C. (?) he ascertained that a vigorous attempt was about to be made to recover Egypt. His own forces being quite inadequate to resist the enemy and fleet which were advancing upon him, he sent to Athens, inviting assistance.¹

Revolt of
Egypt under
Inaros.
462 B.C. ?

¹ Ctesias, *Pers.* 31, 32; Thuc. i. 104; Diod. xi. 71, who says of

Since the decisive victories of the Eurymedon the Athenians had sent out no expeditions on a great scale to the East, but on hearing of the troubles in Egypt, they despatched a fleet of 200 vessels to operate in the neighbourhood of Cyprus and the Syrian coast. In spite of the victories of Pausanias and Cimon, Cyprus had never been acquired by the Greeks. It formed no part of the Delian league; there was neither ally nor subject among its numerous cities. Even Salamis—the home of the Greek dynasty of the Teucridae—seems to have been held by a Persian garrison.¹ It was a wealthy island, well situated for trade with the East, and exceedingly valuable as a military station, for on the one hand it lay opposite the Cilician plain, which formed the *rendezvous* of the Persian empire for all operations in the West and South; and on the other, it commanded the mouth of the Nile. With Egypt in revolt and the Egyptian fleet detached from the service of the king, there was a reasonable hope of annexing the island to the league.² It was true that Cimon was not now in Athens to urge his countrymen on the old path, but perhaps his absence acted as a spur to the popular party, whose prestige would be increased if they could add to their democratic measures the credit of acquiring an island which had defied or escaped the great general.³

Artaxerxes, ἐπεμελήθη δὲ καὶ τῶν προσόδων καὶ τῆς δυνάμεων παρασκευῆς· καὶ καθόλου τὴν βασιλείαν ὅλην ἐπιεικῶς διοικῶν, μεγάλης ἀποδοχῆς ἐτύγχανε παρὰ τοῖς Πέρσαις.

¹ Diod. xii. 4, though this refers to a date ten years later; subsequently the city became "utterly barbarous." Isocr. *Evag.* § 47 = 198 c. That the Greeks were engaged in Phoenicia as well as Cyprus is shown by the inscription, *C. I. A.*, i. 433 = Hicks, *Historical Inscript.*, No. 16.

² Thuc. i. 104, says of the Athenians *ἔτυχον ἐς Κύπρον σπαρ-ενόμενοι*. That they went to the island and fought there is proved by the inscription quoted above. I have assumed that the Athenians were aware of the revolt when sending out the fleet.

³ Plutarch, *Cim.* 13, on the authority of Callisthenes (ivth cent.) mentions an expedition of Ephialtes beyond the Chelidonian islands, and another of Pericles, unless in this case the Cyanean islands, mentioned just before in Plutarch's text, are intended.

2. On receiving the application of Inaros the Athenians abandoned the project of acquiring Cyprus, and ordered their fleet to Egypt to co-operate with the rebels. The risk was great but the temptation was irresistible. Egypt, if a friendly power, would supply Athens with stores of grain; she could also furnish a number of brave and experienced seamen, with whose assistance the conquest of Cyprus would be rendered an easier task; and as head of the Delian confederacy, mistress of the funds and ships of the allies, Athens may have felt that even with 200 ships in Egypt she was more than a match for any combination which could be brought against her in Hellas.

The Athenian
fleet ordered
to the Nile.
459 B.C.
Ol. 80. 2.

The expedition at first met with considerable success. Even before the arrival of the Athenians, Inaros had routed at Papremis the army which Artaxerxes had sent against him, and had slain Achæmenes with his own hand. When the Athenians sailed up from Cyprus, they had no difficulty in defeating the Persian fleet of eighty ships which lay at the mouth of the Nile, after which they ascended the river as far as Memphis, and captured two-thirds of the city. But here the success of the rebels came to an end; the "White Fortress," the citadel of Memphis, which was held by a garrison of Persians, Medes, and loyal Egyptians, resisted their utmost efforts; the siege lingered on, and the movement received a sensible check.¹

Success of the
rebellion.

3. Artaxerxes was quickly informed of the defeat and death of Achæmenes. New preparations were made, for, at any cost, it was necessary to recover Egypt. Not less than two years seem to have been consumed in getting together a force which should make successful resistance impossible. In the interim, Megabyzus, a distinguished Persian, was sent

New prepara-
tions in Persia.
Megabyzus
sent to Sparta.

¹ Thuc. *l.c.*; Herod. iii. 12. The battlefield of Papremis was one of the most famous scenes of Persian disaster. The site of the city does not appear to be known. Diodorus (xi. 74) represents the Athenians as present at the battle, and Ctesias mentions Charitimides as a distinguished general in the Greek fleet: *Pers.* 32.

to Sparta with a sum of money, in the hope that the Spartans might be induced to invade Attica, and divert the Athenian forces from Egypt. The Spartans were willing enough to take the money, but no active measures followed, and after a short stay Megabyzus returned with the remainder of his treasure to Persia.¹

In the year 457 B.C. Megabyzus, the son of Zopyrus, the foremost of the generals of Persia, who had recently been occupied in reducing the rebellion of Babylon (*supra*, p. 308), marched from Susa to Cilicia, where the forces which he was to command were assembled. Another year was spent in practising and drilling the troops, and in building ships, and it was not till the beginning of 455 B.C. that he advanced upon Memphis.² The appearance of such a vast armament—the fleet amounted to 300 triremes, the foot soldiers to 300,000 men—was calculated to fill the eastern Mediterranean with terror. In spite of the crushing defeats of the Eurymedon ten years before, and the overthrow of Achaemenes at Papremis, Persia could still put forth a power which it seemed impossible to resist. The day of vengeance was come at last; the cities of the coasts and islands would again experience the fury of the Phoenician fleet, as they had done fifty years before. We may imagine how great was the alarm when the news came that Megabyzus had utterly defeated Inaros and the Egyptians, had driven the Athenians out of Memphis, and shut up Greeks and Egyptians alike in Prosopitis, an island formed by the Canopic and Sebennyitic arms of the Nile, and a canal which connected them.³ It may have been about this time that the chest of the Delian league was transferred from Delos

¹ Thuc. i. 109; Diodorus, on the other hand, xi. 74, asserts that the Lacedaemonians did not receive the money or listen to the overtures of Artaxerxes in any way.

² Diod. xi. 75, 77, who associates Artabazus with Megabyzus in the command.

³ Herod. ii. 41, Stein's note.

to Athens; a change proposed by the Samians, and perhaps due to the prevailing terror.¹

The investment of Prosopitis had continued for a year and a half, when at length Megabyzus, weary of the delay, drained the canal which formed the base of the island.

By this stratagem the Athenian ships were rendered useless, and in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy, they

Suppression of
the rebellion.

453 B.C.

Ol. 81. 4.

were burnt. The Persian forces could now march dryshod into the island, and, after a severe resistance, they captured it. Inaros, with 6000 Greeks, escaped to Byblus, a town in the Delta, where Megabyzus induced him to capitulate by guaranteeing to Inaros his life, and to his allies an unmolested return. As they were without ships, the Greeks marched overland to Cyrene, from which port they sailed home, "few out of many." Inaros was conveyed a captive to Susa. After the lapse of five years, in spite of the pledges and protestations of Megabyzus, he was crucified at the instance of Amestris, the cruel widow of Xerxes, who desired to revenge the death of Achaemenes. Egypt was once more a Persian province; but, in spite of their severe defeat, a remnant of the rebels maintained themselves in the marshes of the Delta under Amyrtaeus.²

The disasters of the Athenians were not yet ended. After the capture of Prosopitis, and in ignorance of the event, a squadron of fifty triremes sailed into the Mendesian arm of the Nile. Here they were immediately attacked by land and sea, and the larger part destroyed.

Further dis-
asters of the
Athenians.

So, after six years, ended the great expedition of the Athenians to Egypt. It was the most severe disaster which had overtaken Athens, the first failure in a long series of

¹ Plut. *Aristid.* 25; see *infra*, p. 362.

² Thuc. i. 109, 110, who says of Inaros *προδοσίᾳ ληφθεὶς*. Diod. xi. 77 represents the defeat as due to the treachery of the Egyptians, and greatly softens the extent of the disaster to the Greeks. Ctesias, *Pers.* 33, 34.

successes against Persia. To most men the catastrophe would appear an unmixed evil, but Pericles might reflect that such a severe lesson would teach the Athenians not to waste their strength on distant expeditions, and that the transference of the chest from Delos to Athens would in the end prove an ample compensation for the terrible reverse which had fallen upon the city.¹

4. When peace had been secured at home by the truce of 451 B.C., the Athenians were free to turn their attention once more to the East. It was asserted by some of the authorities, whom Plutarch consulted, that before Cimon's return from ostracism an agreement was made that Pericles should be unmolested in his home policy, while Cimon sailed out with the Athenian fleet to renew the war with Persia.² However this may be, in the spring of 449 B.C. we find Cimon at the head of 200 vessels, supplied by Athens and her allies, on his way to Cyprus. The expedition was needed. After the success in Egypt, Persia had felt herself able to push forward in Asia. Megabyzus was once more encamped in Cilicia; Artabazus had been sent out with the fleet to Cyprus.

Of the two hundred ships sixty were detached for the assistance of Amyrtaeus, who still bid defiance to Persia in the impenetrable swamps of the Delta. With the remaining one hundred and forty Cimon sailed to Mareion, a town on the west coast of Cyprus, and captured it (?). Thence he ad-

Renewed
attack on
Cyprus.
449 B.C.
Ol. 82. 4.

Siege of
Citium, and
death of
Cimon.

¹ Thuc. i. 110. For the chronology, see Busolt, *Griech. Gesch.* ii. 480, n. 2. Diodorus places the end of the Egyptian campaign in 460 (xi. 77); the battle of Halicis in 459 (xi. 78); the conflicts in Megara in 458 (xi. 79). We know from *C. I. A.* i. 433, that the Athenians were engaged in all these places in one and the same year; and this may be 459 B.C., though others decide for 460. If the expedition was sent out in 459, the end came in 453, for Thucydides allows six full years to it. As the siege of Prosopitis lasted eighteen months, we may place the arrival of Megabyzus in Egypt in 455; and if a full year was spent in drilling his forces, etc., the end of 457 may have been the date of his arrival in Cilicia. Ctesias, *Pers.* 32 ff., says not a word of the siege of Memphis, or of Prosopitis.

² Plut. *Per.* 10, ἐνιοι δὲ φασί.

vanced along the south shore of the island and laid siege to Citium. The city was at this time governed by a Phoenician prince, and it was defended with the stubborn spirit which has made the sieges of Phoenician towns so famous in military history. Ere long the Athenian fleet began to suffer from famine, and, to increase their misfortune, their great commander fell sick and died.¹ When dying, he is said to have given orders for the besieging forces to retire and conceal the news of his death. But retirement was impossible; the Phoenician fleet had already appeared on the north coast of Cyprus. Notwithstanding the weakness caused by famine and the loss of their leader, the Athenians put to sea and sailed upon the enemy. The battle, which Victories of
Salamis. took place off Salamis, ended in a complete victory for Athens. The Phoenician vessels fled to the shore, where the soldiers were drawn up to protect them; but the Athenians followed close, disembarked and defeated the army, no less than the fleet. The achievement of the Eurymedon was repeated; Athens once more proved her immense superiority over the Persian forces. But in spite of this success, no attempt was made to acquire the island of Cyprus. The fleet returned home, carrying with it the corpse of Cimon, which was buried in the sepulchre of the Philadae, outside the Melitian gate of Athens. On their way the ships were joined by the squadron from Egypt, which seems to have accomplished nothing.²

¹ Thuc. i. 112; Diod. xii. 3; Plut. *Cim.* 18, 19. Diodorus and Plutarch represent Cimon as gaining a great victory before his death.

² Plutarch *l.c.* in part on the authority of Phanodemus. He adds that Cimon was spurred to unusual activity *ὅτι τοῦ Θεμιστοκλέους ἐπυνθάνετο δοῦσαν εἶναι καὶ δύναμιν ἐν τοῖς βαρβάρους μεγάλην, ὑποδεγμένου βασιλεῖ κινεῖν τὸν Ἑλληνικὸν πόλεμον στρατηγήσειν*, but this is surely a confusion with an earlier date. Diodorus puts the scene of the battle on the coast of Cilicia, where Megabyzus had drawn up his army: in the conflict Anaxierates, the second Athenian general, met a soldier's death. The Athenians then retired to Cyprus and besieged Salamis, till the king made peace (*infra*, p. 363). Thucydides merely mentions the double victory off Salamis, i. 112. Köhler, *Urkunden*, p. 130, finding that there are defalcations in the

The balance was once more in favour of Athens in the East, but the success was transient, and it had been purchased at severe cost. The Phoenician and Cilician fleets had been defeated, but Cyprus was as far as ever from being annexed to the Delian league. The island was still a dependency of Persia; Persian troops could land on it; Phoenician princes ruled in most of the cities, supported by Persian garrisons; Hellenes and Hellenism maintained a precarious footing, and in fact almost ceased to exist. For the rest of the century we hear no more of Grecian fleets at Cyprus. In Egypt Amyrtaeus appears to have held his ground for a few years, but when Herodotus visited the country (before 443 B.C.) the Persians had put down all resistance. At a later time Pausiris, the son of Amyrtaeus, succeeded to the power which his father had enjoyed before his revolt. In like manner Psammetichus and his younger brother Thanyras, the sons of Inaros, became in succession vassal kings of Libya, after the death of their father.¹

5. And Cimon was dead. The great captain, who for thirty years had led the allies to victory, would lead them no more. In public life we first hear of him as an Athenian knight, cheerfully hanging up his bridle in the temple of Athena on the acropolis, in recognition of the change which made it imperative for every Athenian to fight on board ship as Themistocles demanded. From 478 B.C. when Xanthippus, the hero of Mycale, disappears from sight, Cimon is associated with Aristides in the command of the fleet.

tribute of the Aegean as far as the Hellespont at this time, thinks the year was one of dearth; hence the famine of Cyprus. But we do not know that the famine extended beyond the Greek fleet: see Jowett, *Thuc.* ii. p. xlvii.

¹ For Cyprus, *Isocr. Evag.* § 47. The prince of Citium at the time of Cimon's attack is called Baalmelek i. by Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.* ii. 509; see Head, *Hist. Num.* p. 621, who gives coins of Baalmelek *circ.* B.C. 450-420. The names on the older coins of Salamis are Greek, *ib.* 625. For Amyrtaeus, etc., *Herod.* iii. 15; *Philoch. Frag.* 90 M.

With him he founded the Delian confederacy; and from this time onwards he was the life and soul of every military expedition which went forth from Athens.

His manners and character were those of a soldier. Tall in stature, with abundant hair curling close to his head, and winning eyes, he was a well-known figure in Athens. His accomplishments made him a welcome guest at every social gathering:

His appearance and manners.

a song from Cimon was remembered by those who heard it; while others listened attentively to the stories which he loved to tell of his military life and experiences.¹ When he rose to eminence and acquired wealth, his liberality was unbounded. He would command his well-

His liberality.

clad followers to exchange garments with the aged poor, or he would remove the fences which protected his gardens and orchards, that all who passed by might take what they chose. Or he would squander small coin among those who were willing to pick it up. Any Athenian, or at least any one belonging to his deme of Laciadae, was welcome at his hospitable table. In the "Archilochi," a comedy of Cratinus, the notary Metrobius laments the death of his patron. "I hoped," he says, "to bring my life to a close in a happy old age with Cimon, a man 'divine' and bountiful, and far the noblest of the Pan-Hellenes in his day. But he has left me and gone before."² So great was his profusion that his enemies accused him of seeking to win the people by unworthy means. But he also applied his wealth to noble uses. He adorned the city with the spoils

¹ Such was Ion's account, but Stesimbrotus, who was a contemporary of Cimon, gave a different description of him, affirming that he was a man of no accomplishments at all, and without any of the cleverness characteristic of Athenians; he was, in fact, more like a Peloponnesian than an Athenian, honest and straightforward, but simple almost to the degree of rusticity. Plut. *Cim.* 9. 4.

² Arist. *Athen. Pol.* c. 27; Plut. *Cim.* 10. It should be remembered that the epithet θεῖος "divine" was Laconian and female "slang" for ἀγαθός. Plato, *Menon* 99 D, καὶ αὐτὴ γυναικες τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας θεῖους καλοῦσι καὶ οἱ Λάκωνες ὅταν τινὰ ἐγκωμιάσωσιν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα, θεῖος ἀνὴρ, φασίν, οὗτος.

taken from the enemy; the market-place was planted with trees, to afford the shade so grateful in an Athenian summer; the Academy was irrigated and laid out with pleasant walks and courses; the foundations of the long walls which connected Athens and the harbour were laid; the southern wall of the acropolis was built up; preparations were made for a new temple of Athena, and Pheidias was employed to erect the great bronze statue of the goddess, which towered aloft above the city. In his epigrammatic style Gorgias, the rhetorician of Leontini, declared that Cimon acquired wealth to use it, and used it to win honour.¹ The exercise of such liberality would be the more delightful to one whose early years had been crushed by the heavy fine imposed upon his father Miltiades. For until this was paid, it was impossible for him to claim his rights as a citizen.

Cimon's
adornment
of the city.

The accounts preserved of the domestic life of Cimon are not altogether to his credit. Before his great qualities had shown themselves, he had but an indifferent reputation. Men saw in him a copy of his grandfather—the owner of the famous mares—who had been nicknamed Coalemos, or “Simpleton.” In his youth he formed a connection, which Greek custom allowed to be called a marriage, with his half-sister Elpinice, a connection which came to an end when Elpinice married the wealthy Callias. Afterwards we hear of mistresses, Asteria and Mnestra. His love of good fellowship brought upon him the charge of drunkenness, and in his admiration of all things Laconian some detected an inclination to Laconian vices.² But his intrigues did not prevent him from cherishing a devoted love for his wife Isodice, the daughter of Euryptolemus, of the race of the Alcmaeonidae. By her he had a

His private
character.

¹ Plut. *Cim.* 10, 13. For the Cimonian temple see Harrison, *Mythology and Monuments of ancient Athens*, p. 167. For the statue, Paus. i. 28. 2; it must belong to the Cimonian time.

² Plut. *Cim.* 4, 15. The grossest charge comes from the comedian Eupolis. Plutarch's comment on the charge of drunkenness is amusing: εἰ δ' ἀμελῶν καὶ μεθύσκόμενος τοσαύτας πόλεις εἶλε καὶ

son Thessalus, and by a later wife, a native of Cleitor in Arcadia, he had Lacedaemonius and Eleus—half breeds, whose very names were alien, as Pericles bitterly said of the whole family.¹

As a statesman Cimon had the support of Aristides and the Lacedaemonian party, who put him forward as a rival to Themistocles. So long as the Spartans and Athenians were on good terms, his influence was ever on the increase, and when the removal of Themistocles and the death of Aristides left him without a rival, he was for some years the most powerful man at Athens. But his constant absence on military expeditions deprived his party to a large extent of his services as a statesman, and as the new democracy acquired power under Ephialtes and Pericles, as Sparta and Athens became alienated, his political position was ruined. After his ostracism he returned to Athens as a soldier, not as a statesman. As a soldier he was indispensable; as a statesman his efforts to save the Areopagus and maintain the constitution of Clisthenes, however far-sighted and wise, deprived him of popular favour. His services to his country were great, but they were forgotten, as those of Themistocles were forgotten, in the ever-changing currents of party spirit.²

Two charges have been brought against Cimon. It is said that he hunted Themistocles out of Athens, thus depriving the city of her greatest man, and that he prevented the destruction of Sparta at the moment when destruction was possible. It is true that

τοσαύτας νίκας ἐνίκησε, δῆλον ὅτι νήφοντος αὐτοῦ καὶ προσέχοντος οὐδεὶς αὖν οὔτε τῶν πρότερον οὔτε τῶν ὕστερον Ἑλλήνων παρήλθε τὰς πράξεις.

¹ Plut. *Cim.* 16; *Per.* 29.

² Plut. *Them.* 20, διὸ καὶ τὸν Κίμωνα προῆγον (the Spartans) ταῖς τιμαῖς, ἀντίπαλον ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῷ Θεμιστοκλεῖ καθιστάντες—after the affair of the Amphictyony; Id. *Cim.* 16 (cf. *supra*, p. 270; Plut. *Cim.* 5); Id. *Per.* 7, ἐπειδὴ Ἀριστείδης μὲν ἀποτεθνήκει καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐξεπεπτώκει, Κίμωνα δ' αἱ στρατεῖαι τὰ πολλὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἔξω κατείχον—Pericles joined the democracy, δεδιὼς μὲν ὑποψία περιπεσεῖν τυραννίδος, ὁρῶν δὲ ἀριστοκρατικὸν τὸν Κίμωνα καὶ διαφερόντως ὑπὸ τῶν καλῶν καγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαπώμενον.

he was the persistent enemy of Themistocles, and, in order to drag his rival down, he was willing to forget the disgrace which the Alcmaeonidae had brought upon his own father; he joined Leobotas in preferring the charge of "Medism" against the man who had saved Athens. Yet there is something to be said on the other side. The jealousy of Themistocles was felt before Cimon came to the front; as we have said, he was never employed in the field or in the fleet after 480 B.C. And though he served Athens in other ways, his services provoked the animosity of Sparta—a serious policy for the peace of Hellas, and unpopular with a large section of Athenians. We may also reasonably doubt whether Themistocles would have succeeded as well as Cimon and Aristides in organising the Delian league; his conception of an imperial Athens was hardly consistent with a confederation of equal cities. Cimon at any rate, whose heart was set on the union of the Greek fleet under Athens, and on the wider union of Greece under Athens and Sparta, would naturally regard the policy of Themistocles as a serious obstacle in his way. And he may have believed, as doubtless he was only too ready to believe, that Themistocles was really implicated in the treachery of Pausanias.—It is true that Cimon and the Spartans. Cimon persuaded the Athenians to send help to Sparta at the siege of Ithome. But as events turned out, the expedition was unsuccessful, and if it had not been sent, Sparta would not have fallen. In later days, when Athens had suffered so greatly at the hands of her rival, men looked back to the earthquake and the revolt as they look back on lost opportunities, and Critias could say that Cimon had sacrificed the welfare of his city to the interests of Lacedaemon. This is more than the account of Thucydides allows us to affirm. The helots were already driven into Ithome before the application for assistance came, and the Athenians were sent back because they failed to take the fortress.¹ Cimon was at all times the firm friend of Sparta;

¹ Thuc. i. 102; Plut. *Them.* 23; *Cimon*, 16; *Arist.* 25.

he never accepted the doctrine that the two great cities could not work together; and under his management they probably would have worked together. Co-operation on the lines of Themistocles and Pericles was impossible; to these statesmen, who wished to see Athens an imperial city, Sparta was a rival to be crushed by every means. We cannot truly describe their policy as Pan-Hellenic; it was merely Pan-Athenian. But Cimon's views were sincerely Pan-Hellenic, so far as any Greek's could be such. He knew that a quarrel between Athens and Sparta would be an irreparable injury to Hellas; the beginning of endless confusion in Grecian politics. He was also far too good a soldier to underrate the value of Spartan discipline and Spartan courage. For these reasons he strove to preserve a friendly feeling between the two great cities, which he wished to see united in peace and war. With his death all hope of continuing the conflict with Persia, and of lasting peace between Athens and Sparta, came to an end.

6. After the death of Cimon the Athenians made no attempt to carry on the war on a great scale. But the mere fact that in 444 B.C. the rebel king of Egypt sent a present of corn to Athens shows that Athens and Persia were still regarded as enemies. Enemies indeed they must remain, if the existence of the Delian league was to be

Athens and
Persia after
the death of
Cimon.
448 B.C. ?
Ol. 83. 1.

justified. And though Pericles, who was now the ruling spirit at Athens, was anxious that the forces of the confederacy should not be wasted in a struggle, in which nothing seemed decisive, he had no intention of allowing the funds to slip out of his fingers. He wanted them for another purpose—the purpose of his life—for the establishment of the Athenian empire, and the glorification of Athens.

On the other hand Artaxerxes was not in a position to prosecute the war with vigour. As we have said, Inaros surrendered to Megabyzus at Byblus on the assurance that his life would be spared. This promise was not kept, owing to the influence of Amestris, the queen-mother, whose son-in-law, Achaemenes,

Megabyzus
and Arta-
xerxes.

Inaros had slain with his own hand. Five years after his capture (448 B.C.?) he was crucified in some especially cruel manner on three crosses. Enraged at this disregard of his plighted word, Megabyzus begged leave to retire to Syria, where he secretly organised a revolt against the king. In two great battles he defeated the forces sent against him; but at length, chiefly through the good offices of Artarius, the brother of Artaxerxes, a reconciliation was brought about, and Megabyzus returned to Persia. Not long afterwards he had the misfortune to incur the king's serious displeasure. When hunting Artaxerxes was attacked by a lion, and before he could strike it, the animal fell beneath the spear of Megabyzus. The king's life was saved, but the king's honour was wounded; it was little less than treason to strike down a hunted beast before the king had delivered his blow. Artaxerxes, in his fury, gave orders that Megabyzus should lose his head; but on the intercession of Amytis, the sister of Artaxerxes, and wife of Megabyzus, and of Amestris, the extreme penalty was remitted. Megabyzus was sent into exile at Cyrtæ on the "Red Sea." There he lived for five years, after which he escaped disguised as a *Pisagas* or leper. Returning to Susa, he was once more received into favour by the king, who reinstated him in his old position as a "table-companion."¹

7. We cannot take leave of Cimon without some discussion of one of the famous puzzles of Greek history. From the middle of the fourth century B.C. downwards, The "Peace of Callias." *i.e.* from about a century after the death of Cimon, we hear of a peace between Athens and Persia, which is sometimes called the peace of Cimon, and sometimes the

¹ Ctesias, *Pers.* §§ 36-42. The stories which this author relates of Amytis and Amestris confirm the worst opinions that can be formed of the domestic morals of the Persian court. But whether we meet her in Herodotus or in Ctesias, Amestris bears away the palm for horrid and unrelenting cruelty. In a later generation Parysatis was her equal, if not more than her equal; see *Plut. Artaxerx.* c. 14 ff.

peace of Callias; sometimes placed after the battles of the Eurymedon (466 B.C.); sometimes after the battles of Salamis (449 B.C.). The first mention of it occurs in Isocrates, then we hear of it in Demosthenes and other orators; and at last we find the historian Diodorus, who was a contemporary of Augustus, giving a very precise account of the transaction, which he may have taken from Ephorus, the pupil of Isocrates. After narrating in a most exaggerated manner—as compared with Thucydides—the success of the Athenians at Cyprus, the historian goes on to say that Artaxerxes, on hearing of the disaster which had overtaken his forces, summoned a council, and, by the advice of his friends, resolved to make peace with the Greeks, who were besieging Salamis at the time. “So he sent orders to the commanders and satraps in charge at Cyprus, bidding them bring the war to an end on any terms. Upon this Artabazus and Megabyzus despatched envoys to Athens with proposals of peace. The proposals were accepted, and Callias, the son of Hipponicus, was sent with other plenipotentiaries to arrange terms. The conditions agreed upon were as follows: All the Greeks in Asia to be independent; the Persian satraps not to come nearer the coast than three days’ journey (*i.e.* than Sardis); no Persian ship of war to enter the water between Phaselis and the Cyanean Rocks. On their side, the Athenians engaged not to attack any country over which Artaxerxes ruled.” After the conclusion of the peace, Diodorus adds, the Athenians drew off their ships from Cyprus, and Cimon, who lingered in the island, died of disease.¹ The terms of the peace are given with slight variations in other authors. Plutarch, for instance, who puts the peace after the battles of the Eurymedon, speaks of the Chelidonian islands in the place of Phaselis, and of a single day’s journey on horseback instead of three days’ journey on foot.²

Diodorus’
account of
the peace.

¹ Diod. xii. 4.

² Plut. *Cim.* 13.

Whether we take the earlier or the later date, the existence of a peace between Athens and Persia is open to very grave doubts. (1) It is true that for five or six years after the defeat of the Eurymedon we hear of no conflicts between Athens and Persia; but this is easily accounted for by the severe blow inflicted on Persia in the battles, a blow from which even the Great King would require some little time to recover; by the revolt of Thasos, which called away the Athenian fleet in another direction; and by the grave disaster of Drabescus. But in 459 B.C. the Athenians sent a large fleet to support Inaros, and even before his appeal for help, they were engaged at Cyprus and in Phoenicia, which implies that no lasting peace had been concluded between Athens and Persia. (2) After 449 B.C., as we have said, war was discontinued on a great scale, but in 440 B.C., on the occasion of the revolt of Samos, Persia and Athens were regarded as hostile powers. If the king was bound by treaty not to enter the Aegean with ships of war, Pisuthnes could not have called up the Phoenician fleet to assist the rebellious Samians; and though the Phoenician fleet never arrived, it is certain that the Athenians expected it. Nor is it likely that the rebel king of Egypt would have sent corn to Athens in 444 B.C. if there was no hope of Athenian assistance against Persia.

The strongest proof of the peace which could be produced in antiquity was an inscription in which the terms of the peace were engraved—an inscription still in existence in the time of the historian Theopompus, and preserved, in a copy, to a later age among the documents collected by Craterus, the general of Alexander. But Theopompus declared that the inscription was a forgery; it was written in Ionic letters, which did not come into use till 404 B.C., long after the date of the supposed peace; and Callisthenes, a contemporary of Craterus, denied that any formal compact was concluded. It was terror at his recent defeat which kept the "barbarian" out of the Aegean so completely that Pericles and Ephialtes

subsequently sailed beyond the Chelidonians without discovering any Persian fleet.¹

There is no mention of the peace in Herodotus and Thucydides. The silence is not remarkable in Herodotus, for he says nothing of the battles of Eurymedon or Cyprus, but in Thucydides there is more than one passage where we might expect to hear of such a compact. It is at any rate curious that, when

The peace not mentioned in Herodotus and Thucydides.

the Mytilenaeans speak of the change in the Athenian conduct of the league—how they abandoned the war with Persia, and began to subjugate the allies—they should say nothing of a peace which would have been a definite proof that the Athenians had renounced the legitimate object of the league, and were using its resources for their own purposes. Still more remarkable would it be, if Pericles, whose hopes depended on the Athenian allies, should put the existence of the league in peril by destroying the object for which it existed. Why should Samos, Chios, and Lesbos, all great islands off the Asiatic coast, contribute ships to the league, if all fear of Persia was at an end?

Nevertheless, it is certain that Callias was in Susa at some period after the accession of Artaxerxes, and perhaps not long after. We have also the testimony of Demosthenes to the fact that Callias was condemned to pay a fine of fifty talents for receiving bribes from the king in the matter of the famous peace.²

It is, of course, possible that a peace was proposed and not

¹ Theopomp. *Frag.* 168 M.; Plut. *Cim.* 13. It is strange that Callisthenes did not appeal to the conflicts at Cyprus or the Egyptian war, when denying the existence of a peace after Eurymedon. Plutarch mentions a vague statement (φασί) that the Athenians founded an altar to Peace, and paid "conspicuous honours" to Callias. This last is contradicted by Demosthenes; see next note.

² Herod. vii. 151; Dem. *Fals. Leg.* § 273=p. 429, *ἐκείνοι τοίνυν Καλλίαν ταύτην τὴν ὑπὸ πάντων θρυλουμένην εἰρήνην πρεσβεύσαντα*—the terms are given as in Plutarch—*ὅτι δῶρα λαβεῖν ἔδοξε πρεσβεύσας, μικροῦ μὲν ἀπέκτειναν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς εὐθύναις πενήτηκοντα ἐπράξαντο τάλαντα.*

carried through. Callias may have gone to Susa, and, like the envoys who in the days of Clisthenes agreed to give earth and water to Artaphernes, he may have aroused the wrath of the Athenian people by some supposed concessions to Persia.¹ However this may be, the terms of the supposed peace express with tolerable accuracy the *status quo* between Persia and Athens from the battle of Cyprus to the appearance of Tissaphernes on the Asiatic coast, in 412 B.C. During that period Athens did not attack Persia on any great scale, and no Persian fleet entered the Aegean. On the other hand, we have reason to suppose that this situation was not the result of any settled compact, and that the king never gave up his claim to the tribute from the cities. Herodotus informs us that the tribute fixed by Artaphernes for Ionia after the revolt (*supra*, p. 73) was the same as the tribute assessed in his own day; and Thucydides tells us how Darius, the successor of Artaxerxes, pressed his satraps for the arrears due from the Grecian cities of the coast.² Such claims are inconsistent with the "independence" guaranteed to the cities under the supposed treaty.

But if the peace never existed, how did the legend of it arise? We find mention of it, as has been said, for the first time in Isocrates, the famous rhetorician. And we find it after 387 B.C. In that year the Spartans, who at the time claimed to be the champions of Hellenic freedom, whose king, Agesilaus, had wished to pose as a second Agamemnon in a great invasion of Persia, concluded the shameful compact with Persia which is known as the peace of Antalcidas. In this bargain the Greeks agreed to withdraw from Asia and leave their countrymen on that side of the water entirely at the mercy of the

The peace expresses the status quo of 449-412 B.C.

Possible origin of the legend of the peace.

¹ Herod. v. 73.

² Herod. vi. 42. Artaphernes measured the land and imposed tribute οἱ κατὰ χώραν διατελέουσι ἔχοντες (remain unchanged) ἐκ τούτου τοῦ χρόνου αἰεὶ ἔτι καὶ ἐς ἐμὲ, ὡς ἐτάχθησαν ἐξ Ἀρταφρένεος. Thuc. viii. 5.

Great King, who in return was graciously pleased to insist that the cities in Greece, great and small, should be independent. The causes which led to this arrangement cannot be discussed here, but it was natural that the rhetoricians of Athens, who cared little about historical truth, should contrast the state of the Grecian world under Spartan supremacy with the state of it under Athenian supremacy. Now the Greeks were practically the slaves of Persia; then no Persian vessel was seen in the Aegean, no Persian soldier on the Asiatic coast. By degrees the contrast assumed a more definite shape, and the peace of Cimon or Callias was quoted by the side of the peace of Antalcidas as a historical fact.¹

II. THE DELIAN LEAGUE.

8. Of the history of the Delian league from the suppression of the revolt of Thasos (463 B.C.) to the conclusion of the thirty years' peace (445 B.C.) no satisfactory account can be given. Some very important events occurred in this period, such as the removal of the chest from Delos to Athens, and possibly the final extinction of the Delian synod, but our information is too vague and fragmentary to allow us to fix with certainty the order of events, or to explain their connection and meaning. What we gather from inconsistent statements and mutilated inscriptions is as follows:—

¹ The most recent discussion of this subject, so far as I know, is that by Holtzapfel, in his *Beiträge zur Griech. Gesch.*, Berlin, 1888, p. 19 ff. The passages in the orators which bear upon the peace are: Isocrates, *Panegyricus*, § 120=65 d; *Areopagiticus*, § 80=156 c; *Panathenaicus*, § 59=244 e; Demosthenes, *De falsa Leg.* § 273=479; Lycurgus, *In Leocratem*, §§ 72, 73=157, to which may be added, as bearing on the relations of Athens and Persia in the second half of the fifth century, Andocides, *De Pace*, § 28; Plato, *Menex.* c. 12; Lysias, *Epitaphius*, § 56=195 end. See also *Quaestionis de pace quae fertur Cimonis Epicerisis*, G. Wiegand, Marburg, 1870. It is worth noticing that in Isocrates (*Areopag. Panath.*) the land limit of the Persians is the Halys, the southern sea limit Phaselis, nothing being said of a northern limit. Of course the Persians did not at any time relinquish their hold on all the land west of the Halys, if on any.

In his life of Aristides, Plutarch informs us on the authority of Theophrastus, the scholar of Aristotle, that when the treasures of the league were removed from Delos to Athens contrary to the original agreement, on the proposal of the Samians, Aristides expressed the opinion that the change, though dishonest, was to the advantage of his city. As we do not know when Aristides died, this statement helps us little in fixing the date of the removal of the chest, and we may also observe that the same remark, or nearly the same remark, of Aristides is quoted with regard to the proposal of Themistocles to burn the allied fleet (*supra*, p. 269). In another passage Plutarch tells us that the discredit into which the Athenian people were brought by the removal of the money of the Greeks to Athens was turned into a charge against Pericles, who had made the excuse given for the removal—the fear that the treasure might fall into the hands of the barbarians—quite untenable by his expenditure of the money on the public buildings of Athens. In this passage also there is nothing which enables us to fix a date for the removal of the funds, for the change may have taken place long before Pericles began to use them for his own purposes.¹ By Diodorus we are told that the Athenians removed the money (8000 talents) from Delos to Athens and gave it to Pericles to keep. In his opinion, if he had an opinion, the removal was made not long before the Peloponnesian war, for the wish of Pericles to conceal his private expenditure of part of this money was one of the causes of the war.²

Lastly, we read in Justin that the Athenians, after their dismissal from Ithome, in their indignation at the conduct of the Spartans, transferred the money collected and by Justin. for use against Persia from Delos to Athens, lest it should fall into the hands of the Lacedaemonians.

¹ Plut. *Aristid.* 25; *Per.* 12.

² Diod. xii. 38. This is given on the authority of Ephorus (cf. *ibid.* c. 41).

whom they suspected of wishing to withdraw from the alliance. If we assume, as we have every reason to do, that the Athenians were sent back from Ithome not later than 462 B.C., we have the authority of Justin for taking this year as the date before which the treasure cannot have been transferred to Athens.¹

We can also fix a date after which the change cannot have been made. We have a series of inscriptions, beginning in 454 B.C., which prove that the money of the allies was kept at Athens from this time onwards.² Whether the chest was transferred in that year is not so certain. Falling, as it does, at the very time when the great expedition to Egypt was fast going to ruin, the date is not unlikely; and the inscriptions leave no doubt that an office of some kind, connected with the payments of the league, was established at Athens in that year. But this office may have been created some years after the change, as an improvement in the administration of the chest. It cannot therefore be said that the precise date of the change is finally determined. The statement of Theophrastus is the most instructive; it informs us that the change was made on the proposal of the Samians, a fact which was not likely to have been invented. And if the change was made on the proposal of the Samians, it was probably made owing to some alarm created by the military preparations in Persia. Such alarm would be felt in 457 B.C. at the approach of the army of Megabyzus, and, as we do not know that Aristides was not alive in that year, this may be the date intended by Theophrastus. It is also quite consistent with the date indicated by Justin; and though the quota lists begin three years later, we may explain the difference by supposing that the new "office" connected with the payment began with the first Panathenaic period after the chest had been transferred.

Evidence of
inscriptions.

Date of the
removal.
457-454 B.C.?

¹ Justin, iii. 6. 4.

² The lists of the quota paid to Athena; *C. I. A.*, i. 226 ff. The date is fixed by No. 260.

It is highly probable that the existence of the Delian synod came to an end—at any rate in its larger and original form—
 Decay of the Delian synod. with the removal of the chest to Athens. We have already pointed out how difficult it would be for the synod to retain its original power as the league grew in extent. How could two hundred cities send deputies to Delos? How could the synod be summoned in the face of an emergency? At the best there could only be stated meetings, at which a general policy was sketched, the details being left to Athens. By this time also a number of the allies had been enslaved, and Athens had made it plain that her policy must be the policy of the league. At the utmost, she may have allowed the independent states, such as Euboea, Samos, Lesbos, and Chios, to send deputies to Athens—though this is a mere conjecture—with whom she fixed the contingents which these cities were to furnish. All that we really know about the synod of Delos is that it was created at the time of the foundation of the league as a guarantee of the equality of the confederate cities. Of its action, decay, and extinction nothing is recorded.¹

9. From the year 454 B.C. onwards the lists already quoted are the most important source of information about the league. In that year an “office” (*ἀρχή*) was
 The so-called quota lists. created at Athens, under which one-sixtieth, i.e. a mina in every talent, of the tribute received from the allies was paid over by the Hellenotamiae to the treasury of Athena. Lists of the cities which paid this quota, and the amount paid, were made out under the supervision of the thirty Logistae (accountants), and engraved on marble, by which means they have been preserved in a more or less mutilated condition till our time. Thus we are able to identify a large number of the cities, which were members of the league, and the amount which they paid. By comparing one list with another we can discover, within very uncertain limits, what changes took place in the amount of the con-

¹ See Guiraud, *De la condition des Alliés*, etc., p. 9.

tributions, what cities ceased to pay, and what new members were added to the list.¹

Other inscriptions supply us with some isolated facts. From a mere fragment, of which the date is uncertain, we find that the Athenians found it necessary to interfere in the affairs of Miletus. What were the circumstances which led to this action we cannot ascertain, though we know that there were quarrels

Inscription
of Miletus.
450 B.C.?

between the people and the oligarchs at Miletus, in which the Athenians took a part. The misfortunes of Athens in the East might bring these troubles to a head in 450 B.C. We find that a garrison was placed in the city; five commissioners were sent from Athens to administer the public affairs, or to frame a new constitution; and we also learn that all suits at law for the value of more than 100 minae (about £335) were to be brought to Athens for decision. These arrangements, which are all that can be read, are typical of Athenian dealings with the subject states; in the last we find an indication of that development of the law-courts, which became so marked a feature of Athenian democracy.²

10. Similar measures were taken at Erythrae and Colophon. The decree by which the constitution of Erythrae was reorganised may still be read, and the document is of peculiar value, because, being framed under the influence of Pericles, it expresses the Periclean views of the best and safest government of a subject state in the interests of Athens. Erythrae was to be ruled

The inscription
of
Erythrae.

¹ For some details, see Appendix iii. at the end of the volume.

² *C. I. A.*, iv. 22 a. According to Kirchhoff the writing shows that the decree cannot be later than Ol. 83. 2 = 447 B.C. He connects it with Xenoph., *Rep. Athen.*, iii. 11, *ὅτε Μιλησίων εἰλοντο τοὺς βελτίστους ἐντὸς ὀλίγου χρόνου ἀποστάντες τὸν δῆμον κατέκοψαν*, and would fix the date at Ol. 82. 3 = 450 B.C. The inscription bears traces of the name Euthynus, but the only archon of that name is the archon of the year 426 B.C. Kirchhoff, however, thinks that Diodorus has wrongly given Euthydemus for Euthynus as the archon of 450 (xii. 3), a mistake which he has made in 426. All this is very vague and uncertain.

by a council consisting of one hundred and twenty members, chosen yearly by lot. The first council under this ordinance was to be elected by the overseers (*ἐπίσκοποι*) sent from Athens, and the commander of the garrison (*φρούραρχος*); afterwards each new council was to be elected by the commander and the outgoing council. No citizen could offer himself for election if less than thirty years of age, or hold office more than once in four years. From the council elect, before entering office, an oath was required—an oath sworn before the council by Zeus, Apollo, and Demeter, over burning victims, and invoking destruction on the perjurer and his children. The terms were as follows: "To the best of my

Oath of the
Erythraean
council.

power I will advise what is lawful and right for the people of Erythrae, the Athenians, and the allies. I will not revolt from the people of

Athens or their allies, or join with others in doing so. I will not go over to the enemy, or allow another to do so; I will not receive an exile, or allow another to do so, nor any of those who have taken refuge with the Medes, without the sanction of the Athenians and the people. I will not put any Erythraean to death, without the sanction of the Athenians and the people." Other regulations follow: if any citizen

Other
regulations.

slay another he is to be put to death; if any citizen sin against the gods, he is to be put to death; if any one offend against the alliance, he is to be sent into exile, and his property given to the Erythraeans. If any one is convicted of betraying the city of Erythrae to the tyrants, he shall be put to death, and his children also. The

Victims sent
to the
Panathenaea.

Erythraeans were to send victims of not less than three minae in value (£10, 10s., or a little more) to the Panathenaea, and, in return,

each Erythraean was allowed to have a portion of the sacrificial meat not exceeding a drachma in value (8d.). Other clauses bound the citizens of Erythrae to be faithful to the Athenians and their allies. There were also regulations about the government of Erythrae, and the duties of the officers or "overseers" whom Athens sent to the city,

but owing to the imperfect state of the inscription we cannot state what these were.¹

II. In these regulations it is quite clear that Athens identified the confederacy with herself; treachery to the alliance was treachery to her. She did not hesitate to plant garrisons of Athenian soldiers in the citadels of allied cities, or to alter their constitution, if the step seemed necessary to secure their allegiance; or to reduce them to the condition of subject cities by claiming the sovereignty in the administration of law. Like Naxos and Thasos, Miletus and Erythrae, after these changes, were no longer confederates on equal terms, but on compulsion; their contributions went to swell a fund which made resistance on their part more and more impossible. Even more significant were the results which followed from the transference of the chest from Delos to Athens. The old Ionian place of meeting was no longer the centre of the confederacy; to Athena and not to Apollo were dues paid and victims brought. The whole administration of the league was conducted at Athens, and perhaps by Athenians only. At Athens, too, the more important law-suits of the confederates were decided.²

Condition of
the cities in
the Athenian
league.

On the other hand we see that Athens did not pursue one unaltered plan in dealing with the allies. The conditions of alliance differed in different cities. Some were independent, enjoying their own form of constitution, even though widely different in spirit from the constitution of Athens; others were subjects. In the subject cities there were degrees of subjection.

Variety in the
relations be-
tween Athens
and the allies.

¹ C. I. A., i. 9, and for Colophon, *ibid.* 11. Cf. Hicks, *Historical Inscriptions*, No. 23. The officers sent out to Erythrae were of two kinds: (1) the *φρουραρχοι* or commanders of garrisons (cf. Isocrat. *Areop.* § 65=153 a, *ἡμᾶς τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ἀκροπόλεις φρουροῦντας*), whom we also find at Miletus and Colophon; and (2) the *ἐπίσκοποι*, officers chosen by lot and sent to carry out reforms when needed. See Aristoph. *Birds*, 1022; Gilbert, *Handbuch*, i. 401; A. Fraenkel, *De condicione, etc., sociorum Atheniensium*, Rostochi, 1878.

² For the treatment of Euboea, see *supra*, p. 344f.

Erythrae did not sink so low in the scale as Chalcis or Naxos, and probably Miletus ranked above Erythrae. But every change was a tightening of the Athenian grip—a grip which was exerted most strongly in the control of the military forces and the more important legal business of the allies,¹ and in the forcible collection of tribute.

III. PERICLES IN THE PONTUS.

12. After relating the operations of Pericles in the Corinthian gulf (p. 335), which must be placed about the year

Pericles' voyage into the Pontus, 447 B.C. ?
Ol. 83. 2.

453 B.C., Plutarch proceeds, without any note of time, to describe an expedition which the Athenians undertook into the Pontus. The account is brief and meagre, and it stands alone, no other record of the event having come down to us. In answer apparently to some request of the Grecian cities, which lay along the coasts, Pericles conducted a large and well-equipped fleet into the Euxine for the double purpose of forming friendly ties with the Greek colonies, and of displaying the greatness of Athens before the princes of the barbarous tribes which inhabited the western and northern coasts of those waters. Of the success of the expedition we hear nothing except at Sinope, where the assistance of the fleet

Expulsion of Timesilaus from Sinope.

was invoked to overthrow the despot Timesilaus. Sinope was a colony of Miletus, which, like other colonies in the neighbourhood, was at this time subject to Persia, and the despot was no doubt a ruler of the type of Histiaeus, a prince who governed the city in the interests of Persia, and was maintained in his position by Persian influence. It was the mission of Athens

¹ See A. Fraenkel, *l.c.* We may observe that these regulations about law-suits, which seem to us so curious, were by no means an invention of the Athenians. When Aegina was subject to Epidaurus, cases at law were taken to Epidaurus for trial (Herod. v. 83). But with the development of the law-courts at Athens, the tendency to bring business there naturally increased.

to destroy such men. Pericles responded to the appeal by leaving Lamachus behind with thirteen ships and a number of soldiers. Such a force, when combined with the citizens, was more than the tyrant could resist; he was driven into exile and his friends with him. Their lands and houses were subsequently divided among six hundred volunteer colonists whom on the motion of Pericles, the Athenians sent out to dwell in Sinope.¹

Athenian
colonists at
Sinope.

On the expulsion of the Persians from Europe the tribes of Thrace had recovered their freedom. Among these the Odrysians, who lay in the valley of the Artiscus, began to extend their borders, and under their king Teres, they succeeded in advancing as far as the Danube in one direction and Byzantium in another. Beyond the Danube, as far as Olbia on the Borysthenes, stretched the dominion of Ariapeithes, the son-in-law of Teres. Both were princes of great vigour and capacity. The Greek cities of the western shore of the Pontus probably paid tribute to Teres, and those on the northern shore were, of course, in close proximity to the Scythians. It was of great importance that these princes should be on good terms with the Greeks, and a timely display of force was likely enough to leave an impression upon them.²

Barbarian
potentates in
the Pontus.

The most important Greek town in the Pontus at this time was Panticapaeum, a colony of Miletus, founded in the second half of the sixth century B.C., on the western shore of the Cimmerian Gulf. It was the great emporium of the corn trade, drawing to its

The Greek
princes of
Panticapaeum.

¹ Plut. *Per.* 20. Plutarch closes his account with the words: "In other ways he did not give way to the impulses of the citizens, nor did he keep pace with them when, owing to the greatness of their strength and good fortune, they were eager to lay hands again on Egypt, and interfere with the maritime parts of the Persian empire." If this sentence can be taken as a mark of time, we must put the expedition after the year 449 B.C.

² For the kingdom of the Odrysians see Thuc. ii. 97. For Teres, Thuc. ii. 97, 29; Xen. *Anab.* vii. 2. 22, where we are told that Teres met with severe losses at the hands of the Thyni, in the neighbourhood of Perinthus. For Ariapeithes, see Herod. iv. 76, 78.

warehouses the products of the districts between the Borys-thenes and the Sea of Azov. About the time of the Persian invasion a family came to the throne which claimed descent from Archaeanax, an ancient prince of Lesbos. It is quite possible that Pericles entered into friendly relations with a city from which more corn was exported than from any other. At a time when the supplies from Egypt were passing wholly into the hands of Persia, such a step would be particularly opportune, for Attica (without Euboea) did not produce much more than two-thirds of the amount of corn required by her population. On the other hand, the king of Panticapaeum would wish for Athenian support against Ariapeithes.

Perhaps we ought to connect with this expedition of Pericles the enrolment of the city of Nymphaeum, which lay a little to the south of Panticapaeum, in the Delian league, and the colonisation of Amisus, on the southern shore of the Euxine, of which Plutarch informs us that it was a colony of the Athenians, planted at the time of their greatest power, and when they were masters of the sea.¹

IV. THE COLONIES OR CLERUCHIES.

13. Even in the sixth century B.C. Athens had secured one or two places of exceptional importance by establishing colonies in them. When Salamis was finally conquered it was occupied, at least in part, by Athenian citizens. And at the close of the century, after the victory over the oligarchs of Chalcis, the best of their territory was

¹ Plut., *Lucull.* 19; cf. Theopomp. *Frag.* 202. M. For Nymphaeum, see Craterus, *Frag.* 12. M. but the evidence is very vague, and it is uncertain whether Nymphaeum can be traced on the tribute lists; see Kirchhoff, *C. I. A.*, i. p. 23. We cannot affirm that the tolling place was established at Chrysopolis at this time, for the evidence that the tax was collected there in 435 B.C. (*C. I. A.*, i. 40 = Hicks, *Hist. Inscrip.*, No. 44), is very dubious. See, however, Duncker, *Gesch. Alt.* ix. 114.

divided among four thousand Athenians. In both cases the occupants were regarded as colonists, but they were not colonists in the ordinary Greek sense of the word. They were *cleruchi* (allotment-holders), not *apoeci* (dwellers in a distant home). They continued to be citizens of Athens though they owned land or even dwelt in a foreign country.¹

From the year 453 B.C. onwards,—so far as we can trust our dates—a great development took place in this mode of colonisation at Athens, under the auspices of Pericles. In this year he took out 1000 citizens to the Chersonese, where he once more strengthened the defences which Miltiades had erected across the neck of the peninsula to check the incursions of the Thracian tribes on the north. In the same year a second thousand were conducted by Tolmides into Euboea (?). At what point they were settled we are not informed, but whether it was at Hestiaea in the north of the island or at Chalcis, the Euboeans were not likely to regard the new-comers with friendly eyes. Other colonies were subsequently conducted to Naxos and Andros, and perhaps it was at this time that the Athenians established their own citizens in the islands of Lemnos and Imbros, islands which, like Scyros and the Chersonese, were always considered as very closely connected with Athens.²

Colonies in the
Chersonese,
Euboea, etc.
453 B.C.
Ol. 81. 4.

¹ For Salamis, see Curtius, *Griech. Gesch.*, i. p. 344 and 673 (6th edit.). He quotes from a decree discovered in the acropolis, τοὺς λαρόντας οἰκεῖν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ξὺν Ἀθηναίοις τελεῖν καὶ στρατεῦναι, ἀρουραν δὲ μισθοῦν, εἰ μὴ τις οἰκῇ ἐν Σαλαμῖνι.

² Diod. xi. 88, archonship of Lysicrates: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἔλθων (Περικλῆς) εἰς Χερρόνησον χιλίοις τῶν πολιτῶν κατεκληρούχησε τὴν χώραν ἅμα δὲ τοῖς πρᾶττομένοις Τολμίδης ὁ ἕτερος στρατηγὸς εἰς τὴν Εὐβοίαν παρελθὼν ἄλλοις χιλίοις πολίταις . . . τὴν τῶν Νάξων γῆν διένειμε. Paus. i. 27. 5: Τολμίδης εἰσήγαγε μὲν εἰς Εὐβοίαν καὶ Νάξον Ἀθηναίων κληρούχους. Plut. *Per.* 11: πρὸς δὲ τοῖς χιλίοις μὲν ἐστειλεν εἰς Χερρόνησον κληρούχους, εἰς δὲ Νάξον πεντακοσίους, εἰς δὲ Ἄνδρον ἡμίσεις τούτων, εἰς δὲ Θράκην χιλίους Βισάλταις συνοικήσαντας, κ.τ.λ.

Another colony of which we happen to have more precise information was conducted to Brea, a place of uncertain locality, but probably situated among the Bisaltian Thracians. It was known from the old lexicographers that a colony had been sent to this site from Athens, but in 1833 and 1847 two fragments were discovered of the very stone on which the decree sanctioning the colony was written. From the inscription we learn that ten Athenians were chosen to be Geonomi or dividers of land, one from each tribe, Democrides being intrusted with full powers to establish the colony in the best manner that he could. The existing sacred precincts were to remain uninjured, but no new ones were to be consecrated; the colonists were to bring an ox and two sheep to the Great Panathenaea, and a phallus to the Dionysia. If any enemy attacked the territory of the colonists, the Greek cities of the neighbourhood were to render immediate assistance, according to the agreements made previously with them. These regulations were to be written on a stone and set up in the acropolis. Should any one attempt to alter or curtail anything, he and his children were to be disfranchised, and their property confiscated, a tenth going to Athena, unless the colonists were themselves eager to have a change made. Any soldier whose name was in the list was to go to Brea within thirty days after returning to Athens; and the colony was to be taken out within thirty days of the passing of the decree. Aeschines was to go with it and provide the necessary means. The colonists were to be selected from the two lowest of the Solonian classes—from the Zeugitae and Thetes.¹

It will be observed that these colonies are all planted

¹ See *C. I. A.*, i. 31=Dittenberger, *Syll.* No. 12 and D.'s notes. The colony is probably the same as the colony mentioned by Plutarch as planted among the Bisaltians (see last note). It is called an *ἀποικία* by the lexicographers and in the decree—cf. Hicks, *Hist. Inscript.* No. 29—but it is very improbable that Athens intended it to have an entirely separate existence, such as an *ἀποικία* in the stricter sense claimed.

between Athens and the Bosphorus, with the exception of that in Naxos. They were no doubt intended to strengthen the hold of Athens upon her corn-trade in the north, upon which the city was growing more and more dependent. The peculiar nature of the colonies bound them closely to the parent city; a revolt among them was impossible, for their existence depended on the maintenance of the Athenian power. They appear to have paid no tribute—at any rate the districts in which they are planted pay less tribute after their establishment,—they were Athenian citizens, and the constitutions under which they lived were copies on a smaller scale of the constitution of Athens. Hence they were, and could not fail to be, centres of Athenian influence. On the other hand, they caused the greatest exasperation in the cities and countries where they were planted. Under what circumstances the Athenians obtained possession of the entire city of Brea, if it was a city, is unknown, but they can only have established their citizens in the Chersonese, in Naxos, Andros, Imbros, and Lemnos, at the expense of the existing inhabitants. Where these inhabitants required a force to protect them, or were barbarians—to a greater or less extent—the immigration was tolerated by Hellenic custom and feeling, but in old-established communities such as Euboea and Naxos, the planting of these colonies could not fail to create a bitter feeling of hostility against the head of the Delian league.¹

Object with which these colonies were planted.

Ill-feeling created by them.

¹ We find diminution of tribute in the case of the Chersonese, but not for some years after 453 B.C., and of Andros, which is reduced from 12 talents to 6 talents after 450 B.C. Naxos also after 450 B.C. pays only 6 talents, a small sum for such an island. That the cleruchies did not pay tribute is maintained by Kirchhoff, *Abh. Berl. Akad.* 1873. For the government of the cleruchies see Gilbert, *Handbuch*, i. 423; Duncker, *G. A.* ix. 237 ff.; but all the evidence, except the inscription of Brea, is late and refers to the fourth century or to Roman times. The Lemnians and Imbrians are found among the Athenian troops in the Peloponnesian war, and in *C. I. A.*, i. 443, 444, Lemnians of Myrrhina are enrolled in Athenian tribes. If the numbers given by

14. Thus did Pericles proceed in his task of turning the confederacy into an empire. The three great islands of Lesbos, Chios, and Samos were still independent, and had they combined their forces, or acted together, they might have formed a counterpoise to Athens. But they were too near the coast of Asia to be secure from Persia, if they broke with Athens; and their trade would have suffered severely from a rupture with a state which could control Byzantium and Miletus. The rest of the confederates were merely subjects in various degrees of subjection; their citadels occupied by Athenian garrisons, their governments controlled by Athenian officers, their soldiers serving in the Athenian army, their cases at law settled in Athenian law-courts, their tribute paid on compulsion. Among them were planted Athenian citizens, in communities which reproduced Athenian customs and institutions, owning the soil of those who had once been free and independent Greeks. And though the reins were thus tightened, the object for which the confederacy was originally founded was allowed to slide out of view. The forces of the allies were carried into the Pontus to secure the trade and corn supply of Athens; their money was stored in the acropolis, to be laid out at the decision of the Athenian people; but of war against the Great King there was not a word. Cyprus was allowed to become a Persian island, and little or no attempt was made to rescue Caria from the aggressions of the satraps of Persia. A new policy was on foot of which the centre was Athens and not Delos.

Diodorus and Plutarch are correct, more than 5000 citizens must have left Athens between the years 453-444 B.C.: 1000 to Euboea; 500 to Naxos; 1000 to Chersonese; 250 to Andros; 1000 to Brea(?); and 2000 to Oreus (Hestiaea), besides the numbers sent to Lemnos and Imbros, an additional 500 sent to Naxos, and the 600 sent to Sinope. See *infra*, p. 411.

The Delian confederacy becomes an Athenian empire.

CHAPTER XI.

INTERNAL HISTORY OF ATHENS, 476-445 B.C.

I. It is impossible to give a satisfactory account of the internal history of Athens in the period between the Persian wars and the Thirty Years' peace. We can indeed affirm that the constitution of the city became more democratical in this interval, both in form and in spirit; and we can point to

Athens becomes more democratical in 480-445 B.C.

two at least of the measures by which this change was brought about: the limitation of the powers of the Areopagus, and the payment of the jurors who sat in the Athenian law-courts. We are also aware that for some years after their great victories, Themistocles and Aristides were the leaders of the city, and that both were friends of the democracy, though they differed widely in character and apparently in their views of the best democratic policy.

A general outline of this period can be given, but the details are uncertain.

When they disappear from view Ephialtes comes in sight—the Incorruptible, who made himself a power in the state by his attacks on the peculation of the rich. Under his leadership the people were induced to limit the powers of the Areopagus, which seem to have become more extensive after the Persian war. Soon after this success Ephialtes fell by the knife of an assassin. His place was taken by Pericles, whose rival at the head of the oligarchs was Cimon, and after Cimon's death Thucydides, the son of Melesias. Between Pericles and Thucydides the conflict was still raging at the time when peace was concluded with Sparta. But beyond this outline we cannot go without treading on

uncertain ground. Our contemporary authorities, Herodotus and Thucydides, leave us without any information; and when we turn to Aristotle and Plutarch (who had not only Aristotle, but many contemporaries of Aristotle before him), we find ourselves confronted by contradictory statements, without any means of deciding certainly between them.

2. In the *Constitution of Athens* we are told that, in the years immediately preceding the Persian invasion, the city slowly increased in power, and with this increase democracy was gaining ground (*supra*, p. 105); but after the invasion the council of the Areopagus once more came to the front and managed the city. This position of authority was not established by any public decree;

Account given in the "Constitution of Athens" of the internal state of the city after 480 B.C.

it was due to the action of the council in regard to the battle of Salamis (*supra*, p. 176). Under the guidance of the Areopagus all went well with Athens: the military reputation of the citizens was great, and they were able to acquire the "hegemony" in Greece in spite of the opposition of the Lacedaemonians. At this time the leaders of the people were Aristides and Themistocles; of whom the second was, above all things, a soldier, the first a statesman and renowned for his honesty. For this reason Themistocles was mainly employed as a general, and Aristides as a counsellor. In the building of the walls the two worked together, though they did not agree; but it was Aristides who urged the Athenians to win over the Ionians, by taking advantage of the odium which the conduct of Pausanias brought upon the Lacedaemonians. Hence it was he who fixed the first tribute for the

The policy of Aristides.

cities in the third year after the battle of Salamis (478 B.C.), and who swore the oaths of alliance, offensive and defensive, with the Ionians. After this, when the city was more confident, and a large amount of money had been collected, Aristides advised the Athenians to claim the leadership; and, as a means to this, to leave their homes in the country and dwell in the city. All would find support, he said; some as soldiers, some as guards, some

as public servants, and so they would maintain their position as leaders of Greece.¹

In this remarkable passage Aristides is presented to us in a light in which we have not been accustomed to view him.

We knew, of course, that he founded the Delian league, and arranged the tribute; we knew too that he was a supporter of the Athenian democracy; but we did not know that he originated that policy of empire and concentration which we are accustomed to connect with the name of Pericles. And perhaps we may suggest that the author of the *Constitution*, whether Aristotle or another, has in this case somewhat antedated the course of events, and attributed to Aristides as

Criticism of the account in Aristotle.

a definite policy what was, in fact, the result of transactions undertaken with a different object in view. It will be noticed that nothing whatever is said by "Aristotle" of the arrangements which were made at the founding of the Delian league: there is no reference to the synod or to the common chest in the temple of Apollo. The tribute is regarded merely as a fund from which the Athenian people can be supported. Yet it is certain that the position of Athens in the league was one thing in 478 or 476, and another in 466. Far-sighted men may have foreseen the empire in 476; but in 466 it was becoming a realised fact. This was still more the case when the chest was removed from Delos to Athens. From that time the funds of the confederacy were wholly in the control of the Athenians; and though the party leaders in the city might quarrel over the expenditure of them, the allies could have little voice in the matter. This change took place, at any rate in part, during the lifetime of Aristides; and Theophrastus, the pupil of Aristotle, even goes so far as to assert that Aristides was a consenting party to it.² It is

In what sense Aristides laid the foundations of the policy of Pericles.

¹ Aristot. *Athen. Pol.* cc. 23, 24. The passage concludes thus: Τροφήν γὰρ ἔσσεσθαι πᾶσι, τοῖς μὲν στρατευομένοις, τοῖς δὲ φρουροῦσι, τοῖς δὲ τὰ κοινὰ πράττονσι, εἰθ' οὕτω κατασχέσειν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν.

² Plut. *Aristid.* 25.

not unreasonable, therefore, to suppose that the policy here attributed to him is the policy which he lived long enough to see developed out of that equal league of cities of which he had been the founder.

In the same manner, though it is hard to believe that Aristides wished the people to abandon the country for the city, we can see how the result followed from the line which Athens took after the battle of Salamis. She could not be at the head of the league and stand foremost in liberating the Greeks of Asia without a large supply of sailors. These would be drawn from the

The increasing necessity of military and naval service brought the Athenians into the city,

poorer classes, many of whom would now find it convenient to live in the town. Life at Athens after the Persian invasion must indeed have been very different from what it was before. On the one hand, the devastations of Xerxes and Mardonius must have reduced a good many citizens to extreme poverty; on the other, the campaigns against Persia offered constant occupation and good pay. The old days in which the hoplite served at his own expense came to an end when service lasted for several months, and the payment of the sailors, which we hear of at Salamis, was doubtless

but the great change did not come till Pericles.

continued at Sestos, and ever after (see *infra*, p. 399). In this way Aristides may be said to have inaugurated a policy which drew men into the city; but that he wished, like Themistocles and Pericles, to sacrifice Attica to Athens, is perhaps more than we can affirm. At any rate it is quite certain, from the statements of Thucydides, that a very large number of the citizens continued to live in the country long after the time of Aristides; and in the plays of Aristophanes we have abundant evidence that a country life had a peculiar charm for the Athenians.

3. Though Aristotle informs us that Themistocles and Aristides were at variance, he does not state the points of difference; he speaks of both as champions of the democracy. In Plutarch, on the other hand, Aristides is said to be "aristocratic" in his sympathies, while Themistocles favours

an extreme development of democracy; and this is the cause of the disagreement between them (*supra*, p. 270 f.). The contradiction is not so great as it appears to be at first sight, for in Plutarch's mouth "aristocracy" means no more than the constitution of Clisthenes, which in Aristotle is spoken of as democratic.¹ It is possible that Aristides wished to preserve the constitution as he had helped to make it, while Themistocles was in favour of destroying old restrictions, and placing unlimited power in the hands of the people. Another point of difference may have been the different attitude which each of these great men took up towards Sparta: one wished the two foremost cities in Greece to be friendly; the other was prepared for uncompromising enmity. In support of this conjecture it may be urged that Cimon, about whose Lacedaemonian sympathies there can be no doubt, was brought forward and supported by Aristides in opposition to Themistocles. But this proves very little, and there is no passage in Aristotle or Plutarch which enables us to speak with certainty about the feeling of Aristides towards Sparta—though we are told that he admired her institutions. We know, on the other hand, that he joined with Themistocles in building the city walls, and that he won over the allies against the will of Sparta. This is enough to prove that he meant Athens to be the independent equal of Sparta, however sharp the contention between the cities.

4. A further difficulty arises from the contradiction which we find in our authorities about the opening of the archonship to those who had hitherto been excluded from it. In Plutarch we are told that, when the Athenians had returned to the city after the battle of Plataea, Aristides, seeing that they were eager to recover the democracy—thinking, too, that the "demos" had shown themselves

Dissensions
between
Themistocles
and Aristides:
to what were
these due?

Lowering of
the qualifica-
tion for the
archonship:
by whom
and when
proposed.

¹ Plut. *Aristid.* 2, ἡψατο μὲν ἀριστοκρατικῆς πολιτείας. Id. *Cim.* 15, τὴν ἐπὶ Κλεισθένους ἐγείρειν ἀριστοκρατίαν. Arist. *Athen. Pol.* c.

worthy of office, and that it would not be easy to exclude them, now that they had arms in their hands, and were excited with victory—brought forward a proposal “that the constitution should be extended to all, and that the archons should be chosen out of all the Athenians.”¹ From this statement it has been inferred that the archonship was now opened even to the lowest class, the Thetes, of the Solonian census.² But in the *Constitution of Athens* we are told that the choice of archons was not interfered with till five years after the death of Ephialtes (457 B.C.), when the Zeugitae or third class were made eligible, to which Mnesitheides, the archon of that year, belonged.³ This contradiction may be stated, but it cannot be solved. We do not know from whom Plutarch derived his statement, or why he made it regardless of the assertion of Aristotle—if this was before him. On the other hand, there is nothing in Aristotle which connects the reform made in 457 B.C. with Aristides.

5. Of the limitation of the powers of the Areopagus, which later writers regard as the turning-point in the history of the Athenian democracy, Aristotle gives the following account: “For seventeen years after the Persian war the constitution remained unchanged, though its strength was slowly sapped, under the direction of the Areopagitae. But as the population increased in numbers and power Ephialtes, the son of Sophonides, came forward as a leader of the people, and when he attained a reputation as incorruptible and

Limitation of
the powers of
the Areopagus.
Account given
by Aristotle.

22, speaking of the reforms of Clisthenes, τούτων δὲ γενομένων δημοτικωτέρα πολὺ τῆς Σόλωνος ἐγένετο ἡ πολιτεία.

¹ Plut. *Aristid.* 22, τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἀπολαβεῖν—does this refer to the “aristocratic” government during the years 480-479? γράφει ψήφισμα κοινὴν εἶναι τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἐξ Ἀθηναίων πάντων αἰρεῖσθαι.

² The date, so far as we can fix it, of this proposal is about 476 B.C., or even 478.

³ *Athen. Pol.* c. 26. There is no proof that Aristides was not alive in 457 B.C., but Plutarch seems to speak of the battle of Plataea (479) as occurring “not long” before his death: cf. *συγγ.*, p. 289 f.

honest towards the constitution, he attacked the council. He began with destroying a great number of the Areopagitæ, by bringing them to trial for their management of public business; and afterwards in the archonship of Conon (462 B.C.) he stripped the council of all the additional powers by which it had become the guardian of the constitution, assigning some of these functions to the Five Hundred, some to the people, and some to the law-courts. In this attack he was assisted by Themistocles, who, himself one of the Areopagitæ, was on the point of being brought to trial for Medism. Wishing to destroy the council he informed Ephialtes that the Areopagitæ were about to arrest him; and at the same time he informed the Areopagitæ that he would reveal to them certain persons who were conspiring to overthrow the constitution. A number of members were selected, whom he took to the house of Ephialtes to show them the conspirators. Ephialtes, seeing him in close conversation with the Areopagitæ, was alarmed, and fled for refuge to the altar, without even waiting to put on his mantle. The incident caused the greatest astonishment, and when the council of the Five Hundred met, Ephialtes and Themistocles denounced the Areopagitæ; they afterwards repeated their charges before the people, until they stripped the council of its power. Not long afterwards Ephialtes was assassinated by Aristodicus of Tanagra."¹

Fall of the
Areopagus in
462 B.C.

Part taken by
Themistocles.

Assassination
of Ephialtes.

So much of this account as refers to Themistocles may be at once dismissed as unhistorical. Whether Diodorus is right in placing his ostracism in 471 B.C. may be doubted, on the general ground that the dates in Diodorus are not very trustworthy; but if the evidence of Thucydides is to count for anything, it is quite certain that Themistocles finally left Greece for Persia about 466 B.C.² We may even doubt whether the story is a part of the work known to

Criticism of
the account.
Themistocles
not at Athens
in 462 B.C.

¹ Arist. *Athen. Pol.* c. 25.

² See *supra*, p. 283.

Plutarch, as "Aristotle"; it is at any rate very remarkable that while quoting from Aristotle the statement that Ephialtes was slain by Aristodicus, Plutarch says not a word about Themistocles.¹ But the remainder of the account is supported by all our authorities—if indeed it is not merely repeated by them. There has never been any doubt that the attack upon the Areopagus was led by Ephialtes, who had won the confidence of the people by his constant prosecutions of the rich for their peculation and embezzlement of the public funds.

6. But though we may assert without fear of contradiction that Ephialtes took the leading part in stripping the Areopagus of its power, it is not easy to answer the questions which naturally present themselves in regard to his attack: What were the causes which immediately gave rise to it? Did the policy which he carried out originate with him, or was he the agent of Pericles? What were the powers which were now taken from the council?

(1) With regard to the first of these questions the *Constitution of Athens* gives us little assistance. The particular

There must have been some special cause over and above the rise of the democracy.

cause which is there assigned for the action of Ephialtes—the trick of Themistocles—is, as we have seen, unworthy of credit; the general cause, the growth of the democracy, is one which required some special stimulus to make it effective at the moment. It is, however, a

great help that we have the transaction fixed to a definite year—462 B.C.,—for though Aristotle writes as if the foreign and domestic policy of Athens were almost independent of each other, we may be sure that this was not the case. Ephialtes would obviously choose as favourable a moment as possible for his attack, a moment when the people might fear some new act of aggression on the part of the council, or when those who were foremost in its defence were absent from Athens.

¹ See Appendix ii.

Such a moment arrived in 462 B.C. The victories of Cimon at Eurymedon and Thasos had raised him and his party to a position of unusual strength, and if success in the Persian war of 480 had resulted in an increase of the power of the Areopagus, it might be feared that these new successes—the greatest which had been obtained since that time—would have a similar effect. Hence on

Cimon's victories a source of danger to his opponents; hence the attacks on him.

Cimon's return from Thasos Pericles brought forward a charge against him, an absurd and frivolous charge, it is true, but one which showed that every effort would be made to damage the reputation of the great general.¹ Not long afterwards came the application of the Lacedaemonians for assistance against the Messenians, which, as we have seen, was supported by Cimon and opposed by Ephialtes. Cimon carried the day, but only to give Ephialtes the opportunity which he sought. In his absence the attack on the Areopagus was made, and though Cimon attempted on his return to repair the mischief which had been done, he was so discredited by the unfortunate result of his expedition that he was no longer able to hold his ground, and was ostracised (461 B.C.?).²

The breach with Sparta weakened Cimon's position.

(2) The ostracism of Cimon, and the assassination of Ephialtes, which took place not long after the diminution of the powers of the Areopagus, left the ground clear for Pericles. It is true that in the *Constitution of Athens* his first public measure is placed in the year 451 B.C., but we have also the authority of that treatise for the statement (recorded by Plutarch) that he took

Pericles comes forward after the death of Ephialtes. To what extent was he concerned in his policy?

¹ *Supra*, p. 316.

² Plut. *Cim.* 15 puts the attack on the Areopagus in Cimon's absence on military service; and it is probable that the service in question was the expedition to Ithome; on his return he attempted ἀνω τὰς δίκας ἀνακαλεῖσθαι, καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ Κλεισθέους ἐγείρειν ἀριστοκρατίαν.

part in the attack on Cimon in 463 B.C., and there is no reason to doubt that he fought at Tanagra in 457 B.C. and proposed the recall of Cimon from ostracism in that year. He was therefore an active and even a leading politician in Athens at the time when Ephialtes came forward to attack the aristocrats in their stronghold. There is also no doubt

The paid juries
the foundation
of Pericles'
position, and
these con-
nected with
the fall of
the Areopagus.

that he sympathised with the work of Ephialtes, for not only did he complete the work which Ephialtes began, but his position as a democratic leader rested largely on the transference of the judicial functions of the Areopagus to the paid jurors in the law-courts. It is less certain

whether he and Ephialtes were acting independently in the first attack, or whether Ephialtes was put forward by the party of which Pericles was already the moving spirit. In the *Constitution of Athens* the action of the two leaders is treated as quite distinct: Pericles is not mentioned in connection with Ephialtes, and it is long after the assassination of Ephialtes that he completes his work by removing from the Areopagus some of the functions which had been left to it.¹ Plutarch on the other hand clearly attributes the fall of the Areopagus to the action of Pericles, which made it possible

Ephialtes led
the attack, but
Pericles sym-
pathised with
it, if he did no
more.

for Ephialtes to succeed in his measures.² In the *Politics* of Aristotle we also find the names of Ephialtes and Pericles joined, in reference to the limitation of the powers of the Areopagus, though they are not joined in such a

manner that we need suppose the two statesmen to have acted together.³ On the evidence before us it is perhaps impossible

¹ Καὶ γὰρ τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν ἕνα παρείλετο.—*Athen. Pol.* c. 27.

² Plut. *Per.* 9, διὸ καὶ μᾶλλον ἰσχύσας ὁ Περικλῆς ἐν τῷ δήμῳ κατεστάσισε τὴν βουλὴν, ὥστε τὴν μὲν ἀφαιρεθῆναι τὰς πλείστας κρίσεις δι' Ἐφιάλτου κ.τ.λ. The view is less strongly put in *Cim.* 15; Ἐφιάλτου προεστῶτος ἀφείλοντο τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῆς τὰς κρίσεις πλὴν ὀλίγων ἀπάσας, καὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων κυρίους ἑαυτοὺς ποιήσαντες ἐς ἄκρατον δημοκρατίαν ἐνέβαλον τὴν πόλιν, ἥδη καὶ Περικλέους δυναμένον καὶ τὰ τῶν πολλῶν φρονούντος. Cf. *Praec. Reip.* Ger. xv. 18.

³ *Pol.* ii. 12=1274 a 8, τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλὴν Ἐφιάλτης

to ascertain what was the exact position of affairs. We must be content with the general statements already made: (1) that Pericles was influential at Athens at the time of Cimon's return from Thasos; (2) that Ephialtes was the nominal leader of the people when the Areopagus lost the great position which it had won at the period of the Persian war.¹

7. (3) Under the constitution of Solon the Areopagus was the "overseer of all things, and the guardian of the laws." In the time of the tyrants these powers would be practically suspended. To what extent they were restored under the democratic constitution

Ancient power
of the Areo-
pagus.

of Clisthenes we do not know, but we may assume that they were not in any way increased. The influence of the council would however greatly depend on the character of the men who composed it. These were the ex-archons; men chosen from the wealthiest persons in the city, and approved after a year of public office. After

Constitution of
the council.

the expulsion of the tyrants, the archons seem to have been elected directly—without any process of sortition—by the people,² so that the council became filled, between 507 and 487, with the men whom the people thought most worthy to hold the highest office in the state. Under such circumstances it could not fail to become an influential body. The situation was not materially altered by the change in the election of archons, passed in 487 B.C., by which sortition from a number of the candidates elected by the people was introduced, an arrangement which resembled the mode of election under Solon.³ In the alarm and distress of the Persian invasion, the council—which was the wealthiest and most permanent body in the state—acted in a manner worthy of its high position; it became the leading power in the city, which in fact it had saved.

Its action at
the time of
the Persian
invasion.

ἐκόλουσε καὶ Περικλῆς. The chapter is moreover of doubtful authenticity.

¹ So also Diod. xi. 77, who puts the action of Ephialtes in 460 B.C.

² See Mr. Kenyon's note, *Ath. Pol.* p. 59.

³ See Kenyon, *l.c.* p. 21.

It seems to have taken advantage of its success to extend its authority, and even to acquire new functions. To watch over the laws that they might not be altered or evaded or disobeyed; to watch over the public morals, especially in matters which did not fall within the reach of the ordinary law: these had been among its duties from the days of Solon, in addition to the immemorial right of pronouncing sentence on homicide and other serious crimes. But now the council would seem to have claimed a large share in the judicial business of the state, and perhaps in the administrative business also. Aristotle tells us in general terms that the functions of which Ephialtes stripped it were given to the Five Hundred, the *demos* (the *ecclesia*), and the law-courts, and though we cannot be precise, we know that of these three bodies, the council of Five Hundred was the great administrative organ of the state; the *ecclesia* watched over the laws by allowing an "indictment for illegal proposals"; and the law-courts became under Pericles the most striking feature in the Athenian constitution.

8. That the Areopagus was deprived of judicial functions by Ephialtes seems indisputable. Androtion, the contemporary of Demosthenes, and Philochorus, who lived a little later, speak of the Areopagitæ as the judges of almost all offences and crimes,¹ and Plutarch twice mentions the "cases at law" (*κρίσεις*) when speaking of the functions which Ephialtes removed from the council.² We may therefore assume that the fall of the Areopagus was the preliminary step to the virtual government of Athens and her empire through the paid dicasteries.

¹ Philoch. ap. Müller, *Frag. Hist. Græc.* i. p. 387: ἐδίκαζον οὖν Ἀρεοπαγίται περὶ πάντων σχεδὸν τῶν σφαλμάτων καὶ παρανομιῶν, ὡς ἅπαντά φησιν Ἀνδροτίων ἐν πρώτῃ καὶ Φιλόχορος ἐν δευτέρᾳ καὶ τρίτῃ τῶν Ἀρθιδίων.

² Plut. *Per.* 9, ἀφαιρεθῆναι τὰς πλείστας κρίσεις δι' Ἐφιάλτου. *Id. Cim.* 15, Ἐφιάλτου προεστῶτος ἀφείλοντο τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῆς τὰς κρίσεις πλὴν ὀλίγων ἀπάσας.

In the constitution of the Areopagus no change whatever was made. It continued to be a council composed of the ex-archons, and holding office for life. It was also, as far as we know, irresponsible; that is, it was not called upon to give an account of its actions to any higher authority.¹ That Athens, even in the days when democracy was supreme, should have tolerated a council with privileges so oligarchical in their nature, is explained by the fact that Ephialtes did not venture to strip the Areopagus of its ancient and solemn right of jurisdiction in cases of homicide. In this respect it remained the highest tribunal in the city. It was no longer an influence in the administration of the city or in the preservation of the laws; it was without power to bring the officers of the city to trial for offences committed in the discharge of their duties, but the *religi loci* was too strong for any further alteration.²

No change made in the constitution of the council.

It remained also a court for the trial of murder.

9. The limitation of the powers of the Areopagus was a triumph of the democratical over the aristocratical or oligarchical party; and later writers dated the rise of extreme democracy from this event. The council was, in fact, an anomaly in a democratic state; the removal of its powers was inevitable with the growth of popular government. The nation could not submit to the irresponsible control of a small section, even though the men who formed that section owed their position to the voice of the people. They could submit the less because there was no law which limited the functions of the Areopagus, at any rate in some directions.

The limitation of the Areopagus marks the rise of extreme democracy.

¹ In the next century Aeschines speaks of the Areopagus as being liable to give account to the Logistae, *In Olesiph.* § 20, but we cannot draw conclusions from this about the limitations of the council in the preceding century.

² That *φωνικαὶ δίκαι* were never taken from the Areopagus is stated distinctly by Demosthenes *Aristocr.* § 66: τοῦτο μόνον τὸ δικαστήριον οὐχὶ τύραννος οὐκ ὀλιγαρχία οὐδὲ δημοκρατία τὰς φωνικὰς δίκας ἀφέλεσθαι τετόλμηκεν; see Hermann, *Lehrbuch der Griech. Staats*, § 109. 6.

It could make inquiries about the private life of citizens, and condemn them, if not unheard, yet without a public trial; and from the sentence there was no appeal. Ephialtes had also proved, by his successful prosecutions, that the council which claimed and exercised such large powers was itself by no means free from faults. For all these reasons the limitation of the power of the Areopagus was inevitable, and indeed salutary. On the other hand, the progress of Athenian history shows that the loss of it was severely felt. Though its ancient powers were never fully restored to it, its influence revived, and at a later time the period during which it governed the state was regarded as an ideal era in the constitution.

10. It is assumed by some writers on Greek history that after the decree of Ephialtes the guardianship of the laws was intrusted, for a time at any rate, to a board of seven Nomophylakes (Watchers of the Laws). The authority for the existence of this board is very slender, consisting, so far as we can judge, of a single passage in the seventh book of the *Attic History* of Philochorus, in which the historian is at pains to distinguish the Nomophylakes from the Thesmothetae. He begins with noticing some customs which separated the two bodies, and goes on to speak of the duties of the Nomophylakes: "They compelled the magistrates to observe the laws, and they sat beside the Proedri both in the council (of Five Hundred) and in the assembly, to prevent them from doing anything which was not for the advantage of the city. They were seven in number, and were established at the time when Ephialtes left the Areopagus no other functions but those which concerned the lives of the citizens."¹ In the *Constitution of Athens* nothing is said about these officers, nor are they ever mentioned by any contemporary author. We hear

¹ Philoch. *Frag.* 141 b, M. Harpocration and Suidas have of course no independent value.

nothing of them at the revolution of the Four Hundred, when the machinery for preserving the constitution was of necessity suspended; nor at the condemnation of the generals after Arginusæ, when, if such a board existed, we should have expected it to come forward. On these grounds we may claim the right to be somewhat sceptical; and our scepticism is increased when we find that the seventh book of the history of Philochorus was concerned with the period during which Demetrius of Phalerum governed Athens (317-307 B.C.), and that Demetrius gave the name of Nomophylakes to the officers who were known in earlier times as the Eleven.¹ It is not of course impossible that Philochorus has been led by the mention of the Nomophylakes of Demetrius to speak of officers bearing the same name at an earlier period of Athenian history, and we do not know enough of the constitution of Athens to say that any board of which we hear but once in a later author did not exist. We cannot sufficiently remember that we have absolutely no mention of the Areopagus in Herodotus or Thucydides. On the other hand, we may say that whether the board existed or not is merely a matter of antiquarian interest, for not a trace of its action remains.²

We find no traces of their action.

II. Ephialtes did not long enjoy his triumph. Within the year he fell by the hand of an assassin, whom Aristotle asserts to have been a native of Tanagra in Boeotia, by name Aristodicus.³ The assassination was, without doubt, the work of the oligarchical party, whose position and character Ephialtes

Death of Ephialtes, and estimate of his character.

¹ Pollux, viii. 102.

² On the Nomophylakes see the tract of J. Starker, Nissae 1880. Nomophylakes are mentioned in Aristotle's *Politics* and Plato's *Laws*; also in Xenoph. *Oecon.* ix. 14, but these were not officers at Athens. There were Nomophylakes at Lacedaemon, Elis, Corcyra, Chalcedon, and Locri. Starker, *l.c.* p. 35; Pauly, *Realencycl.* s.v.; cf. also Herm. *Gr. Staats.* § 129. 15.

³ Arist. *Pol. Athen.* c. 25. The date is fixed by the archonship of Mnesitheides (457 B.C.), who held office five years after the death of Ephialtes; cf. c. 26.

had done so much to ruin ; but no details have been preserved, which enable us to explain why a Boeotian should be employed for the act. Idomeneus, indeed, the contemporary of Epicurus, went so far as to charge Pericles himself with the guilt of a murder by which he was freed from an inconvenient rival in the affections of the people, but this accusation, if it rested on any historical evidence whatsoever, must have had its origin in the malignity of party hatred, just as at a later time the enemies of Pericles endeavoured to inculpate him in the death of Pheidias.¹

We cannot form a very definite conception of the aims and character of Ephialtes, yet, so far as our evidence goes, it is in his favour. He is one of the very few Athenians who stand clear of all suspicion of bribery, being in this respect the peer of Aristides himself. He rendered excellent service to the state by his prosecution of those who took advantage of public office to fill their pockets at the public expense, and though his limitation of the powers of the Areopagus was perhaps carried out too thoroughly, we cannot doubt that it was done from honest motives. Some reform was needed at the time, for there was a danger that the government might fall too exclusively into the hands of a class, but the difficulty might have been met by a reconstruction of the Areopagitic council, which, while bringing it into greater sympathy with the democracy, would have left Athens with the advantage of a stronger form of government than she afterwards possessed. Stability and control were especially needed in the administration, and they were needed the more as the demos became more powerful. After the fall of the ancient council

¹ Plutarch entirely disbelieves the story of Idomeneus, *Pericl.* c. 10. We may notice that the assassination of Phrynichus, which Plutarch says was the act of Hermon, one of the Peripoli, was by others assigned to Apollodorus of Megara and Thrasybulus of Calydon. Antiphon, *De caed. Her.* § 68, says that the assassin of Ephialtes was never discovered.

there was no serious check on the administrative action of the assembly, and those who led it. From this time onwards the fortunes of the state depended on the personal character of the leading statesmen. Ephialtes made the mistake which all reformers are apt to make—the mistake of destroying an institution instead of adapting it to the needs of the time.

12. During the year which immediately followed the reform of the Areopagus, the attention of the Athenians must have been largely occupied with foreign politics.

After the rude dismissal of Cimon's forces from Ithome, the relations existing between Athens and Sparta since 481 B.C. underwent an entire change; a new departure was made in the alliance concluded with Argos, by which, for the first time in her history, Athens became an influence in the Peloponnesus. The alliance with Thessaly, which had probably been dropped since the fall of the tyrants (510 B.C.), was resumed. Then followed the outbreak of the Hellenic war, and the sending of the great expedition to Egypt. The city was now at the height of her power; the new wave of democratic impulse carried her forward, as she had been carried forward after the expulsion of the tyrants. Now, as then, her conduct created many enemies, and now as then, she met each one with indomitable vigour. The defeat at Tanagra was followed by the recall of Cimon, whose presence was certainly necessary if the city was to use her military strength to the full. The decree under which he returned is said to have been proposed by Pericles himself, and there is no reason to doubt the statement. It is highly creditable to the good sense of both parties in the state that a man so deeply pledged to the more oligarchical form of constitution should be allowed to return, and that when he returned, he should serve the city as honestly and loyally as Cimon did. Whether the story that Pericles made it a condition of his opponent's recall that Cimon should command the forces of

Position of
affairs at
Athens after
462 B.C.

The recall of
Cimon, who,
however, takes
little part in
domestic
politics.

Athens in the war with Persia, while he remained the leader of the city, be true or not, Cimon does not come forward after this time as a leader of the oligarchs in any party struggles, though, as a friend of the Lacedaemonians, he is able to use his influence in bringing about a peace with that city.¹

From the year 460 B.C. we may assume that the influence of Pericles began to be preponderant. In his own party he was without a rival; for after the death of Ephialtes we hear of no other leader of the people but Pericles; and, therefore, we may assume that by this time he had definitely entered on the line of policy by which he was able in the end to obtain undisputed control of the city. This policy took shape in many ways, but we may perhaps distinguish four leading principles in his administration:—

1. The payment of the citizens for service to the state; and more particularly the payment of the jurors in the law-courts.

2. The outlay of public funds on the adornment and improvement of the city.

3. The sending out of Athenian citizens in cleruchies, partly with a view to a stricter hold on the allies, and partly with a view to relieving the poverty of the citizens.

4. The renunciation of war with Persia as a national policy, and the conversion of the Delian league, formed for carrying on war with the Great King, into an Athenian empire, subsisting for the benefit of Athens.

This is not an exhaustive statement of the policy of Pericles; but these are the broad lines on which he proceeded, till his energies became absorbed in the struggle with Sparta.

(1) To what extent, if at all, payment was made to any Athenian magistrate or public officer under the constitution of Clisthenes, is unknown. It was, of course, a principle of the old aristocratical states that a man should give his services to his country: he expected payment for time spent in

Ascendancy
of Pericles:
general outline
of his policy.

Payment for
public services
at first un-
known,

¹ Plut. *Cim.* 8.

the council or the law-courts as little as he expected it for service in the field. But when the state became more highly organised, when longer and more regular attendance was required for the discharge of military and civil duties, this generosity of sentiment began to cool.

Under the arrangements of Clisthenes it was necessary for one-tenth of the members of the council of Five Hundred, *i.e.* for the members chosen by one of the ten tribes, to remain continuously in the city for one-tenth of the year. This demand could hardly be made upon citizens, many of whom belonged to the third class in the Solonian census (the Zeugitae), without some compensation, and accordingly we find that the Prytanes during their term of office, lived at the public expense in the Tholos or Rotunda.¹ At the time of the revolution of the Four Hundred the members of the council received a payment for their services in addition to maintenance, but we are unable to fix the date at which this payment was first made. It is never connected, like the payments of the soldiers and the jurors, with the name of Pericles, though it was undoubtedly introduced in the period of extreme democracy, which began with the fall of the Areopagus.

but public officers allowed maintenance when on duty, as, e.g. the members of the council.

At a later time the council was paid.

13. The remuneration for services in war probably began at the time of the Persian invasion, when, as we have seen, the Areopagus furnished the poorer citizens with means to enable them to man the ships at Salamis. From this time payment of the sailors in the fleet, in some form or another, was doubtless the custom, for we cannot suppose

Payment for service in war came into existence at the battle of Salamis (?)

¹ Pollux viii. 155, ἡ θόλος ἐν ᾗ συνεδείπνουν ἐκάστης ἡμέρας πεντήκοντα τῆς τῶν πεντακοσίων βουλῆς, ἡ πρυτανεύουσα φυλή. The passage in *Athen. Pol.* (p. 155) which refers to this subject is unfortunately too mutilated to be of service. To what period the statement of Pollux refers is, of course, unknown, but as the meals were under the care of the Colacretae (*supra*, p. 111) there is no reason to doubt the antiquity of the custom.

that in the next year the Athenians remained in the fleet from the battle of Mycale till the fall of Sestos—a period of more than six months, at the least, without recompence of any kind. Such evidence as we have supports this view. Even before the foundation of the Delian league the states who formed the Hellenic alliance contributed money towards the expense of the war; and in the earliest form of the arrangements of the league money was required as well as ships and men (*supra*, p. 295 f.). We are told, it is true, that

but organised
into a system
by Pericles.

Pericles was the first who introduced the payment for military service, but the authority for the statement is not very good, and we may suppose that Pericles organised into a system what had previously depended to a large extent on the liberality of the Areopagus or of the general at the head of the expeditions, which Athens sent out. In this way he would be able to counteract the influence which Cimon acquired by his generosity, and, in fact, Plutarch informs us that Pericles kept a fleet of sixty ships manned by Athenians at sea for eight months in the year, not merely to exercise the men, but principally in order to supply the crews with a subsistence at the public expense.¹

14. On the other hand, the payment of the jurors for service in the law-courts was an entirely new departure, and carried with it a far-reaching change in the government of Athens. Pericles did not, of course, establish the law-courts; they had been

Payment of
the jurors in
the law-courts,

¹ Schol. on Dem. π. συνταξ. p. 222 D., πρῶτος γὰρ ἐκείνος ἔταξε μισθοφορὰν καὶ ἔδωκε τῷ δήμῳ στρατευομένῳ. At the siege of Potidaea the Athenian soldiers were paid a drachma a day (Thuc. iii. 17), and no doubt this was the case in the long siege of Samos. For the sixty ships, Plut. Per. 11, ἐξήκοντα δὲ τριήρεις καθ' ἑκάστον ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκπέμπων, ἐν αἷς πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ἔπλεον ὀκτὰ μῆνας ἐμισθοί, μελετῶντες ἅμα καὶ μανθάνοντες τὴν ναυτικὴν ἐμπειρίαν.

In Aristoph. Eccl. 304, we are informed that no payment was made to soldiers in the time of Myronides, but Myronides was not engaged in any distant expeditions. To judge from Aristophanes no payment was made for service in Attica or on the border, but in foreign campaigns the case was different. The generals drew good pay.

in existence since the time of Solon. But so long as the jurors were unpaid they could not be expected to devote much of their time to settling the quarrels of others; and so long as the Areopagus exercised judicial functions there would be comparatively little for them to do. Pericles seized the opportunity which the success of Ephialtes provided, to raise a number of men who had hitherto been of no importance in the state to a position of almost supreme authority. The jurors of Athens were not, indeed, the administrative power of the city, but they were now the body before whom every one who transgressed the laws, who failed, or was thought to have failed, in his executive duties, was brought for trial, and against whose sentence there was no appeal. The action of the Heliaea, which had hitherto in all probability been intermittent, was now thoroughly organised; and duties, which had been discharged by those who had the leisure to give to them, were now stipendiary and a source of income. The effect upon the people was enormous. Any one who who could find employment as a juror was sure, at least, of such a payment as would keep him, in an Athenian climate and with Athenian abstemiousness, from starvation; any one who was filled with the Greek love of domineering could, by becoming a juror, indulge his passion at the expense of the pockets or the lives of his neighbours. On the other hand, no one who had any serious or remunerative occupation was likely to waste his day in a law-court for the miserable pittance which a juror received, and no one whose presence was required on his farm in the country, or who was engaged in any public office; no one who was serving in the army or the fleet, could spare the time to attend the law-court. As a natural consequence of the innovation of Pericles, the important duty of interpreting the laws of the city—for at Athens there was no bar, and no judge in our sense of the word, the jurors being at once judge and jury,—of pronouncing

an innovation
due to Pericles.

Importance of
the change
thus intro-
duced.

The jurors, as
a rule, men of
inferior station
and character.

guilty and not guilty on cases involving ruin, banishment, and death, was left to a class which must have been largely composed of the aged and infirm, the idle and nefarious. The only qualifications of a juror were that he should be an Athenian citizen, of more than thirty years, and of a character free from public stain. The only check on his conduct was his respect for the oath which he swore on entering upon his office.¹

15. The number of jurors is said by Aristotle to have been 6000, and though we do not know to what precise

period we are to refer his statement, we find
 Numbers of the jurors. this number fixed in the time of Aristophanes.²

Whether Pericles began with so large a number we cannot say, but it is indisputable that he ended with it. It is hardly less certain that before the death of Pericles each juror received a payment of three obols (about 4d.) for each day that he sat in a court. The payment of the jurors, therefore, enabled Pericles to provide at the public expense for six thousand of the poorest citizens, and not only to provide for them but to make them a power in the state, which could hardly fail, under any circumstances, to support the policy which brought grist to their mill. For these same six

The jurors
 could support
 Pericles in the
 assembly.

thousand were also members of the general assembly, where they voted on every subject connected with the public administration, and they were the more valuable members because, as they were always present in the city, their attendance could be pretty safely counted upon. So long as this large

¹ Arist. *Athen. Pol.* c. 27, speaks of the liberality of Cimon, and proceeds: πρὸς δὲ ταύτην τὴν χορηγίαν ἐπιλειπούμενος ὁ Περικλῆς τῇ οὐσίᾳ, συμβουλευόντος αὐτῷ Δαμωνίδου [Δάμωνος] τοῦ Οἴηθεν . . . ἐπεὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις ἡττάτο δίδοναι τοῖς πολλοῖς τὰ αὐτῶν (?), κατεσκεύασε μισθοφορὰν τοῖς δικασταῖς. ἀφ' ὧν αἰτιῶνται τινες χεῖρὰ γενέσθαι, κληρουμένον ἐπιμελὲς εἶναι μᾶλλον τῶν τυχόντων ἢ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἀνθρώπων. Cf. Plut. *Pericl.* 9. For the juror and his oath see Demoth. *De Cor.* init. Reputation and piety are checks which diminish in force with the division of responsibility.

² Arist. *Athen. Pol.* c. 24; Aristoph. *Wasps*, 661.

body of men remained faithful to him, Pericles was more than a match for the aristocratical party.¹

It is in this sense that the payment of the jurors marked the beginning of the extreme democracy at Athens. United with the growing influence of the sailor element in the population, it threw the balance on the side of the multitude and of those who led them. And from this point of view the policy of Pericles, in making this change, is severely condemned by the philosophers of the succeeding generation. But there is another point of view from which the change

appears as an attempt to get rid of a great mischief, by placing the administration of public justice on a firm and broad foundation. Of all the evils which can overtake a state there is perhaps none more terrible than the suspicion that the laws are unequal and justice

The paid law-courts an attempt to put the administration of justice on a better foundation.

corrupt. Where one law is in force for the rich and another for the poor, there is no such thing as freedom; where sentences are sold to the highest bidder, no life is safe. Even the Persian tyrant, who looked on every subject as a slave, visited the taking of bribes by a 'royal judge' with ruthless severity. But the successful prosecutions of Ephialtes seemed to prove that the Areopagus was by no means an immaculate body; and if the aristocrats were found to be corrupt in the administration of public office, who could tell how far the corruption went? This evil Ephialtes and Pericles may have wished to correct by placing the administration of justice in the hands of the people. By so doing they would secure two advantages. They would gain for the law the hearty support of the people, who would henceforth be interested in understanding and upholding it; and they would guard the administration of the law from sinister

¹ That the sum paid to the jurors was three obols in the time of Aristophanes is beyond dispute; that it was ever less than three, depends on the accuracy of the scholiast on *Wasps*, 88, 300, who may have confounded the *διοβολία* and the *δικαστικόν*. See Gilbert, *Handbuch*, i. 326, n. 2; Arist. *Athen. Pol.* p. 79.

influence. These were objects worth attaining, and to some degree, at any rate, they were attained. Perhaps in no city of equal size and importance has the law been so simple a matter as it seems to have been in Athens. It is true that Aristotle in the *Constitution of Athens* speaks of the laws of

Popular
character of
Athenian law:
every citizen
acquainted
with it.

Solon as designedly obscure—a device by which Solon hoped to bring work to the law-courts—but in their practical working the obscurity was rarely felt; rarely did any Athenian citizen find it necessary to obtain advice

as to the course which he ought to pursue in order to act legally.¹ Every citizen made it his business to be acquainted with the law; and this was the easier as the greatest care was taken to make the statute-book as simple as possible. We may also add that the Athenians were to a

The Athenians
a law-abiding
people.

remarkable degree a law-abiding people. A strict watch was kept upon those who proposed measures in the assembly, and if anything was

brought forward which was contrary to existing law, any Athenian present was at liberty to stop the proposal by undertaking to indict the proposer for illegality. This wholesome check was rarely disregarded even in moments

The "Graphe
Paranomon."

of great excitement, though, of course, it might be evaded by a direct proposal to

suspend the law for the time, as was done when the constitution of the Four Hundred was brought in.² And with regard to bribery, the Athenian law-courts would seem to have commanded the confidence of the people for half a century after the reforms of Ephialtes. Though Aristotle speaks of the jury-courts as open to bribery after payment was introduced, the first instance which he can quote is that of Anytus, in 409 B.C.³

¹ *Athen. Pol.* c. 9; cf. *Plut. Solon*, 18.

² At what date the *Graphe Paranomon* was instituted is not known; but the limits within which its introduction lie are: 462 B.C., the fall of the Areopagus, before which it was not needed, and 411, the revolution of the Four Hundred, when it is in use.

³ *Pol. Athen.* c. 27.

16. But while we are justified in pointing to this attractive side of the popular administration of law, we must bear in mind that such a popular administration is impossible without payment; and when payment is introduced, the door is opened to evils of many kinds; for even if no one comes forward to make such a use of them as Pericles is thought to have done, the

Evils resulting from the payment of juries.

employment of paid juries on so great a scale inevitably breeds a spirit, which is in itself very mischievous. Athens became a city of lawyers; and, with her example before us, we may permit ourselves to doubt whether a state suffers more when the law is a mystery with which no one will meddle unless he is compelled, or when it is so simple that every man is his own lawyer! It is, however, probable that the evils of the system did not appear in their worst shape in the time of Pericles; and though his motives in introducing the change were doubtless mixed, he may have thought that the new arrangements, if they benefited himself and his party, would also benefit the Athenian state. It is also clear that, by compelling the subject allies to bring their important cases for decision to Athens, he gave the Athenian jurors a direct interest in maintaining the empire.

17. (2) The expenditure of public money upon public works is justifiable so long as the works are needed, and the money spent upon them is furnished by those who vote it away. Nothing could be more creditable to himself or to the city than the proposal of Themistocles to devote the surplus arising from the mines of Laureion to the building of ships, and the fortification of the Peiræus. And, again, there are fewer acts which we contemplate with greater satisfaction than the generosity of the rich in adorning their cities with beautiful works of art. But it is quite another matter when public works are instituted in order to provide subsistence for those who would otherwise find it difficult to obtain employment, or at least to obtain it on such remunerative terms; when the money so spent is taken from sources contributed for other

Expenditure of public money: within what limits is it justified?

objects ; or when a rich man allows his wealth to become a means of pauperising and corrupting his fellow-citizens. In these matters the Athenians—and indeed the Greeks altogether—were partly in advance of us, and partly behind us. They were in advance of us in so far as the rich men in Greek cities were generous to a degree which we do not expect to find among our own citizens. To spend a large fortune in acquiring things of beauty for his private gratification, was a use of money of which a Greek would have been incapable. His vanity, not to speak of any higher motive, would have prevented it. On the other hand, the Greeks had no idea of public finance. They had not discovered the art of creating national debts, which appears to be the chief business of the modern financier ; and they dealt with a surplus in a rough and ready manner, giving back in some way or another to the people anything that was left over at the year's end, without any thought of the demoralisation caused by such expenditure. It is with the greatest hesitation that Demosthenes—a century after Pericles—ventures to suggest that those who receive the public money should do something for the public service.

18. When, therefore, we find the enemies of Pericles attacking his public expenditure—and no part of his policy met with fiercer opposition—they did not venture to attack it because he was dividing Athenian money among Athenians. It would have been perfectly useless to take such a line. And though they might object to the amount which he spent, they could not say that it was spent in an unworthy manner. Pheidias was employed by Cimon as well as by Pericles ; and there is reason to suppose that the idea of building a new temple on the acropolis to Athena did not originate with the democratic leader. What the oligarchs attacked was the expenditure of money, which was not the surplus of Athenian revenue, on objects which were purely Athenian. The money, they said, came from the allies who formed the Delian league,

Athenian ideas
contrasted
with modern.

Attacks on
Pericles for
his expendi-
ture : on what
ground were
they made ?

and it ought to be spent upon the purposes for which the league had been founded. To spend it in any other way was a misuse, in fact it was a malversation, of the funds intrusted to the care of the city. They maintained that the credit of Athens was at stake; the chest of the confederacy had been removed from Delos to the city on the plea that only there would

The money which he spent belonged to the Delian league.

it be safe from the barbarians, but the conduct of Pericles destroyed the validity of this plea, and allowed the Greeks to give a very different explanation of the matter—an explanation which many were only too ready to give. It would be felt as an outrage, and a tyrannical outrage, by all Hellas, when they saw their contributions lavished on the city as money is lavished on a vain and foolish woman. There is no doubt that this accusation, though urged, perhaps, in the spirit of a party, was to a large extent true. The only honest refutation would have been the denial that the money so spent formed any part of the contributions of the allies; and this denial Pericles never made. On the contrary, he met his opponents with the impudent assertion that the city owed the allies no account of the contributions which they made, so long as she performed her part of the bargain. The allies were freed from any fear of the barbarians without finding so much as a horse, or a ship, or a soldier; they paid a sum of money, and money so paid belonged not to those who paid

Pericles' answer to this charge quite unjustifiable.

but to those who received it, so long as they performed the service for which it was given. Such reasoning might easily satisfy the Athenian people who received the money, but it was not likely to satisfy the allies who provided it. The tribute formed a common fund which could only be expended by the common consent. While the original arrangements of the Delian league continued in force, the bargain behind which Pericles sheltered himself did not exist; and when the league had been changed into the Athenian empire, and the synod together with the independence of the cities which formed it had been altogether extinguished, an

honest bargain could not be made, for one of the contracting parties had been deprived of free action.¹

19. It cannot be denied that in this matter Pericles was guilty of gross injustice towards the members of the Delian

The expenditure of Pericles resulted in great works which have benefited the world.

league—though his offence was slight when we compare it with the act of a king or a minister, who, for his own purposes, involves his country in the misery and extravagance of war. It is also probable that he demoralised a large portion of the citizens by his expenditure. Athens

now became a vast workshop, in which those who were not serving the state as soldiers or sailors, or by sitting in law-courts, were still receiving public money. But the result of the expenditure was in every way satisfactory; the city became the wonder of the world. In her temples and her statues, her gateways and her porticoes, she not only surpassed anything to be seen in Greece, but even to this day she is unapproachable. Such a vast service to mankind must be taken at its worth. For the injustice of which she under her great leader was guilty, for the demoralisation of her citizens, Athens paid a sufficient penalty; but the prize of her splendid mendacity remains to the world, which in the course of two thousand years has never seen the like of the work finished in such profusion by the craftsmen who laboured with and under Pheidias. We cannot wonder that the people supported their leader, not merely for the sake of the pay which they received, but for the glory which he conferred on the city. When his enemies accused him

The people agreed to the expenditure.

in the assembly of squandering the public funds, he merely asked whether the sum expended was considered large. The answer

was that it was not only large but excessive. "Then let the

¹ Plut., *Pericl.* 12. In the *Athen. Pol.* it is Aristides who first leads the Athenians to look to the funds of the allies as a means of support. If we are to believe this authority, the man who was renowned for his "justice" was more sweeping and reckless in his malversation than Pericles himself. But see *supra*, p. 382.

cost of the works fall on me," said Pericles, "and my name shall be written upon them as the dedicator." But the people would not hear of it. Let the cost fall on us, they cried; spend and spare not.¹

Once more had Pericles gained an end which may have been in a large degree personal, by measures which claimed to rest on a higher basis, and seemed to confer a lasting benefit on the state. He had won the people to his side, but had he not made the city the most beautiful in Greece? Had he not established the reign of law, and secured for the meanest citizen the inestimable advantage of a pure administration of justice? Such success was overwhelming and irresistible; those who murmured amid the courts and the workshops, that justice was well, but honesty was better, and that gifts were only acceptable to the gods when offered with clean hands, sank into the position of a discredited minority.²

Yet the expenditure was partly made for selfish purposes.

20. (3 and 4) On the two remaining points in the policy of Pericles, the establishment of cleruchies and the cessation of the war with Persia, we need not touch here because they have already been discussed.

The foreign policy of Pericles.

We saw that by planting Athenian citizens in the territory of the allies Pericles increased his hold upon them; while the cessation of the war with Persia, for which the league was founded, without any alteration in the arrangements of the league, was equivalent to a declaration that the allies were now the subjects of Athens, pledged to her interests and not to a common policy. Yet we cannot read that five or six thousand Athenians left the city in the ten years (more or less) after 453 B.C. (*supra*, p. 379 note) without wishing to know something more

The cleruchies.

¹ Plut. *Pericl.* 14.

² In dwelling on this part of the policy of Pericles I have somewhat anticipated events. Many of his public works were built after 445, but there seems no reason to doubt that he gained his popularity by this means.

about the population of Athens at the time; and our curiosity is increased when we are told that in 451 B.C. Pericles brought forward a law affecting the status of the Athenian citizen.

We have no good evidence of the amount of the population of Athens in the fifth century. On two occasions—the visit of Aristagoras to Athens and the battle of Salamis—Herodotus speaks as though the male population of full age were about 30,000,¹ but on what ground he formed this estimate we do not know. At the time of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war we learn that the number of Athenians capable of bearing arms—including the horse—was about 28,000. In the *Constitution of Athens* we are informed that “more than 20,000 men” were supported out of the public funds and tribute; but in what relation these 20,000 stood to the whole population we have no means of ascertaining. The 1200 cavalry and 1600 archers are included in them; but on the other hand we hear of only 2500 soldiers besides the guards of the city and docks, and indeed the items given come far short of the total.² It is, however, reasonable to suppose that even in the Peloponnesian war there were not more than two-thirds of the Athenian citizens drawing pay from the state and the confederacy, and on this computation we again come back to the total of about 30,000 men. In contradiction to this amount a story is quoted for which we have the authority of Philochorus, a story repeated or supported by Plutarch. These writers assert that a present of 30,000 or 40,000 medimni of corn was sent from Egypt or Libya to Athens (Philochorus says by King Psammetichus) in 444 B.C. to be distributed among the people. The distribution gave rise to many law-suits, for Pericles had recently carried a law that only those were Athenian citizens who were born of Athenian parents on both sides, and under this law many of

Population
of Athens:
difficulty of
arriving at
a result.

Disfranchise-
ment of large
numbers in
444 B.C.

¹ Herod. v. 97; viii. 65.

² Arist. *Pol. Athen.* c. 24.

those who came forward to claim their portion of corn were found not to be citizens at all, and were struck off the list. This misfortune fell upon a little less than 5000 men, leaving 14,040 on the roll.¹ The total number of citizens contemplated in this story is not more than 19,000, a total which is quite impossible in 444 B.C. if in 432 B.C. the city could put 28,000 men in the field. But here again we have no assurance that the 19,000 represent the whole of the inhabitants of the city; there may have been a third of the citizens who did not wish to partake of the liberality of Psammetichus.²

21. However this may be, we find that in the years 453-443 B.C. Athens is able to spare a large number of citizens for colonisation, for it is not probable that all those who received gifts in land were allowed to remain in the city. Indeed we know that this was not the case at Brea (*supra*, p. 378); and such indulgence could not be granted without frustrating the purposes for which the colonies were planted. In these years also, and for some time previously, Athens must have suffered severely in war. For the whole of the ten years from 460 to 450 B.C. she was involved in hostilities, and for six years of the time a large number of her citizens were on service in Egypt, whence few returned. In an inscription, dating from the year 459 or thereabouts, we have the names of more than 170 citizens who fell in the Erechtheid tribe alone in one year. Unless this tribe suffered in an especial degree beyond the others, the loss in this year would amount to 1700 men.³ In the *Constitution of Athens* we read that owing to the incompetence of the generals—the

Drain upon
the population
owing to
colonies and
losses in war.

¹ Plut. *Pericl.* 37; Philoch. *Frag.* 90 M., archonship of Lysimachides, Ol. 83. 4, 445-444 B.C. The corn would no doubt be sent after the harvest, which in Egypt falls in the spring. See Schol. Arist. *Wasps*, 716. Philochorus gives 4,760 and 14,240, making an exact total of 19,000.

² This is not inconsistent with Plutarch, but Philochorus seems to be speaking of the whole body of citizens.

³ The inscription is *C. I. A. i.* 433 = Dittenberger, *Syll.* No. 3 = Hicks, *Hist. Ins.* No. 19.

author is speaking of the days of Cimon!—who were chosen because they came of great families, the Athenians never went out to battle without losing 2000 or 3000 men, a loss which fell on the better class of citizens, whether in a higher or lower degree of life,¹ and naturally caused a great diminution of their numbers!

Under such circumstances we should suppose that the population of the city was rapidly diminishing, and that measures were taken to repair the loss. But, on the contrary, Pericles in 451 B.C. brought forward a law raising the qualification for citizenship, a law, too, which had a retrospective effect! Hitherto the sons of citizens who had married aliens, though *νόθοι*—a word which means both bastard and half-breed—were allowed to exercise the rights of citizenship (see *supra*, p. 106). This was allowed no longer, and those who were born of such mixed unions were deprived of the rights which they had hitherto enjoyed.

The law of
Pericles re-
stricting the
franchise.

Discussion
of the law.

No wonder that the existence of the law has been called in question. Other popular leaders at Athens had been generous to aliens; Cleisthenes admitted many aliens to citizenship, Themistocles favoured them; and at the very time when the law was passed, Pericles was sending out Athenians by thousands into foreign countries where they would be pretty certain to form connections with alien women. It is also indisputable that the law fell into desuetude, for the self-same regulation was brought forward, without the retrospective effect, by Aristophon, the Azenian, in 403 B.C. And if the law was retrospective, how was it possible for Cimon, whose birth was known to every Athenian, to be employed in 449 B.C. as a commander of the Athenian forces, or for his son, Lacedaemonius, if born of an Arcadian mother, to command an Athenian fleet in 432 B.C.? If it was not retrospective—and Aristotle leaves this uncertain—how came the division of the corn to be connected with it?

¹ *Athen. Pol.* c. 26.

If, however, we accept the assertion of Aristotle¹ as a final proof that Pericles, "owing to the multitude," did persuade the Athenians to pass a law that those only should be citizens who were born of Athenian parents on both sides, we may suppose that he had a double object in view. On the one hand he may have wished to prevent the wealthy citizens, who were his opponents, from strengthening their position by marrying into powerful families outside Athens, as Miltiades had done in the preceding generation; on the other, while throwing the burden of the people more and more upon the public funds, he may have improved their status and pleased their vanity by raising the qualification for citizenship. None but pure-bred Athenians were to share in the good things which he was providing for the people; and every one so bred was to look down with scorn upon those who had brought in aliens to swell the population of the town. That the law was retrospective in its operation, or that the number of citizens was reduced to 14,000 in consequence of its strict application, are statements which we may still be permitted to doubt.

Reasons
which may
have induced
Pericles to
propose it.

22. Thus did Pericles win his way as a leader of the people. Yet he was not free from opposition—an opposition which after the death of Cimon in 449 B.C. became better organised and more effective. For years past Cimon had done little for his party besides preserving a good understanding with Sparta: his ideas of party-management did not extend beyond profuse liberality and personal influence, and he may have felt under some obligation to Pericles after his return from ostracism. But so long as he lived, he was nominally the head of his party, though perhaps he was more of a hindrance than a help in home politics. After his death his place was taken by his kinsman, Thucydides, the son of

The oligarchical party at Athens led Thucydides.

¹ *Athen. Pol.* c. 26 end, ἐπ' Ἀντιδότου διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν, Περικλέους εἰπόντος, ἔγνωσαν μὴ μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως ὅς ἂν μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἀστοῖν ἢ γεγονώς.

Melesias, a capable and high-minded man, who is ranked by Aristotle with Nicias and Theramenes as one of the three best Athenian statesmen after the "men of old."¹ The change was significant in the history of Athens; hitherto the general and the statesman had been one and the same person, but the

His character;
and his or-
ganisation of
the party.

functions now began to be looked on as separate. Thucydides was not a great soldier like Cimon; it is not certainly known whether he ever commanded in an expedition; and in any case he could not be compared for a moment with Pericles. This defect he compensated by his activity in domestic politics. Finding his party scattered and disorganised he gathered them together, urging them to separate themselves from the people among whom when isolated their influence was of little weight, and to act as one compact body. By this means he restored the balance for a time, but only to provoke more bitter hostility between the two parties in the city. "From the first," says Plutarch, "there had been a flaw in the state, such as we see in iron, indicating a difference of policy between the people and the aristocrats, but the rivalry of these two men, Pericles and Thucydides, cut a deep wound; and henceforth one side was called the demos and the other the oligarchs."² Pericles saw

Counter-
measures of
Pericles:
severe opposi-
tion of oli-
garchs and
democrats.

his position threatened as it had not been threatened before; if he was to win he must attract the people to him by still more generous measures, and convince them in the assembly that his "policy" was right. More colonies were sent out, new means of paying the citizens were devised. Defeat in the assembly, even when sustained, was never acknowledged. When Archidamus asked Thucydides whether he or Pericles were the better wrestler, Thucydides replied: "When I throw him, he argues that he has not fallen; and so he wins the day, deceiving the bystanders."³

¹ *Athen. Pol.* c. 28.

² *Plut. Pericl.* 11.

³ *Plut. Pericl.* 8. The story gains point when we remember that

In the end, as we shall see, Pericles was victorious, Thucydides being ostracised in 444 B.C.; but for five or six years before this time the oligarchs were placed in a stronger position than they had enjoyed since the Areopagus was stripped of its authority by Ephialtes. The aims of the party, or at least of the better members of it, went no further than peace with Sparta, the maintenance of the constitution as it had been left by Clisthenes, and a liberal treatment of the allies; they had no thought of establishing an oligarchy at Athens in the stricter sense of the word. But among them were men capable of darker deeds; for it was they who brought about the assassination of Ephialtes, and who entered into a conspiracy with Sparta before the battle of Tanagra (*supra*, p. 329). In these two instances they form a striking contrast to their opponents, whose patriotism was above suspicion, and who were content with removing their rivals from the city by the legal and almost honourable expedient of ostracism.

Pericles the winner.

Aims of the oligarchical party at Athens.

Here for the present we must stop. Pericles is now the leader of Athens, and the events of 446-445 B.C., though for a moment they might seem to shake his position, in reality confirmed it. Athens, even after the loss of her tributaries on land, was still the head of a mighty empire, whose greatness was being embodied in the glorious temple on her acropolis. The means by which she attained this position, and by which also she was prepared to keep it, will not bear very close examination; but we cannot forget that it was she who repelled the tide of invasion, that under her rule the Aegean was free from the presence of the arch-enemy. And never before or since has life developed so richly as it developed in the beautiful city which lay at the feet of the Virgin Goddess.

Thucydides gave his two sons an excellent education in wrestling; they became the most distinguished athletes of their time at Athens. Plato, *Meno*, 94.

CHAPTER XII.


HISTORY OF THE COLONIES IN SICILY FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO 450 B.C.¹

I. IF we adhere to the account of the Greek colonies in Sicily which we find in Thucydides, and no better account is in existence, the earliest settlement was planted at Naxos in 735 B.C., and the latest at Agrigentum in 581 B.C. During this century and a half the whole of the eastern coast of the island was occupied by the immigrants; on the south-west coast their cities extended with some interruptions as far as Selinus; on the north, the Zancleans secured Mylae, as an outpost, and established a colony at Himera, but the central part of the coast does not seem to have been occupied by the Greeks.²

The colonies were the work of two distinct groups of adventurers, whose different origin was marked by a difference in the locality of their settlements. The Chalcidic or Ionic cities, which were derived in the first instance from Chalcis in Euboea, were planted on the northern half of the eastern coast, and at Himera in the north-west; the Dorian cities, which were derived from Corinth, Megara, and Rhodes, lay along the southern half of the eastern, and nearly the whole length of the southern, shore. It is true that the Chalcidic

¹ In writing this chapter I have had the very great advantage of consulting Holm's *Geschichte Siciliens*, and in revising it, I have been able to use Professor Freeman's exhaustive work, *History of Sicily*, vols. i., ii.

² For traces of an earlier acquaintance with the west see Holm, *l.c.*, i. p. 108 ff. For the north coast, cf. Thuc. vi. 62; vii. 58.



colony of Zancle became to some extent a Dorian colony when it passed into the possession of the Messenians, but with this exception no Dorians settled in Sicily north of the promontory of Taurus, which formed the limit, in that direction, of the territory of Hyblæan Megara; no Ionians settled on the whole line of coast between Megara and Selinus.¹ But though the two nations were thus locally distinct, we do not hear that either of them was united in any religious festival, such as those which at once kept together and distinguished the Ionians and Dorians of Asia Minor. However distinct the institutions of the Dorian and Chalcidic cities might be, there was no union of either—no common worship of Poseidon or Apollo. In this respect the eastern and western colonies of Hellas differed widely, and the reason of the difference is not far to seek. At the time when the Greeks emigrated into Asia the worship of the tribal deity was still a bond of union, political as well as religious. At that time also the distinction of Dorian and Ionian had been brought into prominence by the Dorian migration. But when the colonies settled in Sicily, the city had triumphed over the tribe; and each band of immigrants was independent of the other. The tribal feeling was not indeed lost; on the contrary, it gained in strength as time passed on; but when it became most vigorous it was too late to express it in a religious form.²

No common religious festivals in Sicily, such as we find in Asia Minor.

¹ The inhabitants of Himera were partly Dorian owing to the presence of the Syracusan exiles; but the "Chalcidic customs" prevailed. Thuc. vi. 5. One would like much to know in what the distinction between Chalcidic and Dorian customs, on which Thucydides lays such stress, consisted.

² The altar of Apollo Archegetes at Naxos was regarded as a sort of national altar by the colonists, whether Ionian or Dorian. On this, which in the time of Thucydides stood outside the city, the Theori offered sacrifice when leaving Sicily for the great games of Greece. See Holm, *l.c.* i. p. 119; Thuc. vi. 3. But there was no great gathering such as we hear of at the temple of Hera Lacinia—still less anything approaching to the Panionium at Mycale, and the Dorian Hexapolis.

From the same cause arose another characteristic feature, which distinguishes the western from the eastern colonies of Greece—the closer links which bind together mother and daughter city in the West. It is true that the Ionians of Asia claimed kindred with the Athenians; they celebrated the festival of the Apaturia, as it was celebrated at Athens; they believed that their cities were founded, and for a time governed, by members of the royal family of Athens. Athens on her part acknowledged the claim, and on more than one occasion rendered assistance to the Ionians on this ground. But these were very different links from those which connected later colonies with their parent cities: the bond was faint and legendary; it was not commemorated by sacred customs; it tended to disappear under Lydian and Persian influence; and though it was renewed in the Delian league, the change of the confederacy into the Athenian empire made it clear that Athens did not intend her power to be limited by any feelings of race. Her subsequent attempt to resuscitate the Amphictyony of Delos seems to have been attended with very little success. Stronger still is the contrast between the indifference with which the Dorians of the Peloponnese regarded the fortunes of their kinsmen in Asia, and the intimate relations which prevailed between Corinth and her western colonies.

2. With few exceptions the colonies in Sicily were planted on the coast. A strong position, commanding a convenient harbour at the mouth of a river, was the first condition of success. When the Chalcidic emigrants crossed from the extreme point of Italy to the Sicilian coast, they passed onwards to the south till they found an opening in the range of hills which in this district lies close behind the shore. Such an opening occurs where the Acesines separates this range from the mass of Etna, and at the mouth of this river Naxos was planted. The next band, alarmed perhaps at the volcano, advanced beyond the range of Etna, and were thus brought to Syracuse, one

Closer nature of the connection between the western colonies and the mother cities.

Position of the colonies in Sicily.

of the finest and most securely protected harbours in the world. In like manner, Himera, Gela, Agrigentum, and Selinus, were situated on high ground at the mouths of rivers. For a maritime and trading nation—and by the middle of the eighth century the Greeks had become the mariners and traders of the central Mediterranean—these sites were most attractive. The mouths of the rivers offered anchorage for their ships, and along the banks ran the roads which connected the coast with the interior. A profitable trade soon sprang up between the natives and the immigrants, to which the great prosperity of the Sicilian cities was in a large measure due.

Round the cities thus established a narrow strip of territory was secured, which seems to have extended on an average about fifteen miles from the shore.¹ All beyond this was left in the possession of the natives.

*Territory of
the cities.*

The Syracusans alone seem to have secured a route into the interior by a permanent settlement or outpost at Acræ—twenty-four miles from the city—and possibly at Henna (seventy miles). On the sea-coast the territory of the cities varied much in extent; and some of them carried their influence beyond the limits of their own domains by planting sub-colonies or dependencies. The city of Zancle protected herself from attack on the north by establishing an outpost at Mylae, thus bringing under her control the entire promontory or Chersonese which forms the north-east point of Sicily. Naxos, by establishing Leontini and Catana, obtained for the Chalcidians the possession of the fertile slopes of Etna; and by her colonies of Helorum (?), Camarina, and Casmenae, Syracuse was able to secure the whole of the south-eastern corner of the island, while on the other hand her limits were restricted on the north by the foundation of Megara, which eventually fell a victim to the ambition of Syracusan tyrants. On the southern coast the limits of the

¹ Holm, *l.c.* gives on pp. 156-7 a rough estimate of the extent of territory possessed by the Sicilian cities.

various settlements were more definitely fixed by natural features than on the east. Selinus and Gela were founded long before Agrigentum, which was nevertheless able to secure a sufficient territory between them. Neither had attempted to pass beyond the natural limits of the site which she had chosen, and bring the interjacent coast under her sway. On the north, as we have said, there were no Greek colonies between Mylae and Himera; and even on the east the valley of the Symaethus was left to the Sicels. Nor was there any Greek colony at the mouth of the southern Himera, the most important of all the rivers on that coast.¹

3. Thus the Greeks were in no sense the conquerors of Sicily; they held the island, as they held the Asiatic coast, by a chain of powerful cities established on the shore. But the territories which they acquired, small though they appear to us, were large when compared with the territories of the mother-cities from which the colonists sprang. And they were planted in some of the most fertile regions in the world: the slopes of Etna were unrivalled in productivity; the plains of Leontini and Gela were famous; and indeed the whole island was an almost inexhaustible storehouse. Wheat was abundant everywhere; orchard fruits were common; the vine, the fig-tree, and the olive, whose products formed so large a part of the food of the Greeks, grew with a luxuriance unknown in the bare and shallow soil of Euboea and Corinth. These riches were exported by the Greeks to foreign countries. Oil and wine were sent from Agrigentum to Africa; corn was brought to Crisa, at the foot of Delphi, whence it was dispersed over Greece.²

¹ On the colonies of Syracuse, see Freeman, *l.c.* ii. 16 ff. The colonies of Sicily fall into two classes: (1) the parent colonies founded by immigrants; (2) the daughter colonies founded by Sicilian cities with a view to the extension of territory. This second group may be again divided into the cities which were independent of the parent, as Leontini, and those which were mere outposts, as Acrae and Mylae.

² Holm, *l.c.* p. 158; Strabo, p. 419.

Maritime though they were, the territories could not be acquired without coming into collision with the natives. The name of the city Zancle is said to be derived from a Sicelian word, a fact which implies that the Sicels were established there or in the neighbourhood when the Greek colonists arrived. At Syracuse the native inhabitants, if they were not slain or expelled, were reduced to serfdom, and under the name of *Cyllyrii*, tilled the lands of their Hellenic masters, as the *Helots* tilled the lands of the Spartans. At the first establishment of *Leontini* the Sicels of the region formed a part of the community, but subsequently *Theocles*, the founder, though pledged to do them no hurt, admitted a body of *Megarians* into the town on condition that they drove out the Sicels.¹ When these conflicts were over, the natives and Greeks continued to live side by side without any marked hostility. Each proved of advantage to the other. What the Sicels produced, the Greeks exported. A striking proof of the attitude of the two nations is found in the fact that the *Siceliots*, as the Sicelian Greeks were called, took the unit of their coinage from the Sicels. This was the *litra* or pound of copper, of which the value in silver was known as the *nummus*.² As time went on both natives and immigrants were more than once united against common enemies, and the Greeks were too sensible of the advantage of employing native allies in their quarrels with one another to destroy their power altogether.

These remarks apply mainly to the Sicels. With the natives farther to the west relations were not so peaceful. The *Sicani* maintained their independence at *Hyccara*. *Segesta*, the neighbouring city of the *Elymi*, was constantly at war with *Selinus*, the *Megarian* colony, and though the *Phoenicians* retired into the extreme west before the advance of the Greeks, their concentration in the towns of *Motyê*, *Panormus*,

The Greeks
and the
natives.

The Sicels.

The Sicani,
Phoenicians,
and Tyrrhe-
nians.

¹ Holm, *l.c.* p. 130 ; Polyæn. v. 5. 1.

² Holm, *l.c.* p. 159.

and Soloeis gave them strength; and, as we shall see, they received new support when Carthage rose to power. As traders the Greeks had also to contend with the Tyrrhenians, the pirate mariners of the sea which bore their name. The power of these pirates was chiefly felt by the inhabitants of the north coast of Sicily, and above all, by the colonists of the Lipara islands, among whom the necessity of constant defence gave rise to peculiar political institutions.¹

4. At the time of their establishment the government of the colonies was no doubt entirely in the hands of the original settlers, who divided the land which they acquired among themselves, but of the details of the constitutions we know nothing; we can only illustrate them by analogy. There was doubtless a council, composed of members chosen by and from the privileged class, and a number of executive officers. Of kings we have no certain trace. The population which grew up outside the privileged class—that is, the men who flocked to the cities as traders and artisans,—though excluded from citizenship, may have been summoned from time to time in assemblies—not to express their own wishes, but to learn the pleasure of their masters. So long as the wealth of the land-holders enabled them to maintain a superior position, their rule was accepted as the traditional and inevitable order of things; but with the growth of an opulent class which was not privileged, a period of discontent began.² Successful trade has always triumphed over agriculture. It requires a keener wit, a more daring and venturous habit of mind. Civil dissensions now broke out on every side, and the more readily because many of the colonies were not founded by any one city, but by mixed

Constitution
of the cities
aristocratical.

Rise of a new
order.

¹ Holm, *l.c.* p. 158; see *infra*, p. 431.

² On the demos see Freeman, *Hist. of Sicily*, ii. 11 ff. It is unfortunate that the word *δημος* is applied indifferently in Greek writers to the citizens of Athens who were rulers of the state, and to the populace of Syracuse and other similar cities, who, so long as the government was oligarchical, had no rights at all.

bands of adventurers, united in the common hope of gain. Naxos, the earliest of all the colonies, was founded by Ionians from Naxos and Euboea; in Gela settlers from Crete and Rhodes were joined with others from Telos and the Peloponnese; and more than one band of colonists occupied Zancle. These different immigrants would bring with them different traditions and perhaps different deities—distinctions which would prevent the privileged class from offering a solid front to the population rising round them.

Various attempts were made to meet the evil. In some cases new colonies were sent out. It was thus that Naxos provided for the numerous population which was attracted to her; her colonies at Leontini and Catana not only extended her power but relieved her from the presence of discontent.

Attempts to deal with the spirit of discontent.

And if the inland colonies of Syracuse at Acrae and Henna were intended to secure a route through the Sicel country, the settlements of Casmenae and Camarina, while winning new territory, were also outlets for the growing population.¹ Even in the founding of Himera, though it was not a Syracusan colony, an exiled Syracusan gens, the Myletidae, took part. But when colonisation ceased to be possible, reform or revolution was inevitable. In some cities codes of law were introduced; in others an ambitious citizen availed himself of the commotion to establish a tyranny. In these respects Sicily merely repeats

Colonies; codes of law; tyrants.

¹ Thuc. vi. 5. The date of Himera is fixed by Diod. xiii. 62 to 648 B.C., five years before Casmenae. It has been pointed out that Casmenae was founded a few years after the establishment of Cypselus as tyrant of Corinth, when no doubt many oligarchs would wish to leave Corinth. That Casmenae was a stronghold of the oligarchs is shown by the retirement of the Gamori from Syracuse to that city (see *infra*, p. 440). Cf. Freeman, *l.c.* ii. 23 f. Casmenae and Acrae did not strike coins, which may imply that they were never really independent of Syracuse. Camarina on the other hand issued coins, but was at an early time suppressed by Syracuse. Leontini and Catana both issued coins. Prof. Freeman compares Camarina and Coreycra as colonies which were intended to be dependencies and insisted on their freedom.

the picture presented by the cities of Greece. Charondas, who devised laws for Catana, is the counterpart of Solon, or Pittacus; and the tyrants at Leontini and Agrigentum rose to power on the ruins of their order, as Cypselus at Corinth, and Pisistratus at Athens.

5. The name of Charondas was famous in antiquity. His laws were observed not only in many of the cities of Sicily
Charondas. and Italy, but even in Mazaka, the capital of
cir. 640 B.C. Cappadocia.¹ Yet little that is trustworthy

has been preserved, either about the lawgiver or about his code. It is true that Diodorus, when relating the foundation of Thurii (443 B.C.), gives us an account of what he considered to be the laws of Charondas, and in the collection of Stobaeus we have the supposed proem or prelude, in which the lawgiver expressed the spirit of his legislation. But as Diodorus

The laws in speaks of him as a citizen of Thurii, who
Diodorus. was chosen to make laws for the city, whereas

he lived about two centuries previously, and was certainly a native of Catana; and as some of the regulations which he mentions in the code are stated on far better authority to belong to the code of Zaleucus, we cannot place much confidence in his account. In the prelude also there

are turns and expressions which tell strongly
The Prelude. against the genuineness of the document as a

whole.² Without denying, therefore, that there may be something both in the prelude and in the laws given in Diodorus, which is taken from the original legislation of Charondas, we cannot appeal to either as trustworthy evidence. In Aristotle, Charondas is said to have been a pupil of Zaleucus of Locri (see *infra*, p. 494), who in turn is said to have been a pupil of Thaletas of Crete, from whom Lycurgus also received

¹ Arist. *Pol.* ii. 9=1274 a 23; Strabo, 539, *χρῶνται δὲ οἱ Μαζακηνοὶ τοῖς Χαρόνδα νόμοις, αἰρούμενοι καὶ νομοδόν, ὅς ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ἐξηγητὴς τῶν νόμων, καθάπερ οἱ παρὰ Ῥωμαίους νομικοί.*

² Stob. *Flor.* xlv. 40; Plato, *Laws* 722, E., claims to be the first to propose a prelude to laws. See Grote, *Plato*, iv. p. 323, who quotes Heyne, *Opusc.* vol. ii. Prolus. i., vi.

instruction.¹ This may perhaps mean that the institutions of Charondas, though given to a Chalcidic city, were Dorian in their nature; and this supposition receives some support from the fact that the name Charondas is not Chalcidic or Ionian in form, and the so-called prelude is written in the Doric dialect. The connection of Charondas with Zaleucus, if we are to understand it in the literal sense that he was instructed by him as a pupil, would enable us to fix his date in the second half of the seventh century, for Zaleucus is said to have flourished in 664 B.C. Like Solon and Lycurgus, according to Aristotle, he belonged to the middle class of citizens.²

Of his legislation Aristotle has preserved a few notices. He gave the name *homosipyoî*, i.e. eaters from the same store, to the members of the same household; he imposed fines of different amount on the rich and poor, if they declined public office; and he instituted the prosecution of those who gave false witness³ by the form of process known as *ἐπίσκηψις*. Aristotle further tells us that Charondas was more precise in his code than subsequent legislators, and that this and the prosecution for false witness were the only characteristics which distinguished his laws from others.⁴ Among the regulations given in Diodorus, we find a rule that a man who had married a step-mother over his children was not allowed to take part in public affairs. One who had ordered things so ill at home was not likely to give good advice to his city, and, moreover, a man who had married once should not tempt fortune again! That such a law was current under the name of Charondas is proved by a quotation from a comic

Statements
of Aristotle
about the laws
of Charondas.

The law
about second
marriages, and
ready-money
payments.

¹ Arist. *Pol.* ii. 9=1274 a 23, 30.

² Arist. *Pol.* iv. 9=1296 a 20. Holm compares the name Charondas with Epaminondas, Pagondas, etc., *l.c.* p. 401. Zaleucus, however, cannot have been a fellow-pupil in the ordinary sense with Lycurgus (circa 800 B.C.).

³ Arist. *Pol.* i. 1=1252 b 14. *Ib.* ii. 9=1274 b 5.

⁴ Arist. *l.c.*

poet given by Diodorus.¹ Theophrastus mentions another law which insisted on ready-money payments; any one who allowed credit could not recover the debt.²

Charondas, like other ancient law-givers, took measures to prevent the alteration of his laws. Any one who proposed a change came forward in the assembly with his neck in a noose; if he convinced the audience, the law was altered; if not, the noose was drawn. A similar regulation is ascribed to Zaleucus; and it may have been common to master and pupil. The effect was satisfactory; for only three changes are said to have been made in the laws of Charondas. (1) The *lex talionis* was so far modified that a man who, having two eyes, struck out the eye of a man who had but one, was deprived of the sight of both; (2) a wife or husband who claimed divorce, could not marry a husband or wife younger than those from whom they parted; (3) under the original code the nearest relative of an orphan girl must either marry her or give her a dowry of 500 drachmas, but afterwards he was not allowed the alternative; he must marry her.³

The penalty of transgressing the laws was severe. Charondas is said to have slain himself in the public assembly because he had unwittingly disobeyed one of his own ordinances. In his eager haste he had come into the assembly with his sword, and when his attention was called to the fact that his law forbade any one, under pain of death, to attend a meeting in armour, he declared that he would obey the law, and stabbed himself to the heart.⁴ We are also informed that those citizens who observed the laws of Charondas were charged to learn the prelude by heart, and to repeat it at their feasts after the paeans of the gods. In connection with

¹ Diod. xii. 14.

² Theoph. ap. Stob. *Flor.* xliv. 22.

³ The first of these changes is said by Demosthenes to have been made at Locri, under the constitution of Zaleucus.

⁴ Diod. xii. 19; but cf. *ib.* xiii. 33.

this rule we may record the story, repeated by Athenaeus, that the laws of Charondas were sung by Athenians over their wine. At Mazaka, too, the interpreter of the laws of Charondas was called the "Conductor" or "Choir-leader" (νομοδός).¹

6. The first of the Sicilians to establish a tyranny was Panaetius of Leontini, whose date is fixed by Eusebius in 608 B.C. By Aristotle, Panaetius is classed with Cypselus, Pisistratus, and Dionysius, among the tyrants who had risen to power as leaders of the people, and we also learn from the same author that his rule was preceded by an oligarchy. In other words, he attained the throne by supporting the people against the nobles.² Of his actions after he obtained the tyranny we know nothing, and as we hear of no successor on the throne we may suppose that his power was transient, and ended as violently as it arose.

Panaetius of
Leontini.
608 B.C.
Ol. 43. 1.

A far more imposing figure is Phalaris, the tyrant of Agrigentum, whose reign may be placed in the middle of the sixth century,³ about twenty years after the foundation of the city. Aristotle compares Phalaris with the tyrants of Ionia; like them, he made the tenure of public office a stepping-stone to the tyranny.⁴ Polyænus informs us that the tyrant, on acquiring his power, turned his arms against the neighbouring Sicani, whose town, Vessa, fell into his hands. We also hear, though on very bad

Phalaris.
549 B.C.
Ol. 57. 4.

His expedi-
tion against
the Sicani,
Leontini, and
Himera.

¹ Prelude, end; Hermippus (of Smyrna, third cent. B.C.) *Frag.* 7 M; Athen. xiv. 619, B. (on the authority of Hermippus); Strabo, p. 539. Plato, *Laws* 811, prescribes that the preludes to his laws shall be learned and recited by the youth.

² Arist. *Pol.* v. 10=1310 b 29; v. 12=1316 a 36. In Polyæn. v. 47, we have an account of the manner in which he accomplished his *coup d'état*.

³ The reign of Phalaris is put by Jerome 565-549 B.C. Eusebius puts him a century earlier, but Agrigentum was not founded then.

⁴ Arist. *Pol.* v. 10=1310 b 28, ἐκ τῶν τιμῶν. For details see Polyæn. v. 1. 1, 2.

evidence, of an expedition against Leontini. Another story, of no better credit, tells us that he was elected general by the Himeraeans, but when he asked for a body-guard, Stesichorus, the famous poet, repeated to his citizens the fable of the horses who sought the aid of men, and the request was refused.¹ Phalaris was finally slain by Telemachus, ^{His death and} the grandfather of Thero, who subsequently ^{successors.} became tyrant of the city. After the death of Phalaris, we hear of Alcamenes and Alcander as leaders under whom the city prospered; Alcander is also praised for his humanity.²

Phalaris has become a bye-word as a monster of cruelty. He is said to have eaten the flesh of children, and to have ^{The bull of} burned his Leontine captives in the crater of ^{Phalaris.} Etna, or to have plunged them alive into boiling caldrons. Above all, he was memorable for the brazen bull, the work of Perillus. This instrument of torture was so constructed that the victims could be introduced into the belly of the animal through an opening in the back. It was then heated by fire placed beneath it; and by an arrangement of pipes in the nostrils the screams of the sufferers were changed into the bellowing of a bull. Antiquity, with a rough sense of justice, has represented Perillus as the first to suffer by the instrument which he created.³ This is probably a fiction, but the existence of the bull seems proved. It is mentioned by Pindar, who was in Agrigentum about two generations after Phalaris, and doubtless had opportunities of learning the truth. And though Timaeus says that the Agrigentines threw the bull into the

¹ For Phalaris and the Sicani, see Polyaen. v. 1. 3 and 4. The expedition against Leontini has no better foundation than the proverb *ἀεὶ Λεοντῖνοι περὶ τοῦς κρατῆρας*, see Holm, *l.c.* p. 399. For Phalaris at Himera, see Arist. *Rhet.* ii. 20 = 1393 b 10.

² Heracl. Pont. *Frag.* 37 M. (*F. H. G.* ii. 223) μεθ' οὗ Ἀλκαμένης παρέλαβε τὰ πρᾶγματα, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτον Ἀλκαῆδρος προσέστη, ἀνὴρ ἐπιεικής. For Telemachus, Schol. Pind. *Ol.* iii. 68.

³ Pind. *Pyth.* i. end; Lucian, *Phalaris*, i. 11, 12; Diod. ix. 19, 20.

sea, and that the bronze bull which existed in his time was an image of the river Gela, he does not deny the existence of the bull in the days of Phalaris.¹ But without denying the existence of the bull of Phalaris, we may deny that it was the invention of the tyrant, or the instrument of his cruelties. It may have been connected with some form of Moloch-worship. At Rhodes, which was indirectly the mother-city of Agrigentum, there was a bull of bronze; the Moloch statue of the ancient Israelites bore the head of an ox; and the Carthaginian image of Moloch was so constructed as to allow the children placed in his arms to roll into a burning fire. In Crete a legend told how Talus crushed in his red-hot arms the strangers who landed in the island. It is possible, therefore, that the bull of Phalaris is connected with some form of the worship of Moloch, and this connection is rendered more probable by the story that Phalaris ate the flesh of children, for it was known to the Greeks of Sicily that the Carthaginians sacrificed children to their god. But while suggesting this explanation of the legend we have to confess that no reason has been ever given for the establishment or resuscitation of the worship of Moloch at Agrigentum in the sixth century, or the particular connection of the bull with Phalaris.²

Proof of the
existence of
the bull.

Attempt to
explain the
legend.

¹ See Schol. Pind. *Pyth.* i. 185 with Boeckh's note. Timaeus, *Frag.* 116-118 M. Polybius (xii. 25) and Diodorus (xiii. 90) say that Timaeus denied the existence of the bull, which is a mistake; see Freeman, *Hist. Sicily*, ii. Appendix vii. They contradict the statement of Timaeus; Diodorus asserting that the bull was taken to Carthage in 408 B.C., and restored by Scipio in 146 B.C.; Polybius that it was taken to Carthage when the Carthaginians held the city of Agrigentum (κατὰ τὴν ἐπικράτειαν Καρχηδονίων).

² See Holm. *l.c.* p. 152. If Phalaris had meditated a combination with the Carthaginians there would have been a reason for his adopting or resuscitating Phoenician rites, but we never hear any hint of this. Of the letters of Phalaris, 148 in number, which gave rise to the famous controversy between Boyle and Bentley at the close of the 17th century it is not necessary to speak. They are supposed to be the work of Hadrian of Tyre, who was Greek secretary to the Emperor Commodus, and died 190 B.C.

7. At the time when Dorieus led out his ill-fated band to Sicily with the intention of founding a colony at Heraclea, in the territory of Eryx, the city of Selinus was in the hands of a tyrant named Peithagoras, but the only fact which is recorded in connection with his reign is the end of it. Euryleon, the sole survivor of the fellow-officers of Dorieus, was allowed to seize the Selinuntian colony of Minoa, and from this place, acting in concert with the Selinuntians, he liberated Selinus. But the liberation was no more than a change from one master to another, for Euryleon became himself tyrant of the city. After a short reign he perished in a revolution in spite of the protection of Zeus Agoraeus, to whose altar he had fled for refuge.¹ When we next hear of Selinus—it is in 481 B.C.—she is an ally of Carthage. Can the Carthaginians have taken advantage of the divisions in the city to obtain control of it?

Another incident recorded by Herodotus throws light on the internal history of Gela during the sixth century. Faction broke out, and the party which was worsted retired to the town of Mactorium, which lay above the city. Upon this Telines, the descendant of a Telian, who had taken part in the original settlement of Gela, came forward with the sacred emblems used in the worship of the Chthonian deities (Demeter and Korê), a form of worship which was apparently hereditary in his family, and without any armed force whatever brought back the seceders. For this public service himself and his descendants were allowed henceforth to be the hierophants of these deities, the worship of them being apparently raised from a cult practised by a private family into a public festival.²

¹ Herod. v. 46.

² Herod. vii. 153. Telines was a weak and effeminate person, but his descendants were of a very different stamp, and became the most powerful tyrants in Sicily. Whether it was the nobles or the commons of Gela who retired to Mactorium is unknown; nor have we any clue to the nature of the emblems, or to the manner in which Telines used them.

To these scanty and disconnected facts, which are all that have been preserved about the internal history of the Sicilian cities till near the beginning of the fifth century, we may append the interesting account given by Diodorus of the colony of Lipara. After relating the mythical history of the Aeolian islands, Diodorus goes on to say that certain Cnidians and Rhodians who found the tyranny of the Asiatic king intolerable set out to the West in the 50th Olympiad, under the leadership of Pentathlus, with the intention of founding a colony. Arriving at Lilybaeum, or more correctly at Motye, for Lilybaeum did not exist at this time, they found the Segestaeans and Selinuntians at war—as was pretty generally the case. They were persuaded to join the Selinuntians, but the combination was unsuccessful. The Selinuntians were defeated; and the Rhodians having lost Pentathlus and a large part of their numbers, resolved to return whence they came. On their way through the Tyrrhenian sea they put in at Lipara, where they met with a friendly reception from the inhabitants, some 500 in number, who were all that remained of the earlier colonists. At their request the newcomers settled in the island, occupying the land in common with the natives. Finding themselves attacked as time went on by Tyrrhenian pirates, the colonists built a fleet, and that their resistance might be more effective they were divided into two classes, of which one cultivated the islands, while the other met the enemy. The islands were now regarded as common property; all threw their possessions into a common stock, and joined in common meals. At a later time the scheme was so far modified that Lipara, in which the city was placed, was divided into separate properties, but the remainder of the islands were cultivated in common. Later still, all the islands were divided into lots, which were apportioned anew every twenty years. The plan was found to answer. The colonists were successful against the Tyrrhenians, and

The colony
in Lipara.
580 B.C.
Ol. 50. 1.

Conflicts with
the Tyrrhen-
ians.

Institutions
of Lipara.

sent substantial evidence of their success as offerings to Delphi.¹

8. From the evidence furnished by religious rites and the names of places, so far as it is available, it appears tolerably certain that the Phoenicians were once in possession of the northern and southern points of Sicily as well as the western. From the first they could control the navigation of the straits of Messina; and the second—the promontory of Pachynus—was the first land sighted in Sicily on the voyage from the East. Nor were their settlements confined to the coasts. A number of towns in the interior bear names which seem to be derived from Phoenician originals, and as the Carthaginians never succeeded in colonising the interior, these can only be explained by the presence of Phoenicians in the period preceding the arrival of the Greeks. At the approach of the new invaders the settlements were abandoned, and for nearly a century and a half (735-600 B.C.) the Phoenicians looked on while the trade and control of three-fourths of the island passed into the hands of their enemies. Their concentration in the cities of the west, Motye, Panormus, and Soloeis, enabled them to keep up their communication with the Phoenician settlements in Africa and Spain—settlements of far greater importance to them than any which they had founded in the east of Sicily.²

¹ Diod. v. 7 f., 9 f. In chapter 10 he gives an interesting account of the subsequent prosperity of Lipara, which was due (1) to the warm baths which worked wonderful cures, and made Lipara a favourite resort of the invalids of Sicily; (2) to the mines of alum (στρωτηρία); (3) to the fertility of the islands, and the abundance of fish and fruit. For Lipara, see also Thuc. iii. 88, and Paus. x. 11. 4. The common meals may have been derived from Italy; for Italus, the king of the Oenotrians, is said to have established the custom, Arist. Pol. vii. 10=1329 b 16, who goes on: διὸ καὶ νῦν ἔτι τῶν ἀπ' ἐκείνου τινες χρῶνται τοῖς σπονσίοις καὶ τῶν νόμων ἐνίοις.

² See Thuc. vi. 2. Holm, *l.c.* p. 81, 85, who, however, seems to me to repose too much confidence in Movers' *Phoenicians*, a book to be used with caution.

Meanwhile a city was growing up, whose power, by giving new life to the Semitic settlers in Sicily, was destined to make the island a battlefield between Oriental and Hellenic civilisation. Towards the end of the ninth century B.C. colonists from Tyre

Carthage
founded
(814 B.C.).

settled on the shore of Africa and built a town, to which they gave the name of Karthada or New City.¹ The coast had long been known to the mariners of Sidon; Carthage was not the earliest settlement in the region, and it is probable that the Tyrians were not the first colonists of the site to which they gave a new name. The city grew and prospered. The tyranny of the kings of Assyria pressed more and more heavily on the inhabitants of the Phœnician coast during the course of the eighth century, and a revolution at Tyre, in which the democracy got the upper hand, was a further inducement to the aristocrats to emigrate. Under their influence and prestige Carthage became the Tyre of the West. The site of the city was admirably chosen: it lay near the narrowest part of the Mediter-

Situation of
the city.

anean, the distance from Cape Bon to Lilybaeum being about a hundred miles, and at either end were Phœnician settlers, who thus held in their hands the key of the West. It commanded an excellent harbour, well provided with fresh water; the region round was one of the most fertile in northern Africa. For a long time the city made no attempt to extend her borders on the mainland; trade was her only object, and for this the sea-coast and the islands were most important. The colonists were not a warlike race; they cared little for the reputation of a great nation, if they could secure the solid power of wealth; for 200 years they even paid tribute to the natives for the land on which the city was built. But the value of the western point of Sicily was not likely to escape them. From the beginning of the sixth

Carthage
supports the
Phœnicians
in Sicily.

¹ The date of the founding of Carthage is uncertain. I have given the date of Timaeus, *Frag.* 21. See Smith's *Dict. Geogr.* i. p. 531. Holm, *l.c.* p. 191, 195; Freeman, *l.c.* i. 283.

century onwards we find them supporting the native or Phoenician inhabitants in their contests with the Greeks.

We have already seen that in 580 B.C. the Greeks of Selinus were in conflict with their barbarous neighbours on the west, and that the Cnidians failed to found a colony in Phoenician or Elymian territory. Thirty years later we hear that Malchus, a Carthaginian general, was carrying on war in Sicily, but nothing is known of his campaigns beyond the fact that they took place.¹ Later

still, when Dorieus came to Sicily (510 B.C.?) the same conflict is raging; Dorieus and his companions fell in battle against the Segestaeans, who are now assisted by the Phoenicians. And finally, between 510 and 480, Selinus passes into the alliance of Carthage. In fact the extreme west of Sicily was wholly a barbarian country, into which no Greek was allowed to venture. Whatever the mutual relations of the Phoenicians at Panormus, the Elymi at Segesta, the Sicanians at Hyccara, might be, they were unanimous in keeping out the Greeks. And Carthage found it to her advantage to consolidate and support this resistance. The advancing tide was checked; and for a moment it was thrown back. But Selinus and Himera remained the outposts of Greek civilisation, and even the might of Carthage and the devotion of Hamilcar were unable to remove them.²

9. Coincident with the activity of the Semitic colonies in the western Mediterranean was the extension of the Tyrrhenian power in the Gulf of Genoa. Tyrrhenians is of course the name given by the Greeks to the Etruscans who in historical times occupied the region which extends on the shore of Italy from the Macra to the Tiber, and is bounded in the interior partly by the Apennines and partly by the Tiber. As we are

¹ Justin, xviii. 7. Malchus was a contemporary of Cyrus.

² For what is known of the constitution of Carthage see Newman, *Aristotle's Politics*, ii. 401; Strachan-Davidson, *Selections from Polybius*, p. 47 ff.

Greeks and
barbarians
in Sicily.
Advance of
Carthage in
the sixth
century.

told that the Etruscans had at one time settlements in the Hadriatic at the mouth of the Po, from which they were driven by the Celts, it is probable that they entered Etruria, as they afterwards entered Campania, from the north. But of their ultimate origin nothing is certainly known. Herodotus traced the Tyrrhenians to Lydia, and Hellanicus identified them with the Pelasgians, but the first statement is probably erroneous, and the second varies in meaning according to the view which we take of the Pelasgians. The language and manners of the Etruscans mark them as a distinct people from the rest of the natives of Italy, and this is really all that we can say about them.

From very early times the Tyrrhenians had infested the coasts of the sea which bore their name. According to Ephorus it was the fear of these pirates which prevented the Greeks from settling or even trading in Sicily before the middle of the eighth century, and, as we have seen, the colonists of Lipara had to fashion their institutions for the express purpose of repulsing them from their shores. Of permanent settlements planted by them, either in southern Italy or in Sicily, we hear nothing. Even Sardinia and Corsica, to a considerable extent, were abandoned to the Carthaginians. On the other hand, they made every effort to get rid of the Greeks from their own waters. About the year 540 B.C. a combined fleet of Tyrrhenians and Carthaginians—each supplying a contingent of sixty ships—succeeded in driving out the Phocaeans from their settlement at Alalia in Corsica, and on this occasion the Tyrrhenians treated their prisoners with a barbarity which was thought to bring down upon them the curse of heaven.¹ Later in the century (525 B.C.) an attack was made on the Greek city of Cyme by a vast horde of barbarians, in which the Tyrrhenians took the lead (see *infra*, p. 475). The attack was unsuccessful

Their piracy
in the Gulf
of Genoa.

Battle of
Alalia.

¹ Herod. i. 166, 167. The Phocaeans were not pleasant neighbours, they plundered and robbed on every hand.

in its main object, but a great part of Campania was conquered and occupied by their colonies, and for fifty years from this time the Tyrrhenians controlled the trade from Marseilles to the mouth of the Tiber. In 474 B.C. the crushing defeat at sea off Cumae broke their power, and soon afterwards the advance of the Samnites drove them out of Campania, as they had already been driven out of the valley of the Po.¹ In the time of their greatest power they were probably in possession of all the trading routes of northern Italy, and many valuable products—such as amber—were brought into Greek ports by them. They seem to have readily come to terms with the Carthaginians; both being traders, they found that they could exchange goods with mutual advantage, and Aristotle speaks of treaties existing between the two nations. Like the Carthaginians they doubtless resorted to all kinds of cruelty and deception in order to keep the secret of their trade routes. Even in the time of Herodotus little was known of northern Italy; the historian doubts the existence of the river Eridanus which he speaks of as flowing into the North Sea.²

10. About the close of the sixth century a great change took place in the Sicilian cities. The tyrannies which have appeared hitherto have appeared, so far as we know, in isolated instances only, but now this form of government became almost universal. The beginning of the new order of things was made at Gela. We have seen that there had been factions in the city, and that the factions

¹ Strabo, p. 242, διὰ δὲ τὴν τρυφὴν εἰς μαλακίαν τραπομένους καθάπερ τῆς περὶ τὸν Πάδον χώρας ἐξέστησαν οὕτω καὶ ταύτης παραχωρῆσαι Σαννίταις.

² Arist. Pol. iii. 5=1280 a 36, διὰ τὰς ἀλλαγὰς καὶ τὴν χρῆσιν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους. For the Eridanus, see Herod. iii. 115. He argues that the word is Greek and cannot be the name of a river in a barbarian country; and moreover there is no North Sea for it to flow into! The Carthaginians and Tyrrhenians were careful not to intrude on each other: there are no Tyrrhenians in Sicily; no Carthaginians in Italy.

had been composed by Telines, the high priest of Demeter and Persephone. The spirit of dissension, if quieted, was not removed. In the year 505 B.C. Cleander, the son of Pantares, overthrew the oligarchy, and with the aid of the people established himself as tyrant. He had reigned for seven

Cleander
of Gela.
505 B.C.
Ol. 68. 4.

years when he was assassinated by one of the citizens named Sabyllus.¹ His death did not however put an end to the tyranny, which was maintained by his brother, Hippocrates, a man of daring and ability, who extended the power of Gela over most of the cities of eastern Sicily. Callipolis, Naxos, Zancle, and

Hippocrates.
498 B.C.
Ol. 70. 3.

Leontini were reduced to subjection and governed by petty tyrants under his authority.² Even the Syracusans were defeated in a great battle on the Helorus, and only saved their independence by the sacrifice of Camarina, which they had appropriated some fifty years previously. Hippocrates had already encamped near the temple of Zeus Olympius at Syracuse, when, on the intervention of the Corinthians and Corcyraeans, hostilities were brought to an end. He gave back his prisoners, and Camarina was re-established as a dependency of Gela.³

Nor were the arms of Hippocrates directed only against the Greeks; he conquered many of the barbarian towns, among the rest Ergetium, which he brought into his power by an act of atrocious treachery. Finally he lost his life, after a reign of seven years, in an attack on the Sicel town of Hybla.⁴

Death of
Hippocrates.
491 B.C.
Ol. 72. 2.

¹ Arist. *Pol.* v. 12 = 1316 a 37; Herod. vii. 154. The dates of Cleander and Hippocrates are calculated from the accession of Gelo, which may be placed in 491 B.C., see Holm, *l.c.* p. 411; Dionys. vii. 1; Paus. vi. 9. 4.

² Holm, *l.c.* p. 198; Herod. vii. 154.

³ Thuc. vi. 5, who says it was given up by the Syracusans in return for prisoners. Herod. vii. 154.

⁴ For Ergetium see Polyæn. v. 6; for Hybla, Herod. vii. 155. There were three towns called Hybla in Sicily: (1) Hybla near

The manner in which Hippocrates treated the cities which fell under his sway is illustrated by the history of Zancle.

Hippocrates and Zancle. After the conquest of Miletus by the Persians in 494 B.C. Scythes, the tyrant of Zancle, invited those Ionians who were not inclined to submit to the yoke of Persia to bring out a colony to Sicily, offering as a site the place called Calê Actê on the northern shore of the island. He may have been induced to make this offer by the presence of Dionysius of Phocaea, who, after the defeat of Lade, entered upon a career of piracy in the West at the expense of the Carthaginians and Tyrrhenians. A colony at Calê Actê would be an additional protection against these enemies. The patriotic section of the Samians and the Milesian exiles (*supra*, p. 69) accepted the proposal, and indeed in their circumstances nothing could be more opportune. But on the voyage they touched at Locri Epizephyrîi in Italy, where they were visited by Anaxilaus, the tyrant of Rhegium. Anaxilaus persuaded them to change their plans. He had a quarrel with the Zancleans; and he now proposed that the Samians should abandon the colony at Calê Actê, and seize the opportunity of the absence of the Zancleans, who were besieging a town of the Sicels, to appropriate their city. The Samians were base enough to fall in with his scheme, and they at once possessed themselves of Zancle. In his distress Scythes called upon Hippocrates, who was his ally, or sovereign. But when he appeared with his forces, Hippocrates, so far from aiding his allies, put Scythes into prison at Nycum for "losing his city," and made common cause with the Samians, who offered him half the slaves and moveables in the city, and everything that was in the country, as the price of collusion. The majority of the citizens he carried off as slaves, but 300

The Samians
at Zancle.
493 B.C.
Ol. 71. 4.

Scythes.

Syracuse, which was occupied by the Megarians; (2) Hybla on the southern slope of Etna; (3) Hybla Heraea on the way from Gela to Syracuse. The town in question is either 2 or 3. See Paus. v. 23.

of the leading men were selected and handed over to the Samians to be put to death—an extremity of crime for which they were happily not prepared. Scythes soon afterwards escaped from Inycum and sought refuge with Darius, by whom he was held in great honour as the most honest of all the Greeks who had ever come to the Persian court. For, when Darius gave him leave to revisit Sicily, on condition that he returned to Persia, he kept his word, and came back.¹ Zancle remained in the hands of the Samians but a little time. The promoter of the scheme had no intention that the prize which he had in view should fall to others. In a few years after the expulsion of Scythes Anaxilaus made himself master of the city, drove out the Samians, filled it with a mixed population, and gave it a new name from the country of his forefathers—Messene. As Hippocrates took no steps to protect Zancle against this attack, we may suppose that it was made after his death (491 B.C.).²

II. Hippocrates had been greatly aided in his conquests by two Geloans of noble birth, Aenesidemus, the son of Pataecus, and Gelo, a descendant of Telines. Gelo becomes tyrant of Gela. Aenesidemus was perhaps rewarded by the throne of Leontini; Gelo was made commander-in-chief of the cavalry. When the tyrant died, his two sons found the Geloans disinclined to submit to their rule. A rebellion broke out. The princes appealed to Gelo, who came to their assistance and defeated the insurgents, but, far from giving the tyranny to the sons of Hippocrates, he kept it for himself.³ He continued to rule over Gela, till his attention was directed to a greater city.

We know little about the early history of Syracuse, but

¹ Herod. vi. 22-24.

² See *infra*, p. 498, for Anaxilaus. For the expulsion of the Samians, etc., see Thuc. vi. 5. Yet the coins of *Messene* afford evidence of the presence of Samians in the city—they bear the lion's scalp, which is the device of the coins of Samos; Head, *Hist. Num.* p. 134.

³ Herod. vii. 154, 155. It is not certain that Aenesidemus, the tyrant of Leontini, was the son of Pataecus.

what we do know indicates that the course of events had not run smoothly. In 648 B.C. the whole *gens* or clan of the Myletidae were expelled from the city, and found a home in the new colony of Himera; and in 553 the colony of Camarina, founded forty-six years previously, was broken up on a charge of rebellion, the inhabitants being expelled and the land appropriated by the Syracusans.¹ About the time of the death of Hippocrates a revolution occurred in which the demos, aided by the Cyllyrii or serfs, drove out the Democratic revolution. Gamori, or landed aristocracy. The exiles retired to Casmenae, and after the lapse of four or five years invoked the assistance of Gelo. Gelo at once marched upon Syracuse with the exiles in his train, but the Syracusan people, who were now weary of the anarchy which they had created, offered no resistance. They placed both themselves and their city in his hands. No sooner had he obtained possession of the prize than he left Gela to be governed by his brother Hiero, and made himself tyrant of Syracuse, which he now considered his capital. Henceforth it was the aim of his life to develop the resources of his new home.²

His first care was to increase the number of the citizens, and with this object he collected inhabitants from every side. For some time after his accession to the throne of Gela he had ruled Camarina through Glaucus of Carystus, the famous athlete, whom he established as tyrant there; but when Glaucus was put to death by the public vote of the Camarinæans, he compelled the whole of the inhabitants to leave the city, which he destroyed, and become citizens of Syracuse.³ More than half of the population of Gela was in like manner forced to migrate to Syracuse, and when the oligarchs in the neighbouring city of Megara, who had

¹ Thuc. vi. 5; Philist. *Frag.* 8 M.

² See Arist. *Pol.* v. 2 = 1302 b 31, where Syracuse is compared with Thebes before Oenophyta, Megara, and Rhodes *πρὸ τῆς ἐπαναστάσεως*.

³ Schol. Aeschin. *In Ctes.* 189, ed. Schultz. Thuc. vi. 5.

ventured to take up arms against him, were driven to capitulate, they were made citizens of Syracuse. The people, on the other hand, who had been in no way implicated in the war, were sold for exportation. The same treatment was extended to the nobles and commons of the city of Euboea, a colony of Leontini. This marked difference in dealing with the rich and the poor was due to a conviction on Gelo's part that a *demos* was "a very thankless companion to live with." He was willing enough to rise to power by the aid of a democracy—it was thus that he became master of Syracuse—but he wished his citizens to be men of wealth and position; a poor and free population was what he most dreaded.¹

He conquers
Megara.
483 B.C.
Ol. 74. 2.

By these means Gelo became master of the whole of south-eastern Sicily, from the Symaethus to the Himera. His resources on land were enormous, and he added to them by the construction of a fleet. When the Greeks appealed to him for assistance against Persia he was able to compare his forces to the "spring of the year," so favourable was the proportion which they bore to the forces of united Hellas. No single city in Hellas but Syracuse could at that time have put into the field an army of 20,000 infantry and 2000 horse. The measures by which he acquired his power were cruel and arbitrary, but as events turned out it was fortunate for Sicily that so large a force was collected in the hands of one man. The island was now called upon to fight her own battle against the barbarians, and here as in Greece proper the power of the enemy was rendered more formidable by domestic dissension.

Great power
of Gelo.

¹ Herod. vii. 156, ἐποίησε δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς ἀμφοτέρους νομίμας δῆμον εἶναι συνοίκημα ἀχαριστότατον. Polyæn. i. 27. 3, gives a different account of Gelo's proceedings at Megara. He mentions Diognetus as ruler at the time. Stein, on Herod. l.c., suggests that the poorer population in these places was largely composed of Phœnicians and Sicels. For Megara see Thuc. vi. 4. In order to receive the new citizens Gelo must have greatly enlarged the city of Syracuse, but we have no details. See Lupus, *Syrakus*, p. 98; and on the other side, Freeman, l.c. ii. 139 f.

12. After the deposition of the tyrant Phalaris, the government of Agrigentum had become either a moderate oligarchy or a democracy controlled by eminent men. But here, also, in spite of past experience, a new tyranny was established by

Thero tyrant of
Agrigentum.

488 B.C.

Ol. 73. 1.

Thero, the son of Aenesidemus, of the family of the Emmenidae, who traced their lineage to the Cadmeians of Thebes.¹ Like Phalaris,

Thero used his position as a public officer of the city to acquire the throne, but his exercise of power was widely different, and his memory was cherished as one of the best and most just of tyrants. He allied himself with Gelo by a double affinity, giving his own daughter to Gelo, and marrying the daughter of Polyzelus, a younger brother of the Syracusan tyrant.² Under his rule the territory of Agrigentum was extended until it reached on the north to the borders of Himera. That city was now governed by a tyrant, by name

Thero and
Terillus of
Himera.

Terillus, who had given his daughter to Anaxilaus, the tyrant of Rhegium. By some means, at which we can only guess—perhaps

owing to dissensions in Himera—Thero was enabled to procure the expulsion of Terillus, who sought the protection of his son-in-law. Anaxilaus had reason to dread the encroachment of Gelo, who was in close alliance with Thero, and readily listened to the application of Terillus. Sicily was now divided into two hostile sections—the south under Gelo and Thero being ranged against the north under Terillus and Anaxilaus.

The tyrants of the north were well aware that they were no match for their great opponents, especially as Terillus was now an exile from his city. It was necessary to find assistance, and unhappily assistance was at hand. The Carthaginians readily listened to the request of Terillus that they would aid him in recovering his power. Anaxilaus not only joined

¹ It is not certain that this Aenesidemus is the same person as Aenesidemus of Gela; see Busolt, *G. G.* ii. p. 251 n. 1. Thero had been tyrant sixteen years in 472; Diod. xi. 53.

² Timaeus, *Fragg.* 86, 90; Polyaen. vi. 51.

in the request of Terillus but even sent his two sons as hostages to Carthage.¹

For some years the Carthaginians had been preparing for a great attack on Sicily. It was asserted by Ephorus that Xerxes had entered into negotiations with Carthage in order that a combined attack might be made on eastern and western Hellas.

The
Carthaginian
invasion of
Sicily.

This is perhaps one of those additions to the history of Greece, with which Ephorus thought it worth while to present his readers, in order to give greater point and coherence to events; and the coincidence of the hostilities in East and West was striking enough to suggest the combination.² However this may be, the army collected by the Carthaginians amounted to 300,000 men. Included in the ranks were citizens of Carthage and other Libyan cities, mercenaries from Italy, Liguria, Gallia, Iberia, Sardinia, Corsica, and Africa. The fleet amounted to 200 ships of war and 3000 vessels for the transport of provisions. The whole was placed under the command of Hamilcar, the son of Hanno, one of the kings of Carthage, whose family had for centuries been among the first in the city. It was fortunate for the Sicilians that this vast armament did not reach the shores of the island intact. On the voyage a storm annihilated the ships which carried the horses and chariots, but in spite of the destruction the force which landed at Panormus was so overwhelming that Hamilcar anticipated no serious opposition: the war was already at an end, he said, when he set foot on the shore.³ After three days' rest, during which

¹ Herod. vii. 165. It is remarkable that from this moment onwards we do not hear one word of Terillus and Anaxilaus. They did not assist the Carthaginians in any way whatever, so far as we know.

² See p. 446.

³ Diod. xi. 20; Herod. vii. 165. There is a doubt about the number of the ships, for Diod., xi. 1, says 200, and in xi. 20, more than 2000. The Helisyci mentioned by Herodotus were not Volscians, as Niebuhr supposed, but Ligurians; see Stein's note, *ad loc.* who quotes Avienus, *Or. Mar.* 584; and Hecataeus in Steph. Byz. s. v.

he repaired the damage done by the storm so far as this was possible, he set out with the army to Himera, his ships sailing along the coast. On his arrival he pitched two camps—one for the fleet on the low land near the shore to the left of the mouth of the river, the other for his army, extending from the ship-camp to the heights west of the city, from which it was separated by a ravine. The ships of war were drawn up on the shore and protected by a wooden wall; the transports, when the supplies had been taken out of them, were sent to Libya and Sardinia for new freights.¹

There was already in Himera when Hamilcar pitched his camp against the city, but his forces were no match for the immense army of the Carthaginians. He attempted numerous sallies, only to be defeated, and at length in despair he caused the western gates of the city to be built up, and sent to Gelo for assistance. Gelo was prepared, and responded to the call without delay. With 5000 cavalry and 50,000 infantry he marched to Himera, where he pitched his camp to the east of the city, fortifying it strongly with trenches and palisades. Himera was now surrounded, but it was not besieged. On the north and west all was in the hands of the Carthaginians; on the east and south all was in the hands of the Greeks. Gelo had no sooner established himself than he sent out his cavalry into the neighbouring country with such effect that in a short time more than 10,000 prisoners were brought into the camp. These successes encouraged his army, from which the enthusiasm spread to the city. The gates were again opened by Gelo's orders, and even new ones broken in the wall. He now resolved to strike a decisive blow before Hamilcar could repair the loss of the cavalry which had perished on the voyage, and an accident determined his strategy. A prisoner

The battle of
Himera.
481 B.C. ?
Ol. 74. 4.

¹ The upper camp was ἀντιπρόσωπον τῇ πόλει, and for the connection of the two, παρεκτείνας ἀπὸ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ παρατειχίσματος μέχρι τῶν ὑπερκειμένων λόφων, Diod. xi. 20.

was brought to him who had been captured on his way to the Carthaginian camp. He was an envoy from Selinus, which had joined the Carthaginians, and in the letters which he carried it was stated that the Selinuntian cavalry would be sent, as Hamilcar desired, to the Carthaginian ship-camp on a fixed day, when he intended to offer a great sacrifice to Poseidon. Thus instructed in the designs of the enemy, Gelo formed his plans. At dawn, on the day arranged, he sent a portion of his own cavalry to the camp of the Carthaginians, with orders to declare themselves Selinuntians; meanwhile he placed watchmen on the heights to signal the entrance of the cavalry into the camp, and prepared his army for attack. The cavalry were admitted without suspicion. No sooner had they obtained an entrance than they began to burn the ships; and on receiving the signal of their success, Gelo attacked the higher camp. The Carthaginians came out to meet him. They fought bravely till they saw the flames of their burning ships, when their courage fell. The Siceliots now burst into the camp, and began to plunder it, but the battle was not yet won. The Iberians turned upon them and made a last desperate stand, upon which Thero, seeing the slaughter, sent forces out of the city to the western side of the camp to fire the tents. The Iberians on finding themselves attacked on either side rushed down to the shore and sought refuge in the ships, but ere they reached them the greater portion were cut down. Gelo obtained a complete victory. One hundred and fifty thousand Carthaginians are said to have been slain, for no quarter was given. Of the survivors some seized a neighbouring stronghold, which they were soon compelled to surrender for want of water; others dashed into the sea and climbed into twenty vessels which had not been brought to shore. They also perished; the ships being overcrowded sank in a storm, and but one small boat returned to Carthage to carry the news of the utter destruction of the army.¹

Strategy of
Gelo.

Utter defeat
of the
Carthaginians.

¹ Diod. xi. 24.

Of the death of Hamilcar, who certainly did not survive the fatal day, different stories were told. In the account given by Herodotus he remained all day long by the altars, on which he was offering whole victims, in the hope of winning the divine favour; and when he saw that the battle went against him, he cast himself—as a final victim—into the flames. Diodorus, on the other hand, informs us that he was slain by the cavalry on their entrance into the lower camp.¹

The battle of Himera probably took place in 481 B.C. For when the Greeks arrived at Syracuse in the autumn or winter of that year, Gelo not only taunted them with their refusal to aid him in his struggle with the Carthaginians, or to join in avenging the death of the Spartan Dorians on the Segestacans (cf. *supra*, p. 434), but felt himself in a position to send his forces to assist in the rescue of Greece. It is true that Herodotus places the battle of Himera on the same day as the battle of Salamis, but synchronisms of this kind were too attractive to the Greeks for us to receive them without suspicion. As we know of no other conflicts in which Gelo was engaged with the Carthaginians, except the battle of Himera, we must suppose that the battle had already been fought when the envoys appeared, and that Gelo had no more to fear from Carthage.²

13. The impression produced on the Carthaginians by the utter destruction of their great army was immense. Far from acquiring Sicily for their own city, they now expected to see Gelo at the gates of Carthage. The greater was their readiness to accept the

¹ Herod. vii. 167; Diod. xi. 21; cf. Polyæn. i. 27. 2.

² Herod. vii. 165, 166; id. vii. 158, where Gelo says: αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐμεῦ πρότερον δεηθέντος βαρβαρικοῦ στρατοῦ συνεπάψασθαι, ὅτε μοι πρὸς Καρχηδονίους νεῖκος συνέηπτο, ἐπισκῆπτοντός τε τὸν Δωριέος τοῦ Ἀναξανδρίδου πρὸς Ἑγεσταίων φόνον ἐκπρήξασθαι, κ.τ.λ. Grote thinks that these words refer to some contests between Gelo and Segesta, in which Segesta was aided by the Carthaginians. See Freeman, ii. 98, 174, and App. viii.

very moderate terms which he offered. He demanded that they should discontinue their custom of sacrificing human victims to Cronos,¹ and that they should pay 2000 talents as an indemnity for the cost of the war. They were also to build two temples—but in what city is not stated—for the custody of the records of the peace. The Carthaginians, who expected nothing less than a total expulsion of the Phoenicians from Sicily, were overjoyed at such lenient terms. They showed their satisfaction by presenting Demaretê, the wife of Gelo, with 100 talents of gold, apparently in the form of a coronet. Demaretê did not encumber herself with so useless an ornament. Silver was purchased with the gold, and from the bullion thus obtained coins were struck, which were called Demareteia after the queen.²

After this victory Gelo was at the height of his glory. Those princes and cities who had stood aloof, or opposed him—among them Anaxilaus of Rhegium and the rulers of Selinus (?)—now sought his friendship. Gelo received them kindly and allowed the past to be forgotten on promise of future obedience. He was aware of the great struggle which was going on in Greece, and he was anxious to take as signal a part in that as he had done in the defeat of the barbarians of the West. We have already seen that in the version which Herodotus gives of the matter, Gelo's offer of assistance was refused because he demanded that he should, at least, be leader of the Hellenic

¹ Schol. Pind., *Pyth.* ii. 3; Plut. *De sera num. vind.* 6, on the authority of Theophrastus; the prohibition can only have extended to Sicily.

² Diod. xi. 26, στεφανωθείσα ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἑκατὸν ταλάντοις χρυσίου. The weight of such a "garland" would be enormous. For the coins, see Head, *Hist. Num.* p. 151. Boeckh insisted that the Demareteion was a gold coin worth ten Attic minae, and fifty Sicilian litrae: See Pauly, *Realenc.* ii. 847. In another version these coins were made from the ornaments of Demarete and other ladies of Syracuse before the battle of Himera, Busolt, ii. 260; Freeman, ii. 190. Notwithstanding the defeat of Himera there seems to have been some apprehension of a second invasion of Sicily; Pind. *Nem.* ix. 67.

fleet. Diodorus, however, asserts that he was on the point of setting sail when he was prevented by the arrival of some Corinthians who informed him that the battle of Salamis was already fought. Whatever the truth may be, Gelo's forces never appeared in the East.¹

The spoil taken from the Carthaginians was enormous. The choicest part was reserved for the decoration of the temples of Syracuse; other portions were fixed up in the temples of Himera; the rest was distributed, together with the captives, among the cities, according to the amount of assistance sent. Sicily was filled with slaves, many of whom were employed, in chains, on the public works of the various towns. The number acquired by the Agrigentines, who had not only received the largest share in the allotment of all the allies of Gelo, but had also captured others in their own territory, was so great that many of the citizens had no fewer than 500 in their employment. It was by their labour that the stones for the great temples of the city were quarried, and the aqueducts built, which astonished the later Greeks by their magnificence. A large pool was also constructed close to the city, nearly a mile in circumference, and twenty cubits in depth, in which fish and swans were kept for the amusement of the people. At the same time the whole of the fertile land round the city was planted with vines and fruit trees. But large as was the number of slaves at Agrigentum, those carried by Gelo to Syracuse were more numerous still.²

¹ Diod. xi. 25, 26; Herod. vii. 163, 164, says that Gelo sent Cadmus to Delphi to watch the event of the war, with a large sum of money, which he was to give to Xerxes with earth and water if Xerxes was victorious; Cadmus was honest enough to bring it back "though he might have kept it." It was this Cadmus who of his own free will, and without compulsion, renounced the tyranny of Cos, and repaired to Sicily with the Samians. In c. 165 Herodotus gives another version,—that Gelo would have gone to the help of the Greeks but for the arrival of the Carthaginians.

² Diod. xi. 25.

Gelo had now attained an eminence which enabled him to lay aside the fears and precautions of a tyrant. As Diodorus tells the tale, he summoned the Syracusans to an assembly, bidding them bring their weapons, and when assembled he came before them, not merely unarmed, but clad in a single garment, to give an account of his life and all that he had done. His acts of arbitrary power had been neither few nor small. Not only had he removed whole masses of population from Camarina, Gela, and Megara, to Syracuse; not only had he sold the commons of Megara and Euboea into slavery, and destroyed those cities; he had even conferred the franchise of Syracuse on 10,000 of his mercenaries or more. All this was now forgotten. The people applauded at every turn, calling him their benefactor, saviour, and king. To commemorate this scene, a statue of Gelo, unarmed, was set up in the temple of Hera; and long afterwards, when the Syracusans were compelled to part with the rest of their statues, this was reserved.¹

Gelo and the
Syracusans.

Gelo did not long survive this incident. In 478 B.C., when he had been ruler of Syracuse for seven years, he died of a dropsy.² In this short space of time he had established a Hellenic power in Sicily far greater than any other Hellenic power then in existence; and he had beaten back the Carthaginian invaders with such effect that in spite of all the troubles which overtook Sicily in the fifth century, more than two generations elapsed before they renewed the struggle. In creating his power he had acted like a despot, but his aims were not selfish. He had not impoverished others that he might become rich, but he had built up a great city, at once prosperous and secure. With this object in view he had endeavoured, on the one hand, to develop the agricultural resources of Syracuse to the

Death of Gelo.
478 B.C.
Ol. 75. 3.

Character of
his tyranny.

His love of
agriculture.

¹ Diod. xi. 26 ἀχίρων ἐν ἱματίῳ. For the statue, see Plut. *Timol.* c. 23. For some details mentioned by Aelian, see Freeman, *l.c.* ii. 204.

² Diod. xi. 38; Arist. *Frag.* 486 R.

utmost, in the belief that agriculture was not only the most remunerative but also the most wholesome of all occupations for the citizens; on the other, he had brought into the city an enormous mass of mercenaries, by which he was able to keep the oligarchs under his control. The commonalty he regarded, as we have said, as an inconvenient companion. He had no intention of adding to the proletariat of Syracuse by collecting there the rabble of Euboea or Megara.

He seems to have been a man of popular manners and humane disposition. If he was ambitious, his ambition took

a form which benefited his country and Greece.
His popularity.

Hence he was regarded with an affection which was not extended to any other tyrant. Though he strictly forbade a costly funeral, in accordance with the laws of Syracuse, the people followed his corpse to its resting-place on the

property of his wife Demarete, about a mile
His tomb.

and a half out of the city. A splendid monument was there set up to his memory, and nine massive towers marked the place. The monument was destroyed by the Carthaginians in their subsequent invasion; the nine towers by Agathocles; "but neither the Carthaginians nor Agathocles, nor any one else, has been able to destroy the fame of Gelo."¹

Unlike his brother Hiero, who succeeded him, Gelo had little taste for literature, and art was only employed as the

minister of public splendour. His court also
His court.

was unlike the court of Hiero; he cared less for the society of poets and philosophers than for that of men of arms and of business; less for amusement than for glory; less for luxury than for the power and prosperity of Syracuse. Plutarch joins him with Pisistratus of Athens, saying of both, that they gained their tyrannies badly, but used them well.²

¹ Diod. xi. 38; he here puts the place of sepulture 200 stades (twenty-five miles) from the city, but cf. xiv. 63.

² Plut. *De sera num. vind.* 6.

14. At his death Gelo left a son, who was not of age to succeed him. In the interim, till the minority should come to an end, it was his wish that the power which he had wielded alone should be divided between his brothers, Hiero, tyrant of Gela, and Polyzelus. Hiero was intrusted with the management of the state; the command of the army and the care of the youth were in the hands of Polyzelus, who was also to take to wife Demarete, the widow of Gelo. These arrangements did not satisfy the ambition of Hiero. Finding that Polyzelus was winning favour with the people, he collected a number of foreign mercenaries with whom he at length compelled him to fly from Syracuse.¹ Polyzelus took refuge with his father-in-law, Thero of Agrigentum. Thero's own position was threatened at the time. His son, Thrasydaeus, whom he had placed as tyrant in Himera, had oppressed his subjects to such a degree that they offered themselves to Hiero; and though the request came when a rebellion had broken out in Agrigentum, headed by Hippocrates and Capys, remote members of the ruling family, Thero undertook the cause of his son-in-law. The armies of the two greatest tyrants of Sicily met at the river Gela, and a conflict was inevitable, had not the poet Simonides succeeded in bringing about a reconciliation, under which Polyzelus was allowed to return to Syracuse in security. The only sufferers were the unfortunate Himeraeans, of whom Thero put to death all those who had taken any part in the conspiracy against his son, and filling their places in the city with aliens, principally of the Dorian race.² The leaders of

Hiero and
Polyzelus.

Thero and
Hiero re-
conciled by
Simonides.
478-477 B.C.

¹ Diod. xi. 48; Tim. *Frag.* 90 M. The accounts do not agree in detail.

² Diod. xi. 48, 49, τοὺς τε Δωριεῖς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς βουλομένους ἐπολιτογράφησεν. Diodorus goes on to say that the inhabitants lived together for fifty-eight years, καλῶς πολιτευόμενοι, after which the city was destroyed by the Carthaginians and remained desolate till his time. For Simonides, see Schol. Pind. *Ol.* ii. 29; for Hippocrates, Schol. Pind. *Pyth.* vi. 4. It must be remembered that Himera was partly Dorian from the first.

the domestic rebellion, Hippocrates and Capys, after suffering defeat in an engagement on the river Himera, established themselves in Camicus.

As the second founder of their city, for such they considered him, Gelo was honoured by the Syracusans as a "hero." Hiero aspired to a similar title. He compelled

Foundation
of Aetna.
476 B.C.
Ol. 76. 1.

the inhabitants of Naxos and Catana to congregate at Leontini, which then became a considerable city, and on the deserted site of Catana—the most fertile perhaps in all Sicily—

he founded a new town, to which he gave the name of Aetna. Five thousand citizens from Syracuse, and as many more from Peloponnesus, were collected, all of whom received land out of the territory of the expelled Catanaeans, or the neighbouring Sicels. Hiero now called himself an Aetnaean; his son Deinomenes, and Chromius—a connection of the house—were intrusted with the management of the state, which was Dorian in its customs. Pindar is loud in his praise of Hiero's achievement, and even Aeschylus wrote a play, *The Aetnaean women*, in honour of the new city. But the settlement never prospered, and the violent measures by which Hiero had carried out his scheme became a source of much trouble in Sicily.¹

He shows in a better light in his dealings with the Italian city of Locri. The city was attacked, or threatened with an attack, by Anaxilaus, the restless tyrant of Rhegium,

Hiero saves
Locri. and the Locrians in distress sent to Hiero for help. He at once despatched Chromius to

Rhegium, with the threat that Anaxilaus must desist from his scheme or meet the forces of Syracuse. For this Anaxilaus was not prepared. He thought it wise to remain quiet, and not long afterwards he died (476 B.C.). This incident in the reign of Hiero is celebrated in some beautiful lines in the second Pythian ode of Pindar.²

¹ Diod. xi. 49, 76; Pind. *Pyth.* i. 118 f. with the scholiast.

² Pind. *Pyth.* ii. 34 with Schol. *ibid.* i. 98.

Still more glorious was his victory over the Tyrrhenians. Fifty years had elapsed since the unsuccessful attack on Cyme. In the meantime the Tyrrhenians had become the dominant nation in Campania, but, on the other hand, the Straits of Messina had been closed against them by the strong hand of Anaxilaus. Their hatred of the Greeks, at all times bitter, was now more bitter than ever; they resolved to make a new attempt upon Cyme, and this time by sea. The Cymaeans sent to Hiero for assistance, who at once despatched a number of triremes to the Campanian coast. The combined fleets of Cyme and Syracuse met the enemy, and defeated them so decisively that the Tyrrhenian navy never recovered from the blow. From this time onward they ceased to be an object of alarm to the Greeks. Some of the booty captured in the engagement was sent by Hiero to Olympia, where an iron helmet (now in the British Museum) was discovered with the inscription: "Hieron, the son of Deinomenes, and the Syracusans to Zeus; Tyrrhenian spoils from Cyme." Hiero attempted to follow up his victory by establishing a colony on the island of Pithecusae, or Ischia, but the colonists were so alarmed by the eruptions and earthquakes, which devastated their territory, that they abandoned the site.¹

Battle of
Cyme
(Cumae).
474 B.C.
Ol. 76. 3.

Colony on
Pithecusae.

15. In the next year died Thero, the wise and just tyrant of Agrigentum. In spite of the rebellion of which we have spoken, his government seems to have been regarded with general approbation, and after his death he received heroic honours. He was succeeded by his son Thrasydaeus, a man of very different character, whose severity at Himera had contributed to the quarrel between Agrigentum and Syracuse. Thrasydaeus was hated at Agrigentum, as he had been hated at Himera; but he maintained his position with the aid of

Death of
Thero.
472 B.C.
Ol. 77. 1.

¹ Diod. xi. 51; Pind. *Pyth.* i. 140; Roehl, *I. G. A.*, 510. For Pithecusae, Strabo, 248.

an army of more than 20,000 men, partly mercenaries, partly selected from Himera and Agrigentum. In order to find employment for his soldiers, or to revenge himself on Hiero, he was about to lead an attack upon Syracuse, when he found himself anticipated by Hiero. The armies met on the river Acragas. In the engagement Hiero was completely victorious; 4000 Agrigentines are said to have fallen. After such an overthrow Thrasydaeus was unable to retain the tyranny. He retired to Megara, in Greece, where, however, he was condemned and executed. This was the end of the tyranny at Agrigentum, and at Himera also, so far as we know.¹

Defeat and
expulsion of
Thrasydaeus.

After this we hear nothing of any political actions of Hiero, beyond the bare fact that he instigated the young princes of Rhegium to demand from Micythus an account of his administration (see *infra*, p. 500). He had long suffered from a painful disease, and during the last years of his life his infirmity grew upon him. Seeking amusement and distraction in competing for the prizes at the Hellenic games, and in the society of men of letters, he continued to be the miserable centre of a splendid court, till death put an end to his sufferings in 467 B.C., after a reign of eleven years and eight months.² He died and was buried at his colony of Aetna, where heroic honours were paid to him as founder.

Death of
Hiero.
467 B.C.
Ol. 78. 2.

Hiero never acquired the affection and confidence of his subjects as Gelo had done. His victory at Cyme was an immense service to Hellas, but the effects of it were not felt in Sicily as the effects of the

His character.

¹ Diod. xi. 53. Thero had reigned sixteen years (488-472) B.C. ζῶν μεγάλης ἀποδοχῆς ἐτύγχανε παρὰ τοῖς πολίταις, καὶ τελευτήσας ἡρωικῶν ἔτυχε τιμῶν. No reason is given for the condemnation of Thrasydaeus at Megara. For Thero, see Pind. *Ol.* ii.

² Diod. xi. 66, 38. Aristotle, however, *Pol.* v. 12. 6 = 1315 b 35, allows only ten years. For his disease see Ar. *Frag.* 587 R, δυσουρία δυστυχῆσαι, *ibid.* 486. Xenophon selected him as the type of the splendid but unhappy tyrant. His "Hiero" is an imaginary dialogue between Simonides and Hiero.

victory of Himera were felt. And though he liberated Agrigentum and Himera from the yoke of a tyrant, these cities had no wish to see him at the head of their government, however much they might respect his power. In his own city his rule created both dislike and fear. Suspecting the loyalty of his citizens, he established a detestable system of espionage; his male and female detectives (ᾠτακουσταί and ποταγωγίδες) were present at every social gathering, to listen and collect information. His avarice and violence formed a strong contrast to the equitable and mild rule of Gelo, and these defects were aggravated by his incurable disease. The "rich and highly-favoured hearth" of Hiero was celebrated throughout Greece, but in the master of it we see a man broken with pain, haunted by suspicions, extravagant and therefore needy, avaricious, irritable, morose.¹

Outwardly his court was splendid beyond all the courts of his time. What Gelo had spent in promoting agriculture or increasing his army, Hiero spent in magnificence and luxury, of which the fame went out into all

His court.

lands, and Herodotus ranks the tyrants of Sicily even before Polycrates of Samos. The magnificence was something more than barbarous ostentation; the luxury was refined by a love of literature. In his early life Hiero is said to have been as indifferent to letters as Gelo, but the forced inactivity of his later years caused him to delight in them. He attracted to his court, not only the best talent in Sicily, but the foremost poets of Greece: not only Epicharmus and Phormis the comedians, but Simonides, Pindar, and Aeschylus. He was aware—and Pindar would not fail to remind him—that without the praise which poets bestowed, many of his most cherished achievements would be unknown to posterity. Owing to this patronage of literature we know more of Hiero than of any other tyrant of the time; more than we know of Thero, though he also sought the aid of Pindar to record his

¹ For the spies, Arist. *Pol.* v. 11. 3. = 1313 b 13. For the avariciousness, etc., Diod. xi. 67.

victories; and much more than we know of Gelo, who was by far the greatest of the three.¹

16. Hiero was succeeded on the throne of Syracuse by his younger brother, Thrasybulus, for Polyzelus disappears from

Thrasybulus : view after his return to Syracuse in 477 B.C.
his treatment The son of Gelo, for whom Hiero acted as
of Gelo's son. regent, appears to have been still a minor, but

Thrasybulus could not expect to remain in power long if the throne was to return to its rightful owner. To remove his nephew out of the way by violence was dangerous, for the Syracusans were devoted to Gelo's family, and there were many who looked forward to the day when it would again occupy the throne. Thrasybulus, who was utterly unscrupulous, resolved to secure his object by conduct even more detestable than direct murder. He encouraged the youth in every kind of dissolute excess, intending not merely to make him odious and contemptible in the sight of the citizens, but to bring his life to an untimely end. As the friends of Gelo's family bitterly resented this conduct, the party in Syracuse, who were pledged to support a despotic form of government, were now divided into two sections: one favouring Thrasybulus, the other the heir to the throne.²

Meanwhile the cruelty and rapacity of the tyrant were alienating the hearts of his subjects. Hiero, in spite of his faults, had at least shown himself a capable monarch; he had maintained and even extended the authority of Syracuse, which under his rule was the foremost city in Greece. Thrasybulus had no virtues wherewith to redeem his vices; he plundered, imprisoned, and murdered, merely to obtain the means for gratifying his selfish desires. Under such circumstances the suspicions

¹ Hiero was victor three times at Olympia: with the κέλως, Ol. 73. and 77 (Pind. *Ol.* i.), and with the τέθριππος in Ol. 78. (see Paus. vi. 12. 1; viii. 42. 8); three times at the Pythia: twice with the κέλως, Ol. 73. 3, and 74. 3, and once with the τέθριππος, Ol. 76. 3. See Pind. *Pyth.* i. iii. He was also victor at the Iolacia at Thebes with a four of mules, Ol. 75. 4; Pind. *Pyth.* ii.

² Arist. *Pol.* v. 10. 31 = 1312 b 11.

which had disturbed Hiero quickly developed into open discontent. Thrasybulus found himself the object of almost universal hatred. He endeavoured to maintain his position by collecting a number of mercenaries, but the passions of the people were too strong to be repressed. In less than a year from his accession, the city was in revolt. At first he attempted negotiations; but when he found these useless, he brought a number of the citizens, whom Hiero had placed at Catana (Aetna), into Syracuse with other allies, who when added to his mercenaries made up a force of 15,000 men. With these he entrenched himself in the island of Ortygia and in Achradina, each fortress being now secured by a separate wall, behind which he could carry on war against his enemies.¹ On the other hand, the Syracusans established themselves in the quarter of the city known as Tyche, and at the same time sent envoys to Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, and Himera, urging the citizens to hasten to the liberation of Syracuse. The appeal met with a ready response; horse and foot came in; a fleet was equipped; in a short time the forces of the rebels were a match for those of Thrasybulus, who, moreover, found that his allies were leaving him, and that he could only depend on his mercenaries for effective help.

Thrasybulus was the first to begin the attack. In an engagement at sea he was defeated, with the loss of many triremes. A sally from Achradina met with no better success; he was repulsed in the suburbs of the city, and forced back behind the walls. After these failures he despaired of his position, and entered into negotiations for a peace. Terms were arranged under which he was allowed to retire unharmed to Locri, where he remained as a private

A revolution
breaks out.

Outbreak of
hostilities.

Defeat and
expulsion of
Thrasybulus.
466 B.C.
Ol. 78. 3.

¹ Achradina is of course the part of the city on the mainland at the extreme eastern end of the cliff. Grote did not believe that Achradina and Ortygia were both held by Thrasybulus; see *Hist. of Greece*, iii. 558 note. We are quite without information about the extent of the city in Gelo's time; see *supra*, p. 441 note.

citizen till his death; so much favour had Hiero won for his kindred in the city which he had delivered. His mercenaries also withdrew. Of the son of Gelo nothing more is recorded.

Syracuse was at last a free city; after twenty years of servitude she had broken the chains of her tyrants. In the enthusiasm of her new-won liberty she established a popular form of government in all the cities which were either ruled by tyrants or held by garrisons, and for two generations Sicily was without a despot.¹

To celebrate the recovery of their freedom, the Syracusans held an assembly, in which, after fixing their constitution, they agreed to dedicate a colossal statue to Zeus Eleutherius, and to institute splendid games called Eleutheria every year on the anniversary of the day of their deliverance. Four hundred and fifty bulls were to be sacrificed on the great occasion—a sufficient number to provide a feast for the whole body of the citizens. But while thus endeavouring to unite the city in the ardour of freedom,

New diff-
culties arise
from the
mercenaries.

they found themselves compelled to make distinctions, which inevitably led to new quarrels. To support his power, Gelo had introduced about 10,000 mercenaries into the city, whose loyalty he had secured by conferring on them the franchise. Of these, even after the commotions which attended the fall of Thrasybulus, no fewer than 7000 remained. Fearing that as mercenaries they would favour the despotic form of government, to which they owed their position, or because they despised them, the old citizens gave these aliens no rights in the new constitution.²

17. The result was a second revolution. The city was again divided. The mercenaries seized Achradina and

¹ Diod. xi. 67, 68, 73; Arist. *Pol.* v. 12=1316 a 33; what Aristotle here calls a democracy seems to be the same as the "politeia" of 1304 a 27, where he says the "demos" of Syracuse having conquered the Athenians changed the politeia into a democracy.

² Diod. xi. 72, 73.

Ortygia, while the citizens maintained the rest of the town, which they fortified with a wall on the side towards Epipolæ. The mercenaries were the more practised soldiers, and they were probably in the stronger position of the two; but, on the other hand, the Syracusans had command of the routes which connected Achradina with the interior of the island. By this means they were enabled to cut off supplies without difficulty. In a very short time the mercenaries, though they defeated their opponents in the field, began to suffer from a scarcity of provisions. Nevertheless, they seem to have been able to hold out for a whole year (462 B.C.). In the next (461 B.C.) they were defeated at sea, and again in a great battle on land, in which both sides showed the most resolute bravery. The victory of the Syracusans was mainly due to the heroism of a chosen band of 600 citizens, whom the city rewarded with especial honours, crowning them with garlands and presenting each man with a mina of silver. After this the mercenaries made no further resistance, and Syracuse was once more in the hands of the citizens.¹

Revolution
of the mer-
cenaries in
Syracuse.
463 B.C.
Ol. 79. 2.

The next few years were a period of great prosperity for Sicily. The fertility of the island supplied the inhabitants with wealth; and as nothing was now spent on great wars or magnificent courts they soon acquired the means of filling their houses with slaves and their fields with cattle.

Meanwhile the Sikel prince, Ducetius, of whom we now hear for the first time, joined the Syracusans in an attack on the Hieronian colony of Aetna. Half of the colonists were aliens whom Hiero had collected from the Peloponnesus, others had supported Thrasybulus (*supra*, p. 457), and many of them had been provided with land at the expense of the Sicels. Hence the old citizens of Syracuse and the native population of Aetna, whom they had dispossessed, were equally hostile

Restoration
of Catana.
461 B.C.
Ol. 79. 4.

¹ Diod. xi. 76.

to them. After a brave attempt to maintain their ground the Hieronians were expelled, and Catana was restored to the rightful owners—the Sicels, and the Catanaeans, who were brought back from Leontini. The exiles established themselves at Inessa, a Sicel town, to which they gave the name of Aetna (461 B.C.). On their return the Catanaeans destroyed the tomb of Hiero, but the honours paid to him as founder were continued at the new colony.¹

The new
colony of
Aetna.

This success encouraged all those who had been robbed of their lands or cities by Hiero to return to their homes.

Return of the
exiles to the
cities of Sicily.
c. 461 B.C.
Ol. 79. 4.

Many exiles came back to Gela, Agrigentum, and Himera, expelling those who had taken their places. Throughout the whole of Sicily there was a general restoration of property and recalling of exiles; until at length the various cities were once more in the hands of those who had possessed them before the violent changes of the tyrants. The Geloans took the opportunity to assert their claim to Camarina, which they colonised with Dorians. The new city acquired a great reputation for prosperity, and in ten years' time (Ol. 82=452 B.C.) Psaumis of Camarina attained the proud distinction of an Olympian victory.

These resumptions of lost rights naturally gave rise to severe conflicts in the states in which they occurred. At

last, to avoid new revolutions, a general agreement was made throughout all the cities by which civic rights were given to native citizens only, all aliens—whether Greek or barbarian, Sicilian or foreign—being compelled to leave the towns in which they had been placed. Those who did not wish to leave Sicily were allowed to settle in the territory of Messina.²

General

pacification.

The tyrants had been removed; a popular government had

¹ Diod. xi. 76. The town recovered its name at a later period, and is called Inessa by Thucydides, iii. 103.

² Diod. l.c. For Psaumis, see Pind. Ol. iv. v.

been established in the cities ; but after the pacification Sicily was no longer the Sicily of the sixth century. Then the island had been pretty equally divided between Dorian and Chalcidic colonists, now the Dorians were greatly preponderant. It is true that Syracuse and Agrigentum were not so powerful under their free constitutions as they had been under their tyrants—their decline was so marked that, as we shall see, the native Sicels seized the opportunity to assert their independence—but, on the other hand, Himera had become largely Dorian owing to the action of the tyrant of Agrigentum, for the Dorians placed there by Thero were not expelled on the rearrangement of property ; and Zancle was now so little of a Chalcidic town that it no longer bore its old name. Gela and Camarina were both Dorian, and independent of Syracuse ; the new Aetna consisted of Dorian colonists from the Peloponnesus ; Dorian also was Selinus in the extreme west. And if Hyblæan Megara had disappeared from among the Dorian cities, the same fate had overtaken the Chalcidic town of Eubœa. Naxos and Catana—newly restored to existence with the aid of the Sicels—and Leontini, weakened by the return of the Catanæans to their home, were now the only Chalcidic cities in Sicily of importance.¹

Great increase in the Dorian power of Sicily.

18. If the court of Hiero had been the resort of poets and artists, the period of democracy, which followed the fall of his dynasty, is remarkable for the rise of oratory. In the constant discussions, which were necessary for the restoration of a popular form of government, eloquence acquired an importance which it had never enjoyed before. From Sicily came that art of rhetoric which is so prominent in the history of Athens ; in Sicily, out of the beginnings of political science, was

Rise of rhetoric in Sicily.

¹ Holm, *Gesch. Sic.*, i. p. 254. The tyrants rose to power in Dorian cities (Panaetius and Terillus being exceptions), and favoured Dorian institutions.

developed an important branch of sophistry. A man who could debate and speak in the new public assemblies inevitably rose to eminence. The most striking figure in this new order of men is Empedocles of Agrigentum, but examples of the class were found everywhere. Such was Corax of

Corax.

Syracuse, the founder of rhetoric. In the days of Hiero he had been influential, but in the democracy his eloquence made him the most powerful man in the city. So far as we know, he used his gifts and his influence for the good of the city, helping to settle adverse claims, and smoothing the difficulties which arose out of the change of constitution. But this was not the case

Tyndarides.

454 B.C.

Ol. 81. 3.

with his contemporary Tyndarides. This man, whom Diodorus describes as a bold and impudent fellow, flattered the poorer citizens by every means in his power with a view of creating a following. When it became obvious that he was endeavouring to raise himself above the mass of the citizens, he was brought to trial and condemned to death. As he was being carried to prison, his partisans attacked those who had him in charge, but they were beaten off by the loyal citizens. Not only was Tyndarides executed, but along with him perished those who had attempted his rescue.¹

Other incidents of a similar kind occurred, and at length, to put an end to the schemes of ambitious demagogues, the Syracusans resolved to follow the example of the Athenians in establishing a kind of ostracism. The name of the institution was changed from ostracism to "petalism," because the Syracusans found it convenient to use olive leaves instead of

Introduction
of petalism
at Syracuse.

"ostraca" for their votes, and at Syracuse a simple majority was enough to send a man into exile, but in other respects the arrangements were the same. The innovation did more harm than good. It was found that the best citizens were driven into exile on suspicion of "aiming at a tyranny,"

¹ Diod. xi. 86.

and in consequence politics were renounced by all the higher classes. This was mischievous for them, for in the selfishness of private life they declined to luxury; and mischievous for the city, which was left to the guidance of the rabble. The result was faction and turbulence. A race of sycophants and demagogues arose, while the younger men devoted all their time to the cultivation of eloquence and argumentation. The material prosperity of the city increased, but the simple and earnest manner of life, which had prevailed in old days, tended to become obsolete. After a short trial petalism was discontinued.¹

The institution works badly, and is soon discontinued.

While these disturbances were occupying the domestic politics of Syracuse, the city was once more called upon to resist the encroachments of the Tyrrhenians. More than twenty years had elapsed since the defeat at Cyme (Cumae), and though the Tyrrhenians had not recovered their former power, they were perhaps encouraged by the dissensions at Syracuse, and by the decline of military power owing to the expulsion of the mercenaries. It was at any rate necessary to check their advances. Phayllus was elected general, and was sent out with a force to Tyrrhenia. He had ravaged Aethaleia (Elba), when he was bribed into inaction by the Tyrrhenians, and returned home without any other achievement. On his arrival he was at once sent into exile as a traitor, and a new general, Apelles by name, was despatched with sixty triremes to continue the war. Apelles overran the coast of Etruria; and sailing thence to Corsica, which at this time was in the hands of the Tyrrhenians, he laid waste the larger part of the island. He then returned to Aethaleia which he reduced to subjection, and so sailed to Syracuse with a large amount of spoil and many captives.²

New expeditions against the Tyrrhenians.

Phayllus and Apelles.
453 B.C.
Ol. 81. 4.

¹ Diod. xi. 87, *ὀλίγον χρόνον αὐτῷ χρησάμενοι*. The introduction of petalism was after 454 B.C.

² Diod. xi. 88.

19. On the fall of the tyrants of Agrigentum a liberal oligarchy had been established, in which the government was placed in the hands of a council of One Thousand. Such large councils were not uncommon in Greece; we find them in existence at Colophon, Croton, Locri, and Rhegium.

Oligarchy at
Agrigentum.
472-469 B.C.
Ol. 77. 1-4.

They arose out of the desire to keep the administration in the hands of the well-to-do citizens, while making it difficult for any ambitious man to found a tyranny. At Agrigentum the merits of Thero had been forgotten in the cruelty of Thrasydaeus, and there was a large body of citizens to whom despotism in any form was intolerable. Among these was

Democracy
established on
the advice of
Empedocles.
469 B.C.
Ol. 77. 4.

Meton, the father of Empedocles, the famous philosopher and statesman. But on Meton's death a new attempt was made to bring in tyranny—an attempt which was only frustrated by the extraordinary penetration of Empedocles, on whose evidence the two leaders of the movement were at once seized and executed. Empedocles then persuaded his citizens to establish a democracy. The council of One Thousand was removed, and the franchise was extended to all the citizens without distinction. So sensible were the Agrigentines of the services of Empedocles that they offered to raise him to the throne, but he declined the honour, which indeed he could not have accepted without a violation of his principles.¹ The constitution thus established seems to have lasted till the city was destroyed by the Carthaginians in 408.

Empedocles, to whom these reforms were chiefly due, is one of the most remarkable men in Sicilian and indeed in Grecian history. We see him here the leader in a popular movement, and author of changes which may be compared

¹ Diogen. Laert. *Emp.* 63-72. I take the words τὸ τῶν χιλίων ἄθροισμα συνεστὼς ἐπὶ ἔτη τρία (66) to mean that the council had been in existence three years. Holm, *l.c.* p. 431, thinks that it was elected for three years. Diod. xi. 53 speaks of the constitution of Agrigentum after the expulsion of the tyrants as a democracy, but this is not exact.

with the reforms introduced by Clisthenes at Athens. But many who knew little and cared even less about his work as a politician, knew and venerated—nay, almost worshipped—him as a philosopher. In his praises of Sicily, Lucretius, the Roman poet, declares that he can find in the whole island nothing more praiseworthy, “nothing more holy or wonderful or lovable,” than the sage, whose poems, setting forth his marvellous discoveries, seemed to prove him higher than a “mixture of earth’s mortal mould.”¹ To us, who have only fragments of his works, such praises seem exaggerated, yet we can discern, even in the fragments, the outlines of a system which must have brought light in darkness and comfort in terror to those whose minds were perplexed by old cosmogonies. In Empedocles we find the first mention of the Four Elements, and, less clearly, the idea that matter is indestructible. In his system there was neither birth nor death; “that which existed had not been created and could not be destroyed.” What seemed to be creation and destruction was but the operation of Love and Hate, the two principles which were ever bringing the elements into new combinations and in turn dividing them.² He also discussed the nature and origin of the gods, and of the human soul, which he conceived as alienated by perjury and bloodshed from its divine kindred, “the long-lived spirits,” and compelled to wander for thrice ten-thousand years through air and sea and earth. “Even such an one am I,” he said, “an exile and a wanderer by heaven’s decree”—and in his wanderings he had passed through many forms: “I have been a boy and a girl and a bush and a bird and a fish in the sea.” This belief in metempsychosis is one which, as we shall see, Empedocles

Empedocles as
a philosopher.
495-435 B.C.
Ol. 71-16.

The Four
Elements:
Love and
Hate.

Gods and
human souls.

Metem-
psychosis.

¹ Lucret. i. 723 ff.

² See Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Phil. Graecae*, p. 139 f., seventh edition.

shared with the Pythagoreans, and like them he drew the necessary conclusion that it was unlawful to eat animal food.

Animal food. For as it was impossible to tell whose soul was in any bird or beast, a man who ate flesh might unawares be eating the body of his father, or a father the body of his son!¹

The opening verses of a poem have been preserved in which he gives us a remarkable picture of the position which he claimed and occupied in Sicily. "Hail ye who dwell in the

His claims to
superhuman
knowledge. mighty town by the yellow Acragas, on the city heights, men whose hearts are set on honest deeds, who know not iniquity, to whose

harbours strangers repair—among you I move, honoured as a god immortal, a man no longer, as is fitting, crowned with garlands and chaplets; and wheresoever I go in the prosperous cities of men, I am revered of men and of women, who follow me in thousands, seeking the path that leads to help; some asking for a prophecy, others for a cure of long and wasting disease." From this point of view Empedocles is little more than a quack and miracle-worker—

His miracu-
lous works
and cures. an aspect in which Pythagoras also appears. In this capacity he is said to have protected

Agrigentum from unwholesome winds, to have cleansed a foul stream at Selinus, and even to have raised Panthea from the dead. Finally, that he might be as renowned in his death as in his life, we are told that he cast himself while yet alive into Etna, a story which was, however, contradicted by Timaeus, the Silician historian, who maintained that he retired to the Peloponnesus and died there.²

In these legends there is, no doubt, much that is false, but we have the philosopher's own word that he claimed to be something more than mortal. If he imposed upon others he began by imposing on himself. And the age was one in which imposition was almost innocent. Those who were in possession of some instrument of thought,

¹ Ritter and Preller, *l.c.* p. 150 ff.

² *Ibid.* p. 125 f.

or even of some great idea unknown to others; who had studied the human body, the effects of drugs, or the laws of health, and Empedocles may have done this to some degree, over-rated their own powers, and found them over-rated in proportion to the ignorance of their contemporaries. Empedocles was certainly in advance of his age in many respects. He was an impressive figure, and he took means to make himself more impressive still, as was the manner of that time. If we are astonished that one who had refused to be more than a citizen in his own city should wander through Sicily in a garb designed to attract attention, we may remember that before him Pytharmus put on a purple robe when addressing the Spartans in their own assembly, and that after him, the sophists, the itinerant teachers of Greece, seem to have copied something of his dress and manner. Perhaps we may go a little further, and say that, in the irony of history, this man, who showed himself a devoted patriot, gave the mode to a troop of lecturers who had neither country nor patriotism.¹

He must be
judged by his
age.

20. Under the year 454 B.C., the archonship of Ariston, Diodorus informs us that the Lilybaeans and Segestaeans were at war with one another. The statement as it stands is unintelligible, for on the one hand Lilybaeum did not exist at this time; and on the other, if we suppose that Lilybaeum is a mistake for Motye, it is difficult to understand why the Segestaeans, who were always supported in their contests with the Greeks by the Phoenicians, should have gone to war with the Phoenician settlement at Motye. As Diodorus also tells us that the war arose out of a quarrel about land on the

Wars in the
west of Sicily.
454 B.C.
Ol. 81. 3.

¹ On Empedocles, see Freeman, *Hist. of Sicily*, ii. 342 ff. 558 ff. His philosophy is sketched in Grote's *Plato*, vol. i., and treated at length in Zeller, *Presocratic Phil.* vol. ii. The passion of the Greeks for fine clothing is remarkable; cf. *infra*, p. 483 of Alcisthenes; p. 513 of the Colophonians; and the striking words of Thucydides i. 6, μερῖα δ' αὖ ἐσθῆτι καὶ ἐς τὸν νῦν τρόπον πρῶτοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐχρήσαντο.

river Mazarus, a river which divided the territories of Motye and Selinus, it has been conjectured that his statement refers to some war between Selinus and Motye. Again, Pausanias tells us that he saw on the wall of the Altis at Olympia some

Agrigentum statues of boys, with arms outstretched in an
and Motye. attitude of prayer to Zeus, which had been

dedicated by the Agrigentines as a thank-offering for a victory over Motye. The statues were said to be works of Calamis, from which we may conclude that they were dedicated about the middle of the fifth century. Lastly, we learn from a mutilated inscription that Segestæan envoys visited Athens at a date which may perhaps be the archonship of Ariston.

Segesta and
Athens.

What the object of the embassy was is quite uncertain; it seems to have some reference to the city of Halicyæ, a neighbour of Segesta, but a settlement of the Sicanians, and therefore possibly an enemy of the Elymian town. We do not know that these various wars stood in any connection with each other, nor do they appear to have been of much importance, though it is interesting to notice the beginning of that connection of Athens with Sicily—and more precisely with Segesta—which was afterwards to lead to such fatal consequences.¹

21. Far more important than these disturbances in the West was the attempt which Ducetius now made to create a

Attempt of
Ducetius to
organise a
Sicilian league
or kingdom.

Sicel kingdom in the island. We have already seen (*supra*, p. 459) that he took part in the attack on Catana, when he succeeded in winning back for the Sicels the lands which Hiero had taken from them (461 B.C.), though the Hieronian colonists

¹ Diod. xi. 86; Paus. v. 25. 5. The inscription will be found in Freeman, *Hist. Sic.* vol. ii., who treats of these wars, p. 338 ff. and 549 ff. The date of the Segestæan embassy depends on the question whether the letters AP are a part of the expression Ἀπίστῶνος ἀρχοντος. A second inscription is quoted by Mr. Freeman, as proving the victory of the Selinuntians over some unknown enemy; but see Roehl, *I. G. A.*, No. 515, where a different interpretation is given. The coins of Motye are imitated from Segesta and Agrigentum, and Head (*Hist. Num.* p. 138) suggests that the adoption of Agrigentine types may be connected with the victory of Agrigentum over Motye.

were able to found a new Aetna at the Sicel town of Inessa. Feeling that a favourable moment had now come he attempted to unite the whole Sicel nation under his leadership. After the deposition of the tyrants, Syracuse and Agrigentum were by no means so powerful as they had been, nor was there now that solidarity among the Greek cities which existed when all were under a similar government. In 459 B.C. Ducetius founded a new city, Menae or Menaenum, at his own birthplace, not far from the sacred lake of the Palici,¹ after which he attacked and captured the city of Morgantina. Beginning with these successes he went on in the course of the next six years to unite the whole of the Sicel towns under his rule—with the single exception of the Aetnaean Hybla. In order to give a new and more definite centre to the league thus formed, he built a new town close to the sacred lake, to which he gave the name Palicé. Hither he transferred the inhabitants of his own city Menaenum, protecting them by a wall and dividing the territory (453 B.C.).²

Founding of
Menaenum
and Palicé.
459 B.C.
Ol. 80. 2.

The Sicels thus united, Ducetius felt himself strong enough to attack the Greek cities. He began with Inessa-Aetna, a town which had been lost to the Sicels partly by his own act. This he captured after the assassination of the Greek commander. Then he besieged Motyon, a fortress held by the Agrigentines, and when the Syracusans came up to help, he succeeded, by some rapid movements, in driving both armies out of their camps and seizing the fort. Winter now put an end to the campaign; the Syracusans returned home and revenged their failure by executing Bolco, their general, as a traitor (451 B.C.). In the following summer a new

Attack on
Inessa: defeat
of the Syra-
cusans, etc.
451 B.C.
Ol. 82. 2.

¹ Diod. xi. 78.

² Diod. xi. 88, 90. The city prospered for a time, but it was afterwards destroyed, and the site remained desolate till the time of Diodorus.

general was sent out with orders to finish the war with Ducetius. He came up with him in the neighbourhood of Nomae,

Severe defeat
of Ducetius
by the Syra-
cusans.
450 B.C.
Ol. 82. 3.

of which the site is unknown, and after a severe struggle the Sicels were defeated with prodigious slaughter. Of the survivors the majority retired into their fortresses and strongholds, whence they prepared to negotiate with the

Greeks, only a few remaining loyal to Ducetius and his plans. With the help of the victorious Syracusans the Agrigentines now recovered Motyon, and as even his own soldiers were preparing to lay violent hands on him, Ducetius found

Ducetius at
Syracuse; he
is sent to
Corinth.
450 B.C.
Ol. 82. 3.

himself reduced to desperate straits. He resolved to throw himself upon the mercy of his enemies. Escaping by night, he rode to Syracuse, and when the morning broke, he was found seated as a suppliant at the public altar

of the city, whence he offered to place himself and so much of the country as was still in his power in the hands of the Syracusans. A crowd quickly gathered round; a public assembly was summoned, and the matter was laid before it. The popular leaders demanded the punishment of Ducetius as a public enemy, but the older and less violent of the citizens were inclined to mercy. The enemy was now a suppliant under the protection of the gods; his right must be respected; the Syracusans must consider not what he ought to suffer, but what they ought to do; it was the part of a great nation to treat a suppliant with mercy, and the gods with reverence. The audience was convinced by these arguments, and the life of Ducetius was spared; he was sent to Corinth, to spend the rest of his days there, and provision was made for his support.¹

Ducetius did not long remain at Corinth. Giving out that he had received an oracle which commanded him to colonise Calê Actê, on the north coast of the island (see *supra*, p. 438), he sailed back to Sicily with a band of colonists

¹ Diod. xii. 92, τὴν ἱκανὴν αὐτῷ χορηγίαν συναπέστειλαν.

from Peloponnesus, and on his return he was joined by a number of Sicels. The colony can hardly have been established against the will of the Syracusans, though we cannot say what induced them to look idly on while their old enemy once more found a footing in Sicily. The Agrigentines were greatly indignant at their conduct; they charged the Syracusans with granting terms to the common enemy without consulting those who equally with themselves had suffered from his ravages. Remonstrances led to open hostilities; the whole of Sicily was in commotion, some joining the Syracusans, others the Agrigentines. It was clear that a contest was impending which would decide whether Syracuse or Agrigentum was to be the leading city in the island. A battle was fought on the banks of the Himera, in which Syracusans were victorious, slaying more than a thousand of the enemy. After this trial of strength the Agrigentines were content to negotiate a peace, without taking any further steps to expel Ducetius. He remained at Calê Actê, indulging once more his dreams of a Sicel league, in which he was supported by Archonides, the king of Erbita, but before he could put his dreams into shape he was carried off by disease (440 B.C.).¹

Ducetius
returns to
Sicily.
446 B.C.
Ol. 83. 3.

Quarrel of
Agrigentum
and Syracuse.

Battle on the
Himera.
445 B.C.
Ol. 83. 4.

Death of
Ducetius.
440 B.C.
Ol. 85. 1.

After his death the Syracusans reduced all the Sicel towns to subjection. Trinacria alone made a stubborn resistance. The city had always claimed to be at the head of the native race; and was both populous and patriotic. The Syracusans collected all their forces for the attack; the Trinacrians could summon no allies, but their courage was indomitable. The younger men fell in the field; the elder refused to survive the slavery of the city. In the end the Syracusans were completely victorious, and the

Subjugation of
the Sicels by
Syracuse.

¹ Diod. xii. 8, 29. Archonides lived nearly to the time of the Sicilian expedition; Thuc. vii. 1.

city was razed to the ground. The victory was celebrated by sending part of the spoil to Delphi. With the fall of Trinacria the resistance of the Sicels came to an end.¹

Syracuse was now the foremost city in Sicily. To maintain her position, she tightened her grasp, increasing her forces and compelling the Sicel states to pay a higher tribute towards their support. Hellenic influence began to spread widely over the whole island, and a beginning was made of that fusion of Sicel and Greek which in Roman times was an accomplished fact. The change is shown in nothing more plainly than in the native coinage; even when struck at Henna or Morgantina, the coins of the Sicels have a Greek character and Greek inscriptions.²

¹ Diod. *l.c.*

² Diod. xii. 30; Holm, *l.c.* p. 261, 262; Freeman, *Hist. Sic.* ii. 356 ff.

CHAPTER XIII.

HISTORY OF THE GREEK COLONIES IN ITALY TO THE YEAR 450 B.C.

I. THE colonies of the Greeks in Italy may be conveniently divided into two groups: a northern group including the cities in Campania, and a southern including the cities on the bay of Tarentum, with the offshoots which they planted on the Tyrrhene sea. To these we must add as a third group the Phocaean colonies in the bay of Lions, with which Elea (Velia), the Phocaean colony on the coast of Lucania, will naturally be classed.

Classification
of the Greek
colonies in
Italy.

In speaking of Campania as a part of Italy—and indeed in speaking of Campania at all—we are employing terms which the Greeks would not have employed.

In the oldest use of the word, Italia is the name given to the extreme south-western part of the peninsula, south of a line drawn from the Napetine to the Scylletic gulf. In the time of Herodotus and Thucydides the boundary line had been removed as far north as the head of the gulf of Tarentum; Metapontum is now in "Italy." This additional portion of the peninsula had previously been known as Oenotria, and Herodotus still speaks of Elea as in Oenotria. North of Oenotria was Opicia, in which lay Cyme and the cities which we have called Campanian. The south-eastern portion of the peninsula was known as Iapygia. A considerable portion of this territory was occupied by the Messapians—a tribe of the Iapygians—but it is remarkable that Herodotus and Thucydides, though they speak of Messapians, never speak of any

Use of the
word Italia
by the Greeks:
division of
the peninsula.

definite territory as Messapia. In the legends of the Greeks this part of Italy was once colonised by Crete, Hyria being a colony founded by a number of Cretans who had been carried thither from the expedition which Minos sent into Sicily to search for Daedalus; Brundisium by those who came with Theseus from Cnossus, or with Iapyx from Sicily.¹ North of Opicia lay Tyrrhenia, the land of the Etruscans, who also possessed settlements near the mouth of the Po. The central parts of the peninsula were occupied by Umbrians, Samnites, Lucanians, and other nations—warlike tribes whose strength was felt at a later time by Romans and Greeks.²

2. Whatever the date of the settlement of Cyme, it was undoubtedly the oldest Greek colony in Italy. The city,

Cyme. Site of the city: extreme fertility of the neighbourhood.

which is said to have been first planted in the island of Ischia, whence it was transferred to the mainland, lay on a promontory formed by the projecting end of the range of hills which reaches its summit in Mt. Gaurus. The whole

district is volcanic: round the city were numerous lakes, the Avernian, the Lucrine, the Acherusian, which represented extinct craters; to the north extended the Campi Phlegraei; on the east rose the cone of Vesuvius. A more fertile region does not exist. Corn and wine were produced in abundance, and even when the ground lay fallow it was covered with roses, from which perfumes were extracted. From some parts of the land four crops were taken in the year—two of spelt (*zea*), one of millet (*elymus*), and one of vegetables. In

¹ Herod. vii. 170; Strabo, p. 282. These legends are thought to derive some support from the fact established by Mommsen, *Die Unteritalischen Dialekte*, that the language of the old Iapygians was quite distinct from the Oscan, and much nearer Greek.

² See the articles *Italia*, *Apulia*, *Calabria*, *Magna Graecia*, etc., in Smith's *Dictionary of Geography*, where also the question of a Greek element in the population of Iapygia is discussed. For the oldest use of the word *Italia*, Antiochus, *Frag.* 4 m.; Metapontum in *Italia*, Herod. iv. 15; Velia in Oenotria, *ib.* i. 167; Cyme in Opicia, Thuc. vi. 4; Iapygia, Herod. iv. 99.

later days the wine of Falernum and the olives of Venafrum were reputed the best of their kind; and Strabo, moralising in a strain not infrequent in antiquity, attributes the decay of the nations which successively invaded the country to the temptations of ease and luxury by which they were surrounded.¹ These advantages were increased by the geographical position of the city of Cyme, which commanded the whole bay of Naples; and by the unwarlike character of the native population, who seem to have made no resistance whatever to the settlement of strangers on their coast—resembling in this the natives of Sicily. New ports were planted on the bay formed by the headland of Misenum, among which Neapolis became a flourishing city, and even the inland towns of Nola and Abella are said by some to be of Chalcidian origin.²

No resistance
on the part of
the natives.

What we know of the history of Cyme begins with the year 524 B.C. At this time the city enjoyed such extraordinary prosperity that it attracted the envy of neighbouring tribes. The Tyrrhenians, who had recently been expelled from their possessions in the lower valley of the Po by the advance of the Celts, poured into Campania from the north and east, bringing with them a horde of Umbrians, Daunians, and other wild tribes of the hills. Tradition puts their numbers at 500,000 foot, and 18,000 horse, and informs us that the neighbouring rivers, the Volturnus and the Glanis, turned back in their courses at the terrific sight!³ The Cymaeans prepared for defence; they divided their forces into three parts; with the first of which they guarded the city; with the second they protected their ships; with the third, which numbered no more than 4,500 foot and 600 horse, they went out to meet the enormous horde of the barbarians.

Attack on
Cyme by the
Tyrrhenians.
524 B.C.
Ol. 64. 1.

Defeat of the
Tyrrhenians:
distinguished
bravery of
Aristodemus.

¹ Strabo, p. 243. Livy. viii. 22. For the fertility, Strabo, l.c. Pliny, xviii. 29 (109); see article *Campania* in Smith's *Dict. Geogr.*

² Justin. xx. 1.

³ Dionys. vii. 3.

The place chosen for battle was a narrow defile, shut in by hills on the one side and by a lake on the other—a situation in which numbers were rather an encumbrance than an advantage. The Tyrrhenians and their allies trampled each other down, or were thrust into the waters of the lake, and though the cavalry made a stubborn resistance they were finally defeated and put to flight. Cyme was saved from the danger which seemed about to overwhelm her.

Among the bravest of the brave in her defence had been Aristodemus, surnamed the Effeminate, who had slain the leader of the enemy with his own hand. When the danger was past, the Cymaeans met to award the prize of valour.

Contest for
the prize of
valour. The
people support
Aristodemus.

The city was at this time under an aristocratic government, but the "demos" had already become an object of suspicion, if not of alarm, to their rulers. On this occasion they strongly supported Aristodemus, while the aristocracy were in favour of Hippomedon, the Hipparch, who was of their party. The contention became so hot that, in order to avoid an outbreak of popular fury, it was decided to award equal honours to both the candidates.¹

3. So the matter rested for a time. But Aristodemus was now the leader of the people, or at least their favourite, and

The Aricians
apply to Cyme
for help
against the
Tyrrhenians.
505 B.C.
Ol. 68. 4.

he took every means in his power to strengthen his position; spending his own money on the poor, and attacking the rich for their speculation. In proportion to his success he naturally became more odious to the aristocratical party, who longed for an opportunity to get rid of him. Twenty years after the great invasion, in 505 B.C., the citizens of Aricia, a town in Latium, sent to Cyme for assistance against the Tyrrhenians, who were now besieging their city under the command of Aruns, the son of Porsena. The Cymaeans agreed to send a force two thousand strong under the command of Aristodemus; but, regardless of the

¹ Dionys. vii. 4.

fate of the Aricians, they resolved to select an army which would certainly be destroyed and, as they hoped, bring its leader to destruction along with it. The lowest, most inefficient, and most suspected of the citizens were enlisted; and for their conveyance ten old and unseaworthy triremes were provided. Aristodemus, though well aware of the intentions of the Cymaeans in sending him out with such a force, did not hesitate to undertake the task. He reached Aricia in safety; and, encamping near the town, encouraged the Aricians to engage the enemy. They did so, and were defeated, upon which Aristodemus attacked the Tyrrhenians with his own forces and utterly routed them, slaying Aruns with his own hand.¹

Aristodemus is sent with an inadequate force, but is completely victorious.

After this victory Aristodemus returned to Cyme with his army, followed by vessels containing the spoils which he had taken. When he drew near the city he called his soldiers together and delivered an address, in which he charged the aristocracy with many crimes, and, pointing out their designs against himself, urged his hearers to resist any violence. As the army approached the gates of Cyme the population streamed out to meet it—fathers, sons, and even wives coming to embrace those whom they had never expected to see again. Thus assured of public support, Aristodemus resolved on a *coup d'état*. He entered the senate-house with a band of conspirators, cut down the senators, and followed up the assassination by seizing all the strong places in the city. He increased the number of his adherents by throwing open the prisons, and, in order to excite the enthusiasm of the people still more, he proposed such universally popular measures as a redivision of property and a cancelling of debts. But while thus flattering the people he took measures to render them utterly powerless. Under pretence of dedication, he induced the citizens to carry their arms to the

He returns to Cyme,

and makes himself master of the city.

¹ Dionys. vii. 5, 6.

temples, where he seized them all ; and those citizens upon whom weapons were subsequently found were put to death.

He seizes the arms of the citizens, and establishes a body-guard. Even these precautions were not sufficient ; he now established a body-guard, which in the traditional account consisted of three sections : one formed of the rabble, with whose help he had destroyed the constitution ; another of the slaves whom he had set free after they had slain their masters ; and the third of mercenaries drawn from the most savage barbarians—a body not less than 2000 strong. Thus supported, he seized upon the property of the men whom he had slain ; the gold and silver he kept for himself, the remainder he distributed among his associates.¹

4. Thus did Aristodemus make himself master of his city. Wild stories were told of his tyranny. His choicest rewards

The tyranny of Aristodemus. were given to slaves who had killed their masters—men who, when thus raised to opulence, compelled the wives and daughters of their victims to live with them. In order to rid himself of any fear of future vengeance, he resolved to put to death, on one day, all the male children of his opponents ; and though he was dissuaded from this monstrous plan, he devised other means,

His treatment of the sons of his opponents. less cruel, but more degrading, to prevent them from forming any conspiracy against him. They were driven into the country to live the lives of shepherds and husbandmen ; training, and education of any kind, was forbidden to them ; it was death to enter the city. Even these measures did not quiet his apprehensions. In order to prevent the possibility of resistance to his power, he determined to destroy the spirit of the whole nation. The gymnasia were closed ; martial

His plan for corrupting the whole nation. exercises were forbidden. Boys were clad in the garb of girls ; the hair was allowed to grow long ; they were habituated to a quiet indoor life, and taught to dance and play the flute. This

¹ Dionys. vii. 7, 8.

training went on till they were twenty-one years of age, when, and not before, they were allowed to join the ranks of the men. While thus attempting to ruin the manly spirit of his people, Aristodemus indulged himself in wild excesses of lust and cruelty, which his advancing years only served to make more horrible.¹

His precautions were of no avail. Some years after he had sent the sons of his enemies out of the city to live the life of ploughmen and peasants, he found, on making a journey into the country, that they had grown up into a strong and vigorous youth. Filled with alarm, he resolved once more to remove them out of his way; but while he was discussing the subject with his adherents, his plan was either detected or betrayed, and the young men fled into the mountains, carrying with them such iron implements as they were accustomed to use. They were supported in their revolt by some Cymaeon exiles at Capua, who were not only able to supply them with arms, but also to organise a body of mercenaries. Uniting their forces, the rebels overran the estates of their enemies, enticed away their slaves, and opened the prisons; what they could not carry off they burned or slew. Aristodemus was in despair; his forces, however superior in strength, were useless against an enemy who was here to-day and gone to-morrow; he grasped eagerly at any opportunity of striking a decisive blow. The rebels took advantage of this eagerness to mature a scheme for recovering the city: a pretended fugitive offered to serve as a guide to Aristodemus, but the forces intrusted to him were only led away to remote and desolate regions to waste their time in a fruitless search. Meanwhile, on learning that the bulk of the army was at a distance, the conspirators encamped in the mountains near lake Avernus, close to the city. At nightfall sixty of their number were sent into the

He finds his precautions useless, and meditates a wholesale massacre.

A rebellion breaks out which Aristodemus is unable to crush.

¹ Dionys. vii. 9.

town from various directions, disguised as woodcutters; and during the darkness they found means to unite, opened the gates towards Avernus, and cut down the guards. It was the night of a great festival, when every one was given up to enjoyment, and in consequence the conspirators had no difficulty in making their way to the house of the tyrant, or in destroying the guards, who were either asleep or intoxicated. Aristodemus and his sons were taken, and after a night of torture were put to death. The whole house of the tyrant was utterly extirpated, even to the women and children. On the next day an assembly was summoned, in which the conspirators laid down their arms and proclaimed the restoration of the old constitution.¹

The city is surprised; Aristodemus and his house are put to death.

Such was the end of Aristodemus. The account which I have given is abbreviated from the narrative of Dionysius—
 Criticism of but from whom Dionysius derived his information we do not know. Though the details are suspiciously like a rhetorical description of a tyranny in its rise and fall, the main facts may be true. Aristodemus won his way to the front in contests against the Tyrrenians; he became a democratical leader at a time when the people and the nobles at Cyme were in bitter opposition; and he used his popularity to make himself tyrant of the city. The enjoyment of irresponsible and absolute power destroyed the nobler part of his nature; he became the prey of lust, cruelty, and suspicion, until at length his rule, or misrule, was intolerable, and he fell by a conspiracy, in which apparently both town and country joined.²

5. After the death of Aristodemus, of which the date is

¹ Dionys. vii. 10, 11.

² Some additional details of the rebellion will be found in *Plut. Mul. Virt.* Xenocrita. It was during the reign of Aristodemus that Tarquin came to Cyme (Cumae) after his expulsion from Rome; Livy ii. 21; Dionys. vi. 21. We also hear of an embassy sent from Rome to Cyme to purchase corn, which did not meet with a favourable reception; Dionys. vii. 12. This is put in the fourteenth year of Aristodemus, i.e. in 492 B.C.

unknown (after 492 B.C.), we hear no more of Cyme till 474 B.C., when the city is again threatened by the Tyrrhenians. The tyranny of Aristodemus, and the dissensions to which it gave rise, must have greatly weakened the power of the city, and this at the very time when the Tyrrhenians had been gaining ground in Campania. On this occasion the attack was made by sea. We have already related how the Cymaeans sent to Hiero of Syracuse for assistance, and how the combined Cymaeon and Syracusan fleets inflicted a crushing defeat on the enemy.¹ A new era of prosperity now began, which seems to have continued till the destruction of the city by the Samnites, who overran Campania in the last third of the fifth century. In 420 B.C., after a stubborn siege, Cyme was taken and destroyed, and the inhabitants were sold into slavery.²

Attack of the
Tyrrhenians
and Cartha-
ginians on
Cyme in
474 B.C.
Ol. 75. 3.

Cyme
destroyed by
the Samnites.
420 B.C.
Ol. 90. 1.

Cyme was the centre of Greek influence in central Italy. From that city the Greek alphabet passed with some modifications to the Etruscans, the Oscans, and finally to the Latins; through her as a daughter of the Aeolian Cyme, the legends of the Trojan War were localised on the Campanian shore; and the Cumaean sibyl is but a repetition of the sibyls so common in Aeolis. From Cyme also Greek pottery—especially Athenian—was largely imported to Campania and Etruria. We learn on numismatic evidence that the oldest coins of the city were struck on the Aeginetan standard, but from 490 to 480 B.C. the Attic standard replaced the Aeginetan. Finally the Attic standard was abandoned for the Phocaean, owing no doubt to the influence of the neighbouring town of Elea (Velia), a standard which continued in use from 480 to the destruction of the city.³

Cyme as a
centre of Greek
civilisation
and trade.

¹ *Supra*, p. 453; Diod. xi. 51; Pind. *Pyth.* i. 136-146 Schol.

² Diod. xii. 76; Strabo, 243; Livy, iv. 41.

³ For the Cumaean alphabet, see Kirchhoff, *Studien*, p. 107, ed. 3, and for the coins, Head, *Historia Numorum*, p. 31. The types are very curious and interesting.

6. The colonies which fringed the bay of Tarentum were the most flourishing of all the Grecian settlements in Italy, and their prosperity was as rapid in growth as it was remarkable in degree. At a time when Athens and Sparta were inconsiderable towns, and even the Silician cities were still in their infancy, Sybaris and Croton were at the height of their fame.¹

These two cities were called Achæan colonies, and the date of their foundation is put at 720 and 710 B.C. The town of Sybaris lay at some distance from the sea, between the rivers Sybaris and Crathis, names which the settlers had brought with them from Achæa and given to the streams of their new home.² The soil round the city was

Sources of the prosperity of Sybaris: soil and situation.

extremely fertile; the trade of the town was increased by the free admission of foreigners; but what contributed most to the prosperity of

the Sybarites was the command which the city acquired of a route overland, from the bay of Tarentum to the Tyrrhene sea. To secure this advantage the Sybarites founded the colony of Laus on the western sea-board. The traders of the east and west, the Milesians and the Tyrrhenians, of whom the former were on the closest terms of friendship with Sybaris, could thus exchange their wares through Sybaris without braving the perils of the Messenian strait, or forcing their way past the Chalcidic cities which lay on either side of it, and Sybaris prospered for the self-same reason which made Corinth a wealthy city in the earliest ages of Greek commerce. Supported by these advantages, Sybaris extended her power

Extent of her power in the sixth century.

on every side. In the sixth century she ruled over four neighbouring tribes and twenty-five subject cities; she could put into the field 300,000 men; her walls covered an area of 50 stades ($6\frac{1}{4}$ miles) in circumference, or, in other words, the city was as large if not larger than Athens in the days of Themistocles;

¹ See F. Lenormant, *La Grande Grèce*, 3 vols. Paris, 1881.

² Strabo, p. 386; Herod. i. 145.

and besides Laus, she had planted the colonies of Poseidonia and Scidrus on the Tyrrhene sea.¹

Such a position could not have been won without vigour and ability. There must have been a period in the history of Sybaris in which her citizens were brave warriors and capable statesmen. But with the growth of prosperity came a fatal reaction. The ambition of the Sybarites went no further than the acquisition of riches and the enjoyment of their acquisitions; neither literature nor art flourished among them. Their luxury passed into a by-word, and not without reason, for whatever the exaggeration of later writers may be, Herodotus selects Smindyrides of Sybaris as the most luxurious of the men of his time. Fine clothing and delicate living, softness and splendour, were the ideals of life at Sybaris. The choicest products of Milesian looms—and the wool of Miletus was the finest known to the ancient world—were brought to the city, where men seem to have been rated at the cost of their apparel! We are informed that the embroidered robe of Alcisthenes, which Dionysius found in the spoils of the temple of Hera Lacinia, was sold to the Carthaginians for 120 talents, *i.e.* £24,000.²

The government of Sybaris was an oligarchy, but in Italy, as in Sicily, the end of the sixth century seems to have been marked by the rise of a democratic party. In 510 B.C., or just before that date, a "demagogue," named

¹ Strabo, p. 263; Diod. xii. 9. The enormous number of 300,000 soldiers contrasts strongly with the 29,000 which constituted the force of Athens in the Peloponnesian war. A very large proportion must have been supplied by the subject tribes or cities. See Lenormant, *La Grande Grèce*, i. c. 5, who claims the whole country between the Bradanus on the north and the Traeis on the south for Sybaris. This is on the gulf, and on the Tyrrhene sea, the coast from the Sabatus to the Silarus.

² Herod. vi. 127; Athenaeus, p. 273; Diod. viii. 19. For Alcisthenes, Athen. p. 541, Aristotle, *De Mirab.* 96. Twenty thousand pounds has been suggested as the value of a carpet in the palace of Schönbrunn which was given by Peter the Great to Charles VI.; *Standard*, March 30, 1891.

Telys, by his constant accusations, induced the Sybarites to banish about 500 of the leading citizens. The exiles took refuge at Croton, but Telys, whom Herodotus describes as the king or tyrant of Sybaris, had no wish to see his rivals established in a neighbouring city. He sent an embassy to demand their surrender, with a threat of war in the event of a refusal. The Crotoniates, after some wavering, were induced by Pythagoras himself, if we are to believe Diodorus, to refuse the surrender of the suppliants. Upon this Telys marched out at the head of an army 300,000 strong to the river Traeis, where he was met by the Crotoniates, with about one-third of his numbers.

Quarrel of
Sybaris and
Croton. Telys,
tyrant of
Sybaris.

Defeat of the
Sybarites.
Destruction of
the city.

In spite of this inferiority, the Crotoniates gained a decisive victory; the Sybarites fled to their walls for refuge, but in vain; the city was taken and destroyed. That the very site of Sybaris might be unknown, the waters of the Crathis were turned upon the land to wash away the foundations of the houses. The remnant of the inhabitants retired to Laus and Scidrus, and for more than fifty years the once fertile territory was allowed to remain unoccupied and uncultivated. In the days of Herodotus their descendants maintained that the defeat was in some measure due to the assistance given to the Crotoniates by Dorieus of Sparta (*supra*, p. 430), but this the Crotoniates stoutly denied. In Aristotle this destruction of the Sybarites is spoken of as a sort of "retribution" for their treatment of the Troezenians, whom, though fellow-founders of the colony, they had expelled from the city. Other legends were also related of their iniquity—legends which were perhaps invented to justify the Crotoniates in their savage destruction of the foremost of the Italiot cities. With the fall of Sybaris her dominion was naturally broken up. The native tribes who had been held in check by her authority were now at liberty to develop their resources, and an opening was made for incursions from the north. The fall of this famous city and the quarrels which followed the expulsion of the Pythagoreans

were two great steps in the decline of Hellenic power in Italy.¹

7. Up to the time of their fatal quarrel Sybaris and Croton had lived harmoniously side by side, rivals in trade, but united by similar forms of government, and by the necessity of keeping in check the native tribes of the district. Like Sybaris, Croton founded a port on the Tyrrhene sea—the city of Terina—and in order to make the transit across the peninsula as short as possible she established an emporium at Seylletium on the eastern coast, to the south of her own port. Another settlement was Caulonia. But while the Sybarites were notorious for their luxury, the Crotoniates were devoted to gymnastic exercises; their athletes were famous for the prizes which they won at Olympia, and the name of Milo, the greatest of them all, seems to have been known at the Persian court.² As we should expect from such distinctions, the city of Croton was considered to be peculiarly healthy; and since training was but another form of hygiene, the reputation of Crotoniate physicians spread throughout Hellas. We have told the story of Democedes, his success and his misfortunes, and the disasters which they were supposed to have brought upon Greece; but a more interesting figure in the history of science is the Crotoniate

Croton.

The Crotoniates distinguished as athletes and physicians.

¹ Diod. xii. 9, 10; Herod. v. 44 f.; Strabo, 263; Arist. *Pol.* v. 3 = 1303 a 29, who after telling the story of the expulsion of the Troezenians adds: ὁθεν τὸ ἄγος συνέβη τοῖς Συβαρίταις. We may notice that Herodotus says nothing of the presence of Pythagoras at Croton on this occasion, but he adds two interesting facts: (1) Philippus of Croton, having become the suitor of Telys' daughter, found it necessary to leave Croton; (2) Callias of Elis, who was the seer of Telys, on finding the sacrifices unpropitious for war upon Croton, fled to that city. Diodorus says Milo the famous athlete aided the Crotoniates. Heracleides Ponticus informs us that the Sybarites had removed Telys before the destruction of their city, which was in fact the punishment for slaying the adherents of the tyrant at the altar. Cf. Athen. xii. p. 521 E.; Müller, *Frag. Hist. Graec.* ii. p. 199.

² On one occasion the Crotoniates are said to have secured the first seven places in the foot-races at Olympia, Strabo, 262.

physician Alcmaeon, who laid the foundation of the study of anatomy.

The constitution of Croton was a moderate oligarchy, if we may judge from the existence of a council of a Thousand, such as we have seen established at Agrigentum after the fall of the tyranny. But in the second half of the sixth century a movement arose in the city and spread through a large number of the towns of Magna Graecia, which is one of the most remarkable and interesting features in Greek history.¹

8. Pythagoras, the son of Mnesarchus and Pythias, is said by his biographer, Iamblichus, to have left Samos when eighteen years of age, owing to the increasing tyranny of Polycrates. After some stay in Asia Minor, during which he became acquainted with Thales and Anaximander, he repaired to Egypt, whence he was carried captive by Cambyses to Babylon! When he returned to Samos he endeavoured to establish a school, that he might impart to his disciples his accumulated stores of thought and learning, but on finding that his project received very little encouragement, he resolved to seek a new country, in the conviction that his proper home was in the city where he could obtain an audience interested in philosophy. Like Xenophanes of Colophon he left the eastern limits of Hellas for the western, and, influenced perhaps by the fame of the city, fixed his abode at Croton. There he quickly collected a number of disciples, who were not only willing to listen to his teaching, but also consented to join in the common life which he instituted, and become *Coenobii*. The date of his arrival in Italy is put at 532 B.C.²

The life and teaching of Pythagoras became a favourite subject of the Neoplatonists, who, being without any skill in historical criticism, have overlaid the few facts which may have been known to them with all kinds of ridiculous

¹ Valerius Max. viii. 15; Iamblichus, *Vita Pythag.* 45.

² This is of course inconsistent with his capture by Cambyses. Iambl. *V. Pyth.* 29, 35; Porphyry. *V.P.* 4, 11, 18.

fables. For this reason it is impossible to give anything but a vague and uncertain outline of the work of Pythagoras in Croton. We know from Herodotus, who speaks of him as "not the least of the sophists in Greece," that his followers practised peculiar customs, refusing for instance to bury corpses in woollen garments.¹ As a school of philosophers whose principle was "number," the Pythagoreans of course attracted the attention of Plato, and Aristotle also wrote a treatise on them, but the chief source of knowledge was the work of Philolaus, a native of Croton and pupil of Pythagoras, who was the first to put his master's doctrine into writing. In his later years, at the time when Socrates was active at Athens, Philolaus was a resident at Thebes, which thus became a centre of Pythagorean teaching.²

Uncertainty
of our
knowledge.

On his arrival at Croton Pythagoras found a society which, as we have said, was devoted to gymnastic exercises, and perhaps the more so as these were felt to be an antidote to the luxury prevailing in the Italian colonies. He found also an aristocratical society, menaced, if not shaken, by the rising democracy. And, thirdly, he found a society with an interest in philosophy, especially in the practical applications of natural philosophy to medicine and hygiene. To this society he brought a store of wisdom collected during his travels in distant countries—for there is no reason to doubt the fact of those travels:—theories about the nature of the human soul, about number and music, about moral and physical purity, about the social duties of men and women, about education, and about health. The influence of such a man in such a society is something which we can now hardly understand or estimate. We have accumulated a vast stock of knowledge, by which our minds

Pythagoras
establishes a
society at
Croton.

His enormous
influence.

¹ Herod. iv. 95; ii. 81.

² See Plato, *Phaed.* 61 E, with the Scholiast. Aristotle's work *περί τῶν Πυθαγορείων* is mentioned in Diogen. Laert. v. 25.

are trained, and our imaginations are limited; we have some conception, however imperfect, of the laws of nature; and if we have brought the moral and spiritual world into closer connection than the Greeks succeeded in doing, we have also separated morals from mathematics, though we still continue to use mathematical metaphors in speaking of moral action. To the Greeks of the sixth century B.C. human nature was not thus subdivided; the limits of the natural and supernatural were ill-defined; knowledge was not merely the ability to set causes at work; it was a power, an influence, almost magical. To this feeling was due the enthusiasm which greeted Epimenides at Athens; the veneration accorded to Empedocles at Agrigentum (see *supra*, p. 466); and above all, the position which Pythagoras won throughout the cities of Magna Graecia.

9. To the association which he gathered round him at Croton—consisting at first of 300 aristocrats—he imparted

Doctrines of
Pythagoras:
the nature of
the soul.

his teaching theoretical and practical. He told them that the soul of man was immortal, passing in its varied existence not only from man to man but from man to animals, and

from animals back into human shape, and therefore animals and men ought not to be regarded as entirely distinct, as they commonly were; the cries of beasts might be the inarticulate utterances of a human soul. We are told by Xenophanes, who was a contemporary of Pythagoras, that on hearing the howls of a dog which was being whipped, Pythagoras begged that the animal might be beaten no longer, because he recognised in its cries the voice of an old friend!¹ He taught also that the world moved in cycles; what had been would be again, and there was nothing new under the sun.

Number and
harmony.

He dwelt much on number and harmony, in which he found the key to the explanation of the universe; he spoke of the harmony of the spheres, the celestial music, more ravishing to the ear than the tones of

¹ Xenoph. *Frag.* 4. Pomtow.

any instrument. Where number and harmony existed, falsehood could not exist; and conversely, strife and falsehood were inherent in all that was "unlimited." He even went further, and insisted that number was not merely an instrument by which we may attain a knowledge of things; it was the cause of their existence, their essence, their real self. Such ideas are to us extravagant, but any one who for the first time discovered the properties of numbers might well think that he was in possession of a secret which gave him the command of nature. There are among us men who dream that by new discoveries in magnetism, or "occult science," or medicine, they may change the conditions of human existence.

Those who accepted these doctrines were formed into a school or society, pledged to the observance of certain rules about conduct, clothing, and food. Silence was imposed upon them for a period, partly as a test of character (*ἡ ἐχεμυθία*), and partly to preserve the mystic nature of the teaching.

Rules of the society about conduct, dress, and food.

A close friendship united the members of the communion; they not only shared each other's goods, but were recognised as a body separate from the rest of the citizens. These were the *Mathematici*; while those who listened to the master's teaching but did not adopt his rules of life were the *Acusmatici*. The regulations for dress and food were doubtless based upon some ideas of health and cleanliness. Woollen garments were discarded for linen; flesh and the more indigestible or heating vegetables were forbidden. The master began each day by playing on the lyre, and singing ancient poems of Thaletas, in order to attune his soul to the tasks which he had to perform. He also practised and impressed on his followers the duty of self-examination. There were two hours in the twenty-four when this was especially necessary; the hour of retiring to rest, and the hour of waking; at these a man should consider carefully what he had done, and what he was going to do. Above all,

Necessity of self-examination and of truth.

Pythagoras bade his disciples speak the truth, for that, and that only, made men like unto God.¹

Women as well as men were allowed to be members of the society; a long list of female disciples has been preserved, beginning with Theano, the wife of Pythagoras, who was not only the first, but the foremost of them all.

10. The society thus formed in Croton was imitated in other cities of Magna Graecia, either under the influence of Pythagoras or of his followers. More especially do we hear of Pythagoreans at Rhegium, Tarentum, and Metapontum. Whether the peculiar coinage which was struck in the cities of Magna Graecia at the end of the sixth century owed its origin to the Pythagorean brotherhood is perhaps more than we can prove, but the existence of the coinage is a very remarkable and interesting fact. The coins of Tarentum and Rhegium, of Croton and Caulonia, of Metapontum and Siris, and even for a time of Sybaris, as well as those of the cities on the Tyrrhene sea: Pyxus, Laus, and Temesa, resemble each other, and differ from other coins, in their thin disc-like nature, and in the fact that obverse and reverse bear the same stamp, one in relief, the other incuse.² This similarity is sufficient to prove that the cities of Magna Graecia regarded themselves as forming some sort of union, but what was the object or extent of the union is quite uncertain. That it was not sufficient to prevent internecine

¹ For Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans see Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Phil.* p. 40 ff. Porphyry. *V.P.* 40. Diod. x. c. 7 ff.

² A coin of Metapontum, for instance, has on the obverse an ear of corn in relief, on the reverse the same incuse, but the impressions are produced by two different dies, Head, *Hist. Num.* p. 62. On the subject of this coinage and its connection with the Pythagorean clubs, see Head, *l.c. Introd.* p. li. I do not see that any connection is *proved* between the Pythagoreans and the coinage; what is quoted by Mr. Head (p. 84) from Lenormant and De Luyne seems to me nothing more than clever guessing.

war between the cities sharing in it is proved by the lamentable issue of the conflict between Sybaris and Croton.

Thus the Pythagoreans formed an *imperium in imperio*, a brotherhood existing within the government of the city, and by superior organisation and force of ability obtaining considerable influence over it. The movement was not religious, at least in the Greek sense of the word, for it introduced no new deities, but it was spiritual and moral, claiming to establish a higher rule of life among men, on the ground that such a life brought human nature into closer harmony with the divine. From a political point of view the movement might be called aristocratic, for only those who had leisure could follow its precepts; or socialistic, owing to the community of goods which was maintained among the disciples. In either direction it was very far removed from the busy mercantile life of a flourishing port. The sailors and traders of Croton or Metapontum can have had very little inclination to listen to a teaching which discouraged luxury, or any coarse form of enjoyment; and the principle of common property is of course destructive of that eager desire for gain which is the soul of commerce. For such reasons the Pythagoreans, as they grew in power, were viewed with no friendly eyes by the democratical section of the cities in which they dwelt, and in time the opposition showed itself in various outbursts, which led to the expulsion or extinction of the sect.¹

The Pythagoreans by degrees come into collision with the democratic section of the cities.

The first attack upon them seems to have taken place at Croton during the life of Pythagoras. In the narrative which Iamblichus copies from Aristoxenus of Tarentum, the scholar of Aristotle, we are informed that Cylon, one of the richest and most influential of the Crotoniates, but a

Quarrel of Cylon and Pythagoras: attack on the Pythagoreans.

¹ For the political influence of the Pythagoreans see Iambl. *V. P.* 254, who speaks of a body of 300 as forming a club at Croton; and Porphyry. *V. P.* 54, who speaks of the cities generally as intrusting the government to the Pythagoreans.

man of low and violent character, sought admission into the brotherhood, and was rejected by Pythagoras. The refusal brought upon the society the relentless and unremitting hostility of Cylon and his friends, which was not diminished when Pythagoras withdrew to Metapontum, where he died. For a time the Pythagoreans were able to hold their own, and though the dissensions which had begun at Croton spread to other cities, the influence of the brotherhoods was not overthrown. At length the Cylonians resorted to open violence: when the Pythagoreans were met to deliberate on

Burning of the
house of Milo.
Destruction of
the political
power of the
sect.

some matter of public interest in the house of Milo, the building was set on fire. Two only of the society escaped, Archippus and Lysis, of whom the first retired to his native town of Tarentum, and the other to Achaea in Peloponnesus, and finally to Thebes, where he became the tutor of Epaminondas. No effort was made in any of the cities to punish the attack upon the sect—on the contrary, the outrage at Croton seems to have been the signal for similar outbursts in other cities. The Pythagoreans were expelled from all the Italian cities except Tarentum and Rhegium; their political power, whatever it may have been, was at an end, and in time the sect became almost entirely extinct. The traditional date for the expulsion of the Pythagoreans is 504 B.C., a date which may be true of the quarrel between Cylon and Pythagoras; but it is obvious that the burning of the house of Milo must have occurred much later (440 B.C.?) if Lysis, who escaped, became the tutor of Epaminondas (370 B.C.).¹

¹ Iamblich. *V.P.* 248 ff. Polybius, ii. 39, adds nothing definite, but his statements lead us to suppose that he is referring to a period much later than 504 B.C. He speaks of envoys sent from Magna Graecia to Achaea asking for assistance in putting an end to the civil strife and bloodshed which attended the burning of the "synagogues of the Pythagoreans," see Ritter and Preller, p. 46. In Iamblichus, *V.P.* 255, the cause of the outbreak is traced to the refusal of the government of Croton, which was in the hands of the Pythagoreans, to divide among the people the conquered territory of Sybaris. A long account of the Pythagoreans will be found in Lenormant, *La Grande Grèce*, ii. c. 1.

II. The success of the Crotoniates in their war with Sybaris seems to have encouraged them to make an attack upon their neighbours in the south, the cities of Locri and Rhegium. No details of the quarrel have come down to us; nor is the date certain: we are merely informed that the Locrians and Rhegians with a force of 10,000 or 15,000 men met the Crotoniates, whose numbers amounted to 130,000, on the banks of the river Sagras, and that contrary to all expectation the Locrians gained a complete victory. After the battle the Crotoniates were content to remain quiet; and for many years little or nothing is recorded of the city.¹

War between
Croton and
Locri: the
battle on the
Sagras.

Six miles from Croton, on a headland overlooking the sea, and commanding a "noble view in all directions," lay the temple of Hera Lacinia, a well-known landmark to the Italiot mariner. From the legends connected with the place—which are not worth repeating—we may perhaps conclude that the site was hallowed long before the Greeks settled in Italy, and that on their arrival they took over the native cultus, as their manner was, giving the name of Hera to the goddess worshipped there. The temple formed a centre to which all the Italian Greeks repaired at an annual gathering, when a festival was celebrated with great pomp and splendour.² The temple was renowned for its wealth, for not only were rich offerings dedicated by the prosperous Greeks, but the shrine derived large revenues from its own property, especially from the herds of cattle which fed on the adjacent pastures. Whether

The temple
of Lacinian
Hera.

¹ Strabo, p. 261, who says that the unexpected issue of the battle gave rise to the proverb: ἀληθέστερα τῶν ἐπὶ Σάγρᾳ. His authorities led him to believe that Croton ceased to exist soon after the battle, but this is not true, for the battle cannot have been fought after 480 B.C. or we should have some account of it in Diodorus; and Croton continued to flourish long after that time. Justin (xx. 2. 3), who mentions the battle, puts it before the arrival of Pythagoras in Italy. He ascribes the quarrel to the desire of the Crotoniates to punish the Locrians for aid given to Siris.

² Arist. *De Mirab.* 96; Athen. p. 541.

it was built by the Crotoniates we do not know, but they undertook to adorn the interior, and among the ornaments which they placed there was the famous picture of Helen, by Zeuxis (a contemporary of Pericles).¹

12. The remainder of the Calabrian peninsula, as we now call it, between the territory of Croton and the Straits of

Locri. Messina, was occupied by the cities of Locri
The laws of and Rhegium. Long before the arrival of
Zaleucus. Pythagoras in Italy the Locrians had received
664 B.C. their laws from Zaleucus, who appears, so far
Ol. 29. 1. as we know, to have been the author of the first written
code of law among the Greeks. Some forty or fifty years
after the colonisation (664-660 B.C. Euseb.)—such is the
legend preserved,—the city fell into great disorder. The
oracle was consulted, which bade the citizens ordain a code
of laws, saying that there was among them a shepherd named
Zaleucus, who could provide them with excellent statutes.
Search was made; Zaleucus was discovered, and asked whence
he obtained his ordinances; and when he replied that Athena
had revealed them to him in dreams, he was made the law-
giver of the city.² Of the laws themselves little is known.
Ephorus, indeed, went so far as to assert that Zaleucus

collected his regulations from the institutions
of Crete and Lacedaemon, and from the
Areopagus at Athens, but the statements of
Ephorus on such a matter must be taken for what they are
worth. He also mentions as an "innovation of Zaleucus"
that he fixed the penalties for offences and did not leave
them to the caprice of the jury, whose opinions changed from

¹ Cicero, *De inven.* ii. 1; Pliny, xxxv. 9. Livy speaks of a column of solid gold in the temple, xxiv. 3. See Smith, *Dict. Geogr.* s.v. CROTON. The distinctive types of the coins of Croton are the tripod and the head of Hera. The second is no doubt connected with the Lacinian temple; the first is supposed to have some reference to the Pythagorean society of Croton, but this is nothing more than a conjecture; see, however, Head, *Hist. Num.* p. 84.

² Aristot. *Frag.* 548 R.; Plut. *De se laud.* xi.

time to time.¹ To Zaleucus also is ascribed the famous provision for preventing innovations in law, which has already been described in connection with Charondas (*supra*, p. 426).² Whatever the code may have been, Locri became famous for the excellence of her laws, and Demosthenes could say that for 200 years the city had continued to observe the laws of Zaleucus with one change only!³

We know little of the constitution of Locri. There was a council of One Thousand, and a supreme magistrate called the Cosmopolis. Of this officer Polybius, who had carefully studied the history of Locri, records an incident which throws some light on his position. Two young men had quarrelled about the possession of a slave; the first took the slave from the other's house in his absence; the second, on his return, recovered the slave, and at once carried him before the magistrate, from whom he claimed the protection of the law of Zaleucus: that a disputed chattel should remain in the possession of the person from whom it had been taken away, till the case was decided. His opponent replied by appealing to the same law: the slave, he said, had been taken from him. The dispute was referred to the Cosmopolis, who decided that the law applied only to peaceable and uncontested possession; but as this interpretation was not at all satisfactory to the aggressor in the quarrel, he denied it to be the true interpretation of the statute. Upon this the Cosmopolis challenged him to discuss the matter before the One Thousand in the manner which Zaleucus had arranged. For Zaleucus had directed that if the interpretation of the Cosmopolis were disputed, he and his opponent should appear in the assembly,

Constitution
of Locri: the
Cosmopolis.

Interpretation
of the laws.

¹ Ephorus in Strabo, p. 260. In Aristotle's *Politics*, ii. 9. 5. = 1274 a 23, Zaleucus is said to be a disciple of the Cretan Thaletas.

² Demosth. *Timocr.* p. 744.

³ So far as we know, no tyrant ever arose in Locri; when Pythagoras and his followers came to the city on their expulsion from Croton, the Locrians refused to receive them, on the ground that they were sufficiently provided with good laws. Porphy. *V.P.* § 56.

each with his neck in a noose, and whichever of the two failed to establish his view of the case was to be executed on the spot. The young man refused the challenge: such an ordeal, he pleaded, was unjust between a man who had but three or four years to live—the Cosmopolis was nearly ninety years of age—and a youth, whose life was still before him. The assembly took this view of the matter, and without insisting on the legal trial, gave their decision for the Cosmopolis.¹ We are also informed on the authority of Timaeus that the Locrians had no slaves, and that their laws against kidnapping, adultery, and desertion, were severe. Timaeus

Timaeus on
the customs
and origin of
Locri.

brought forward these facts as proofs that the story which Aristotle told of the colony of Locri was untrue, urging that men who had no slaves, and punished these offences so severely, could hardly have been the descendants of the runaway adulterers and kidnappers who, in Aristotle's account, were the founders of the colony. It is indeed more probable that the original colonists were members of a disfranchised class in the old city than that they were such men as Aristotle described (see vol. i. p. 354), for runaway slaves would not have had the means to found a new city at so great a distance from their home. But their origin was no doubt humble: they brought with them no religious institutions, no family worship which could become the public worship of the new home; and the nobility of Locri—such as it was—was derived from the women of the higher classes whom the colonists persuaded to accompany them. Polybius tells us that the Locrians took over from the Sicels the custom by which a Phialephorus or cup-bearer preceded the sacred processions, but while the Sicels always chose a boy of the noblest parentage for this purpose, the Locrians chose a girl.²

¹ Polyb. xii. 16.

² Polyb. xii. 5, 7, 9. Did the Locrians get their bad reputation for immorality from the so-called "Locrian songs"? See Pomtow, *Lyr. Graec.* ii. 157. For their piracy, see Roehl, *J. G. A.* 322.

As we have already stated, Locri was threatened about the year 476 B.C. with an attack from Anaxilaus of Rhegium, a danger which was averted by the interference of Hiero of Syracuse. This kindly act naturally led to a warm friendship between the cities; when Thrasybulus was expelled from Syracuse he found refuge at Locri, and remained there unmolested for the rest of his life (*supra*, p. 457). The friendship and the enmity continued to the next generation; when the Athenians sailed to Sicily under Laches they found Locri in alliance with Syracuse, and at open war with Rhegium. In earlier days, on the other hand, Locri and Rhegium had united in repelling the attack of Croton, which was defeated at the Sagras.¹

Relations
of Locri,
Rhegium, and
Syracuse.

13. Rhegium was a mixed colony of Chalcidians and Messenians. In the legend the Chalcidians were sent away from Euboea in a year of famine, in which the cities had consecrated a tenth of the population to Apollo, but the historian Antiochus is content to assert that they came on the invitation of their kinsmen at Zancle, who, in fact, provided them with a leader. The Messenians were exiles who left their country after the first Messenian war (723 B.C.). Though they formed the minority in the colony, the magistrates of the city were always chosen from them, down to the time when Rhegium fell under the power of a tyrant. During this period the constitution was oligarchical, and we hear of an assembly of One Thousand as at Locri and Croton. The laws of Charondas were adopted at Rhegium; the Pythagoreans found refuge there after their expulsion from Croton.²

Rhegium:
originally
oligarchical.

The territory of the city was small, covering merely the extreme point of the peninsula, west of a line running up the

¹ It is a curious fact that no coins of Locri are in existence which date from an earlier period than the middle of the fourth century. Like Croton and Sybaris, Locri established colonies on the Tyrrhene sea; these were Medma and Hipponium.

² Strabo, p. 257; Heracl. Pont. 25; Arist. *Pol.* v. 12=1316 a 38; Iamblich. *V.P.* 33, 130, 251.

river Halex, and continued northwards to the coast of the Tyrrhene sea. Yet we are told that Rhegium had many

Extent of the territory of Rhegium. Rhegium and Zancle. "Perioecic cities," by which are meant, no doubt, the native towns reduced by the Rhegians to some kind of dependence. With their neighbours beyond the Halex—the Locrians—the

Rhegians were generally on bad terms, as we have said, perhaps owing to the narrowness of their borders. But if confined on land, there was the more reason why Rhegium should devote herself to the sea, and of all the Italian colonies she stands in the nearest relation to Sicily. As in their foundation, so in their history, the fortunes of Rhegium and Zancle were very closely connected.¹

If we accept the account given by Pausanias, we must believe that there was a tyrant at Rhegium in 664 B.C.,

Pausanias' account of the earlier Anaxilaus. 664 B.C. Ol. 29. 1. Anaxilaus by name, the great-grandson of the Alcidas who had led the Messenians to Rhegium after the first Messenian war. At his invitation a second band of Messenians went to Rhegium at the end of the second

Messenian war, by whose help Anaxilaus was enabled to get possession of Zancle (see vol. i. p. 276). But as the story is almost entirely a confused repetition of what took place 170 years later, we cannot accept it as genuine history. It was after the fall of Miletus and with the help of the Samians that Anaxilaus became master of Zancle, which henceforth became known as Messene (*supra*, p. 438).

The history of Rhegium begins at the beginning of the fifth century with the tyranny of Anaxilaus. How he rose

The tyranny of Anaxilaus. 594 B.C. Ol. 46. 3. to power we cannot explain, but as he was of Messenian descent, and therefore a member of the ruling class, it is probable that he was one of the tyrants who made the enjoyment of some public office the stepping-stone to absolute dominion. After the acquisition of Zancle, which must have been one

¹ Strabo, p. 258. Thuc. iv. 1. 24.

of the very earliest acts of his reign, he was able to close the Straits of Messina against the Tyrrhenians, an immense boon to the traders of the Tarentine gulf; and in order to secure himself against them yet more, he fortified the rock of Scyllaeum at the northern entrance of the strait.¹

We have already related how Anaxilaus joined his father-in-law Terillus, the tyrant of Himera, in inviting the Carthaginians into Sicily. After the defeat of the invaders, he was glad enough to be received as a friend by Gelo (*supra*, p. 447), and later still he gave his daughter in marriage to Hiero. He reigned for eighteen years (494-476), enjoying the reputation of a mild and equitable

Reign of
Anaxilaus;
at his death
Micythus be-
comes regent.
476 B.C.
Ol. 76. 1.

ruler, in spite of his acquisition of Zancle, and at his death he was able to bequeath his power to his sons. As these were too young to succeed at once, Anaxilaus appointed Micythus, one of his slaves, to be regent, on condition that when the boys came of age he should resign his charge.² Three years later the Rhegians were compelled by Micythus to join the Tarentines in resisting an attack of the Iapygians, their neighbours on the north and east. A fierce battle was fought, in which the Iapygians were completely victorious. Three thousand Rhegians were slain; the survivors were so long and so hotly pursued by the enemy, that the Iapygians—if Diodorus is right—even entered Rhegium with the fugitives and obtained possession of the city. Nevertheless, in 471 B.C., Micythus was able to establish the authority of Rhegium in the town of Pyxus, on the Tyrrhene sea.³

Defeat of the
Rhegians by
the Iapygians.
473 B.C.
Ol. 76. 4.

In 467 the regency of Micythus came to an end. At the instigation of Hiero, the sons of Anaxilaus demanded that

¹ Strabo, p. 257.

² Diod. xi. 48.

³ Herod. vii. 170; Diod. xi. 52, 59. Herodotus describes Micythus as a slave (*olkérēs*); his father's name was Choerus (pig). The number of Tarentines slain on this occasion was not stated; altogether it was the greatest slaughter of Greeks known to Herodotus.

the throne should be surrendered to them, in accordance with the last directions of Anaxilaus, and an account given of the years during which it had been held in Miccythus ceases to be regent. 467 B.C. Ol. 78. 2. Miccythus at once collected the friends of Anaxilaus together and gave them an account of his regency. So exact and precise was the report that all were filled with amazement at his honour and fidelity, while the young men, ashamed of their importunity, besought him to resume his charge and govern the city as their father. Miccythus refused. He gathered his possessions together, embarked them on board ship, and sailed away to Tegea, where he remained till his death.¹

The sons of Anaxilaus did not long retain their power. The tide which set in against tyranny after the death of Hiero was too strong for them to stem. In 461 both Messene and Rhegium succeeded in shaking off their yoke and establishing free constitutions. Of the revolution we have no details, nor do we know what became of the princes: Diodorus tells us that they were driven into exile.²

Like the tyrants of Sicily Anaxilaus was distinguished in the national games. His mules were so famous, that the pen of Simonides was employed to celebrate their achievements, and a car with mules was stamped on the coins of Rhegium. When he was victorious at Olympia he entertained all the Greeks present at a banquet, upon which one was heard inquiring: "What would he have done had he been first with horses?"³

¹ Diod. xi. 66; Herod. vii. 170. In speaking of the departure from Rhegium, Herodotus uses the word *ἐκπεσόν*, which implies a less pacific departure than Diodorus relates; he also mentions "the numerous statues" which Miccythus dedicated at Olympia while at Tegea.

² Diod. xi. 76.

³ Heracl. Pont. 25. The earliest coins of Rhegium are struck on the Aeginetan standard—as is the case with most of the Chalcidic cities—but in type and fabric they are thoroughly Achæan. After the accession of Anaxilaus they become Sicilian in type, fabric, and weight. Head, *l.c.* p. 92.

14. The coast between Sybaris and Tarentum was occupied by the territory of Siris and Metapontum, cities which we know to have been wealthy and flourishing settlements, but of whose history there is little to tell. Both claimed to derive their origin from the Trojan war, and both could produce evidence in support of their claim: at Siris there was a statue of Athena of Ilium, at Metapontum the funeral rites of the Neleids, *i.e.* of Nestor and the Pylians who came with him from Troy, were celebrated. These legends are of course worthless. So far as Strabo could ascertain, the city of Siris was originally a settlement of the native Chonians (Oenotrians), from whom it was taken by a band of fugitive Ionians who had fled from Colophon to escape the tyranny of the Lydians. We know from the poems of Archilochus that the land "by the streams of the Siris" was in his day regarded as a desirable possession for a colonist in search of a home; and Archilochus was a contemporary of Gyges, whose attack on Colophon is mentioned by Herodotus. There is therefore no reason to doubt that the account of Strabo is correct, and we may venture to place the founding of the colony in the first third of the seventh century B.C., some twenty or thirty years after the founding of Tarentum. The fertility of the site was such that the city rapidly became prosperous; and there is ground for supposing that she established some kind of communication with the city of Pyxus on the Tyrrhene sea, thus obtaining a share of the carrying trade which was so profitable to Sybaris, Croton, and Locri. A century after her foundation Siris was still a great city; about 570 B.C. Damasus of Siris came to Sicily as a suitor for the hand of Agariste.¹ But at some period between this date and the destruction of Sybaris (510 B.C.), Siris seems to have aroused the jealousy

Siris and
Metapontum;
legends of
the cities.

Siris a
colony from
Colophon.

Later history
of the city:
attack of
the Achæan
cities.

¹ Strabo, p. 264. For Siris and Pyxus, Head, *Hist. Num.* p. 69. For Damasus, Herod. vi. 127.

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¹ Strabo, p. 264. For Siris and Pyxus, Head, *Hist. Num.* p. 69
For Damasus, Herod. vi. 127.

of her neighbours. She was an Ionian city in the midst of Achaeans; she may have been unwilling to join the league or combination which was formed at that time among the Achaean cities. Whatever the cause, we are informed that Metapontum on the one hand, Sybaris and Croton on the other, joined their forces against the city, forced her into the Achaean league, or expelled the inhabitants. The site was

Desolation of the Siritis. apparently left desolate or only imperfectly populated, for in 480 B.C. Themistocles could declare that an oracle had bidden the Athenians colonise the region. Forty years later the possession of the territory was disputed by Thurii and Tarentum.¹

Metapontum was an outpost of the Achaean colonies, intended to protect them from the aggression of the Tarentines. In the account of Antiochus, the Sicilian historian, which Strabo has preserved, Metapontum, a colony of Sybaris,

the colony was planted at a time when Siris had not yet been occupied by the Ionians, for the Sybarites, who sent out the settlers, had the choice of Siris and Metapontum, and decided to take the latter that it might not be appropriated by Tarentum. Of the history of the city we know very little; the coins exhibit the peculiar fabric of the Achaean coinage, and the type is an ear of corn, a symbol of the fertility of the land, which was also attested by the "golden harvest," dedicated by the Metapontines at

a chosen home of the Pythagoreans. Delphi. Metapontum was a chosen resort of the Pythagoreans; it was there that Pythagoras himself found refuge when he retired from Croton. And as the Metapontines were called in to settle the disputes which followed the fall of the Pythagoreans, we may suppose that these disorders did not extend to that city.²

¹ Justin., xx. 2. 10 ff., who tells us of the attack on Siris, says that the inhabitants were expelled, but to judge from the coins of Siris, which have been preserved, the city was for a time in close connection or dependence on Sybaris. Head, *l.c.* For Themistocles, Herod. viii. 62. See Lenormant, *La Grande Grèce*, i. 203 ff.

² Iambl. V.P. 170, 249, 256, 262; Strabo, p. 264, 265. Leucippus

Of the remaining colonies or dependencies of the Achaeans in Italy little can be said. We are informed by Herodotus that after the destruction of the parent city the surviving Sybarites withdrew to Laus and Scidrus. Of Scidrus this is the only fact recorded, and the very site of the city is uncertain. Of Laus some coins remain, the types of which testify to the close connection of the city with Sybaris. Of Poseidonia, also, or Paestum, there is little to record beyond the types and standards of the coins. Though a colony of Sybaris we find Doric forms on the Poseidonian coins, which have been explained by the presence in the city of those Troezenians whom the Sybarites expelled; the standard, also, of the earliest coins is not that of the Achaean cities. These facts may perhaps indicate that Poseidonia owed her origin to some faction at Sybaris, and that she stood in a less intimate relation to the mother-city than the rest of the colonies.¹

Scidrus,
Laus,
Poseidonia.

15. There remains the colony of Tarentum. This was the one truly Dorian colony in Italy, though, of course, there were Dorian elements at Poseidonia and Rhegium, and it was Dorian of the Dorian —a colony from Sparta. The circumstances which led to the founding of the city have been related (vol. i. 268, 347); the date given by Jerome, 708 B.C., is not inconsistent with the circumstances and may be correct; it is also in harmony with the assertion of Strabo that the Achaeans were settled in Italy before the arrival of Phalanthus, the founder of Tarentum.

Tarentum.

was the founder of Metapontum. Eusebius puts the colony in 774 B.C., which is quite inconsistent with the account of Antiochus quoted by Strabo. See Smith's *Dict. of Geogr.* sub voce. On the worship of Apollo at Metapontum, see Herod. iv. 15.

¹ For the coins of Poseidonia see Head, *l.c.* p. 67. Poseidonia and Laus were in the highway of the advance of the Lucanians; the first was reduced to dependence, the second destroyed, soon after the end of the fourth century. Once in every year the Poseidonians kept a solemn day of lamentation, on which to wail over their lost liberty. For Laus and Scidrus, see Herod. vi. 21.

The site selected for the colony was the best in southern Italy. It is true that the territory about Tarentum is not so fertile as the land about Siris and Metapontum, for owing to the absorption of the water in the soft stone, the whole district suffers from drought. But the soil is peculiarly adapted for olives, and the wool of the sheep which fed on the pastures by the Galaesus was of a very superior quality. The bay adjacent to the town—the Mare Piccolo of modern times—abounded in edible shell-fish and in the murex which provided the purple dye of antiquity. Above all, it formed a harbour by far the best, not only in the gulf, but along the entire stretch of coast from Brindisi to Naples. Here alone was there a land-locked bay capable of sheltering a fleet in safety. Enjoying these advantages, it was inevitable that Tarentum should become a great emporium. It was in this city that Arion, about the beginning of the sixth century, found a ship in which to return to Greece; and in the reign of Darius there appears to have been pretty constant communication between Tarentum and Cnidus.¹

The town lay on the small island which lies across and nearly closes the mouth of the inlet of the Mare Piccolo. Of the early fortunes of the new settlers various accounts are given. Pausanias speaks of a great native city as already in existence before the arrival of Phalanthus, and which he had much difficulty in capturing.² Strabo informs us, on the authority of Antiochus, that Phalanthus and his companions were guided by the Delphian oracle to the rich land of Taras, where they were received by the barbarian natives and the Cretan colonists who had settled in Iapygia on their return from

¹ See the story of Gillus; Herod. iii. 138. The friendship between these cities is explained by the fact that Cnidus was a colony from Lacedaemon, *ib.* i. 174.

² Paus. x. 10. 6 f. Phalanthus was told by the oracle that he would not capture the city till he felt rain out of a clear sky (*ἐξ αἰθρας*); the prediction was fulfilled by the tears of his wife Aethra!

Sicily; and again, on the authority of Ephorus, that Phalanthus found the Achaeans at war with the barbarians, joined in the fray, and founded Tarentum. In a third account Strabo asserts that at the time of the arrival of Phalanthus in Italy the Cretans had already left Brentesium (Brundisium), which was then under a monarchy. In the contests with the Lacedaemonians the city lost much territory, but nevertheless when Phalanthus was expelled from Tarentum, he was welcomed at Brentesium, where he died, and received a splendid funeral. The conclusion seems to be that the Tarentines, finding it impossible to advance in the direction of Metapontum, endeavoured, not without success, to extend their borders into Iapygia,¹ and even acquired for a time possession of Brentesium.

In early times the constitution of the city was probably monarchical. At any rate we hear of a king of Tarentum in the time of Darius, and as we know that the colonists preserved in their new home many memories of their old one—they loved to call the Galaesus the Eurotas; there was a Temenid gate in the city, and a tomb of Hyacinthus beyond the walls—it is likely enough that they should preserve some trace of the monarchy which prevailed in the Dorian cities of the Peloponnesus.² Between the reign of Darius and the defeat of the Tarentines by the Iapygians, the monarchy became modified into a *politeia*—a constitution which was free, but not as yet democratic. In a passage of the *Politics* Aristotle quotes Tarentum as an instance of a city in which the notables behaved wisely and moderately towards the demos, and though unfortunately he has left it uncertain to what period of Tarentine history he is referring, it is pretty

¹ Strabo, p. 280, 281. Herodotus is of opinion that the Cretans remained and became Iapygians.

² Though a Dorian city Tarentum adopted the form of coinage struck by the Achaean cities, and there is no reason to doubt that a Pythagorean society existed in the city in the fifth century as it certainly did at a later time, under Archytas.

clear that he is describing the constitution as it was before the democracy of his own day. At this time the rich gave their wealth freely to the poor, thus winning ready obedience, and the offices of the city were divided into two classes, one of which was assigned by sortition, the other by selection. By this arrangement the people were allowed to share in office—through the lot—while the constitution was kept in order by the selection of the higher magistrates.¹

The conflicts between the colonists and the natives which began with the founding of the city no doubt went on in the centuries which followed. An account has been preserved of the destruction of the Iapygian town of Carbina, at which the Tarentines treated the captive women with such indescribable barbarity that they were thought to have brought down upon themselves the vengeance of heaven.² We also hear of offerings sent by the Tarentines to Delphi in the early part of the fifth century, in commemoration of victories over their neighbours: horses and Messapian women in bronze, which were wrought by Ageladas of Argos; and a work of Onatas of Sicyon, which exhibited the death of Opis, an Iapygian king.

In 473 B.C. occurred the defeat of the Tarentines and Rhegians by the Iapygians (*supra*, p. 499), a defeat the most bloody of any that had befallen the Greeks to the days of Herodotus. The immediate consequence of this disaster, which seems to have fallen chiefly on the nobles, was a change of the constitution—perhaps already modified by the removal of the king. In the words of Aristotle the *politeia* became a democracy—*i.e.* the power passed into the hands of the whole people, without any high qualification for

Conflicts
between the
Tarentines
and the
natives.

Changes in the
constitution of
the city the
politeia
becomes a
democracy.

¹ Arist. *Pol.* vi. 5=1320 b 10 f.

² Pausan. x. 10. 6; 13. 10. Ageladas and Onatas flourished in the early part of the fifth century. The precise date of the victories is uncertain; they may have been subsequent to the great defeat of the Tarentines. For Carbina, Clearchus, *Frag.* 9 M.

citizenship; he compares the change with that which took place at Argos after the great defeat of the Hebdome.¹ The fishermen of the city were now the ruling power; and in later times they became notorious as a reckless, idle, pleasure-loving rabble, who, like the Athenians of the fourth century, cared for little but their own enjoyment, and hired mercenaries to fight their battles.²

By the middle of the fifth century Tarentum had outstripped her Achaean rivals. At the time of her greatest power she was able to put 3000 horse and 30,000 men in the field. Though she felt, like the rest of the Greeks in Italy, the advance of the Lucanians to the south, she held her own against them, and remained the greatest of the cities of Magna Graecia.

16. It is a remarkable fact in the history of Greek colonies that the exploration of the extreme west of the Mediterranean was not undertaken either by the adventurers who settled at Cyme, or by the powerful cities of Sicily. A century or more elapsed from the foundation of Syracuse before any Greek vessel was seen on the coast of Spain or Liguria, and when the new beginning was made, it was not made by any of the colonies, Chalcidian, Dorian, or Rhodian, which had taken part in the discovery of the West. It was the Phocaeans of Ionia, Herodotus tells us, who first made the Greeks acquainted with the Hadriatic, with Tyrrenia, Iberia (Spain), and Tartessus (the region round Cadiz).³

The first impulse to these distant voyages arose from a mere accident. At the time of the foundation of Cyrene, about the year 630 B.C., a Greek of Samos, by name Colaeus, when on his way to Egypt, was carried by contrary winds beyond the pillars of Heracles to Tartessus. There he found a virgin market, from which he

¹ Arist. *Pol.* v. 3 = 1303 a 3 ff., ἐν Τάραντι ἡττηθέντων καὶ ἀπολομένων πολλῶν γυναικῶν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἰαπύγων μικρὸν ὕστερον τῶν Μηδικῶν δημοκρατία ἐγένετο ἐκ πολιτείας.

² Arist. *Pol.* iv. 4 = 1291 b 22; Strabo, 280.

³ Herod. i. 163.

returned to realise a profit of 60 talents (£12,000), an amount only surpassed by the gains of Sostratus of Aegina, who was the premier of Greek merchants.¹ But this was the beginning and the end of Samian trade to the West; why they left it to the Phocaeans to enter into the riches which they had discovered, we cannot say, but within thirty years of this date, the enterprising Ionian town sent out a colony to Massilia near the mouth of the Rhone, in the district known as Liguria.²

A pretty story is told of the origin of the city. Euxenus, a Phocaean, happened to land at the moment when Nanus, the Ligurian chief—with whom he was already on terms of friendship—was holding a festival, in order to dispose of the hand of his daughter. It was a Ligurian custom that the maiden whose marriage was intended should enter the hall after the banquet with a cup of wine, and to whomsoever she gave it, he was her husband. On this occasion the girl, whose name was Petta, gave the cup to Euxenus. Her father approved the choice, which he thought to be divinely guided, and gladly gave his daughter to the Phocaean. In this manner Euxenus became domiciled at Massilia, and by his wife, whom he re-named Aristoxene, he had a son, Protus, who was the ancestor of the Protiadae, the foremost family at Massilia.³

The territory round the city, though admirably suited for the growth of the olive and vine, was too rugged and bare for corn, but the situation of the city amply compensated for any deficiency in the fertility of the soil. The mouth of the Rhone was the point where all the routes met which traversed France from the English Channel to the Gulf of Genoa. Of these Strabo specifies three. Merchandise was carried by

The founding
of Massilia.
600 B.C.

Story of
Euxenus.

Site of
Massilia: trade
routes across
France.

¹ Herod. iv. 152.

² Scymnus Chius puts the founding of Marseilles 120 years before the battle of Salamis (l. 213).

³ Aristot. *Frag.* 549 R. The story is also told with some variations by Justin, xliii. 3. 8 ff.

boats up the Rhone and Saône, from which it was transferred to the Seine, and so passed down the river; or it was taken by land from Marseilles (or Narbo) to the Loire; or again carried up the Aude and transported thence to the Garonne. By one or other of these routes, the wares collected by the Gaulish merchants—more especially the tin, which they imported from Britain—was brought into the Greek market, if indeed it was not carried on pack-horses straight across the narrowest part of the country.¹ The importance of these lines of transit at a time when the western Mediterranean was held by the Carthaginians, and the northern Hadriatic by the Tyrrhenians, can hardly be over-estimated. The colonists extended their borders by degrees, though not without severe contests with the Ligurians and Tyrrhenians by sea and land. New cities were founded to serve as outposts against the enemy: Agatha in the direction of the barbarians of the Rhone; Olbia, Antipolis, and Nicaea in the direction of the Salyans and Ligurians of the Alps. They also spread themselves down the coast of Spain, where Hemeroscopeion—famous for a temple of Artemis—was the most important of their settlements. Even in the middle of the sixth century an independent body of Phocaeans had ventured as far as Tartessus, beyond the Pillars of Heracles, the El Dorado of the ancient trader. Here they were hospitably received by Arganthonius, the king of the country, who would gladly have seen them established in his land, and when they refused to remain, he gave them money to build a wall round Phocaea in order to protect it from the Persians, who were now threatening the liberties of the Greeks in Asia.²

Of the constitution of Massilia in the period immediately following the foundation of the city it is difficult to say anything definite. In his *Politics* Aristotle twice mentions the city; and the two notices seem to be contradictory of each other. He tells us that

Colonies of
the Massiliots.

Phocaeans at
Tartessus.

Constitution
of the city.

¹ Strabo, p. 182 (cf. 178); Diod. v. 22; cf. Strabo, 147.

² Herod. i. 163.

Massilia was a close oligarchy, in which many of the wealthy were excluded from office, an exclusiveness which naturally led to agitation and reform, ending in the establishment of a form of government which, though still oligarchical, was more liberal.¹ In the second, he commends the Massiliots for the liberality with which they elected to office those who were worthy of it, whether they enjoyed the franchise or not.² In what relation these two statements stand to each other, we cannot now determine, but it is probable that the history of the Massilian constitution is the history of an oligarchy which became less exclusive as time went on. Yet Strabo, speaking of his own day, describes it as still aristocratical. There was a council of Six Hundred who were called Timuchi, and elected for life. In the council were fifteen Presidents who formed the executive, and transacted the current business; of the fifteen, three had especial powers, and of the three, one was elected as chief of the whole; but in what way the election of the fifteen, the three, and the one was made, Strabo does not inform us, nor upon what tenure these offices were held. No one was allowed to be a Timuchus

The laws of
Massilia.

whose family had not been citizens for three generations, and who was without children. The laws of the city, which are described as "Ionic," were set up in a public place where all could see them. Of their nature we know little beyond the fact that they are commended. One or two regulations show a sort of resemblance to the sumptuary rules introduced at Athens by Solon. A hundred gold pieces was the limit of a dowry—at least in Strabo's time; and not more than five could be spent on clothes or gold ornaments.³

17. Of the city of Elea (Velia) which was planted about half-way between Poseidonia and Pyxus there is little to relate. It was a colony of the Phocaeans, who, when driven

¹ Pol. v. 6=1305 b 4.

² Pol. vi. 7=1321 α 20 κρίσιν ποιουμένους τῶν ἀξίων ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι καὶ τῶν ἕξωθεν.

³ Strabo, p. 179, 180.

from their city by Harpagus, sailed away to the West in search of a new home. They shaped their course to Massilia, and from thence to Alalia in Corsica where their countrymen had founded a colony twenty years previously. After some years in which they occupied themselves with a plundering pirate life, they were attacked by a combined force of Carthaginians and Tyrrhenians, and though victorious, they suffered so severely that they could not remain at Alalia. Part returned to Massilia; the rest, terrified perhaps by the ferocity of the Tyrrhenians who stoned all their prisoners to death, sailed to Rhegium, and from thence returned to colonise the site of Velia (Elea), which is said to have been pointed out to them by an inhabitant of Poseidonia.¹

Elea or Velia.

The territory in which the colony was planted was so unproductive, that the colonists were thrown upon the sea for support; we hear especially of establishments for the curing of fish. Elea thus escaped the temptations, if it did not enjoy the advantages, of other Greek settlements in Italy. Though it never became a great city, it prospered, and was the nurse of famous men. The Eleans held their own, not only against the attacks of the neighbouring city of Poseidonia, but also in the far more deadly strife which they, in common with the other Italiots, had to wage against the Lucanians. But Elea will always be known in history as the home of Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Zeno—the great founders of the school of Eleatic philosophy. Of these Xenophanes was an immigrant from Colophon, who seems to have come to Elea about the end of the sixth century, after many years of restless wandering through Greece and Sicily. Parmenides was a pupil of Xenophanes; Zeno was a pupil of Parmenides. Of the first we are told that he gave the Eleans a code of laws; of the second, that he perished at the hands of a tyrant named Nearchus or Diomedon, and though the

Elea a maritime city: but famous for the Eleatic school of philosophers.

¹ Herod. i. 164; see vol. i. p. 348; *supra*, p. 435.

details of the story are improbable, we need not doubt that Zeno would be found on the side of freedom. To the influence of these great men the excellence of the constitution of Elea was due; and far as their philosophy seemed to carry them from practical life, it was through them that Elea was preserved when so many cities perished.¹

Parmenides and Zeno may be left to the historian of Greek philosophy, for though they took a part in the politics of their city, as we have said, they were philosophers rather than politicians, and devoted to abstruse and curious speculation. It is otherwise with Xenophanes. Philosopher indeed he was, and founder of a famous sect, but he was something more: a man of the world, a wanderer through the cities of Greece, who had seen life from many sides, and "knew the minds of many;" above all, an outspoken critic of beliefs and institutions. To describe him at his worst, he was an Irreconcilable, whose tongue was against every one and everything; to describe him at his best, he was unwearied in his search after truth, and fearless in expressing his opinion. On the one hand he approaches Empedocles, and on the other Archilochus. Like Empedocles he wrote an epic poem in which he put forth his views on the universe and the deity, and on human knowledge; like Archilochus, he made his verses a medium for the expression of personal feeling. In his physical speculations it does not appear that he framed any definite system, but he led the way in discarding the principle of change, which had hitherto, in one form or another, governed Greek philosophy. Aristotle thought him wanting in refinement and clearness: "from the pattern of the universe he inferred that the One was god." He insisted that the universe was one, was god, was without beginning or end, or change or division, but he seems to have failed in reconciling this abstract unity with the visible and tangible variety of life and nature.²

Xenophanes:
his character.

His philo-
sophy: the
principle of
unity.

¹ Strabo, p. 252. Diogen. Laert. ix. 3; *ib.* ix. 5.

² Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Phil.* 7th ed. p. 78; Grote's *Plato*, i. 18.

When we turn from his philosophical to his elegiac poems we seem to be reading the works of a different author. The longest fragment is a description of a banquet.

In this there is nothing vague, or obscure. His elegiac poems: on a banquet.

In language that is vivid, because it comes from the heart, he tells of the hall gleaming with goblets, the floor newly swept. The guests are there with garlands on their heads; delicious ointment is passed round on salvers; before them is the cup of kindness; in the midst frankincense sends up a pure odour; there is water at hand, cool and sweet and clear. Wine is abundant, mellow and fragrant, a store that will never give out. The table is loaded with brown loaves, and cheese, and honey; the altar is hidden with flowers; throughout the house is joy and jollity. Then after hymn sung, and libation poured, and prayer uttered, you may drink as much as you can carry home without assistance, unless you are very old. And for conversation, praise him who speaks wisely over his wine, and tells of valorous deeds—not of Titans, and giants, and centaurs, and their furious conflicts, the fictions of a bygone age.

In another fragment we have a picture of the Colophonians as they were in the days when they had learned luxury from the Lydians, but were not yet the slaves of a tyrant. They went to the assembly in purple attire, not less than 1000 in number,

His description of the Colophonians.

their hair carefully dressed, and drenched with rare perfumes. In another, already quoted (p. 488) Xenophanes laughs at the migration of souls, the favourite tenet of his contemporary Pythagoras. In another he satirises the honours given to the winners at athletic games. If a man gains

the prize in any of the contests at Olympia —racing, the pentathlon, wrestling, boxing, horse-racing, and the pancratium are enumerated—he receives all kinds of

His contempt of athletes.

Arist. *Metaph.* i. 5=986 b 21 Ξενοφάνης . . . οὐδὲν διεσαφῆνισεν . . . ἀλλ' εἰς τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν ἀποβλέψας τὸ ἐν εἶναί φησι τὸν θεόν.

distinctions, and yet is he not so deserving a man as Xenophanes claims to be. Wisdom is better than strength; an athlete contributes nothing to his city, which is not the better governed owing to his victories. It is not such conquests that make a city to prosper.¹

More outspoken still are his criticisms on the current religious beliefs of his time. He cannot away with the notion

His criticism
of religious
beliefs.

that gods have a human shape. That is but a foolish fancy; if horses or oxen had a god, they would represent him as a horse or an ox, even as the deity of an Ethiopian is black. In a word, men make gods in their own image for want of better knowledge. And not only so, but they attribute to them human vices as well as human forms. Homer and Hesiod have ascribed to the gods everything that is held disgraceful and wicked on earth: adultery, theft, and treachery.² In these vigorous criticisms Xenophanes breaks entirely with the opinions current in his time. Hitherto men had looked on Homer and Hesiod as exponents of the divine nature, but now they were called upon to compare the ideals which they had taken on trust with the facts and opinions of daily life. It was the dawn of the age of criticism; the awakening of the spirit which denies.


¹ Xenoph. *Frag.* 1, 3, 2.

² Ritter and Preller, *l.c.* p. 77.


APPENDIX I.

PEDIGREES.

A.—THE PHILAIIDAE, 550-450 B.C.



B.—THE ALCMAEONIDAE, 600-450 B.C.



It is uncertain whether Megacles III. or Megacles IV. was the winner with a four-horse chariot, whom Pindar celebrates in *Pythia* vii. That Megacles III. was twice ostracised is stated by Andocides, iv. 34, Lysias, xiv. 39; but the same thing is asserted of Alcibiades I., the paternal grandfather of Alcibiades.

¹ Cypselus and Stesagoras married the same woman.

APPENDIX II.

ON THE AUTHORITIES FOR GREEK HISTORY FROM 478-433 B.C.

WITH the siege of Sestos Herodotus brings his history to a close. For the next forty-five years we have nothing to guide us in our narrative but the meagre and obscure summary of Thucydides—a summary imperfect as a record of facts, and without definite dates; the untrustworthy compilation of Diodorus, a third-hand writer whose authorities were mainly the rhetorical historians of the fourth century B.C.; and the biographies of Plutarch (second century A.D.), which are written from a literary rather than a historical point of view. To these we may add what we can glean from the poetical literature of the period—but, unfortunately, we have only a few fragments of the comic and lyric poets; and from the inscriptions, which are always mutilated and often of uncertain date. From Thucydides we know that Hellanicus had written an account of the period between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, and in Plutarch we find quotations from Ion of Chios, and Stesimbrotus of Thasos, who were contemporaries of Cimon and Pericles; the historian Cratippus, a contemporary of Thucydides, is also said to have collected the facts omitted by that author (Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 16. 2). But Thucydides himself condemns the work of Hellanicus as inadequate and inaccurate; Ion and Stesimbrotus are merely writers of anecdotes and recollections, who sometimes contradict each other, and rarely preserve anything of historical importance; from Cratippus no fact of history is quoted except the incredible statement that the Hermæ were mutilated by the envoys from Leontini and Segesta.¹ We cannot certainly affirm that no other historian existed in the fifth century, but if any did, we do not know who they were. The authorities commonly quoted for this period of history are Ephorus

¹ Even this is probably not from Cratippus; see Müller, *F.H.G.* ii. 75.

and Theopompus (the scholars of Isocrates), Aristotle, and Philochorus, and the writers of the fourth and third centuries B.C., between whom and the events of 478-433 there is an interval of about a hundred years.

The attempt is often made with great learning and ingenuity to determine the extent to which Diodorus and Plutarch follow Ephorus and Theopompus; but even if the attempt were more successful than it is ever likely to be, what is gained? We do not know from whom Ephorus and Theopompus drew. We have got back to the Fourth Century, but we cannot get back further. These historians might have quoted public documents, but that was not their manner; they relied, doubtless, on literary or oral sources, and on their own ability! Their works having perished, we can form but a vague and uncertain judgment about them. If, however, we suppose that they are fairly reproduced in Diodorus and Plutarch, we get the following results:—

- (1) They sometimes give us facts of which there is no mention whatever in Herodotus or Thucydides—such as the voyage of Pericles into the Pontus.
- (2) They give meagre and abbreviated accounts of events related at greater length in the older authors, as, for instance, of the battle of Plataea.
- (3) They add absurd and impossible details, for the sake of rhetorical effect: a striking instance of this tendency will be found in the account given by Diodorus of the battle of Thermopylae and in the story quoted by Plutarch from Phantias about the bribing of Architeles at Artemisium.
- (4) They give a clearer account where the older writers are confused, as in Diodorus's account of the battle of Salamis; or they supply names which are omitted by earlier authors, *e.g.* Plutarch can give the name of the man who took the money for the Euboeans to Themistocles; of the proposer of the decree of the Troezenians to support the children of the Athenians; of the captain of the Tenian ship at Salamis (Plut. *Them.* 7, 10, 12).
- (5) We also observe that as a rule they are full in their accounts of the periods covered by the histories of Herodotus and Thucydides, and meagre or confused in the intervals where these authors fail us—at any rate in regard to the history of Greece, for the history of Sicily is a different matter.

From this we may conclude that though Ephorus and Theopompus were in possession of some independent sources, from which they took details and incidents which they could not find in Herodotus or Thucydides, these sources were of little value in regard to the events which were mentioned by those authors; and what they added was not of much importance. Of the manner in which Ephorus and his contemporaries used their authorities we can only form a doubtful opinion: as we

have said, they are often very inferior to the older writers when we can compare the two, but sometimes they are clearer. It is, however, obvious that they may be quite as unhistorical when they are clear as when they are confused or rhetorical. The more we are acquainted with them, the more we learn to distrust them; and as a necessary result, we feel that whenever we record events on the authority of Diodorus and Plutarch, unsupported by Herodotus and Thucydides, we are building on a foundation of very little security. (The case is, of course, altered when we come to a period contemporary with Ephorus and Theopompus, i.e. to the second half of the fourth century.¹)

A special place must be reserved for the newly-discovered treatise of Aristotle, *The Constitution of Athens*. It is of course out of the question to discuss here the genuineness or the historical value of this work, but a few observations may nevertheless be made. While putting us in possession of more facts concerning the constitutional history of Athens than have been known hitherto, this treatise presents very great difficulties, both critical and historical. 1. It appears to be almost demonstrable that the treatise which we possess was not known in its present state to Plutarch, who nevertheless counts Aristotle among his authorities, and quotes from this very work. The most crucial passage is chapter 25 of the treatise: the now famous account of the part which Themistocles played in the overthrow of the Areopagus. At the end of the chapter we are informed by Aristotle that Ephialtes was murdered by Aristodicus of Tanagra—a fact which Plutarch quotes on the authority of Aristotle—a fact too which Aristotle seems to have been the first to discover, for the orator Antiphon asserts that the murderer of Ephialtes was unknown. It is in the sentence immediately preceding this statement that Aristotle closes his account of Themistocles's attack on the Areopagus, an account apparently quite unknown to Plutarch. We can only reconcile Plutarch's ignorance of the one fact with his knowledge of the other by supposing that his "Aristotle" did not contain the account of Themistocles, for it is very unlikely that he passed it over as unworthy, not of credit only, but of mention. Similar discrepancies seem to make it doubtful whether the present treatise was known to the author of Aristotle's *Politics*, book ii. ch. 12, or to Harpocration (see Kenyon's ed., pp. 17, 70).

¹ It is but just to quote the words of Strabo, p. 422; (Ephorus) $\delta\tau\acute{o}\tau\epsilon\ \pi\lambda\epsilon\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\omicron\nu\ \pi\rho\sigma\chi\rho\acute{\omega}\mu\epsilon\theta\alpha\ \delta\iota\alpha\ \tau\eta\nu\ \pi\epsilon\rho\iota\ \tau\alpha\upsilon\tau\alpha\ \epsilon\pi\iota\mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota\alpha\nu,\ \kappa\alpha\theta\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\rho\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \Pi\omicron\lambda\upsilon\beta\iota\omicron\varsigma\ \mu\alpha\rho\tau\upsilon\rho\omega\nu\ \tau\upsilon\gamma\chi\acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\iota,\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\eta\rho\ \acute{\alpha}\xi\iota\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma.$ Unfortunately the criticism of Polybius on Ephorus is lost, but cf. xii. 25, g.

2. The treatise is at times inconsistent with the narrative of Thucydides, a far better authority for the events of the fifth century and for early Athenian history than Aristotle could possibly be.

3. The dates with which the treatise bristles are sometimes inconsistent with each other and with what we know from other sources.

4. The total separation of the internal from the external history shows that the author had no conception of the influence exercised by the one on the other. Not a word, for instance, is said of the expedition of Cimon to Ithome, which had such important consequences for Athens and Sparta. Alcibiades is never mentioned.

The result is that we must receive the new information with caution, and far from looking on it as superseding our older authorities, we must remember that much in it may not be the work of Aristotle or of Aristotle's time ; and even if it were both, we have still the old enigma : On what basis did a writer in the second half of the Fourth Century make statements about the early history of Athens ?¹

I do not enter on the chronology of the period. One fact makes clear the nature of it : every writer on the subject differs from the rest, and each believes that he is right ! Krüger, Schaefer, Pierson, Clinton, Curtius, Duncker, Busolt, Unger have their systems, built up on slight indications and more or less ingenious combinations—but rarely in agreement. Numerous dates of the internal history of Athens are given in the *Constitution of Athens*, but on what authority we do not know ; in foreign affairs the summary of Thucydides is the best guide for the order of events ; the dates of Diodorus must often be taken in lieu of better, but they are of little value.

¹ Holm, *Gesch. Griech.* ii. p. 116 ff.

APPENDIX III.

ON THE SO-CALLED QUOTA-LISTS.

As these lists are important evidence of the extent of the league, and the amount paid by the cities, a few details concerning the inscriptions will not be out of place.

1. The lists of the first fifteen years of the "office" (454-440 B.C.) were engraved on the four sides of an oblong stone. The first six years, 454-447, were engraved on the face, each year under the other; all being divided into five vertical columns running from top to bottom of the stone, but broken by the headings of the years, which extended completely across the stone, and were written in larger letters than the names of the cities. In the first year the amount of the quota paid by each city was written *after* the name of the city; in all the other years it was written *before* it. The lists of the seventh and eighth years (448-447) were engraved on the right end of the stone, one over the other; the seventh year was written in three columns, of which the third was not completely filled; the eighth in two columns. The years from the ninth to the thirteenth (446-442) were written on the back of the stone; the remaining two years (441-440) on the left side. The rest of the inscriptions were written on similar stones but smaller, or on slabs.

2. The headings prefixed to the lists of the first and the seventh year were longer than those between them; thus the heading of the first year occupies three lines on the stone; the headings of years 2-6 occupy one line each. In the first heading we find traces of the words Hellenotamiae, Triakonta (thirty), and archon. In the third, fourth, and fifth heading we see clearly that the years of the "office" (*ἀρχή*) were numbered consecutively from the first year, and that the name of the scribe was recorded; e.g. *ἐπὶ τῆς τρίτης ἀρχῆς, ἡ Διότριμος ἐγραμμάρει τοῖς τριάκοντα*, is the heading of the third year. In later years the headings were more full; e.g. in the fifteenth year, Ol. 85. 1 = 440 B.C., we have "In the fifteenth year, in which Sostratos

of Hybas was scribe, Aeschylus of Eleusis was Hellenotamias," etc. In No. 34 (*C. I. A. i.* 260) we have the council, and scribe of the council, the archon (Aristion), the whole of the ten Hellenotamiae, and the scribe of the office, and the heading concludes "in the thirty-fourth office, the Thirty scheduled (*ἀπέφηναν*) the first-fruits to the goddess, a mina in the talent."

3. What was the precise nature of the office is not made clear. The "Thirty" are no doubt the thirty Logistae, whom we find in other financial inscriptions (*e.g. C. I. A. i.* 32, 273), but we cannot affirm that they were now instituted for the first time. It is also certain that the Hellenotamiae were not elected for the first time in 454 B.C. more than twenty-one years after the foundation of the league. The "office" therefore seems to be no more than a special function of the Thirty, who were now for the first time charged with the duty of checking or verifying, and setting up a record of the payments made by the Hellenotamiae to the treasury of Athena.

4. We may notice that the office is established in the third year of the Olympiad. As this was the year of the great Panathenaea, it is a reasonable conclusion that the year was purposely chosen because the recurrence of the festival marked off definite periods in Athenian finance. We also find in the treatise (so-called) of Xenophon, on the Athenian state, an assertion that the assessment of the tribute was revised every four years (*De Rep. Athen.* iii. 5, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον εἴρηται πλὴν αἱ τάξεις τοῦ φόρου· τοῦτο δὲ γίγνεται ὡς τὰ πολλὰ δι' ἔτους πεμπτοῦ), a statement which would agree with revision at the end of a Panathenaic period. In the inscriptions we also find instances in which amounts, which have remained unchanged in the first four years, were changed in the second four.

5. The total number of the cities mentioned in inscriptions as belonging to the league is 275, of which 31 are found in the *τάξεις φόρου* only (*C. I. A. i.* 37). The highest amount of tribute paid by any one city is 30 t. = £6000 paid by Aegina; Byzantium paid 15-21 t.; Lampsacus paid 12 t.; Chalcedon 9 t.; Cyzicus 9 t.; the three cities of Rhodes about 24 t.; Miletus 10 t., etc. When we remember that a ship of war cost a talent a month for every month of service, besides the cost of the ship and the wear and tear, we cannot say that these sums are heavy. Many a trierarch at Athens paid out of his own pocket more than was demanded from a subject city. But we do not know that these lists enable us to determine the whole sum paid.

6. The names in the lists were not at first arranged in any geographical order. In the sixth and eighth lists the cities are falling into geographical divisions, but it is not till the twelfth list, 443 B.C.,

that the league is divided into five definite districts, each with a separate heading. These are the Ionian, Hellespontian, Thracian, Carian, and Island districts. In 436 the Carian district was united with the Ionian.

7. We find indications of a change in payments, exclusive of the raising or lowering of the tribute at the end of the Panathenaic period. In some cases towns which pay separately are united; thus, to take examples from the first eight years, the Milesians in the first year appear in two divisions; the Milesians from Leros paying 3 t., the Milesians in Teichiussa paying an unknown sum; but in the fifth year the Milesians pay 10 t. in one body. In the first year Olynthus seems to be in some kind of union with the Scablaeans and Asseritæ; in the fourth year this union is dissolved. In the fifth year the four colonies of the Erythraeans pay separately; in the sixth they seem to pay in one sum; in the eighth each pays separately. In the third year Lemnos pays 9 t.; after this we hear no more of Lemnos, and the two cities of the island, Myrrhina and Hephaestia, pay separately.

8. In the fifth, sixth, and eighth lists a number of cities appear more than once, and some have a payment written after their names as well as before. These repetitions and additional payments are supposed to be arrears and the interest upon them, but, of course, this is no more than a conjecture. In other lists we have additional payments with the word *ἐπιφορὰς* written after them, implying that some additional payments were made. This addition appears for the first time in some of the Ionian and Hellespontian cities in the year 440 B.C., List 15, C. I. A. i. 240.

9. Lastly, we find in addition to the cities arranged in the districts some which come under peculiar headings: (a) Cities *αὐτὰί φόρον ταξάμεναι*; (b) Cities *ὡς οἱ ἰδιῶται φόρον ἐνέγραψαν φέρειν*. Both these notices occur for the first time in the eighteenth list, 437 B.C., C. I. A. i. 243. Other cities, in isolated instances, are called *ἀτακτοί*. Our ignorance of the details of the league does not allow us to give any satisfactory explanation of these entries.

On the subject see Köhler, *Urkunden und Untersuchungen*, etc.; *Abh. Berl. Akad.* 1869; Boeckh, *Staatshaushaltung*, 3d ed.; Busolt, *Philol.* xli. 652; P. Giraud, *Sur la Condition des Alliés pendant la Première Confédération Athénienne*, Paris, 1883, a very excellent summary; A. Fraenkel, *De Condicione*, etc., *Sociorum Atheniensium*, Ros-toch., 1878; Loeschke, *Quæst. de titulis aliquot Atticis*; Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.* ii. sec. 16; also Jowett, *Thucydides*, ii. Introduction.

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